A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario

CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Ib81f15484fa3374bf5f50baece50bb36d105d6d7

Fixes CVE-2023-0217

When attempting to do a BN_Copy of params->p there was no NULL check.
Since BN_copy does not check for NULL this is a NULL reference.

As an aside BN_cmp() does do a NULL check, so there are other checks
that fail because a NULL is passed. A more general check for NULL params
has been added for both FFC public and private key validation instead.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I7086365d9f51b6f36fcfb79a45d36f8d032e1f22

Original author: Nevine Ebeid (Amazon)
Fixes: CVE-2023-1255

The buffer overread happens on decrypts of 4 mod 5 sizes.
Unless the memory just after the buffer is unmapped this is harmless.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20759)

(cherry picked from commit 72dfe46550ee1f1bbfacd49f071419365bc23304)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I636543b8cf34e1edaeee4d1c0d5617eb500a24a6

Fixes CVE-2023-0216
Reviewed-by: NShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Ib4aac57064b9860c1960a66e3cbeac43ff929fe4

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Change-Id: If27a355635b2da681abac1d757386a5c9dfcdae3
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

These calls invoke EVP_DigestInit() which can fail for digests
with implicit fetches. Subsequent EVP_DigestUpdate() from BIO_write()
or EVP_DigestFinal() from BIO_read() will segfault on NULL
dereference. This can be triggered by an attacker providing
PKCS7 data digested with MD4 for example if the legacy provider
is not loaded.

If BIO_set_md() fails the md BIO cannot be used.

CVE-2023-0401
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Id19000b7a7fc2dbe28e9d41fb66d496ec7ca9ef1

Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
cert was bad.

Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20587)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I510a81e2e970638eb61ebd1d78c07f2559d15c18

If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
BIO is eventually freed.

Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
Buehler.

Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I9194a044eccbf5410227b2e833dfd2221ffa3735

In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
free if the caller frees them even on failure.

Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.

Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.

CVE-2022-4450
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Ic4a32fd3b5cbebfcc20bb93db250d44a60f00dd3

This function assumes that if the "gen" is an OtherName, then the "base"
is a rfc822Name constraint. This assumption is not true in all cases.
If the end-entity certificate contains an OtherName SAN of any type besides
SmtpUtf8Mailbox and the CA certificate contains a name constraint of
OtherName (of any type), then "nc_email_eai" will be invoked, with the
OTHERNAME "base" being incorrectly interpreted as a ASN1_IA5STRING.

Reported by Corey Bonnell from Digicert.

CVE-2022-4203
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I008cc36abe7c7957312525e5ee002fdc42737649

Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
cert was bad.

Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints.  Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.

Fixes CVE-2023-0464
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario

CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
BIO is eventually freed.

Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
Buehler.

Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
free if the caller frees them even on failure.

Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.

Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.

CVE-2022-4450
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nhaixiangw <wanghaixiang@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nhaixiangw <wanghaixiang@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nwanghaixiang <wanghaixiang@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: NHJ <huangjun42@huawei.com>

Description:Openssl bugfix CVE-2019-1551
Team:OTHERS
Feature or Bugfix:Bugfix
Binary Source:No
PrivateCode(Yes/No):No

Change-Id: I73aa3eb8c8f1fcbd49183ddfe3e2ea17a4c12bc5
Reviewed-on: http://mgit-tm.rnd.huawei.com/9089040Tested-by: Npublic jenkins <public_jenkins@notesmail.huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ndongjinguang 00268009 <dongjinguang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nhouyuezhou 00386575 <hou@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nlinyibin 00246405 <linyibin@huawei.com>

Description:use openssl asm mode
Team:OTHERS
Feature or Bugfix:Bugfix
Binary Source:No
PrivateCode(Yes/No):No

Change-Id: Id449bd200b5e2ef817ac329fc6874190bc245ad4
Reviewed-on: http://mgit-tm.rnd.huawei.com/9083098Reviewed-by: Nhouyuezhou 00386575 <hou@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Npublic jenkins <public_jenkins@notesmail.huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nlinyibin 00246405 <linyibin@huawei.com>

Description:openssl support to build by arm
Team:OTHERS
Feature or Bugfix:Bugfix
Binary Source:No
PrivateCode(Yes/No):No

Change-Id: Iedde66caa66b2baa5c1a4508240849da0e434efd
Reviewed-on: http://mgit-tm.rnd.huawei.com/8910856Reviewed-by: Ndongjinguang 00268009 <dongjinguang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nhouyuezhou 00386575 <hou@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Npublic jenkins <public_jenkins@notesmail.huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nlinyibin 00246405 <linyibin@huawei.com>

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11445)

This partially reverts commit db943f43.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11400)

Basically we use EXFLAG_INVALID for all kinds of out of memory and
all kinds of parse errors in x509v3_cache_extensions.

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10756)

Found by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8274)

(cherry picked from commit 23dc8feba817560485da00d690d7b7b9e5b15682)

This should avoid half of the trial divisions in probable_prime_dh_safe
and avoid bn_probable_prime_dh generating primes with special properties.
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)

Currently probable_prime makes sure that p-1 does not have
any prime factors from 3..17863, which is useful for safe primes,
but not necessarily for the general case.

Issue was initially reported here:
MIRONOV, I. Factoring RSA Moduli II.
https://windowsontheory.org/2012/05/17/factoring-rsa-moduli-part-ii/Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)

Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11344)