- 18 8月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Justin Blanchard 提交于
Add a dozen more const declarations where appropriate. These are from Justin; while adding his patch, I noticed ASN1_BIT_STRING_check could be fixed, too. Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 07 8月, 2014 7 次提交
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice. Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that |frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam Langley. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that *ok was zero. I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses |s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can see. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call |dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the return value, leaking the fragment. This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer. Fixes CVE-2014-3507 Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of |msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB (for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS connection. In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no check was applied. Fixes CVE-2014-3506 Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a |pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double freed. Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct). Fixes CVE-2014-3505 Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 10 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
PR#3394
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- 05 6月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (cherry picked from commit 1632ef744872edc2aa2a53d487d3e79c965a4ad3)
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (cherry picked from commit d3152655d5319ce883c8e3ac4b99f8de4c59d846)
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- 02 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Sami Farin 提交于
PR#3302
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- 08 4月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) (cherry picked from commit 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3)
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- 21 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450. (cherry picked from commit 34628967f1e65dc8f34e000f0f5518e21afbfc7b)
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- 28 3月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Port TLS 1.2 GCM code to DTLS. Enable use of TLS 1.2 only ciphers when in DTLS 1.2 mode too.
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- 26 3月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Since this is always called from DTLS code it is safe to assume the header length should be the DTLS value. This avoids the need to check the version number and should work with any version of DTLS (not just 1.0).
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- 18 3月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code. Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like this: some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH; ... Record creation stuff ... set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len); ... write_handshake_message(ssl); Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or in some cases has very minor differences. By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the code can cope with both cases. Note: although this passes "make test" and some simple DTLS tests there may be some minor differences in the DTLS code that have to be accounted for.
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由 Michael Tuexen 提交于
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- 06 3月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reduce MTU after failed transmissions.
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- 28 2月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Fix padding bugs in Heartbeat support.
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- 27 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
certificate chain instead of an X509 structure. This makes it easier to enhance code in future and the chain output functions have access to the CERT_PKEY structure being used.
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- 26 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
New function ssl_add_cert_chain which adds a certificate chain to SSL internal BUF_MEM. Use this function in ssl3_output_cert_chain and dtls1_output_cert_chain instead of partly duplicating code.
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- 01 1月, 2012 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
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- 25 12月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Add SCTP support for DTLS (RFC 6083).
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- 27 10月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS fragments.
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- 23 9月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Fix DTLS bug which prevents manual MTU setting
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- 04 4月, 2011 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Fix DTLS Retransmission Buffer Bug
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Don't change state when answering DTLS ClientHello.
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- 03 4月, 2011 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Reviewed by: steve Fix DTLS fragment reassembly bug.
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- 03 5月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Fix bug in bitmask macros and stop warnings.
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- 14 4月, 2010 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted By: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Fix various DTLS fragment reassembly bugs.
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- 25 3月, 2010 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Clear error queue in a few places in SSL code where errors are expected so they don't stay in the queue.
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- 02 12月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Approved by: steve@openssl.org Add Renegotiation extension to DTLS, fix DTLS ClientHello processing bug.
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- 02 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Approved by: steve@openssl.org DTLS Fragment size bug fix.
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- 01 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk> Approved by: steve@openssl.org Correct BIO_ctrl error handling
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- 12 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> Approved by: steve@openssl.org DTLS timeout handling fix.
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- 15 7月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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- 29 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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- 05 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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