- 20 9月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
TLSProxy was failing if we are Configured with compression because it doesn't support it. This fix simply switches compression off for the purposes of the test. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 26 8月, 2015 2 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Add a set of tests for checking that NewSessionTicket messages are behaving as expected. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Previously TLSProxy would detect a successful handshake once it saw the server Finished message. This causes problems with abbreviated handshakes, or if the client fails to process a message from the last server flight. This change additionally sends some application data and finishes when the client sends a CloseNotify. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 14 8月, 2015 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
- select an actual file handle for devnull - do not declare $msgdata twice - SKE records sometimes seem to come without sig - in SKE parsing, use and use $pub_key_len when parsing $pub_key Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 12 8月, 2015 3 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Use a dynamic engine for ossltest engine so that we can build it without subsequently deploying it during install. We do not want people accidentally using this engine. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Add ServerHello parsing to TLSProxy. Also add some (very) limited ServerKeyExchange parsing. Add the capability to set client and server cipher lists Fix a bug with fragment lengths Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This commit provides a set of perl modules that support the testing of libssl. The test harness operates as a man-in-the-middle proxy between s_server and s_client. Both s_server and s_client must be started using the "-testmode" option which loads the new OSSLTEST engine. The test harness enables scripts to be written that can examine the packets sent during a handshake, as well as (potentially) modifying them so that otherwise illegal handshake messages can be sent. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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