- 06 12月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 30 11月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This updates the record layer to use the TLSv1.3 style nonce construciton. It also updates TLSProxy and ossltest to be able to recognise the new layout. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 22 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
This reverts commit 4880672a. Fixes: #1903 Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #1931
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- 17 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
We should use the macro for testing if we are using TLSv1.3 rather than checking s->version directly. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 14 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1669)
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- 07 11月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The record layer version field must be ignored in TLSv1.3, so we remove the check when using that version. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 04 11月, 2016 17 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Travis is reporting one file at a time shadowed variable warnings where "read" has been used. This attempts to go through all of libssl and replace "read" with "readbytes" to fix all the problems in one go. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Rename "read" to "readbytes" Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Travis was failing in some builds due to a bogus complaint about uninit variables. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Also implement the using of them Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Previously they return -1 for failure or the size of the mac. But the size was never used anywhere. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Writing still to be done Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 03 11月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
TLS1.0 and TLS1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We swap to the TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. Issue reported by 郭志攀 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The function ssl3_read_n() takes a parameter |clearold| which, if set, causes any old data in the read buffer to be forgotten, and any unread data to be moved to the start of the buffer. This is supposed to happen when we first read the record header. However, the data move was only taking place if there was not already sufficient data in the buffer to satisfy the request. If read_ahead is set then the record header could be in the buffer already from when we read the preceding record. So with read_ahead we can get into a situation where even though |clearold| is set, the data does not get moved to the start of the read buffer when we read the record header. This means there is insufficient room in the read buffer to consume the rest of the record body, resulting in an internal error. This commit moves the |clearold| processing to earlier in ssl3_read_n() to ensure that it always takes place. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 28 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A zero return from BIO_read()/BIO_write() could mean that an IO operation is retryable. A zero return from SSL_read()/SSL_write() means that the connection has been closed down (either cleanly or not). Therefore we should not propagate a zero return value from BIO_read()/BIO_write() back up the stack to SSL_read()/SSL_write(). This could result in a retryable failure being treated as fatal. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 10月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
OpenSSL 1.1.0 will negotiate EtM on DTLS but will then not actually *do* it. If we use DTLSv1.2 that will hopefully be harmless since we'll tend to use an AEAD ciphersuite anyway. But if we're using DTLSv1, then we certainly will end up using CBC, so EtM is relevant — and we fail to interoperate with anything that implements EtM correctly. Fixing it in HEAD and 1.1.0c will mean that 1.1.0[ab] are incompatible with 1.1.0c+... for the limited case of non-AEAD ciphers, where they're *already* incompatible with other implementations due to this bug anyway. That seems reasonable enough, so let's do it. The only alternative is just to turn it off for ever... which *still* leaves 1.0.0[ab] failing to communicate with non-OpenSSL implementations anyway. Tested against itself as well as against GnuTLS both with and without EtM. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 29 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If we have a handshake fragment waiting then dtls1_read_bytes() was not correctly setting the value of recvd_type, leading to an uninit read. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 22 9月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. CVE-2016-6305 GitHub Issue #1563 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts. Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 16 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This reverts commit 77a6be4d. There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases like this so we need to have a rethink on this. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 13 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A peer continually sending unrecognised warning alerts could mean that we make no progress on a connection. We should abort rather than continuing if we receive an unrecognised warning alert. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 24 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
It is never valid to call ssl3_read_bytes with type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, and in fact we check for valid values for type near the beginning of the function. Therefore this check will never be true and can be removed. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 22 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 19 8月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them. Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the buffered records if we've not got any data left. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Emilia Kasper 提交于
Run util/openssl-format-source on ssl/ Some comments and hand-formatted tables were fixed up manually by disabling auto-formatting. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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