- 17 12月, 2022 1 次提交
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由 Paolo Bonzini 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.0 commit: e5d83c74 category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I66COX CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-5.10.y&id=e5d83c74a5800c2a1fa3ba982c1c4b2b39ae6db2 -------------------------------- The first such capability to be handled in virt/kvm/ will be manual dirty page reprotection. Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 15 6月, 2022 1 次提交
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由 Michael Ellerman 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc2 commit 8e127844 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5C43D CVE: CVE-2022-32981 -------------------------------- The ptrace PEEKUSR/POKEUSR (aka PEEKUSER/POKEUSER) API allows a process to read/write registers of another process. To get/set a register, the API takes an index into an imaginary address space called the "USER area", where the registers of the process are laid out in some fashion. The kernel then maps that index to a particular register in its own data structures and gets/sets the value. The API only allows a single machine-word to be read/written at a time. So 4 bytes on 32-bit kernels and 8 bytes on 64-bit kernels. The way floating point registers (FPRs) are addressed is somewhat complicated, because double precision float values are 64-bit even on 32-bit CPUs. That means on 32-bit kernels each FPR occupies two word-sized locations in the USER area. On 64-bit kernels each FPR occupies one word-sized location in the USER area. Internally the kernel stores the FPRs in an array of u64s, or if VSX is enabled, an array of pairs of u64s where one half of each pair stores the FPR. Which half of the pair stores the FPR depends on the kernel's endianness. To handle the different layouts of the FPRs depending on VSX/no-VSX and big/little endian, the TS_FPR() macro was introduced. Unfortunately the TS_FPR() macro does not take into account the fact that the addressing of each FPR differs between 32-bit and 64-bit kernels. It just takes the index into the "USER area" passed from userspace and indexes into the fp_state.fpr array. On 32-bit there are 64 indexes that address FPRs, but only 32 entries in the fp_state.fpr array, meaning the user can read/write 256 bytes past the end of the array. Because the fp_state sits in the middle of the thread_struct there are various fields than can be overwritten, including some pointers. As such it may be exploitable. It has also been observed to cause systems to hang or otherwise misbehave when using gdbserver, and is probably the root cause of this report which could not be easily reproduced: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/dc38afe9-6b78-f3f5-666b-986939e40fc6@keymile.com/ Rather than trying to make the TS_FPR() macro even more complicated to fix the bug, or add more macros, instead add a special-case for 32-bit kernels. This is more obvious and hopefully avoids a similar bug happening again in future. Note that because 32-bit kernels never have VSX enabled the code doesn't need to consider TS_FPRWIDTH/OFFSET at all. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to ensure that 32-bit && VSX is never enabled. Fixes: 87fec051 ("powerpc: PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSER of FPR registers in little endian builds") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+ Reported-by: NAriel Miculas <ariel.miculas@belden.com> Tested-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609133245.573565-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Conflicts: arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-fpu.c arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c Signed-off-by: NYipeng Zou <zouyipeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
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- 14 4月, 2022 1 次提交
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由 Lijun Fang 提交于
ascend inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4UR5Y CVE: NA -------------------- svm module use svm_get_unmapped_area ops to map an aligned va, which used by mapping l2buf memory. The svm_get_unmapped_area use a lot of duplicated codes, we add MAP_ALIGN to adjust mapinfo alignmask. Signed-off-by: NLijun Fang <fanglijun3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWeilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
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- 17 1月, 2022 1 次提交
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由 Zhenguo Yao 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc1 commit b5389086 category: feature bugzilla: 186043 CVE: NA -------------------------------- We can specify the number of hugepages to allocate at boot. But the hugepages is balanced in all nodes at present. In some scenarios, we only need hugepages in one node. For example: DPDK needs hugepages which are in the same node as NIC. If DPDK needs four hugepages of 1G size in node1 and system has 16 numa nodes we must reserve 64 hugepages on the kernel cmdline. But only four hugepages are used. The others should be free after boot. If the system memory is low(for example: 64G), it will be an impossible task. So extend the hugepages parameter to support specifying hugepages on a specific node. For example add following parameter: hugepagesz=1G hugepages=0:1,1:3 It will allocate 1 hugepage in node0 and 3 hugepages in node1. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211005054729.86457-1-yaozhenguo1@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NZhenguo Yao <yaozhenguo1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NMike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Zhenguo Yao <yaozhenguo1@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Documentation/admin-guide/mm/hugetlbpage.rst arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c include/linux/hugetlb.h mm/hugetlb.c Signed-off-by: NLiu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang<wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 29 10月, 2021 3 次提交
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由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于
ascend inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EUVI CVE: NA https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20200825145753.529284-6-npiggin@gmail.com/ -------------- This changes the awkward approach where architectures provide init functions to determine which levels they can provide large mappings for, to one where the arch is queried for each call. This removes code and indirection, and allows constant-folding of dead code for unsupported levels. This also adds a prot argument to the arch query. This is unused currently but could help with some architectures (e.g., some powerpc processors can't map uncacheable memory with large pages). Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NRui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NDing Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Christoph Hellwig 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.8-rc1 commit 49266277 category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EUVI CVE: NA --------------------------- Switch the two remaining callers to use __get_vm_area_caller instead. Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200414131348.444715-9-hch@lst.deSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NRui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NDing Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline v5.6-rc1 commit 1f059dfd category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EUVI CVE: NA --------------------------- In the x86 MM code we'd like to untangle various types of historic header dependency spaghetti, but for this we'd need to pass to the generic vmalloc code various vmalloc related defines that customarily come via the <asm/page.h> low level arch header. Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NRui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NDing Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NZefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 24 8月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.14-rc5 commit f5e81d11 category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: CVE-2021-34556 --------------------------- In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction /either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to /no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already. This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence' instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4 since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs. The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers. Co-developed-by: NPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: NBenedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: NPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NBenedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/core.c kernel/bpf/disasm.c Signed-off-by: He Fengqing<hefengqing@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NWei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 30 7月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.199 commit 0493b10c06021796ba80cbe53c961defd5aca6e5 CVE: CVE-2021-37576 -------------------------------- commit f62f3c20 upstream. The kvmppc_rtas_hcall() sets the host rtas_args.rets pointer based on the rtas_args.nargs that was provided by the guest. That guest nargs value is not range checked, so the guest can cause the host rets pointer to be pointed outside the args array. The individual rtas function handlers check the nargs and nrets values to ensure they are correct, but if they are not, the handlers store a -3 (0xfffffffd) failure indication in rets[0] which corrupts host memory. Fix this by testing up front whether the guest supplied nargs and nret would exceed the array size, and fail the hcall directly without storing a failure indication to rets[0]. Also expand on a comment about why we kill the guest and try not to return errors directly if we have a valid rets[0] pointer. Fixes: 8e591cb7 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S: Add infrastructure to implement kernel-side RTAS calls") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+ Reported-by: NAlexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 29 6月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Linus Torvalds 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.146 commit f5fa64c8daf7b97280865c73903edc0a3eea819e CVE: CVE-2020-28097 -------------------------------- commit 973c096f upstream. Yunhai Zhang recently fixed a VGA software scrollback bug in commit ebfdfeea ("vgacon: Fix for missing check in scrollback handling"), but that then made people look more closely at some of this code, and there were more problems on the vgacon side, but also the fbcon software scrollback. We don't really have anybody who maintains this code - probably because nobody actually _uses_ it any more. Sure, people still use both VGA and the framebuffer consoles, but they are no longer the main user interfaces to the kernel, and haven't been for decades, so these kinds of extra features end up bitrotting and not really being used. So rather than try to maintain a likely unused set of code, I'll just aggressively remove it, and see if anybody even notices. Maybe there are people who haven't jumped on the whole GUI badnwagon yet, and think it's just a fad. And maybe those people use the scrollback code. If that turns out to be the case, we can resurrect this again, once we've found the sucker^Wmaintainer for it who actually uses it. Reported-by: NNopNop Nop <nopitydays@gmail.com> Tested-by: NWilly Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: 张云海 <zhangyunhai@nsfocus.com> Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: NWilly Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Reviewed-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NXiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 22 5月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Shile Zhang 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.6-rc1 commit 10916706 category: feature bugzilla: NA CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- Use a more generic name for additional table sorting usecases, such as the upcoming ORC table sorting feature. This tool is not tied to exception table sorting anymore. No functional changes intended. [ mingo: Rewrote the changelog. ] Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204004633.88660-6-shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Conflicts: scripts/link-vmlinux.sh scripts/Makefile scripts/.gitignore arch/x86/Kconfig arch/microblaze/Kconfig arch/xtensa/Kconfig arch/parisc/Kconfig arch/powerpc/Kconfig arch/arc/Kconfig arch/mips/Kconfig arch/arm/Kconfig Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJian Cheng <cj.chengjian@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 14 4月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Peter Xu 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-5.6 commit 4064b982 category: bugfix bugzilla: 47439 CVE: NA --------------------------- The idea comes from a discussion between Linus and Andrea [1]. Before this patch we only allow a page fault to retry once. We achieved this by clearing the FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY flag when doing handle_mm_fault() the second time. This was majorly used to avoid unexpected starvation of the system by looping over forever to handle the page fault on a single page. However that should hardly happen, and after all for each code path to return a VM_FAULT_RETRY we'll first wait for a condition (during which time we should possibly yield the cpu) to happen before VM_FAULT_RETRY is really returned. This patch removes the restriction by keeping the FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY flag when we receive VM_FAULT_RETRY. It means that the page fault handler now can retry the page fault for multiple times if necessary without the need to generate another page fault event. Meanwhile we still keep the FAULT_FLAG_TRIED flag so page fault handler can still identify whether a page fault is the first attempt or not. Then we'll have these combinations of fault flags (only considering ALLOW_RETRY flag and TRIED flag): - ALLOW_RETRY and !TRIED: this means the page fault allows to retry, and this is the first try - ALLOW_RETRY and TRIED: this means the page fault allows to retry, and this is not the first try - !ALLOW_RETRY and !TRIED: this means the page fault does not allow to retry at all - !ALLOW_RETRY and TRIED: this is forbidden and should never be used In existing code we have multiple places that has taken special care of the first condition above by checking against (fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY). This patch introduces a simple helper to detect the first retry of a page fault by checking against both (fault_flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) and !