Basically we use EXFLAG_INVALID for all kinds of out of memory and
all kinds of parse errors in x509v3_cache_extensions.

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10756)

Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal
header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally:

While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared
between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal'
are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only.

To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such
a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to
a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary
in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this
ambiguity:

  #include "internal/file.h"      # located in 'include/internal'
  #include "internal/file_int.h"  # located in 'crypto/include/internal'

This commit moves the private crypto headers from

  'crypto/include/internal'  to  'include/crypto'

As a result, the include directives become unambiguous

  #include "internal/file.h"       # located in 'include/internal'
  #include "crypto/file.h"         # located in 'include/crypto'

hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped.

The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially;
they are joined into a single file.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)

In some cases it's about redundant check for return value, in some
cases it's about replacing check for -1 with comparison to 0.
Otherwise compiler might generate redundant check for <-1. [Even
formatting and readability fixes.]
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6860)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1194)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1215)

The X509_TRUST_add() function was leaking an X509_TRUST object on error.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

When auxiliary data contains only reject entries, continue to trust
self-signed objects just as when no auxiliary data is present.

This makes it possible to reject specific uses without changing
what's accepted (and thus overring the underlying EKU).

Added new supported certs and doubled test count from 38 to 76.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

This includes basic constraints, key usages, issuer EKUs and auxiliary
trust OIDs (given a trust suitably related to the intended purpose).

Added tests and updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

By default X509_check_trust() trusts self-signed certificates from
the trust store that have no explicit local trust/reject oids
encapsulated as a "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" object.  (See the -addtrust
and -trustout options of x509(1)).

This commit adds a flag that makes it possible to distinguish between
that implicit trust, and explicit auxiliary settings.

With flags |= X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT, a certificate is only trusted
via explicit trust settings.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.

But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
from lack of EKU constraints.

Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
explicit reject.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Rename BUF_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
to OPENSSL_{strdup,strlcat,strlcpy,memdup,strndup,strnlen}
Add #define's for the old names.
Add CRYPTO_{memdup,strndup}, called by OPENSSL_{memdup,strndup} macros.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules.  Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.

The header files that got moved are:

crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

For a local variable:
        TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption.  Instead do this:
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Add OSSL_NELEM macro to e_os.h to determine the number of elements in an
array.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The mkstack.pl script now generates the entire safestack.h file.
It generates output that follows the coding style.
Also, removed all instances of the obsolete IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF
macro.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

certificate is explicitly trusted (using -addtrust option to x509 utility
for example) the verification is sucessful even if the chain is not complete.

and response verification.

Submitted by: Zoltan Glozik <zglozik@opentsa.org>
Reviewed by: Ulf Moeller

I have tried to convert 'len' type variable declarations to unsigned as a
means to address these warnings when appropriate, but when in doubt I have
used casts in the comparisons instead. The better solution (that would get
us all lynched by API users) would be to go through and convert all the
function prototypes and structure definitions to use unsigned variables
except when signed is necessary. The proliferation of (signed) "int" for
strictly non-negative uses is unfortunate.

PR: 617

Add missing variable length cipher flag for Blowfish.

Only use trust settings if either trust or reject settings
are present, otherwise use compatibility mode. This stops
root CAs being rejected if they have alias of keyid set.

Purpose and trust setting functions for X509_STORE.

Tidy existing code.

Enhance OCSP_request_verify() so it finds the signers certificate
properly and supports several flags.

Initial OCSP certificate verify. Not complete,
it just supports a "trusted OCSP global root CA".

like Malloc, Realloc and especially Free conflict with already existing names
on some operating systems or other packages.  That is reason enough to change
the names of the OpenSSL memory allocation macros to something that has a
better chance of being unique, like prepending them with OPENSSL_.

This change includes all the name changes needed throughout all C files.

yet tighter, and also put some heat on the rest of the library by
insisting (correctly) that compare callbacks used in stacks are prototyped
with "const" parameters. This has led to a depth-first explosion of
compiler warnings in the code where 1 constification has led to 3 or 4
more. Fortunately these have all been resolved to completion and the code
seems cleaner as a result - in particular many of the _cmp() functions
should have been prototyped with "const"s, and now are. There was one
little problem however;

X509_cmp() should by rights compare "const X509 *" pointers, and it is now
declared as such. However, it's internal workings can involve
recalculating hash values and extensions if they have not already been
setup. Someone with a more intricate understanding of the flow control of
X509 might be able to tighten this up, but for now - this seemed the
obvious place to stop the "depth-first" constification of the code by
using an evil cast (they have migrated all the way here from safestack.h).

Fortunately, this is the only place in the code where this was required
to complete these type-safety changes, and it's reasonably clear and
commented, and seemed the least unacceptable of the options. Trying to
take the constification further ends up exploding out considerably, and
indeed leads directly into generalised ASN functions which are not likely
to cooperate well with this.

where the new functions are mentioned.