Skip to content

T
Third Party Openssl

OpenHarmony / Third Party Openssl
1 年多 前同步成功

通知 10
Star 18
Fork 1
T
Third Party Openssl
切换分支/标签
  1. 04 9月, 2019 2 次提交
  3. 30 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  5. 27 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 24 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  9. 22 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • R
      openssl dgst, openssl enc: check for end of input · 8be96f23
      由 Richard Levitte 提交于 
      The input reading loop in 'openssl dgst' and 'openssl enc' doesn't
check for end of input, and because of the way BIO works, it thereby
won't detect that the end is reached before the read is an error.
With the FILE BIO, an error occurs when trying to read past EOF, which
is fairly much ok, except when the command is used interactively, at
least on Unix.  The result in that case is that the user has to press
Ctrl-D twice for the command to terminate.

The issue is further complicated because both these commands use
filter BIOs on top of the FILE BIO, so a naïve attempt to check
BIO_eof() doesn't quite solve it, since that only checks the state of
the source/sink BIO, and the filter BIO may have some buffered data
that still needs to be read.  Fortunately, there's BIO_pending() that
checks exactly that, if any filter BIO has pending data that needs to
be processed.

We end up having to check both BIO_pending() and BIO_eof().

Thanks to Zsigmond Lőrinczy for the initial effort and inspiration.

Fixes #9355
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9668)

(cherry picked from commit 8ed7bbb411d2a9e0edef928958ad955e0be3d6dd)
      8be96f23
  11. 20 8月, 2019 2 次提交
    • J
      Correct documented return value for BIO_get_mem_data() · 378d53ec
      由 Johannes 提交于 
      CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9643)

(cherry picked from commit 797a5b7af9d9bbfbcbff4607c10ad5c5595ac785)
      378d53ec
    • P
      Start up DEVRANDOM entropy improvement for older Linux devices. · 3ff98f55
      由 Pauli 提交于 
      Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed.  Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.

This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions.  However, this is no worse than the current situation.

An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence.  Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process.  Even one long running process will prevent this attack.

The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0.  Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)

[manual merge]
      3ff98f55
  13. 19 8月, 2019 6 次提交
  15. 18 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  17. 17 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  19. 15 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  21. 14 8月, 2019 4 次提交
  23. 13 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  25. 12 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  27. 09 8月, 2019 5 次提交
  29. 08 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  31. 06 8月, 2019 1 次提交