(fault_flag & FAULT_FLAG_TRIED) because now even the 2nd try will have the ALLOW_RETRY set, then use that helper in all existing special paths. One example is in __lock_page_or_retry(), now we'll drop the mmap_sem only in the first attempt of page fault and we'll keep it in follow up retries, so old locking behavior will be retained. This will be a nice enhancement for current code [2] at the same time a supporting material for the future userfaultfd-writeprotect work, since in that work there will always be an explicit userfault writeprotect retry for protected pages, and if that cannot resolve the page fault (e.g., when userfaultfd-writeprotect is used in conjunction with swapped pages) then we'll possibly need a 3rd retry of the page fault. It might also benefit other potential users who will have similar requirement like userfault write-protection. GUP code is not touched yet and will be covered in follow up patch. Please read the thread below for more information. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20171102193644.GB22686@redhat.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181230154648.GB9832@redhat.com/Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: NBrian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Bobby Powers <bobbypowers@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org> Cc: Marty McFadden <mcfadden8@llnl.gov> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Maya Gokhale <gokhale2@llnl.gov> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220160246.9790-1-peterx@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: arch/arc/mm/fault.c arch/arm64/mm/fault.c arch/x86/mm/fault.c drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_vm.c include/linux/mm.h mm/internal.h Signed-off-by: NXiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJing Xiangfeng <jingxiangfeng@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
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- 22 2月, 2021 3 次提交
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由 Bixuan Cui 提交于
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA An error is reported during powerpc platform compilation because VERIFY_WRITE is already removed in powerpc platform. ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h: In function ‘clear_user’: ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:446:48: error: macro "access_ok" passed 3 arguments, but takes just 2 if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, size))) { ^ In file included from ./include/asm-generic/div64.h:25:0, from ./arch/powerpc/include/generated/asm/div64.h:1, from ./include/linux/math64.h:6, from ./include/linux/time64.h:5, from ./include/linux/compat_time.h:6, from ./include/linux/compat.h:10, from arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c:16: ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:446:13: error: ‘access_ok’ undeclared (first use in this function) if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, size))) { ^ ./include/linux/compiler.h:76:40: note: in definition of macro ‘likely’ # define likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) ^ ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:446:13: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, size))) { ^ ./include/linux/compiler.h:76:40: note: in definition of macro ‘likely’ # define likely(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) ^ Kbuild:56: recipe for target 'arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.s' failed Fixes: 837baab68b87 ("powerpc: Add a framework for user access tracking") Fixes: a10f8b4fe993 ("powerpc: Implement user_access_begin and friends") Signed-off-by: NBixuan Cui <cuibixuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
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由 Bixuan Cui 提交于
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA MAP_CHECKNODE was defined in uapi/asm-generic/mman.h, that was not automatically included by mm/mmap.c when building on platforms such as mips, and result in following compiling error: mm/mmap.c: In function ‘__do_mmap’: mm/mmap.c:1581:14: error: ‘MAP_CHECKNODE’ undeclared (first use in this function) if (flags & MAP_CHECKNODE) ^ mm/mmap.c:1581:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in scripts/Makefile.build:303: recipe for target 'mm/mmap.o' failed Fixes: cdccf4d4b7b5 ("arm64/ascend: mm: Add MAP_CHECKNODE flag to check node hugetlb") Signed-off-by: NBixuan Cui <cuibixuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
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由 Zhengyuan Liu 提交于
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA MAP_PA32BIT was defined in uapi/asm-generic/mman.h, that was not automatically included by mm/mmap.c when building on platforms such as mips, and result in following compiling error: mm/mmap.c: In function ‘do_mmap’: mm/mmap.c:1450:14: error: ‘MAP_PA32BIT’ undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean ‘MAP_32BIT’? if (flags & MAP_PA32BIT) ^~~~~~~~~~~ MAP_32BIT mm/mmap.c:1450:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:303: mm/mmap.o] Error 1 Fixes: e422eca7f9c5 ("svm: add support for allocing memory which is within 4G physical address in svm_mmap") Signed-off-by: NZhengyuan Liu <liuzhengyuan@tj.kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: NBixuan Cui <cuibixuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NCheng Jian <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
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- 08 1月, 2021 1 次提交
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由 Andrew Donnellan 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.155 commit 94e8f0bbc475228c93d28b2e0f7e37303db80ffe CVE: CVE-2020-27777 -------------------------------- commit bd59380c upstream. A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve information and update various things. The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall, which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they want with arbitrary arguments. Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in /proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address, poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to the RTAS call. However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem access). Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases. In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure Boot and lockdown we need to care about this. We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO buffer. The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 24 11月, 2020 7 次提交
