t1_lib.c 118.7 KB
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/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
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/* ====================================================================
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 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
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 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#endif
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#include "ssl_locl.h"

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const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
				SSL_SESSION **psess);
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static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
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int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
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#endif
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
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	tls1_enc,
	tls1_mac,
	tls1_setup_key_block,
	tls1_generate_master_secret,
	tls1_change_cipher_state,
	tls1_final_finish_mac,
	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	tls1_alert_code,
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	tls1_export_keying_material,
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	0,
	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
	ssl3_handshake_write
	};

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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
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	tls1_enc,
	tls1_mac,
	tls1_setup_key_block,
	tls1_generate_master_secret,
	tls1_change_cipher_state,
	tls1_final_finish_mac,
	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	tls1_alert_code,
	tls1_export_keying_material,
	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
	ssl3_handshake_write
	};

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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
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	tls1_enc,
	tls1_mac,
	tls1_setup_key_block,
	tls1_generate_master_secret,
	tls1_change_cipher_state,
	tls1_final_finish_mac,
	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
	tls1_alert_code,
	tls1_export_keying_material,
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	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
		|SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
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	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
	ssl3_handshake_write
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	};

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long tls1_default_timeout(void)
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	{
	/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
	 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
	return(60*60*2);
	}

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int tls1_new(SSL *s)
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	{
	if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
	return(1);
	}

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void tls1_free(SSL *s)
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	{
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
		}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
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	ssl3_free(s);
	}

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void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
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	{
	ssl3_clear(s);
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	s->version = s->method->version;
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	}

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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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typedef struct
	{
	int nid;		/* Curve NID */
	int secbits;		/* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
	unsigned int flags;	/* Flags: currently just field type */
	} tls_curve_info;

#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2		0x1
#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME		0x0

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static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
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	{
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		{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
		{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
		{NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
		{NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */ 
		{NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */ 
		{NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
		{NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */ 
		{NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */ 
		{NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
		{NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */ 
		{NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */ 
		{NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
		{NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */ 
		{NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */ 
		{NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
		{NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */ 
		{NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */ 
		{NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
		{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */ 
		{NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */ 
		{NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
		{NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */ 
		{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */ 
		{NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
		{NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */	
		{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */	
		{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */	
		{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */	
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	};
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static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = 
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	{
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	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
	TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
	};

static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
	{
		0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
		0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
		0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
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		0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */	
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		0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
		0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
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		0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */	
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		0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
		0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
		0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
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		0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */	
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		0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
		0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
		0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
		0,6,  /* sect233k1 (6) */
		0,7,  /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
		0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
		0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
		0,4,  /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
		0,5,  /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
		0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
		0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
		0,1,  /* sect163k1 (1) */
		0,2,  /* sect163r1 (2) */
		0,3,  /* sect163r2 (3) */
		0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
		0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
		0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
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	};

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static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
	{
		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
	};

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int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
	{
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	/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
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	if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
		return 0;
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	return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
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	}

int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
	{
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	/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
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	switch (nid)
		{
	case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
		return 1;
	case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
		return 2;
	case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
		return 3;
	case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
		return 4;
	case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
		return 5;
	case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
		return 6;
	case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
		return 7;
	case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
		return 8;
	case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
		return 9;
	case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
		return 10;
	case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
		return 11;
	case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
		return 12;
	case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
		return 13;
	case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
		return 14;
	case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
		return 15;
	case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
		return 16;
	case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
		return 17;
	case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
		return 18;
	case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
		return 19;
	case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
		return 20;
	case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
		return 21;
	case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
		return 22;
	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
		return 23;
	case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
		return 24;
	case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
		return 25;
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	case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
		return 26;
	case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
		return 27;
	case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
		return 28;
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	default:
		return 0;
		}
	}
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/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
 * preferred list
 */
static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
					const unsigned char **pcurves,
					size_t *pcurveslen)
	{
	if (sess)
		{
		*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
		*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
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		return;
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		}
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	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
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		{
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	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
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		*pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
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		break;

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	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
		*pcurveslen = 2;
		break;

