Reported by Coverity Scan (CID 1439138)
[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7156)

Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7090)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7121)

`RSA_free()` and friends are called in case of error from
`RSA_new_method(ENGINE *e)` (or the respective equivalent functions).

For the rest of the description I'll talk about `RSA_*`, but the same
applies for the equivalent `DSA_free()`, `DH_free()`, `EC_KEY_free()`.

If `RSA_new_method()` fails because the engine does not implement the
required method, when `RSA_free(RSA *r)` is called,
`r->meth == NULL` and a segfault happens while checking if
`r->meth->finish` is defined.

This commit fixes this issue by ensuring that `r->meth` is not NULL
before dereferencing it to check for `r->meth->finish`.

Fixes #7102 .
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7121)

In [most common] case of p and q being of same width, it's possible to
replace CRT modulo operations with Montgomery reductions. And those are
even fixed-length Montgomery reductions...
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6915)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6823)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5254)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6371)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6290)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5990)

RSA key generation: ensure BN_mod_inverse and BN_mod_exp_mont both get called with BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set.

Based on an original patch by Billy Brumley

CVE-2018-0737
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Almost all *alloc failures now set an error code.
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5842)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5851)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2181)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5689)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4966)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Replaced variable-time GCD with consttime inversion to avoid side-channel attacks on RSA key generation
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5161)

Found by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5336)

Reduce RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM to 5.
Remove no longer used RSA_MIN_PRIME_SIZE.
Make rsa_multip_cap honor RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4905)

As per documentation, the RSA keys should not be smaller than 64bit (the
documentation mentions something about a quirk in the prime generation
algorithm). I am adding check into the code which used to be 16 for some
reason.
My primary motivation is to get rid of the last sentence in the
documentation which suggest that typical keys have 1024 bits (instead
updating it to the now default 2048).
I *assume* that keys less than the 2048 bits (say 512) are used for
education purposes.
The 512 bits as the minimum have been suggested by Bernd Edlinger.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4547)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4862)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4872)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4845)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4791)

Multi-prime RSA security is not determined by modulus length alone, but
depends even on number of primes. Too many primes render security
inadequate, but there is no common amount of primes or common factors'
length that provide equivalent secuity promise as two-prime for given
modulus length. Maximum amount of permitted primes is determined
according to following table.

   <1024 | >=1024 | >=4096 | >=8192
   ------+--------+--------+-------
     2   |   3    |   4    |   5
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4791)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4770)

* Introduce RSA_generate_multi_prime_key to generate multi-prime
  RSA private key. As well as the following functions:
    RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count
    RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors
    RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params
    RSA_set0_multi_prime_params
    RSA_get_version
* Support EVP operations for multi-prime RSA
* Support ASN.1 operations for multi-prime RSA
* Support multi-prime check in RSA_check_key_ex
* Support multi-prime RSA in apps/genrsa and apps/speed
* Support multi-prime RSA manipulation functions
* Test cases and documentation are added
* CHANGES is updated
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4241)

Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4431)

A new method is added to EVP_PKEY_METH as:

    int (*check) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);

and to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD as:

    int (*pkey_check) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);

This is used to check the validity of a specific key.

The order of calls is:
EVP_PKEY_check -> pmeth.check -> ameth.pkey_check.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4337)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)

Removed e_os.h from all bar three headers (apps/apps.h crypto/bio/bio_lcl.h and
ssl/ssl_locl.h).

Added e_os.h into the files that need it now.

Directly reference internal/nelem.h when required.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4223)

this part contains only the return (x) fix.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4223)

If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that
does the wrap-around.

Re-order seeding and stop after first success.

Add RAND_poll_ex()

Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED.  Also, for child DRBG's,
mix in the address as the personalization bits.

Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib.
(Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.)
Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion.

Various code cleanups:
    -Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls.
    -Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea)
    -Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library
    -Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc.
    -Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the
     implementation of NIST DRBG.
    -Remove blocklength
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)

The memory blocks contain secret data and must be
cleared before returning to the system heap.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4062)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3920)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3920)