Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)

Some EC functions exist in *_GFp and *_GF2m forms, in spite of the
implementations between the two curve types being identical. This
commit provides equivalent generic functions with the *_GFp and *_GF2m
forms just calling the generic functions.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6815)

By default `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (which uses the Lopez-Dahab ladder
implementation) is used only for (k * Generator) or (k * VariablePoint).
ECDSA verification uses (a * Generator + b * VariablePoint): this commit
forces the use of `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` also for the ECDSA verification
path, while using the default wNAF implementation for any other case.

With this commit `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` loses the static attribute, and
is added to ec_lcl.h so EC_METHODs can directly use it.

While working on a new custom EC_POINTs_mul implementation, I realized
that many checks (e.g. all the points being compatible with the given
EC_GROUP, creating a temporary BN_CTX if `ctx == NULL`, check for the
corner case `scalar == NULL && num == 0`) were duplicated again and
again in every single implementation (and actually some
implementations lacked some of the tests).
I thought that it makes way more sense for those checks that are
independent from the actual implementation and should always be done, to
be moved in the EC_POINTs_mul wrapper: so this commit also includes
these changes.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)

This commit implements coordinate blinding, i.e., it randomizes the
representative of an elliptic curve point in its equivalence class, for
prime curves implemented through EC_GFp_simple_method,
EC_GFp_mont_method, and EC_GFp_nist_method.

This commit is derived from the patch
https://marc.info/?l=openssl-dev&m=131194808413635 by Billy Brumley.

Coordinate blinding is a generally useful side-channel countermeasure
and is (mostly) free. The function itself takes a few field
multiplicationss, but is usually only necessary at the beginning of a
scalar multiplication (as implemented in the patch). When used this way,
it makes the values that variables take (i.e., field elements in an
algorithm state) unpredictable.

For instance, this mitigates chosen EC point side-channel attacks for
settings such as ECDH and EC private key decryption, for the
aforementioned curves.

For EC_METHODs using different coordinate representations this commit
does nothing, but the corresponding coordinate blinding function can be
easily added in the future to extend these changes to such curves.
Co-authored-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: NBilly Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6501)

We check that the curve name associated with the point is the same as that
for the curve.

Fixes #6302
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6323)

Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6085)

Almost all *alloc failures now set an error code.
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5842)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5038)

This is based on RT#3810, which added dedicated modular inversion.
ECDSA verify results improves as well, but not as much.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5001)

Since return is inconsistent, I removed unnecessary parentheses and
unified them.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4541)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3740)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3740)

Approved by Oracle.
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3585)

Change code so when switching on an enumeration, have case's for all
enumeration values.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)

We already test in EC_POINT_oct2point that points are on the curve. To
be on the safe side, move this check to
EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_* so as to also check point coordinates
received through some other method.

We do not check projective coordinates, though, as
- it's unlikely that applications would be receiving this primarily
  internal representation from untrusted sources, and
- it's possible that the projective setters are used in a setting where
  performance matters.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Instead of overriding a default operation move default operation to a
separate function which is then explicitly included in any EC_METHOD
that uses it.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Add support for optional overrides of various private key operations
in EC_METHOD.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Those even order that do not play nicely with Montgomery arithmetic
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

New functions to return internal pointer for order and cofactor. This
avoids the need to allocate a new BIGNUM which to copy the value to.
Simplify code to use new functions.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Add CRYPTO_EX_DATA add EndC_KEY_[gs]et_method, From Roumen Petrov.
Had to add various exdata calls to init/copy/free the exdata.
Had to remove const from some EC functions because exdata isn't
const-correct. :(
Also remove EC_EXTRA_DATA and use a union to hold the possible
pre-computed values and an enum to tell which value is in the
union. (Rich Salz)
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Continuing from previous commit ensure our style is consistent for malloc
return checks.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

After openssl_zalloc, cleanup more "set to 0/NULL" assignments.
Many are from github feedback.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Especially since after the #ifdef cleanups this is not useful.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The function EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean value.
It returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if it is not, and -1
on error. Many usages within OpenSSL were incorrectly using this
function and therefore not correctly handling error conditions.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

For a local variable:
        TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption.  Instead do this:
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

After the finale, the "real" final part. :)  Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This gets BN_.*free:
    BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
    BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free

Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>