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由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit 31ebc2fe02df202566d0e36c1106b4902d6e2f8c CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- commit 9a32a7e7 upstream. IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack. This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses. This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788. Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit 6b36099dc92354dc0a895115605d4bf31f252142 CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- commit d02f6b7d upstream. get/put_user() can be called with nontrivial arguments. fs/proc/page.c has a good example: if (put_user(stable_page_flags(ppage), out)) { stable_page_flags() is quite a lot of code, including spin locks in the page allocator. Ensure these arguments are evaluated before user access is allowed. This improves security by reducing code with access to userspace, but it also fixes a PREEMPT bug with KUAP on powerpc/64s: stable_page_flags() is currently called with AMR set to allow writes, it ends up calling spin_unlock(), which can call preempt_schedule. But the task switch code can not be called with AMR set (it relies on interrupts saving the register), so this blows up. It's fine if the code inside allow_user_access() is preemptible, because a timer or IPI will save the AMR, but it's not okay to explicitly cause a reschedule. Fixes: de78a9c4 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection") Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200407041245.600651-1-npiggin@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h [yyl: VERIFY_WRITE is already removed] Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Andrew Donnellan 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit 92e7ec289b955384fba88953584562ce43164fa7 CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- commit 61e3acd8 upstream. The KUAP implementation adds calls in clear_user() to enable and disable access to userspace memory. However, it doesn't add these to __clear_user(), which is used in the ptrace regset code. As there's only one direct user of __clear_user() (the regset code), and the time taken to set the AMR for KUAP purposes is going to dominate the cost of a quick access_ok(), there's not much point having a separate path. Rename __clear_user() to __arch_clear_user(), and make __clear_user() just call clear_user(). Reported-by: syzbot+f25ecf4b2982d8c7a640@syzkaller-ppc64.appspotmail.com Reported-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Suggested-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Fixes: de78a9c4 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection") Signed-off-by: NAndrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Use __arch_clear_user() for the asm version like arm64 & nds32] Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209132221.15328-1-ajd@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Christophe Leroy 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit 8145b3a014e8504f02e15a38f04051fec826f4f2 CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- commit 5cd62333 upstream. Today, when a function like strncpy_from_user() is called, the userspace access protection is de-activated and re-activated for every word read. By implementing user_access_begin and friends, the protection is de-activated at the beginning of the copy and re-activated at the end. Implement user_access_begin(), user_access_end() and unsafe_get_user(), unsafe_put_user() and unsafe_copy_to_user() For the time being, we keep user_access_save() and user_access_restore() as nops. Signed-off-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/36d4fbf9e56a75994aca4ee2214c77b26a5a8d35.1579866752.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.frSigned-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Christophe Leroy 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit 357a5e6febe8839bd217121baa394b11e8fe4085 CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- Backported from commit de78a9c4 ("powerpc: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection"). Here we don't try to add the KUAP framework, we just want the helper functions because we want to put uaccess flush helpers in them. In terms of fixes, we don't need commit 1d8f739b ("powerpc/kuap: Fix set direction in allow/prevent_user_access()") as we don't have real KUAP. Likewise as all our allows are noops and all our prevents are just flushes, we don't need commit 9dc086f1 ("powerpc/futex: Fix incorrect user access blocking") The other 2 fixes we do need. The original description is: This patch implements a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection. Then subarches will have the possibility to provide their own implementation by providing setup_kuap() and allow/prevent_user_access(). Some platforms will need to know the area accessed and whether it is accessed from read, write or both. Therefore source, destination and size and handed over to the two functions. mpe: Rename to allow/prevent rather than unlock/lock, and add read/write wrappers. Drop the 32-bit code for now until we have an implementation for it. Add kuap to pt_regs for 64-bit as well as 32-bit. Don't split strings, use pr_crit_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: NRussell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h arch/powerpc/include/asm/futex.h [yyl: resolve the conflits, because VERIFY_WRITE is already removed] Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Nicholas Piggin 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit f69bb4e51f41973fb7594be1479fa689831efe1a CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- commit f7964378 upstream. IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack. This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry. This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788. Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Daniel Axtens 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.159 commit b4e80478115bc7fcea627110c133f4afe1a40899 CVE: CVE-2020-4788 -------------------------------- (backport only) We're about to grow the exception handlers, which will make a bunch of them no longer fit within the space available. We move them out of line. This is a fiddly and error-prone business, so in the interests of reviewability I haven't merged this in with the addition of the entry flush. Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 22 9月, 2020 6 次提交
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由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.129 commit 373491f1f41896241864b527b584856d8a510946 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bf2c59fc ] In the CPU-offline process, it calls mmdrop() after idle entry and the subsequent call to cpuhp_report_idle_dead(). Once execution passes the call to rcu_report_dead(), RCU is ignoring the CPU, which results in lockdep complaining when mmdrop() uses RCU from either memcg or debugobjects below. Fix it by cleaning up the active_mm state from BP instead. Every arch which has CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU should have already called idle_task_exit() from AP. The only exception is parisc because it switches them to &init_mm unconditionally (see smp_boot_one_cpu() and smp_cpu_init()), but the patch will still work there because it calls mmgrab(&init_mm) in smp_cpu_init() and then should call mmdrop(&init_mm) in finish_cpu(). WARNING: suspicious RCU usage ----------------------------- kernel/workqueue.c:710 RCU or wq_pool_mutex should be held! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from offline CPU! Call Trace: dump_stack+0xf4/0x164 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x164 get_work_pool+0x110/0x150 __queue_work+0x1bc/0xca0 queue_work_on+0x114/0x120 css_release+0x9c/0xc0 percpu_ref_put_many+0x204/0x230 free_pcp_prepare+0x264/0x570 free_unref_page+0x38/0xf0 __mmdrop+0x21c/0x2c0 idle_task_exit+0x170/0x1b0 pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self+0x38/0x2e0 cpu_die+0x48/0x64 arch_cpu_idle_dead+0x30/0x50 do_idle+0x2f4/0x470 cpu_startup_entry+0x38/0x40 start_secondary+0x7a8/0xa80 start_secondary_resume+0x10/0x14 Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200401214033.8448-1-cai@lca.pwSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 David Hildenbrand 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.100 commit 86834898d5a5e5aef9ae6d285201f2d99a4eb300 -------------------------------- commit feee6b29 upstream. -- snip -- - Missing arm64 hot(un)plug support - Missing some vmem_altmap_offset() cleanups - Missing sub-section hotadd support - Missing unification of mm/hmm.c and kernel/memremap.c -- snip -- We currently try to shrink a single zone when removing memory. We use the zone of the first page of the memory we are removing. If that memmap was never initialized (e.g., memory was never onlined), we will read garbage and can trigger kernel BUGs (due to a stale pointer): BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000000353d #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5-next-20190820+ #317 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_hotplug_work_fn RIP: 0010:clear_zone_contiguous+0x5/0x10 Code: 48 89 c6 48 89 c3 e8 2a fe ff ff 48 85 c0 75 cf 5b 5d c3 c6 85 fd 05 00 00 01 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 840 RSP: 0018:ffffad2400043c98 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000200000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000200000 RSI: 0000000000140000 RDI: 0000000000002f40 RBP: 0000000140000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000 R13: 0000000000140000 R14: 0000000000002f40 R15: ffff9e3e7aff3680 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e3e7bb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000353d CR3: 0000000058610000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __remove_pages+0x4b/0x640 arch_remove_memory+0x63/0x8d try_remove_memory+0xdb/0x130 __remove_memory+0xa/0x11 acpi_memory_device_remove+0x70/0x100 acpi_bus_trim+0x55/0x90 acpi_device_hotplug+0x227/0x3a0 acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x1a/0x30 process_one_work+0x221/0x550 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x105/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Modules linked in: CR2: 000000000000353d Instead, shrink the zones when offlining memory or when onlining failed. Introduce and use remove_pfn_range_from_zone(() for that. We now properly shrink the zones, even if we have DIMMs whereby - Some memory blocks fall into no zone (never onlined) - Some memory blocks fall into multiple zones (offlined+re-onlined) - Multiple memory blocks that fall into different zones Drop the zone parameter (with a potential dubious value) from __remove_pages() and __remove_section(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191006085646.5768-6-david@redhat.com Fixes: f1dd2cd1 ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e8] Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NOscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.0+] Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> [yyl: drop the zone parameter in arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c] Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 David Hildenbrand 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.100 commit 000a1d59cfe9d6e875462ed72de32770322c282b -------------------------------- commit 80ec922d upstream. -- snip -- Missing arm64 memory hot(un)plug support. -- snip -- We want to improve error handling while adding memory by allowing to use arch_remove_memory() and __remove_pages() even if CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE is not set to e.g., implement something like: arch_add_memory() rc = do_something(); if (rc) { arch_remove_memory(); } We won't get rid of CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE for now, as it will require quite some dependencies for memory offlining. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527111152.16324-7-david@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "mike.travis@hpe.com" <mike.travis@hpe.com> Cc: Andrew Banman <andrew.banman@hpe.com> Cc: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Jun Yao <yaojun8558363@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [yyl: remove CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE in arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c] Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NKefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 David Hildenbrand 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.100 commit 5163b1ec3a0c3a2e1e53b7794b64866cd6ba8697 -------------------------------- commit ac5c9426 upstream. -- snip -- Minor conflict in arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c -- snip -- All callers of arch_remove_memory() ignore errors. And we should really try to remove any errors from the memory removal path. No more errors are reported from __remove_pages(). BUG() in s390x code in case arch_remove_memory() is triggered. We may implement that properly later. WARN in case powerpc code failed to remove the section mapping, which is better than ignoring the error completely right now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409100148.24703-5-david@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Cc: Andrew Banman <andrew.banman@hpe.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Aneesh Kumar K.V 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.100 commit 58ddf0b0eff2a6cb536082fc6b046f5eb51c240c -------------------------------- commit 26ad2671 upstream. This patch fix the below section mismatch warnings. WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x2d1f44): Section mismatch in reference from the function devm_memremap_pages_release() to the function .meminit.text:arch_remove_memory() WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x2d265c): Section mismatch in reference from the function devm_memremap_pages() to the function .meminit.text:arch_add_memory() Signed-off-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Oscar Salvador 提交于
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.100 commit 5c1f8f5358e8cd501245ee0e954dc0c0b231d6a2 -------------------------------- commit 2c2a5af6 upstream. -- snip -- Missing unification of mm/hmm.c and kernel/memremap.c -- snip -- Patch series "Do not touch pages in hot-remove path", v2. This patchset aims for two things: 1) A better definition about offline and hot-remove stage 2) Solving bugs where we can access non-initialized pages during hot-remove operations [2] [3]. This is achieved by moving all page/zone handling to the offline stage, so we do not need to access pages when hot-removing memory. [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/10691415/ [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10547445/ [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mm/msg161316.html This patch (of 5): This is a preparation for the following-up patches. The idea of passing the nid is that it will allow us to get rid of the zone parameter afterwards. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181127162005.15833-2-osalvador@suse.deSigned-off-by: NOscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 31 8月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Yury Norov 提交于
hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: NA CVE: NA --------------------------- All new 32-bit architectures should have 64-bit userspace off_t type, but existing architectures has 32-bit ones. To enforce the rule, new config option is added to arch/Kconfig that defaults ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T to be disabled for new 32-bit architectures. All existing 32-bit architectures enable it explicitly. New option affects force_o_largefile() behaviour. Namely, if userspace off_t is 64-bits long, we have no reason to reject user to open big files. Note that even if architectures has only 64-bit off_t in the kernel (arc, c6x, h8300, hexagon, nios2, openrisc, and unicore32), a libc may use 32-bit off_t, and therefore want to limit the file size to 4GB unless specified differently in the open flags. Signed-off-by: NYury Norov <ynorov@caviumnetworks.com> Acked-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Conflicts: arch/x86/um/Kconfig [wangxiongfeng: conflicts in arch/x86/um/Kconfig. We only need to add 'select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T' and ignore others. ] Signed-off-by: NXiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com <mailto:guohanjun@huawei.com>> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 22 4月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Michael Ellerman 提交于