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	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
		*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
		*pcurveslen = 2;
		break;
	default:
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		*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
		*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
		}
	if (!*pcurves)
		{
		*pcurves = eccurves_default;
		*pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
		}
	}
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/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
	{
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	const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
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	if (curve[0])
		return 1;
	if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
		return 0;
	cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
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#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
	if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
		return 0;
#endif
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	return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
	}

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/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
	{
	const unsigned char *curves;
	size_t curveslen, i;
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	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
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	if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
		return 0;
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	/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
	if (suiteb_flags)
		{
		unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
		if (p[1])
			return 0;
		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
			{
			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
				return 0;
			}
		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
			{
			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
				return 0;
			}
		else	/* Should never happen */
			return 0;
		}
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	tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
	for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
		{
		if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
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			return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
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		}
	return 0;
	}
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/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
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 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
 * an EC tmp key.
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 */
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int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
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	{
	const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
	size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
	int k;
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	/* Can't do anything on client side */
	if (s->server == 0)
		return -1;
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	if (nmatch == -2)
		{
		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
			{
			/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
			 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
			 * checks.
			 */
			unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
				return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
				return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
			/* Should never happen */
			return NID_undef;
			}
		/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
		nmatch = 0;
		}
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	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
				&supp, &supplen);
	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
				&pref, &preflen);
	preflen /= 2;
	supplen /= 2;
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	k = 0;
	for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
		{
		const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
		for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
			{
			if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
				{
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				if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
					continue;
529
				if (nmatch == k)
530 531 532 533
					{
					int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
					return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
					}
534 535 536 537 538
				k++;
				}
			}
		}
	if (nmatch == -1)
539 540
		return k;
	return 0;
541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575
	}

int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
			int *curves, size_t ncurves)
	{
	unsigned char *clist, *p;
	size_t i;
	/* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
	 * while curve ids < 32 
	 */
	unsigned long dup_list = 0;
	clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
	if (!clist)
		return 0;
	for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
		{
		unsigned long idmask;
		int id;
		id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
		idmask = 1L << id;
		if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
			{
			OPENSSL_free(clist);
			return 0;
			}
		dup_list |= idmask;
		s2n(id, p);
		}
	if (*pext)
		OPENSSL_free(*pext);
	*pext = clist;
	*pextlen = ncurves * 2;
	return 1;
	}

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#define MAX_CURVELIST	28
577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616

typedef struct
	{
	size_t nidcnt;
	int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
	} nid_cb_st;

static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
	{
	nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
	size_t i;
	int nid;
	char etmp[20];
	if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
		return 0;
	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
		return 0;
	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
	etmp[len] = 0;
	nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
	if (nid == NID_undef)
		nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
	if (nid == NID_undef)
		nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
	if (nid == NID_undef)
		return 0;
	for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
		if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
			return 0;
	narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
	return 1;
	}
/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 
				const char *str)
	{
	nid_cb_st ncb;
	ncb.nidcnt = 0;
	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
		return 0;
617 618
	if (pext == NULL)
		return 1;
619 620
	return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
	}
621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631
/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
				EC_KEY *ec)
	{
	int is_prime, id;
	const EC_GROUP *grp;
	const EC_METHOD *meth;
	if (!ec)
		return 0;
	/* Determine if it is a prime field */
	grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
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	if (!grp)
633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659
		return 0;
        meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
	if (!meth)
		return 0;
        if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
		is_prime = 1;
	else
		is_prime = 0;
	/* Determine curve ID */
	id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
	id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
	/* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
	if (id)
		{
		curve_id[0] = 0;
		curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
		}
	else
		{
		curve_id[0] = 0xff;
		if (is_prime)
			curve_id[1] = 0x01;
		else
			curve_id[1] = 0x02;
		}
	if (comp_id)
		{
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        	if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
			return 0;
662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679
		if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
			{
			if (is_prime)
				*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
			else
				*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
			}
		else
			*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
		}
	return 1;
	}
/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
			unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
	{
	const unsigned char *p;
	size_t plen, i;
680
	int j;
681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695
	/* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
	 * is supported (see RFC4492).
	 */
	if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
		{
		p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
		plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
		for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
			{
			if (*comp_id == *p)
				break;
			}
		if (i == plen)
			return 0;
		}
696 697
	if (!curve_id)
		return 1;
698 699
	/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
	for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
700
		{
701
		tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
702 703 704
		for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
			{
			if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705
				break;
706
			}
707 708
		if (i == plen)
			return 0;
709 710
		/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
		if (!s->server)
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			break;
712 713 714
		}
	return 1;
	}
715

