- 29 8月, 2014 3 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the serverinfo checks are no longer needed. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reject attempts to use extensions handled internally. Add flags to each extension structure to indicate if an extension has been sent or received. Enforce RFC5246 compliance by rejecting duplicate extensions and unsolicited extensions and only send a server extension if we have sent the corresponding client extension. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Use the same structure for client and server custom extensions. Add utility functions in new file t1_ext.c. Use new utility functions to handle custom server and client extensions and remove a lot of code duplication. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 18 8月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Justin Blanchard 提交于
Add a dozen more const declarations where appropriate. These are from Justin; while adding his patch, I noticed ASN1_BIT_STRING_check could be fixed, too. Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 15 8月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Move custom extension structures from SSL_CTX to CERT structure. This change means the form can be revised in future without binary compatibility issues. Also since CERT is part of SSL structures so per-SSL custom extensions could be supported in future as well as per SSL_CTX. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 07 8月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious server could exploit this in a DoS attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon for reporting this issue. CVE-2014-2970 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Gabor Tyukasz 提交于
CVE-2014-3509 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 02 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
(cherry picked from commit 2db3ea29298bdc347f15fbfab6d5746022f05101) Conflicts: ssl/t1_lib.c
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- 30 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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- 29 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
PR#2531
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- 03 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 David Benjamin 提交于
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- 02 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Add TLS padding extension to SSL_OP_ALL so it is used with other "bugs" options and can be turned off. This replaces SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG which is an ancient option referring to SSLv2 and SSLREF. PR#3336
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- 26 5月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Juli Mallett 提交于
Closes #74.
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- 20 5月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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- 08 4月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) (cherry picked from commit 96db9023)
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- 06 4月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Enable TLS padding extension using official value from: http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
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- 28 3月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including sensible defaults based on bits of security. The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites, curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets and compression. In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves. In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the peer key size. Documentation to follow...
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
New function ssl_cipher_disabled. Check for disabled client ciphers using ssl_cipher_disabled. New function to return only supported ciphers. New option to ciphers utility to print only supported ciphers.
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Add auto DH parameter support. This is roughly equivalent to the ECDH auto curve selection but for DH. An application can just call SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 1); and appropriate DH parameters will be used based on the size of the server key. Unlike ECDH there is no way a peer can indicate the range of DH parameters it supports. Some peers cannot handle DH keys larger that 1024 bits for example. In this case if you call: SSL_CTX_set_auto_dh(ctx, 2); Only 1024 bit DH parameters will be used. If the server key is 7680 bits or more in size then 8192 bit DH parameters will be used: these will be *very* slow. The old export ciphersuites aren't supported but those are very insecure anyway.
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
(cherry picked from commit bc5ec653ba65fedb1619c8182088497de8a97a70)
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- 21 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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- 20 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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- 19 2月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Rob Stradling 提交于
Add the extension parser in the s_client, ocsp and x509 apps.
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- 06 2月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Scott Deboy 提交于
The contract for custom extension callbacks has changed - all custom extension callbacks are triggered
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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由 Scott Deboy 提交于
Whitespace fixes
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由 Scott Deboy 提交于
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake. Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.
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- 16 1月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Kaspar Brand 提交于
PR#3178
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- 09 1月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Daniel Kahn Gillmor 提交于
ECDHE is the standard term used by the RFCs and by other TLS implementations. It's useful to have the internal variables use the standard terminology. This patch leaves a synonym SSL_kEECDH in place, though, so that older code can still be built against it, since that has been the traditional API. SSL_kEECDH should probably be deprecated at some point, though.
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- 30 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
(cherry picked from commit cfa86987a8d9d2b8cc5e5fea2d3260c46542cdb9)
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- 13 12月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Fix padding calculation for different SSL_METHOD types. Use the standard name as used in draft-agl-tls-padding-02
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- 14 11月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Piotr Sikora 提交于
PR#3106
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- 07 11月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Based on a suggested workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the TLS Client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512. To enable it use an unused extension number (for example 0x4242) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_wtf=0x4242 WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
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- 02 11月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Piotr Sikora 提交于
Don't require a public key in tls1_set_ec_id if compression status is not needed. This fixes a bug where SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE wouldn't work. (cherry picked from commit 5ff68e8f6dac3b0d8997b8bc379f9111c2bab74f)
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- 21 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Removing RSA+MD5 from the default signature algorithm list prevents its use by default. If a broken implementation attempts to use RSA+MD5 anyway the sanity checking of signature algorithms will cause a fatal alert.
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- 15 10月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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- 13 9月, 2013 2 次提交
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由 Rob Stradling 提交于
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由 Rob Stradling 提交于
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- 08 9月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Experimental support for encrypt then mac from draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x10 for the test server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x10 For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no effect.
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