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.2-rc1 commit 53a712ba category: bugfix bugzilla: 13690 CVE: CVE-2020-11669 ------------------------------------------------- In order to implement KUAP (Kernel Userspace Access Protection) on Power9 we will be using the AMR, and therefore indirectly the UAMOR/AMOR. So save/restore these regs in the idle code. Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: NJason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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- 05 3月, 2020 9 次提交
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由 Jason A. Donenfeld 提交于
commit 6da3eced upstream. Recently, the spinlock implementation grew a static key optimization, but the jump_label.h header include was left out, leading to build errors: linux/arch/powerpc/include/asm/spinlock.h:44:7: error: implicit declaration of function ‘static_branch_unlikely’ 44 | if (!static_branch_unlikely(&shared_processor)) This commit adds the missing header. mpe: The build break is only seen with CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=n. Fixes: 656c21d6 ("powerpc/shared: Use static key to detect shared processor") Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: NSrikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191223133147.129983-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Srikar Dronamraju 提交于
commit 14c73bd3 upstream. With commit 247f2f6f ("sched/core: Don't schedule threads on pre-empted vCPUs"), the scheduler avoids preempted vCPUs to schedule tasks on wakeup. This leads to wrong choice of CPU, which in-turn leads to larger wakeup latencies. Eventually, it leads to performance regression in latency sensitive benchmarks like soltp, schbench etc. On Powerpc, vcpu_is_preempted() only looks at yield_count. If the yield_count is odd, the vCPU is assumed to be preempted. However yield_count is increased whenever the LPAR enters CEDE state (idle). So any CPU that has entered CEDE state is assumed to be preempted. Even if vCPU of dedicated LPAR is preempted/donated, it should have right of first-use since they are supposed to own the vCPU. On a Power9 System with 32 cores: # lscpu Architecture: ppc64le Byte Order: Little Endian CPU(s): 128 On-line CPU(s) list: 0-127 Thread(s) per core: 8 Core(s) per socket: 1 Socket(s): 16 NUMA node(s): 2 Model: 2.2 (pvr 004e 0202) Model name: POWER9 (architected), altivec supported Hypervisor vendor: pHyp Virtualization type: para L1d cache: 32K L1i cache: 32K L2 cache: 512K L3 cache: 10240K NUMA node0 CPU(s): 0-63 NUMA node1 CPU(s): 64-127 # perf stat -a -r 5 ./schbench v5.4 v5.4 + patch Latency percentiles (usec) Latency percentiles (usec) 50.0000th: 45 50.0th: 45 75.0000th: 62 75.0th: 63 90.0000th: 71 90.0th: 74 95.0000th: 77 95.0th: 78 *99.0000th: 91 *99.0th: 82 99.5000th: 707 99.5th: 83 99.9000th: 6920 99.9th: 86 min=0, max=10048 min=0, max=96 Latency percentiles (usec) Latency percentiles (usec) 50.0000th: 45 50.0th: 46 75.0000th: 61 75.0th: 64 90.0000th: 72 90.0th: 75 95.0000th: 79 95.0th: 79 *99.0000th: 691 *99.0th: 83 99.5000th: 3972 99.5th: 85 99.9000th: 8368 99.9th: 91 min=0, max=16606 min=0, max=117 Latency percentiles (usec) Latency percentiles (usec) 50.0000th: 45 50.0th: 46 75.0000th: 61 75.0th: 64 90.0000th: 71 90.0th: 75 95.0000th: 77 95.0th: 79 *99.0000th: 106 *99.0th: 83 99.5000th: 2364 99.5th: 84 99.9000th: 7480 99.9th: 90 min=0, max=10001 min=0, max=95 Latency percentiles (usec) Latency percentiles (usec) 50.0000th: 45 50.0th: 47 75.0000th: 62 75.0th: 65 90.0000th: 72 90.0th: 75 95.0000th: 78 95.0th: 79 *99.0000th: 93 *99.0th: 84 99.5000th: 108 99.5th: 85 99.9000th: 6792 99.9th: 90 min=0, max=17681 min=0, max=117 Latency percentiles (usec) Latency percentiles (usec) 50.0000th: 46 50.0th: 45 75.0000th: 62 75.0th: 64 90.0000th: 73 90.0th: 75 95.0000th: 79 95.0th: 79 *99.0000th: 113 *99.0th: 82 99.5000th: 2724 99.5th: 83 99.9000th: 6184 99.9th: 93 min=0, max=9887 min=0, max=111 Performance counter stats for 'system wide' (5 runs): context-switches 43,373 ( +- 0.40% ) 44,597 ( +- 0.55% ) cpu-migrations 1,211 ( +- 5.04% ) 220 ( +- 6.23% ) page-faults 15,983 ( +- 5.21% ) 15,360 ( +- 3.38% ) Waiman Long suggested using static_keys. Fixes: 247f2f6f ("sched/core: Don't schedule threads on pre-empted vCPUs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18+ Reported-by: NParth Shah <parth@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: NIhor Pasichnyk <Ihor.Pasichnyk@ibm.com> Tested-by: NJuri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Acked-by: NWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NGautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NSrikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPhil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NVaidyanathan Srinivasan <svaidy@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: NParth Shah <parth@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Move the key and setting of the key to pseries/setup.c] Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191213035036.6913-1-mpe@ellerman.id.auSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Mike Rapoport 提交于
[ Upstream commit 8fabc623 ] Some powerpc platforms (e.g. 85xx) limit DMA-able memory way below 4G. If a system has more physical memory than this limit, the swiotlb buffer is not addressable because it is allocated from memblock using top-down mode. Force memblock to bottom-up mode before calling swiotlb_init() to ensure that the swiotlb buffer is DMA-able. Reported-by: NChristian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de> Signed-off-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204123524.22919-1-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Michael Roth 提交于
[ Upstream commit 3a83f677 ] On a 2-socket Power9 system with 32 cores/128 threads (SMT4) and 1TB of memory running the following guest configs: guest A: - 224GB of memory - 56 VCPUs (sockets=1,cores=28,threads=2), where: VCPUs 0-1 are pinned to CPUs 0-3, VCPUs 2-3 are pinned to CPUs 4-7, ... VCPUs 54-55 are pinned to CPUs 108-111 guest B: - 4GB of memory - 4 VCPUs (sockets=1,cores=4,threads=1) with the following workloads (with KSM and THP enabled in all): guest A: stress --cpu 40 --io 20 --vm 20 --vm-bytes 512M guest B: stress --cpu 4 --io 4 --vm 4 --vm-bytes 512M host: stress --cpu 4 --io 4 --vm 2 --vm-bytes 256M the below soft-lockup traces were observed after an hour or so and persisted until the host was reset (this was found to be reliably reproducible for this configuration, for kernels 4.15, 4.18, 5.0, and 5.3-rc5): [ 1253.183290] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1253.183319] rcu: 124-....: (5250 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=1941 [ 1256.287426] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#105 stuck for 23s! [CPU 52/KVM:19709] [ 1264.075773] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#24 stuck for 23s! [worker:19913] [ 1264.079769] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#31 