716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736
static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
					size_t *pformatslen)
	{
	/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
	 * use default */
	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
		{
		*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
		*pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
		}
	else
		{
		*pformats = ecformats_default;
		/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
		else
			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
		}
	}

737 738 739
/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
 */
740
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
741 742
	{
	unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
743 744 745
	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
	int rv;
	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
746 747
	if (!pkey)
		return 0;
748 749 750 751 752 753
	/* If not EC nothing to do */
	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
		{
		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
		return 1;
		}
754 755 756 757
	rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
	if (!rv)
		return 0;
758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794
	/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
	 * supported curves extension.
	 */
	rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
	if (!rv)
		return 0;
	/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
	 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
	 */
	if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
		int check_md;
		size_t i;
		CERT *c = s->cert;
		if (curve_id[0])
			return 0;
		/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
		if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
		else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
		else
			return 0; /* Should never happen */
		for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
			if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
				break;
		if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
			return 0;
		if (set_ee_md == 2)
			{
			if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
			else
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
			}
		}
	return rv;
795 796
	}
/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
797
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
798 799 800
	{
	unsigned char curve_id[2];
	EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
801 802
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
	/* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
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	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
804 805
		return 1;
#endif
806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838
	/* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
	 * no other curves permitted.
	 */
	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
		/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
		else
			return 0;
		curve_id[0] = 0;
		/* Check this curve is acceptable */
		if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
			return 0;
		/* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
			return 1;
		/* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
		else 
			{
			unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
			if (!ec)
				return 0;
			if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
				return 0;
			if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
				return 1;
			return 0;
			}
			
		}
839 840 841 842 843 844 845
	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
		{
		/* Need a shared curve */
		if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
			return 1;
		else return 0;
		}
846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853
	if (!ec)
		{
		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
			return 1;
		else
			return 0;
		}
	if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
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		return 0;
855 856 857 858
/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
#if 0
	return 1;
#else
859
	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
860
#endif
861
	}
862

863 864 865 866 867 868 869
#else

static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
	{
	return 1;
	}

870
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
871

872
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892

/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
 */

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
#else
#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
#endif

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
#else
#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
#endif

#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
#else
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#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913
#endif

#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
		tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
		tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
		tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)

static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#endif
};
914
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
915 916 917 918
static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
};
919
#endif
920
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
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	{
922 923 924
	/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
	 * preferences.
	 */
925
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939
	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
		{
	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
		return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);

	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
		return 2;

	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
		return 2;
		}
940
#endif
941 942 943
	/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
	if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
		{
944 945
		*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
		return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
946 947 948
		}
	else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
		{
949 950
		*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
		return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
951
		}
952
	else
953
		{
954
		*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
955
		return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
956
		}
957
	}
958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975
/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
 */
int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
				const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
	{
	const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
	size_t sent_sigslen, i;
	int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
	/* Should never happen */
	if (sigalg == -1)
		return -1;
	/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
	if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
		return 0;
		}
976
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
977 978 979 980 981 982 983
	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
		{
		unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
		/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
		if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
			return 0;
		if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
984 985
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
986
			return 0;
987
			}
988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016
		/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
			{
			if (curve_id[0])
				return 0;
			if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
				{
				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
					return 0;
					}
				}
			else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
				{
				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
					return 0;
					}
				}
			else
				return 0;
			}
		}
	else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
		return 0;
1017
#endif
1018

1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026
	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
		{
		if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
			break;
		}
	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1027
	if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
		return 0;
		}
	*pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
	if (*pmd == NULL)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
		return 0;
		}
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	/* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
	if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
				EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
								(void *)sig))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
		return 0;
		}
1046 1047 1048 1049 1050
	/* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
	 * wish.
	 */
	if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
		s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1051 1052
	return 1;
	}
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1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064
/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
 * session and not global settings.
 * 
 */
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
	{
	CERT *c = s->cert;
	c->mask_a = 0;
	c->mask_k = 0;
1065
	/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1066
	if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1067 1068 1069
		c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
	else
		c->mask_ssl = 0;
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	ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
	/* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1072 1073
	 * signature algorithms.
	 */
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	if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1075
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
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	if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1077
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
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	if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
	if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
		}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
	if (!s->psk_client_callback)
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
		}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
	if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
		{
		c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
		c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
		}
#endif
1102
	c->valid = 1;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1103
	}
1104

