1. 16 7月, 2018 1 次提交
    • N
      EC point multiplication: add `ladder` scaffold · 37124360
      Nicola Tuveri 提交于
      for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
      
      PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
      prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
      with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
      scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
      The newly introduced default implementation directly used
      EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
      
      The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
      specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
      advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
      and different coordinate systems.
      
      - `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
        default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
        Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
        to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
      - `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
        computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
        e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
        addition-and-doubling;
      - `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
        it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
        hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
        the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
        the result point.
      
      This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
      as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
      truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
      function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
      constant-time themselves.
      What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
      operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
      EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
      Co-authored-by: NSohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
      Co-authored-by: NBilly Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
      37124360
  2. 22 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  3. 19 6月, 2018 1 次提交
    • S
      Implement coordinate blinding for EC_POINT · f667820c
      Sohaib ul Hassan 提交于
      This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
      representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
      prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
      EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.
      
      This commit is derived from the patch
      https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.
      
      Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
      and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
      multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
      scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
      it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
      algorithm state) unpredictable.
      
      For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
      settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
      aforementioned curves.
      
      For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
      does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
      easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
      Co-authored-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
      Co-authored-by: NBilly Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)
      f667820c
  4. 25 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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  7. 30 8月, 2017 2 次提交
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  23. 10 11月, 2015 1 次提交
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  25. 05 5月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      Use safer sizeof variant in malloc · b4faea50
      Rich Salz 提交于
      For a local variable:
              TYPE *p;
      Allocations like this are "risky":
              p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
      if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
      could get memory corruption.  Instead do this:
              p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
      Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      b4faea50
  26. 01 5月, 2015 3 次提交
  27. 29 4月, 2015 1 次提交
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  29. 27 4月, 2015 1 次提交