stuck for 23s! [worker:20331] [ 1264.095770] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 23s! [worker:20338] [ 1264.131773] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#64 stuck for 23s! [avocado:19525] [ 1280.408480] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#124 stuck for 22s! [ksmd:791] [ 1316.198012] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1316.198032] rcu: 124-....: (21003 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=8243 [ 1340.411024] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#124 stuck for 22s! [ksmd:791] [ 1379.212609] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1379.212629] rcu: 124-....: (36756 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=14714 [ 1404.413615] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#124 stuck for 22s! [ksmd:791] [ 1442.227095] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1442.227115] rcu: 124-....: (52509 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=21403 [ 1455.111787] INFO: task worker:19907 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.111822] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.111833] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.111884] INFO: task worker:19908 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.111905] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.111925] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.111966] INFO: task worker:20328 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.111986] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.111998] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112048] INFO: task worker:20330 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112068] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112097] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112138] INFO: task worker:20332 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112159] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112179] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112210] INFO: task worker:20333 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112231] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112242] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112282] INFO: task worker:20335 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112303] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112332] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112372] INFO: task worker:20336 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112392] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 CPUs 45, 24, and 124 are stuck on spin locks, likely held by CPUs 105 and 31. CPUs 105 and 31 are stuck in smp_call_function_many(), waiting on target CPU 42. For instance: # CPU 105 registers (via xmon) R00 = c00000000020b20c R16 = 00007d1bcd800000 R01 = c00000363eaa7970 R17 = 0000000000000001 R02 = c0000000019b3a00 R18 = 000000000000006b R03 = 000000000000002a R19 = 00007d537d7aecf0 R04 = 000000000000002a R20 = 60000000000000e0 R05 = 000000000000002a R21 = 0801000000000080 R06 = c0002073fb0caa08 R22 = 0000000000000d60 R07 = c0000000019ddd78 R23 = 0000000000000001 R08 = 000000000000002a R24 = c00000000147a700 R09 = 0000000000000001 R25 = c0002073fb0ca908 R10 = c000008ffeb4e660 R26 = 0000000000000000 R11 = c0002073fb0ca900 R27 = c0000000019e2464 R12 = c000000000050790 R28 = c0000000000812b0 R13 = c000207fff623e00 R29 = c0002073fb0ca808 R14 = 00007d1bbee00000 R30 = c0002073fb0ca800 R15 = 00007d1bcd600000 R31 = 0000000000000800 pc = c00000000020b260 smp_call_function_many+0x3d0/0x460 cfar= c00000000020b270 smp_call_function_many+0x3e0/0x460 lr = c00000000020b20c smp_call_function_many+0x37c/0x460 msr = 900000010288b033 cr = 44024824 ctr = c000000000050790 xer = 0000000000000000 trap = 100 CPU 42 is running normally, doing VCPU work: # CPU 42 stack trace (via xmon) [link register ] c00800001be17188 kvmppc_book3s_radix_page_fault+0x90/0x2b0 [kvm_hv] [c000008ed3343820] c000008ed3343850 (unreliable) [c000008ed33438d0] c00800001be11b6c kvmppc_book3s_hv_page_fault+0x264/0xe30 [kvm_hv] [c000008ed33439d0] c00800001be0d7b4 kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x8dc/0xb50 [kvm_hv] [c000008ed3343ae0] c00800001c10891c kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm] [c000008ed3343b00] c00800001c10475c kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x244/0x420 [kvm] [c000008ed3343b90] c00800001c0f5a78 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x470/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000008ed3343d00] c000000000475450 do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc70 [c000008ed3343db0] c0000000004760e4 ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000008ed3343e00] c000000000476128 sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000008ed3343e20] c00000000000b388 system_call+0x5c/0x70 --- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 00007d545cfd7694 SP (7d53ff7edf50) is in userspace It was subsequently found that ipi_message[PPC_MSG_CALL_FUNCTION] was set for CPU 42 by at least 1 of the CPUs waiting in smp_call_function_many(), but somehow the corresponding call_single_queue entries were never processed by CPU 42, causing the callers to spin in csd_lock_wait() indefinitely. Nick Piggin suggested something similar to the following sequence as a possible explanation (interleaving of CALL_FUNCTION/RESCHEDULE IPI messages seems to be most common, but any mix of CALL_FUNCTION and !CALL_FUNCTION messages could trigger it): CPU X: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): X: smp_mb() X: message[RESCHEDULE] = 1 X: doorbell_global_ipi(42): X: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) X: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() X: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: doorbell_exception(): // from CPU X 42: ppc_msgsync() 105: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): 105: smb_mb() // STORE DEFERRED DUE TO RE-ORDERING --105: message[CALL_FUNCTION] = 1 | 105: doorbell_global_ipi(42): | 105: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) | 42: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 0) | 42: smp_ipi_demux_relaxed() | 42: // returns to executing guest | // RE-ORDERED STORE COMPLETES ->105: message[CALL_FUNCTION] = 1 105: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() 105: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: local_paca->kvm_hstate.host_ipi == 0 // IPI ignored 105: // hangs waiting on 42 to process messages/call_single_queue This can be prevented with an smp_mb() at the beginning of kvmppc_set_host_ipi(), such that stores to message[<type>] (or other state indicated by the host_ipi flag) are ordered vs. the store to to host_ipi. However, doing so might still allow for the following scenario (not yet observed): CPU X: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): X: smp_mb() X: message[RESCHEDULE] = 1 X: doorbell_global_ipi(42): X: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) X: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() X: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: doorbell_exception(): // from CPU X 42: ppc_msgsync() // STORE DEFERRED DUE TO RE-ORDERING -- 42: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 0) | 42: smp_ipi_demux_relaxed() | 105: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): | 105: smb_mb() | 105: message[CALL_FUNCTION] = 1 | 105: doorbell_global_ipi(42): | 105: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) | // RE-ORDERED STORE COMPLETES -> 42: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 0) 42: // returns to executing guest 105: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() 105: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: local_paca->kvm_hstate.host_ipi == 0 // IPI ignored 105: // hangs waiting on 42 to process messages/call_single_queue Fixing this scenario would require an smp_mb() *after* clearing host_ipi flag in kvmppc_set_host_ipi() to order the store vs. subsequent processing of IPI messages. To handle both cases, this patch splits kvmppc_set_host_ipi() into separate set/clear functions, where we execute smp_mb() prior to setting host_ipi flag, and after clearing host_ipi flag. These functions pair with each other to synchronize the sender and receiver sides. With that change in place the above workload ran for 20 hours without triggering any lock-ups. Fixes: 755563bc ("powerpc/powernv: Fixes for hypervisor doorbell handling") # v4.0 Signed-off-by: NMichael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190911223155.16045-1-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Daniel Axtens 提交于