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1105
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1106 1107 1108 1109
	{
	CERT *ct = s->cert;
	if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
		return 1;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117
	return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
	}

static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
	{
	if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
		return 0;
	return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1118 1119
	}

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1120
unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1121
	{
1122
	int extdatalen=0;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1123 1124
	unsigned char *orig = buf;
	unsigned char *ret = buf;
1125 1126 1127
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
	int using_ecc = 0;
1128
	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139
		{
		int i;
		unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);

		for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
			{
			SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);

			alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
			alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1140
			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148
				|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
				{
				using_ecc = 1;
				break;
				}
			}
		}
#endif
1149 1150 1151 1152

	ret+=2;

	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1153

1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181
        /* Add RI if renegotiating */
        if (s->renegotiate)
          {
          int el;

          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
              {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;

          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
          s2n(el,ret);

          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
              {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          ret += el;
        }
	/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
		goto done;

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1182
 	if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1183
		{ 
1184 1185 1186 1187
		/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
		unsigned long size_str;
		long lenmax; 

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1188
		/* check for enough space.
1189 1190 1191 1192 1193
		   4 for the servername type and entension length
		   2 for servernamelist length
		   1 for the hostname type
		   2 for hostname length
		   + hostname length 
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1194
		*/
1195
		   
1196 1197
		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 
		    || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1198 1199 1200 1201 1202
			return NULL;
			
		/* extension type and length */
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 
		s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1203
		
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1204
		/* length of servername list */
1205
		s2n(size_str+3,ret);
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1206 1207
	
		/* hostname type, length and hostname */
1208
		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1209 1210 1211
		s2n(size_str,ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
		ret+=size_str;
1212
		}
1213

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1214
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1215
	/* Add SRP username if there is one */
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1216
	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1217
		{ /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1218

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1219 1220
		int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);	
		if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1221 1222 1223
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233
			} 

		/* check for enough space.
		   4 for the srp type type and entension length
		   1 for the srp user identity
		   + srp user identity length 
		*/
		if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 

		/* fill in the extension */
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1234 1235
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
		s2n(login_len+1,ret);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1236 1237
		(*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
		memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1238 1239 1240 1241
		ret+=login_len;
		}
#endif

1242
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243
	if (using_ecc)
1244 1245 1246
		{
		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
		long lenmax; 
1247 1248
		const unsigned char *plist;
		size_t plistlen;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1249 1250
		size_t i;
		unsigned char *etmp;
1251 1252

		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1253

1254
		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
1255 1256
		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
		if (plistlen > 255)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1257 1258 1259 1260
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
1261 1262
		
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1263 1264 1265 1266 1267
		s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
		*(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
		ret+=plistlen;

1268
		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1269
		plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1270
		tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1271

1272
		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 
1273 1274
		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
		if (plistlen > 65532)
1275 1276 1277 1278
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1279

1280 1281
		
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293
		etmp = ret + 4;
		/* Copy curve ID if supported */
		for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
			{
			if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
				{
				*etmp++ = plist[0];
				*etmp++ = plist[1];
				}
			}

		plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1294

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1295
		s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1296 1297
		s2n(plistlen, ret);
		ret+=plistlen;
1298
		}
1299
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1300

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1301
	if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1302 1303
		{
		int ticklen;
1304
		if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1305
			ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317
		else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
			 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
			{
			ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
			s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
			if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
				return NULL;
			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
			       s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
			       ticklen);
			s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
			}
1318 1319
		else
			ticklen = 0;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1320 1321 1322
		if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
		    s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
			goto skip_ext;
1323 1324 1325
		/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
 		 * rest for ticket
  		 */
1326
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 
		s2n(ticklen,ret);
		if (ticklen)
			{
			memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
			ret += ticklen;
			}
		}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1335
		skip_ext:
1336

