Fix misspelling errors and typos reported by codespell

Fixes #10998
Reviewed-by: NShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11000)

CHANGES

@@ -681,9 +681,9 @@
      bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such
      alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice
      it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3
-     prohibts this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
+     prohibits this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
      support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the
-     record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause inter-operability
+     record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause interoperability
      issues.
      [Matt Caswell]
 
@@ -3700,7 +3700,7 @@
      implementations).
      [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
 
-  *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
+  *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instead of ssize_t which isn't available on
      all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
      header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -8421,7 +8421,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or
      read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output
-     parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
+     parsed, outputted or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
      still needs to check the OCSP response validity.
      [Steve Henson]
 
@@ -9416,7 +9416,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      [Andy Polyakov]
 
   *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set
-     specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
+     specifically for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
      used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was
      ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of
      the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced
@@ -10533,10 +10533,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface.
      NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file,
      which is useful for debugging.  All other functions take the same
-     arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the
+     arguments as the old CONF_* functions with the exception of the
      first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'.
 
-     To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
+     To make it easier to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
      the function CONF_set_default_method is provided.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
@@ -12379,7 +12379,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to
      read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions
      aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of
-     translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded
+     translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code embedded
      in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which
      have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all
      on one line (which resulted in some large lines...).
@@ -12680,7 +12680,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
 
   *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and
      other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the
-     Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure
+     Configure script every time: One now can use ``perl Configure
      <id>:<details>'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended
      to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static
      pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key <id> with value

CONTRIBUTING

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ guidelines:
     consider adding a note in CHANGES.  This could be a summarising
     description of the change, and could explain the grander details.
     Have a look through existing entries for inspiration.
-    Please note that this is NOT simply a copy of git-log oneliners.
+    Please note that this is NOT simply a copy of git-log one-liners.
     Also note that security fixes get an entry in CHANGES.
     This file helps users get more in depth information of what comes
     with a specific release without having to sift through the higher

Configurations/15-android.conf

@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ my %targets = (
     },
 
     ####################################################################
-    # Backward compatible targets, (might) requre $CROSS_SYSROOT
+    # Backward compatible targets, (might) require $CROSS_SYSROOT
     #
     "android-armeabi" => {
         inherit_from     => [ "android-arm" ],

Configurations/50-win-onecore.conf

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 # Mobile[?] Windows editions. It's a set up "umbrella" libraries that
 # export subset of Win32 API that are common to all Windows 10 devices.
 #
-# OneCore Configuration temporarly dedicated for console applications
+# OneCore Configuration temporarily dedicated for console applications
 # due to disabled event logging, which is incompatible with one core.
 # Error messages are provided via standard error only.
 # TODO: extend error handling to use ETW based eventing

crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl

@@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	movdqu	`16*0`($inp),$inout0		# load input
 	movdqa	$rndkey0,$twmask
 	movdqu	`16*1`($inp),$inout1
-	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0		# intput^=tweak^round[0]
+	pxor	@tweak[0],$inout0		# input^=tweak^round[0]
 	movdqu	`16*2`($inp),$inout2
 	pxor	@tweak[1],$inout1
 	 aesdec		$rndkey1,$inout0
@@ -4828,7 +4828,7 @@ ctr_xts_se_handler:
 	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
 
 	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
-	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue lable
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
 	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
 	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
 
@@ -4872,7 +4872,7 @@ ocb_se_handler:
 	mov	56($disp),%r11		# disp->HandlerData
 
 	mov	0(%r11),%r10d		# HandlerData[0]
-	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue lable
+	lea	(%rsi,%r10),%r10	# prologue label
 	cmp	%r10,%rbx		# context->Rip<prologue label
 	jb	.Lcommon_seh_tail
 