[ Upstream commit 934bda59 ] While developing KASAN for 64-bit book3s, I hit the following stack over-read. It occurs because the hypercall to put characters onto the terminal takes 2 longs (128 bits/16 bytes) of characters at a time, and so hvc_put_chars() would unconditionally copy 16 bytes from the argument buffer, regardless of supplied length. However, udbg_hvc_putc() can call hvc_put_chars() with a single-byte buffer, leading to the error. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in hvc_put_chars+0xdc/0x110 Read of size 8 at addr c0000000023e7a90 by task swapper/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2-next-20190528-02824-g048a6ab4835b #113 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x104/0x154 (unreliable) print_address_description+0xa0/0x30c __kasan_report+0x20c/0x224 kasan_report+0x18/0x30 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x24/0x40 hvc_put_chars+0xdc/0x110 hvterm_raw_put_chars+0x9c/0x110 udbg_hvc_putc+0x154/0x200 udbg_write+0xf0/0x240 console_unlock+0x868/0xd30 register_console+0x970/0xe90 register_early_udbg_console+0xf8/0x114 setup_arch+0x108/0x790 start_kernel+0x104/0x784 start_here_common+0x1c/0x534 Memory state around the buggy address: c0000000023e7980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0000000023e7a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 >c0000000023e7a80: f1 f1 01 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ c0000000023e7b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0000000023e7b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Document that a 16-byte buffer is requred, and provide it in udbg. Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Greg Kroah-Hartman 提交于
This reverts commit 4ba32bdbd8c66d9c7822aea8dcf4e51410df84a8 which is commit 14c73bd3 upstream. It breaks the build. Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Parth Shah <parth@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ihor Pasichnyk <Ihor.Pasichnyk@ibm.com> Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Cc: Vaidyanathan Srinivasan <svaidy@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Parth Shah <parth@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Masahiro Yamada 提交于
[ Upstream commit a8de1304 ] The DTC v1.5.1 added references to (U)INT32_MAX. This is no problem for user-space programs since <stdint.h> defines (U)INT32_MAX along with (u)int32_t. For the kernel space, libfdt_env.h needs to be adjusted before we pull in the changes. In the kernel, we usually use s/u32 instead of (u)int32_t for the fixed-width types. Accordingly, we already have S/U32_MAX for their max values. So, we should not add (U)INT32_MAX to <linux/limits.h> any more. Instead, add them to the in-kernel libfdt_env.h to compile the latest libfdt. Signed-off-by: NMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: NRob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Nathan Chancellor 提交于
[ Upstream commit 465bfd9c ] When building pseries_defconfig, building vdso32 errors out: error: unknown target ABI 'elfv1' This happens because -m32 in clang changes the target to 32-bit, which does not allow the ABI to be changed. Commit 4dc831aa ("powerpc: Fix compiling a BE kernel with a powerpc64le toolchain") added these flags to fix building big endian kernels with a little endian GCC. Clang doesn't need -mabi because the target triple controls the default value. -mlittle-endian and -mbig-endian manipulate the triple into either powerpc64-* or powerpc64le-*, which properly sets the default ABI. Adding a debug print out in the PPC64TargetInfo constructor after line 383 above shows this: $ echo | ./clang -E --target=powerpc64-linux -mbig-endian -o /dev/null - Default ABI: elfv1 $ echo | ./clang -E --target=powerpc64-linux -mlittle-endian -o /dev/null - Default ABI: elfv2 $ echo | ./clang -E --target=powerpc64le-linux -mbig-endian -o /dev/null - Default ABI: elfv1 $ echo | ./clang -E --target=powerpc64le-linux -mlittle-endian -o /dev/null - Default ABI: elfv2 Don't specify -mabi when building with clang to avoid the build error with -m32 and not change any code generation. -mcall-aixdesc is not an implemented flag in clang so it can be safely excluded as well, see commit 238abecd ("powerpc: Don't use gcc specific options on clang"). pseries_defconfig successfully builds after this patch and powernv_defconfig and ppc44x_defconfig don't regress. Reviewed-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: NNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> [mpe: Trim clang links in change log] Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119045712.39633-2-natechancellor@gmail.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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由 Gustavo L. F. Walbon 提交于
[ Upstream commit 4e706af3 ] The issue was showing "Mitigation" message via sysfs whatever the state of "RFI Flush", but it should show "Vulnerable" when it is disabled. If you have "L1D private" feature enabled and not "RFI Flush" you are vulnerable to meltdown attacks. "RFI Flush" is the key feature to mitigate the meltdown whatever the "L1D private" state. SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV is a feature for Power9 only. So the message should be as the truth table shows: CPU | L1D private | RFI Flush | sysfs ----|-------------|-----------|------------------------------------- P9 | False | False | Vulnerable P9 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush P9 | True | False | Vulnerable: L1D private per thread P9 | True | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread P8 | False | False | Vulnerable P8 | False | True | Mitigation: RFI Flush Output before this fix: # cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread # echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush # cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown Mitigation: L1D private per thread Output after fix: # cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown Mitigation: RFI Flush, L1D private per thread # echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/rfi_flush # cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown Vulnerable: L1D private per thread Signed-off-by: NGustavo L. F. Walbon <gwalbon@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMauro S. M. Rodrigues <maurosr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190502210907.42375-1-gwalbon@linux.ibm.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
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