1337
	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1338
		{
1339
		size_t salglen;
1340
		const unsigned char *salg;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1341
		unsigned char *etmp;
1342
		salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1343
		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1344 1345
			return NULL; 
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1346 1347 1348
		etmp = ret;
		/* Skip over lengths for now */
		ret += 4;
1349
		salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1350 1351 1352
		/* Fill in lengths */
		s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
		s2n(salglen, etmp);
1353
		ret += salglen;
1354 1355
		}

1356
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1357
	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1358 1359 1360
		{
		size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
		
1361
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373
			return NULL;
		if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
			return NULL;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 
		s2n(col + 2, ret);
		s2n(col, ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
		ret += col;
		}
#endif

1374
	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421
		{
		int i;
		long extlen, idlen, itmp;
		OCSP_RESPID *id;

		idlen = 0;
		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
			{
			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
			if (itmp <= 0)
				return NULL;
			idlen += itmp + 2;
			}

		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
			{
			extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
			if (extlen < 0)
				return NULL;
			}
		else
			extlen = 0;
			
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
		if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
			return NULL;
		s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
		*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
		s2n(idlen, ret);
		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
			{
			/* save position of id len */
			unsigned char *q = ret;
			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
			/* skip over id len */
			ret += 2;
			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
			/* write id len */
			s2n(itmp, q);
			}
		s2n(extlen, ret);
		if (extlen > 0)
			i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
		}

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1422 1423
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	/* Add Heartbeat extension */
1424 1425
	if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
		return NULL;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437
	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
	s2n(1,ret);
	/* Set mode:
	 * 1: peer may send requests
	 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
	 */
	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
	else
		*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
#endif

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1438
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449
	if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
		{
		/* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
		 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
			return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}
#endif

A
Adam Langley 已提交
1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461
	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
		{
		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
			return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
		s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
		s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
		       s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
		ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
		}

M
Matt Caswell 已提交
1462
        if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1463 1464 1465 1466 1467
                {
                int el;

                ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1468
                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479

                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                s2n(el,ret);

                if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
                ret += el;
                }
1480
	custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1481
	/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1482 1483
	if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
		return NULL;
1484
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1485 1486
	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
	s2n(0,ret);
1487
#endif
1488

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1489
	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1490
	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1491 1492 1493
	 *
	 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
	 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1494
	 */
1495
	if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1496
		{
1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510
		int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
		/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
		 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
		 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
		 */
		if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
			hlen -= 5;
		if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
			{
			hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
			if (hlen >= 4)
				hlen -= 4;
			else
				hlen = 0;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1511

1512 1513 1514 1515 1516
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
			s2n(hlen, ret);
			memset(ret, 0, hlen);
			ret += hlen;
			}
1517
		}
1518

1519 1520
	done:

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1521 1522
	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
		return orig;
1523

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1524
	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1525
	return ret;
1526
	}
1527

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1528
unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1529
	{
1530
	int extdatalen=0;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1531 1532
	unsigned char *orig = buf;
	unsigned char *ret = buf;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1533 1534
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	int next_proto_neg_seen;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1535
#endif
1536
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1537 1538
	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1539
	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1540
	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1541
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1542
	
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1543
	ret+=2;
1544 1545
	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1546
	if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555
        {
          int el;
          
          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
              {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1556
          if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569
          
          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
          s2n(el,ret);

          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
              {
              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
              return NULL;
              }

          ret += el;
        }

1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581
	/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
		goto done;

	if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
		{
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

1582
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1583
	if (using_ecc)
1584
		{
1585 1586
		const unsigned char *plist;
		size_t plistlen;
1587 1588 1589
		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
		long lenmax; 

1590 1591
		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);

1592
		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
1593 1594
		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
		if (plistlen > 255)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1595 1596 1597 1598
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			return NULL;
			}
1599 1600
		
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1601 1602 1603 1604
		s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
		ret+=plistlen;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1605

1606
		}
1607
	/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1608
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1609

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1610
	if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1611
		{ 
1612
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
1613 1614 1615
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}
1616

1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623
	if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
		{ 
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
		s2n(0,ret);
		}

1624
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1625
	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1626 1627
		{
		size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1628
		
