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Third Party Openssl

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提交 72716e79 编写于 作者: M Matt Caswell
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Convert some misc record layer functions for size_t 

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
上级 5607b275
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Showing with 80 addition and 47 deletion
ssl/record/record.h
浏览文件 @ 72716e79
......@@ -224,11 +224,11 @@ __owur int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int peek,
size_t *read);
__owur int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send);
__owur int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send);
__owur int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send);
__owur int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
size_t *written);
__owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send);
__owur int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send);
__owur int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send);
int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl);
......
ssl/record/record_locl.h
浏览文件 @ 72716e79
......@@ -107,11 +107,11 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
__owur int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr);
__owur int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr);
void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size);
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size);
__owur int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
__owur int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size);
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size);
int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
__owur int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s);
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
浏览文件 @ 72716e79
......@@ -134,10 +134,9 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
unsigned mac_size;
unsigned int num_recs = 0;
unsigned int max_recs;
unsigned int j;
size_t mac_size;
int imac_size;
size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
......@@ -351,7 +350,14 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
*/
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
unsigned char *mac;
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
/* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (imac_size < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
goto f_err;
}
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
if (rr[j].length < mac_size) {
......@@ -362,7 +368,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
rr[j].length -= mac_size;
mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length;
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
......@@ -569,12 +575,13 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
* occurred.
*/
int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
size_t l, i;
int bs, mac_size = 0;
size_t bs, mac_size = 0;
int imac_size;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
rec = inrecs;
......@@ -631,14 +638,20 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
return -1;
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (imac_size < 0)
return -1;
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
}
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size);
}
return (1);
}
#define MAX_PADDING 256
/*-
* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
*
......@@ -649,14 +662,16 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr;
size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop;
unsigned char padval;
int imac_size;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
unsigned int ctr;
if (send) {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
......@@ -766,16 +781,18 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
}
} else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs);
padnum = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs);
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
/* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
j = i - 1;
for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++)
recs[ctr].input[k] = j;
reclen[ctr] += i;
recs[ctr].length += i;
if (padnum > MAX_PADDING)
return -1;
/* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
padval = padnum - 1;
for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
reclen[ctr] += padnum;
recs[ctr].length += padnum;
}
if (!send) {
......@@ -807,11 +824,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
}
}
i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]);
tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]);
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
? (i < 0)
: (i == 0))
? (tmpr < 0)
: (tmpr == 0))
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
if (send == 0) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
......@@ -830,8 +847,12 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send)
}
ret = 1;
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (imac_size < 0)
return -1;
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
}
if ((bs != 1) && !send) {
int tmpret;
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
......@@ -1089,10 +1110,11 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
*/
/* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
{
unsigned padding_length, good;
const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
size_t padding_length;
unsigned good;
const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
/*
* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
......@@ -1101,6 +1123,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
return 0;
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
/* TODO(size_t): size_t constant_time ? */
good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1);
......@@ -1121,13 +1144,13 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
* 1: if the padding was valid
* -1: otherwise.
*/
/* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
{
unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
unsigned good;
size_t padding_length, to_check, i;
const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
/*
......@@ -1153,6 +1176,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
return 1;
}
/* TODO(size_t): size_t constant_time?? */
good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
/*
* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
......@@ -1207,9 +1231,8 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
*/
#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
/* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size)
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
......@@ -1221,13 +1244,13 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
/*
* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
*/
unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
size_t mac_end = rec->length;
size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
/*
* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
* MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
*/
unsigned scan_start = 0;
size_t scan_start = 0;
unsigned i, j;
unsigned div_spoiler;
unsigned rotate_offset;
......@@ -1256,6 +1279,7 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) {
/* TODO(size_t): should we have constant_time variants for size_t? */
unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
......@@ -1291,7 +1315,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned int mac_size;
int imac_size;
size_t mac_size;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
......@@ -1375,7 +1400,15 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (imac_size < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
goto f_err;
}
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
/*
......@@ -1415,7 +1448,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
......
ssl/ssl_lib.c
浏览文件 @ 72716e79
......@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
* bug
*/
(int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, size_t, int))ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
ssl_undefined_function,
(int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
......
ssl/ssl_locl.h
浏览文件 @ 72716e79
......@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ struct tls_sigalgs_st {
* of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-)
*/
typedef struct ssl3_enc_method {
int (*enc) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int);
int (*enc) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, size_t, int);
int (*mac) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int);
int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *);
int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *,
......
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