crypto/bn/asm/co-586.pl

@@ -39,17 +39,17 @@ sub mul_add_c
 
 	&mul("edx");
 	&add($c0,"eax");
-	 &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# laod next a
+	 &mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# load next a
 	 &mov("eax",&wparam(0)) if $pos > 0;			# load r[]
 	 ###
 	&adc($c1,"edx");
-	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# laod next b
-	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 1;	# laod next b
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 0;	# load next b
+	 &mov("edx",&DWP(($nb)*4,$b,"",0)) if $pos == 1;	# load next b
 	 ###
 	&adc($c2,0);
 	 # is pos > 1, it means it is the last loop
 	 &mov(&DWP($i*4,"eax","",0),$c0) if $pos > 0;		# save r[];
-	&mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1;		# laod next a
+	&mov("eax",&DWP(($na)*4,$a,"",0)) if $pos == 1;		# load next a
 	}
 
 sub sqr_add_c

crypto/dh/dh_gen.c

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *ret, int prime_len, int generator,
  * for 3, p mod 12 == 11
  * for 5, p mod 60 == 59
  *
- * However for compatibilty with previous versions we use:
+ * However for compatibility with previous versions we use:
  * for 2, p mod 24 == 11
  * for 5, p mod 60 == 23
  */

crypto/evp/e_aes.c

@@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                                     (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kma[0] &	\
                                      S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
 
-/* iv + padding length for iv lenghts != 12 */
+/* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */
 # define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i)	((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16)
 
 /*-

crypto/perlasm/README

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Functions of interest are:
 &function_begin_B(name,extra)	Same as normal function_begin but no pushing.
 &function_end(name)		Call at end of function.
 &function_end_A(name)		Standard pop and ret, for use inside functions
-&function_end_B(name)		Call at end but with poping or 'ret'.
+&function_end_B(name)		Call at end but with pop or ret.
 &swtmp(num)			Address on stack temp word.
 &wparam(num)			Parameter number num, that was push
 				in C convention.  This all works over pushes

crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c

@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
         return ret;
 #else
         /*
-         * If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content
+         * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
          * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
          * reseeding.
          */

crypto/rand/rand_lib.c

@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
  * is returned without producing an error message.
  *
  * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
- * to finish the udpate operation (see next comment).
+ * to finish the update operation (see next comment).
  */
 unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
 {

crypto/rand/rand_local.h

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
  * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal
  * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material).
  *
- * The normal value has been chosed by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce
+ * The normal value has been chosen by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce
  * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four
  * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes).  This means the buffer ends
  * with 40 bytes.  The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which

crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-mmx.pl

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 # produce worse code. On the other hand one can wonder why not 128-bit
 # SSE2? Well, SSE2 won't provide double improvement, rather far from
 # that, if any at all on some processors, because it will take extra
-# permutations and inter-bank data trasfers. Besides, contemporary
+# permutations and inter-bank data transfers. Besides, contemporary
 # CPUs are better off executing 64-bit code, and it makes lesser sense
 # to invest into fancy 32-bit code. And the decision doesn't seem to
 # be inadequate, if one compares below results to "64-bit platforms in

crypto/sha/asm/keccak1600-x86_64.pl

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 # Ryzen			8.8
 #
 # (*)	Corresponds to SHA3-256. Improvement over compiler-generate
-#	varies a lot, most commont coefficient is 15% in comparison to
+#	varies a lot, most common coefficient is 15% in comparison to
 #	gcc-5.x, 50% for gcc-4.x, 90% for gcc-3.x.
 # (**)	Sandy Bridge has broken rotate instruction. Performance can be
 #	improved by 14% by replacing rotates with double-precision

crypto/sparcv9cap.c

@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
 
     /*
      * In wait for better solution _sparcv9_rdcfr is masked by
-     * VIS3 flag, because it goes to uninterruptable endless
+     * VIS3 flag, because it goes to uninterruptible endless
      * loop on UltraSPARC II running Solaris. Things might be
      * different on Linux...
      */

crypto/whrlpool/asm/wp-mmx.pl

@@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ sub LL()
 					unshift(@_,pop(@_));
 				  }
 				}
-	else			{ die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+	else			{ die "invalid SCALE value"; }
 }
 
 sub scale()
 {	if	($SCALE==2)	{ &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,@_[1],@_[1])); }
 	elsif	($SCALE==8)	{ &lea(@_[0],&DWP(0,"",@_[1],8));  }
-	else			{ die "unvalid SCALE value";       }
+	else			{ die "invalid SCALE value";       }
 }
 
 sub row()
 {	if	($SCALE==2)	{ ((8-shift)&7); }
 	elsif	($SCALE==8)	{ (8*shift);     }
-	else			{ die "unvalid SCALE value"; }
+	else			{ die "invalid SCALE value"; }
 }
 
 $tbl="ebp";

doc/man1/s_client.pod

@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ at a positive depth or else "matched EE certificate" at depth 0.
 