1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640
		if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
			return NULL;
		if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
			return NULL;

		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 
		s2n(sol + 2, ret);
		s2n(sol, ret);
		memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
		ret += sol;
		}
#endif
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1641

M
Matt Caswell 已提交
1642
        if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1643 1644 1645 1646 1647
                {
                int el;

                ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
                
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1648
                if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654

                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
                s2n(el,ret);

                if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
			{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1655
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1656 1657 1658 1659 1660
			return NULL;
			}
                ret+=el;
                }

1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674
	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
		{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
			0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
			0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
			0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 
			0x03,   0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 
			0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 
			0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
			if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
			memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
			ret+=36;

		}
1675

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1676
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1677 1678 1679
	/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
	if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
		{
1680 1681
		if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
			return NULL;
1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
		s2n(1,ret);
		/* Set mode:
		 * 1: peer may send requests
		 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
		 */
		if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
		else
			*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1692

1693
		}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1694 1695
#endif

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1696
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716
	next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
	if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
		{
		const unsigned char *npa;
		unsigned int npalen;
		int r;

		r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
		if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
			{
			if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
			s2n(npalen,ret);
			memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
			ret += npalen;
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
			}
		}
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1717 1718
	if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
		return NULL;
1719 1720 1721
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
	if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
		{
1722
		/* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1723
		 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1724
		 */
1725
		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1726
		    || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734
			s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
		else
			{
			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
			s2n(0,ret);
			}
		}
#endif
1735

A
Adam Langley 已提交
1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750
	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
		{
		const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
		unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;

		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
			return NULL;
		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
		s2n(3 + len,ret);
		s2n(1 + len,ret);
		*ret++ = len;
		memcpy(ret, selected, len);
		ret += len;
		}

1751 1752
	done:

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1753 1754
	if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0) 
		return orig;
1755

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
1756
	s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1757
	return ret;
1758
	}
1759

A
Adam Langley 已提交
1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829
/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
 * ClientHello.
 *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
 *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
 *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
 *       return.
 *
 *   returns: 0 on success. */
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
					 unsigned data_len, int *al)
	{
	unsigned i;
	unsigned proto_len;
	const unsigned char *selected;
	unsigned char selected_len;
	int r;

	if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
		return 0;

	if (data_len < 2)
		goto parse_error;

	/* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
	 * length-prefixed strings. */
	i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
	    ((unsigned) data[1]);
	data_len -= 2;
	data += 2;
	if (data_len != i)
		goto parse_error;

	if (data_len < 2)
		goto parse_error;

	for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
		{
		proto_len = data[i];
		i++;

		if (proto_len == 0)
			goto parse_error;

		if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
			goto parse_error;

		i += proto_len;
		}

	r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
				   s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
	if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
		if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
		s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
		if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
			{
			*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			return -1;
			}
		memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
		s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
	}
	return 0;

parse_error:
	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
	return -1;
	}

1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
 *   SNI,
 *   elliptic_curves
 *   ec_point_formats
 *
 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
 */
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
	unsigned short type, size;
	static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
		0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
		0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
		0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
		0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
		0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
		0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */

		0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
		0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
		0x01,        /* 1 point format */
		0x00,        /* uncompressed */
	};

	/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
	static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
		0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
		0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
		0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
		0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
		0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
		0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
		0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
		0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
	};

	if (data >= (d+n-2))
		return;
	data += 2;

	if (data > (d+n-4))
		return;
	n2s(data,type);
	n2s(data,size);

	if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
		return;

	if (data+size > d+n)
		return;
	data += size;

1887
	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
		{
		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);

		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
			return;
		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
			return;
		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
			return;
		}
	else
		{
		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

		if (data + len != d+n)
			return;
		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
			return;
		}

	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
}
R
Rob Stradling 已提交
1911
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1912

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1913

1914 1915
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
	{	
1916 1917 1918
	unsigned short type;
	unsigned short size;
	unsigned short len;
1919
	unsigned char *data = *p;
1920 1921
	int renegotiate_seen = 0;

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1922
	s->servername_done = 0;
1923
	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1924 1925 1926
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
1927

A
Adam Langley 已提交
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
		}

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1934 1935 1936 1937
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
1938 1939 1940 1941

