- 06 12月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
At the moment the msg callback only received the record header with the outer record type in it. We never pass the inner record type - we probably need to at some point. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 17 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
We should use the macro for testing if we are using TLSv1.3 rather than checking s->version directly. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 07 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The record layer version field must be ignored in TLSv1.3, so we remove the check when using that version. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 04 11月, 2016 11 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Also implement the using of them Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Previously they return -1 for failure or the size of the mac. But the size was never used anywhere. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Writing still to be done Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 18 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
OpenSSL 1.1.0 will negotiate EtM on DTLS but will then not actually *do* it. If we use DTLSv1.2 that will hopefully be harmless since we'll tend to use an AEAD ciphersuite anyway. But if we're using DTLSv1, then we certainly will end up using CBC, so EtM is relevant — and we fail to interoperate with anything that implements EtM correctly. Fixing it in HEAD and 1.1.0c will mean that 1.1.0[ab] are incompatible with 1.1.0c+... for the limited case of non-AEAD ciphers, where they're *already* incompatible with other implementations due to this bug anyway. That seems reasonable enough, so let's do it. The only alternative is just to turn it off for ever... which *still* leaves 1.0.0[ab] failing to communicate with non-OpenSSL implementations anyway. Tested against itself as well as against GnuTLS both with and without EtM. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 19 8月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them. Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the buffered records if we've not got any data left. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Emilia Kasper 提交于
Run util/openssl-format-source on ssl/ Some comments and hand-formatted tables were fixed up manually by disabling auto-formatting. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 16 8月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The read pipelining code broke constant time unpadding. See GitHub issue #1438 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If we receive a non-initial record but the version number isn't right then we should send an alert. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Feedback on the previous SSLv2 ClientHello processing fix was that it breaks layering by reading init_num in the record layer. It also does not detect if there was a previous non-fatal warning. This is an alternative approach that directly tracks in the record layer whether this is the first record. GitHub Issue #1298 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 09 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
Thanks to Peter Gijsels for pointing out that if a CBC record has 255 bytes of padding, the first was not being checked. (This is an import of change 80842bdb from BoringSSL.) Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1431)
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- 29 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
SSLv2 is no longer supported in 1.1.0, however we *do* still accept an SSLv2 style ClientHello, as long as we then subsequently negotiate a protocol version >= SSLv3. The record format for SSLv2 style ClientHellos is quite different to SSLv3+. We only accept this format in the first record of an initial ClientHello. Previously we checked this by confirming s->first_packet is set and s->server is true. However, this really only tells us that we are dealing with an initial ClientHello, not that it is the first record (s->first_packet is badly named...it really means this is the first message). To check this is the first record of the initial ClientHello we should also check that we've not received any data yet (s->init_num == 0), and that we've not had any empty records. GitHub Issue #1298 Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 20 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Fix some indentation at the same time Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1292)
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- 15 7月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 08 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Previously if we received an empty record we just threw it away and ignored it. Really though if we get an empty record of a different content type to what we are expecting then that should be an error, i.e. we should reject out of context empty records. This commit makes the necessary changes to achieve that. RT#4395 Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 18 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- 17 5月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
In the SSLV2ClientHello processing code in ssl3_get_record, the value of |num_recs| will always be 0. This isn't obvious from the code so a comment is added to explain it. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The function ssl3_get_record() can obtain multiple records in one go as long as we are set up for pipelining and all the records are app data records. The logic in the while loop which reads in each record is supposed to only continue looping if the last record we read was app data and we have an app data record waiting in the buffer to be processed. It was actually checking that the first record had app data and we have an app data record waiting. This actually amounts to the same thing so wasn't wrong - but it looks a bit odd because it uses the |rr| array without an offset. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Pipelining introduced the concept of multiple records being read in one go. Therefore we work with an array of SSL3_RECORD objects. The pipelining change erroneously made a change in ssl3_get_record() to apply the current record offset to the SSL3_BUFFER we are using for reading. This is wrong - there is only ever one read buffer. This reverts that change. In practice this should make little difference because the code block in question is only ever used when we are processing a single record. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 08 3月, 2016 6 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The numpipes argument to ssl3_enc/tls1_enc is actually the number of records passed in the array. To make this clearer rename the argument to |n_recs|. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Rename the have_whole_app_data_record_waiting() function to include the ssl3_record prefix...and make it a bit shorter. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Update a comment that was out of date due to the pipelining changes Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
With read pipelining we use multiple SSL3_RECORD structures for reading. There are SSL_MAX_PIPELINES (32) of them defined (typically not all of these would be used). Each one has a 16k compression buffer allocated! This results in a significant amount of memory being consumed which, most of the time, is not needed. This change swaps the allocation of the compression buffer to be lazy so that it is only done immediately before it is actually used. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Read pipelining is controlled in a slightly different way than with write pipelining. While reading we are constrained by the number of records that the peer (and the network) can provide to us in one go. The more records we can get in one go the more opportunity we have to parallelise the processing. There are two parameters that affect this: * The number of pipelines that we are willing to process in one go. This is controlled by max_pipelines (as for write pipelining) * The size of our read buffer. A subsequent commit will provide an API for adjusting the size of the buffer. Another requirement for this to work is that "read_ahead" must be set. The read_ahead parameter will attempt to read as much data into our read buffer as the network can provide. Without this set, data is read into the read buffer on demand. Setting the max_pipelines parameter to a value greater than 1 will automatically also turn read_ahead on. Finally, the read pipelining as currently implemented will only parallelise the processing of application data records. This would only make a difference for renegotiation so is unlikely to have a significant impact. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Use the new pipeline cipher capability to encrypt multiple records being written out all in one go. Two new SSL/SSL_CTX parameters can be used to control how this works: max_pipelines and split_send_fragment. max_pipelines defines the maximum number of pipelines that can ever be used in one go for a single connection. It must always be less than or equal to SSL_MAX_PIPELINES (currently defined to be 32). By default only one pipeline will be used (i.e. normal non-parallel operation). split_send_fragment defines how data is split up into pipelines. The number of pipelines used will be determined by the amount of data provided to the SSL_write call divided by split_send_fragment. For example if split_send_fragment is set to 2000 and max_pipelines is 4 then: SSL_write called with 0-2000 bytes == 1 pipeline used SSL_write called with 2001-4000 bytes == 2 pipelines used SSL_write called with 4001-6000 bytes == 3 pipelines used SSL_write_called with 6001+ bytes == 4 pipelines used split_send_fragment must always be less than or equal to max_send_fragment. By default it is set to be equal to max_send_fragment. This will mean that the same number of records will always be created as would have been created in the non-parallel case, although the data will be apportioned differently. In the parallel case data will be spread equally between the pipelines. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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