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94fd382f
编写于
16年前
作者:
D
Dr. Stephen Henson
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电子邮件补丁
差异文件
Fix two invalid memory reads in RSA OAEP mode.
Submitted by: Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> Reviewed by: steve
上级
4bd4afa3
master
OpenHarmony-2.2-Beta2
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add_issus_pr_template_for_master
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feature_IDL_20220811
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monthly_20220614
monthly_20220816
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隐藏空白更改
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Showing
2 changed file
with
23 addition
and
8 deletion
+23
-8
CHANGES
CHANGES
+8
-0
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+15
-8
未找到文件。
CHANGES
浏览文件 @
94fd382f
...
...
@@ -685,6 +685,14 @@
[NTT]
Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [xx XXX xxxx]
*) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads.
The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than
'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes
before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where
the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte
invalid read after the end of 'db').
[Ivan Nesterlode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>]
*) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set
TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed
...
...
This diff is collapsed.
Click to expand it.
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
浏览文件 @
94fd382f
...
...
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const
unsigned
char
*
maskeddb
;
int
lzero
;
unsigned
char
*
db
=
NULL
,
seed
[
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
],
phash
[
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
unsigned
char
*
padded_from
;
int
bad
=
0
;
if
(
--
num
<
2
*
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+
1
)
...
...
@@ -106,8 +107,6 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
lzero
=
num
-
flen
;
if
(
lzero
<
0
)
{
/* lzero == -1 */
/* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
* for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge
* -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
...
...
@@ -115,20 +114,28 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* so we use a 'bad' flag */
bad
=
1
;
lzero
=
0
;
flen
=
num
;
/* don't overflow the memcpy to padded_from */
}
maskeddb
=
from
-
lzero
+
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
dblen
=
num
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
db
=
OPENSSL_malloc
(
dblen
);
db
=
OPENSSL_malloc
(
dblen
+
num
);
if
(
db
==
NULL
)
{
RSAerr
(
RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP
,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
return
-
1
;
}
/* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when lzero == 0)
* to avoid leaking timing info about the value of lzero. */
padded_from
=
db
+
dblen
;
memset
(
padded_from
,
0
,
lzero
);
memcpy
(
padded_from
+
lzero
,
from
,
flen
);
maskeddb
=
padded_from
+
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
MGF1
(
seed
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
maskeddb
,
dblen
);
for
(
i
=
lzero
;
i
<
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
i
++
)
seed
[
i
]
^=
from
[
i
-
lzero
];
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
i
++
)
seed
[
i
]
^=
padded_from
[
i
];
MGF1
(
db
,
dblen
,
seed
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
dblen
;
i
++
)
...
...
@@ -143,13 +150,13 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
for
(
i
=
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
i
<
dblen
;
i
++
)
if
(
db
[
i
]
!=
0x00
)
break
;
if
(
db
[
i
]
!=
0x01
||
i
++
>=
dblen
)
if
(
i
==
dblen
||
db
[
i
]
!=
0x01
)
goto
decoding_err
;
else
{
/* everything looks OK */
mlen
=
dblen
-
i
;
mlen
=
dblen
-
++
i
;
if
(
tlen
<
mlen
)
{
RSAerr
(
RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP
,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE
);
...
...
This diff is collapsed.
Click to expand it.
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