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
	if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
R
Rob Stradling 已提交
1942
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1943

1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
	/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
	if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
		s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
		}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1950

1951 1952 1953 1954
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
	s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif

1955
	if (data >= (d+n-2))
1956
		goto ri_check;
1957 1958
	n2s(data,len);

1959
	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
1960
		goto ri_check;
1961

1962 1963
	while (data <= (d+n-4))
		{
1964 1965 1966 1967
		n2s(data,type);
		n2s(data,size);

		if (data+size > (d+n))
1968
	   		goto ri_check;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1969
#if 0
1970
		fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
1971
#endif
1972 1973 1974
		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
			{
			if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
				return 0;
			renegotiate_seen = 1;
			}
		else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
			{}
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:

   - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
   - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
     in which case an fatal alert is generated.
   - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
   - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
     to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 
   - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 
     it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 
     Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
     set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
     case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
     a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
     presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
     the value of the Host: field. 
   - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
     if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
     i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 
   - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 

*/      

2006
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2007
			{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2008
			unsigned char *sdata;
2009
			int servname_type;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
			int dsize; 
		
			if (size < 2) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(data,dsize);  
2018
			size -= 2;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2019
			if (dsize > size  ) 
2020
				{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				} 

			sdata = data;
			while (dsize > 3) 
				{
	 			servname_type = *(sdata++); 
2029
				n2s(sdata,len);
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2030 2031 2032
				dsize -= 3;

				if (len > dsize) 
2033 2034 2035 2036
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2037
				if (s->servername_done == 0)
2038 2039 2040
				switch (servname_type)
					{
				case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2041
					if (!s->hit)
2042
						{
2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048
						if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
							{
							*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
							return 0;
							}
						if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2049 2050 2051 2052
							{
							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
							return 0;
							}
2053 2054 2055 2056 2057
						if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
							{
							*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
							return 0;
							}
2058
						memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2059 2060 2061
						s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
						if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
							OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2062
							s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2063 2064
							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
							return 0;
2065
						}
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2066 2067 2068 2069
						s->servername_done = 1; 

						}
					else 
2070 2071
						s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
							&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 
R
Richard Levitte 已提交
2072
							&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2073
					
2074
					break;
2075

2076 2077
				default:
					break;
2078
					}
2079
				 
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2080
				dsize -= len;
2081
				}
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087
			if (dsize != 0) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

2088
			}
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2089 2090 2091
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
			{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097
			if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2098
				{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
				return -1;
			memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
			s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
  
			if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2111 2112 2113
				}
			}
#endif
2114

2115
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2116
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2117 2118 2119 2120
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);

2121 2122
			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2123 2124 2125 2126
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
2127
			if (!s->hit)
2128
				{
2129 2130
				if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
					{
2131 2132
					OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
					s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148
				}
#if 0
			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2149 2150
#endif
			}
2151
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2152 2153 2154 2155 2156
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));

2157 2158
			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2159 2160 2161 2162
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
2163
			if (!s->hit)
2164
				{
2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177
				if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
				if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184
				}
#if 0
			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2185 2186
#endif
			}
N
Nils Larsch 已提交
2187
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2188
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2189
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;

			if (size < 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2207 2208 2209 2210
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
			else
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
			{
			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
2227 2228 2229
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
			{
			int dsize;
2230
			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 
2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(data,dsize);
			size -= 2;
2237
			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 
2238 2239 2240 2241
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
2242
			if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2243 2244 2245 2246 2247
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
2248
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281
			{
		
			if (size < 5) 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}

			s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
			size--;
			if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
				{
				const unsigned char *sdata;
				int dsize;
				/* Read in responder_id_list */
				n2s(data,dsize);
				size -= 2;
				if (dsize > size  ) 
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				while (dsize > 0)
					{
					OCSP_RESPID *id;
					int idsize;
					if (dsize < 4)
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					n2s(data, idsize);
					dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2282
					size -= 2 + idsize;
2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320
					if (dsize < 0)
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					sdata = data;
					data += idsize;
					id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
								&sdata, idsize);
					if (!id)
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					if (data != sdata)
						{
						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
						&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
						sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
						{
						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
							s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
						{
						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					}

