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  1. 20 2月, 2023 1 次提交
  3. 10 8月, 2021 1 次提交
  5. 31 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  7. 25 3月, 2020 1 次提交
  9. 19 3月, 2020 1 次提交
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  21. 06 12月, 2019 1 次提交
  23. 02 11月, 2019 1 次提交
  25. 15 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  27. 17 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  29. 10 9月, 2019 5 次提交
  31. 09 9月, 2019 2 次提交
    • B
      Change DH_generate_parameters back to order 2q subgroup · 1f9dc86b
      由 Bernd Edlinger 提交于 
      For for G=2 and 5 DH_generate_parameters will continue to generate
the order 2q subgroup for compatibility with previous versions.

For G=3 DH_generate_parameters generates an order q subgroup, but it
will not pass the check in DH_check with previous OpenSSL versions.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9820)
      1f9dc86b
    • N
      [ec] Match built-in curves on EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters · 9a43a733
      由 Nicola Tuveri 提交于 
      Description
-----------

Upon `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()` check if the parameters match any
of the built-in curves. If that is the case, return a new
`EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name()` object instead of the explicit parameters
`EC_GROUP`.

This affects all users of `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`:
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`
- direct calls to `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()` with an explicit
  parameters argument
- ASN.1 parsing of explicit parameters keys (as it eventually
  ends up calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`)

A parsed explicit parameter key will still be marked with the
`OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE` ASN.1 flag on load, so, unless
programmatically forced otherwise, if the key is eventually serialized
the output will still be encoded with explicit parameters, even if
internally it is treated as a named curve `EC_GROUP`.

Before this change, creating any `EC_GROUP` object using
`EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`, yielded an object associated with
the default generic `EC_METHOD`, but this was never guaranteed in the
documentation.
After this commit, users of the library that intentionally want to
create an `EC_GROUP` object using a specific `EC_METHOD` can still
explicitly call `EC_GROUP_new(foo_method)` and then manually set the
curve parameters using `EC_GROUP_set_*()`.

Motivation
----------

This has obvious performance benefits for the built-in curves with
specialized `EC_METHOD`s and subtle but important security benefits:
- the specialized methods have better security hardening than the
  generic implementations
- optional fields in the parameter encoding, like the `cofactor`, cannot
  be leveraged by an attacker to force execution of the less secure
  code-paths for single point scalar multiplication
- in general, this leads to reducing the attack surface

Check the manuscript at https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785 for an in depth
analysis of the issues related to this commit.

It should be noted that `libssl` does not allow to negotiate explicit
parameters (as per RFC 8422), so it is not directly affected by the
consequences of using explicit parameters that this commit fixes.
On the other hand, we detected external applications and users in the
wild that use explicit parameters by default (and sometimes using 0 as
the cofactor value, which is technically not a valid value per the
specification, but is tolerated by parsers for wider compatibility given
that the field is optional).
These external users of `libcrypto` are exposed to these vulnerabilities
and their security will benefit from this commit.

Related commits
---------------

While this commit is beneficial for users using built-in curves and
explicit parameters encoding for serialized keys, commit
b783beeadf6b80bc431e6f3230b5d5585c87ef87 (and its equivalents for the
1.0.2, 1.1.0 and 1.1.1 stable branches) fixes the consequences of the
invalid cofactor values more in general also for other curves
(CVE-2019-1547).

The following list covers commits in `master` that are related to the
vulnerabilities presented in the manuscript motivating this commit:

- d2baf88c43 [crypto/rsa] Set the constant-time flag in multi-prime RSA too
- 311e903d84 [crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
- b783beeadf [crypto/ec] for ECC parameters with NULL or zero cofactor, compute it
- 724339ff44 Fix SCA vulnerability when using PVK and MSBLOB key formats

Note that the PRs that contributed the listed commits also include other
commits providing related testing and documentation, in addition to
links to PRs and commits backporting the fixes to the 1.0.2, 1.1.0 and
1.1.1 branches.

This commit includes a partial backport of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8555
(commit 8402cd5f75f8c2f60d8bd39775b24b03dd8b3b38)
for which the main author is Shane Lontis.

Responsible Disclosure
----------------------

This and the other issues presented in https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
were reported by Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri,
Iaroslav Gridin, Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya and Billy Bob Brumley from the
NISEC group at Tampere University, FINLAND.

The OpenSSL Security Team evaluated the security risk for this
vulnerability as low, and encouraged to propose fixes using public Pull
Requests.

_______________________________________________________________________________
Co-authored-by: NShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>

(Backport from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9808)
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9809)
      9a43a733
  33. 07 9月, 2019 2 次提交
  35. 30 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  37. 20 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • P
      Start up DEVRANDOM entropy improvement for older Linux devices. · 3ff98f55
      由 Pauli 提交于 
      Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed.  Once one such call has succeeded,
a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.

This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
conditions.  However, this is no worse than the current situation.

An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
duration of the process's existence.  Thus, an attacker would not only need
to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
any process.  Even one long running process will prevent this attack.

The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
Linux kernel 2.0.  Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)

[manual merge]
      3ff98f55
  39. 06 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  41. 01 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  43. 25 7月, 2019 1 次提交
    • R
      Fix default installation paths on mingw · 54aa9d51
      由 Richard Levitte 提交于 
      Mingw config targets assumed that resulting programs and libraries are
installed in a Unix-like environment and the default installation
prefix was therefore set to '/usr/local'.

However, mingw programs are installed in a Windows environment, and
the installation directories should therefore have Windows defaults,
i.e. the same kind of defaults as the VC config targets.

A difficulty is, however, that a "cross compiled" build can't figure
out the system defaults from environment the same way it's done when
building "natively", so we have to fall back to hard coded defaults in
that case.

Tests can still be performed when cross compiled on a non-Windows
platform, since all tests only depend on the source and build
directory, and otherwise relies on normal local paths.

CVE-2019-1552
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9400)
      54aa9d51
  45. 23 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  47. 24 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  49. 01 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  51. 09 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  53. 28 5月, 2019 3 次提交