1. 11 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  2. 10 11月, 2016 1 次提交
  3. 09 11月, 2016 2 次提交
  4. 08 11月, 2016 4 次提交
    • F
      Allow null in X509_CRL_METHOD_free · 7cb1ecec
      FdaSilvaYY 提交于
      and fix documentation.
      Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1634)
      7cb1ecec
    • A
      Improve PRF documentation · 27ed73a9
      Andrea Grandi 提交于
      Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
      Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      
      GH: #1834
      27ed73a9
    • D
      Make RSA_sign.pod less confusing. · aa90ca11
      David Benjamin 提交于
      PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm
      RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier
      document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the
      document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms,
      RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
      
      Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find
      anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name.
      Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
      Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      
      GH: #1474
      aa90ca11
    • M
      Partial revert of "Fix client verify mode to check SSL_VERIFY_PEER" · c8e2f98c
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      This partially reverts commit c636c1c4. It also tweaks the documentation
      and comments in this area. On the client side the documented interface for
      SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() is that setting the flag
      SSL_VERIFY_PEER causes verfication of the server certificate to take place.
      Previously what was implemented was that if *any* flag was set then
      verification would take place. The above commit improved the semantics to
      be as per the documented interface.
      
      However, we have had a report of at least one application where an
      application was incorrectly using the interface and used *only*
      SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT on the client side. In OpenSSL prior to
      the above commit this still caused verification of the server certificate
      to take place. After this commit the application silently failed to verify
      the server certificate.
      
      Ideally SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() could be modified to indicate
      if invalid flags were being used. However these are void functions!
      
      The simplest short term solution is to revert to the previous behaviour
      which at least means we "fail closed" rather than "fail open".
      
      Thanks to Cory Benfield for reporting this issue.
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      c8e2f98c
  5. 04 11月, 2016 7 次提交
  6. 02 11月, 2016 3 次提交
  7. 29 10月, 2016 1 次提交
  8. 28 10月, 2016 1 次提交
  9. 27 10月, 2016 1 次提交