 Use one or more times to specify the RRDATA fields of the DANE TLSA
 RRset associated with the target service.  The B<rrdata> value is
-specied in "presentation form", that is four whitespace separated
+specified in "presentation form", that is four whitespace separated
 fields that specify the usage, selector, matching type and associated
 data, with the last of these encoded in hexadecimal.  Optional
 whitespace is ignored in the associated data field.  For example:

doc/man1/sess_id.pod

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Typical output:
      Timeout   : 300 (sec)
      Verify return code 0 (ok)
 
-Theses are described below in more detail.
+These are described below in more detail.
 
 =over 4
 

doc/man3/ASN1_TYPE_get.pod

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ If either or both of the parameters passed to ASN1_TYPE_cmp() is NULL the
 return value is non-zero. Technically if both parameters are NULL the two
 types could be absent OPTIONAL fields and so should match, however passing
 NULL values could also indicate a programming error (for example an
-unparseable type which returns NULL) for types which do B<not> match. So
+unparsable type which returns NULL) for types which do B<not> match. So
 applications should handle the case of two absent values separately.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES

doc/man3/OCSP_request_add1_nonce.pod

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ it adds a nonce to OCSP basic response B<resp>.
 
 OCSP_check_nonce() compares the nonce value in B<req> and B<resp>.
 
-OCSP_copy_nonce() copys any nonce value present in B<req> to B<resp>.
+OCSP_copy_nonce() copies any nonce value present in B<req> to B<resp>.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 

doc/man3/OPENSSL_malloc.pod

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ about what is being done.
 For example, identifying the field names when parsing a complicated
 data structure.
 OPENSSL_mem_debug_push() (which calls CRYPTO_mem_debug_push())
-attachs an identifying string to the allocation stack.
+attaches an identifying string to the allocation stack.
 This must be a global or other static string; it is not copied.
 OPENSSL_mem_debug_pop() removes identifying state from the stack.
 

doc/man7/passphrase-encoding.pod

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ A pass phrase encoded in ISO-8859-2 could very well have a sequence such as
 0xC3 0xAF (which is the two characters "LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A WITH BREVE"
 and "LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z WITH DOT ABOVE" in ISO-8859-2 encoding), but would
 be misinterpreted as the perfectly valid UTF-8 encoded code point U+00EF (LATIN
-SMALL LETTER I WITH DIARESIS) I<if the pass phrase doesn't contain anything that
+SMALL LETTER I WITH DIAERESIS) I<if the pass phrase doesn't contain anything that
 would be invalid UTF-8>.
 A pass phrase that contains this kind of byte sequence will give a different
 outcome in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and newer than in OpenSSL older than 1.1.0.

engines/e_afalg.c

@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static int afalg_start_cipher_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const unsigned char *in,
 
     /*
      * vmsplice and splice are used to pin the user space input buffer for
-     * kernel space processing avoiding copys from user to kernel space
+     * kernel space processing avoiding copies from user to kernel space
      */
     ret = vmsplice(actx->zc_pipe[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT);
     if (ret < 0) {

test/run_tests.pl

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ my $ret = $harness->runtests(map { abs2rel($_, rel2abs(curdir())); }
 # $ret->has_errors may be any number, not just 0 or 1.  On VMS, numbers
 # from 2 and on are used as is as VMS statuses, which has severity encoded
 # in the lower 3 bits.  0 and 1, on the other hand, generate SUCCESS and
-# FAILURE, so for currect reporting on all platforms, we make sure the only
+# FAILURE, so for correct reporting on all platforms, we make sure the only
 # exit codes are 0 and 1.  Double-bang is the trick to do so.
 exit !!$ret->has_errors if (ref($ret) eq "TAP::Parser::Aggregator");