Merge pull request !97 from code4lala/fix-CVE-2023-0465-CVE-2023-0466

Merge pull request !94 from yinchuang/fix_llvm15_openssl

The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.

Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
cert was bad.

Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nyinchuang <yinchuang@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Ida0b31153d9a59d362a23338a5bf547524ec7dcf

Merge pull request !92 from code4lala/fix-CVE-2023-0464

Merge pull request !93 from jiangdi/master

Signed-off-by: Njiangdi <jiangdi11@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Njiangdi <jiangdi11@huawei.com>

A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
that include policy constraints.  Attackers may be able to exploit this
vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack on affected systems.

Fixes CVE-2023-0464
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

满足合入条件、但并发量过大；需要手动合入！

Issue: #I6ID6E
Signed-off-by: Nguzhihao4 <guzhihao4@huawei.com>
Change-Id: I4452c47fd141b3f995f9fa212c8590671edd7e74

Merge pull request !78 from code4lala/master

add rsa_sup_mul.c from CVE-2022-4304 fix https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/43d8f88511991533f53680a751e9326999a6a31fSigned-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA
padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

Patch written by Dmitry Belyavsky and Hubert Kario

CVE-2022-4304
Reviewed-by: NDmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

If the aux->asn1_cb() call fails in BIO_new_NDEF then the "out" BIO will
be part of an invalid BIO chain. This causes a "use after free" when the
BIO is eventually freed.

Based on an original patch by Viktor Dukhovni and an idea from Theo
Buehler.

Thanks to Octavio Galland for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Call PEM_read_bio_ex() and expect a failure. There should be no dangling
ptrs and therefore there should be no double free if we free the ptrs on
error.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

In the event of a failure in PEM_read_bio_ex() we free the buffers we
allocated for the header and data buffers. However we were not clearing
the ptrs stored in *header and *data. Since, on success, the caller is
responsible for freeing these ptrs this can potentially lead to a double
free if the caller frees them even on failure.

Thanks to Dawei Wang for reporting this issue.

Based on a proposed patch by Kurt Roeckx.

CVE-2022-4450
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NHugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !75 from lwx1153805/lsn_openssl_0116

issue:https://gitee.com/openharmony/third_party_openssl/issues/I6AQ8S?from=project-issueSigned-off-by: Nlwx1153805 <longshining2@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !71 from code4lala/master

Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Ie2857a7388c4b7e17d84dd48ec150530983db773

Merge pull request !73 from 周海锋/master

Signed-off-by: Nzhouhaifeng <kutcher.zhou@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Ncode4lala <fengziteng2@huawei.com>
Change-Id: Icb4f5b98f8466ed760026495de9e097b3fa46d04

Merge pull request !69 from ltdong/master

Signed-off-by: Nltdong <donglongtao@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !70 from zhangcui/master

Signed-off-by: Nzhang-cui11 <zhangcui11@huawei.com>

Signed-off-by: Nltdong <donglongtao@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !68 from zhao_zhen_zhou/master

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !62 from zhao_zhen_zhou/master

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !61 from zhao_zhen_zhou/master

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>

Merge pull request !50 from zhao_zhen_zhou/master

Signed-off-by: Nzhao_zhen_zhou <zhaozhenzhou@huawei.com>