				/* Read in request_extensions */
2321 2322 2323 2324 2325
				if (size < 2)
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
2326 2327
				n2s(data,dsize);
				size -= 2;
2328
				if (dsize != size)
2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				sdata = data;
				if (dsize > 0)
					{
2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341
					if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
						{
						sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
									   X509_EXTENSION_free);
						}

2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358
					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
							&sdata, dsize);
					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
						|| (data + dsize != sdata))
						{
						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
						return 0;
						}
					}
				}
				/* We don't know what to do with any other type
 			 	* so ignore it.
 			 	*/
				else
					s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
			}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
			{
			switch(data[0])
				{
				case 0x01:	/* Client allows us to send HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							break;
				case 0x02:	/* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
							break;
2371 2372
				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
							return 0;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2373 2374 2375
				}
			}
#endif
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2376
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2377
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
A
Adam Langley 已提交
2378 2379
			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
			 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398
			{
			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
			 * renegotiation.
			 *
			 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
			 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
			 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
			 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
			 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
			 * anything like that, but this might change).

			 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
			 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
			 * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
			 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
			 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
			}
#endif
2399

A
Adam Langley 已提交
2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
			 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
			{
			if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
				return 0;
2406
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
A
Adam Langley 已提交
2407 2408
			/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2409
#endif
A
Adam Langley 已提交
2410 2411
			}

2412
		/* session ticket processed earlier */
M
Matt Caswell 已提交
2413 2414
		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
				&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2415 2416 2417 2418 2419
                        {
			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
							      al))
				return 0;
                        }
2420 2421
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2422
			s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2423
#endif
2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429
		/* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
		 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
		 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
		 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
		 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
		 */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2430
		else if (!s->hit)
2431
			{
2432
			if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2433
				return 0;
2434 2435
			}

2436
		data+=size;
2437
		}
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2438

2439
	*p = data;
2440 2441 2442 2443 2444

	ri_check:

	/* Need RI if renegotiating */

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2445
	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2446 2447
		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
		{
2448
		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2449
	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2450 2451 2452 2453
				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
		return 0;
		}

2454
	return 1;
2455
	}
2456

2457 2458 2459
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
	{
	int al = -1;
2460
	custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466
	if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
		{
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
		return 0;
		}

2467
	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) 
2468
		{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2469
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2470 2471 2472 2473 2474
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
}

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2475
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2476 2477 2478
/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
 * the length of the block. */
2479
static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494
	{
	unsigned int off = 0;

	while (off < len)
		{
		if (d[off] == 0)
			return 0;
		off += d[off];
		off++;
		}

	return off == len;
	}
#endif

2495
static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2496
	{
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2497
	unsigned short length;
2498 2499 2500 2501
	unsigned short type;
	unsigned short size;
	unsigned char *data = *p;
	int tlsext_servername = 0;
2502
	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2503

2504 2505 2506 2507
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif

A
Adam Langley 已提交
2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513
	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
		}

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2514 2515 2516 2517 2518
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif

2519 2520 2521 2522
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
	s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif

2523
	if (data >= (d+n-2))
2524
		goto ri_check;
2525

B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531
	n2s(data,length);
	if (data+length != d+n)
		{
		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		return 0;
		}
2532

2533 2534
	while(data <= (d+n-4))
		{
2535 2536 2537 2538
		n2s(data,type);
		n2s(data,size);

		if (data+size > (d+n))
2539
	   		goto ri_check;
2540

2541 2542 2543 2544
		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
						s->tlsext_debug_arg);

2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554

		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
			{
			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
				return 0;
			renegotiate_seen = 1;
			}
		else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
			{}
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560
			{
			if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
				return 0;
				}
2561
			tlsext_servername = 1;   
2562
			}
2563

2564
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2565
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2566 2567 2568 2569 2570 2571 2572 2573 2574
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;
			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);

			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
2575
			if (!s->hit)
2576
				{
2577 2578 2579 2580 2581 2582 2583 2584 2585
				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
				if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
				if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
					{
					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					return 0;
					}
				s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
				memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2586 2587 2588 2589 2590 2591 2592 2593 2594
				}
#if 0
			fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
			sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
			for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
				fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
			}
N
Nils Larsch 已提交
2595
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2596 2597 2598

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
			{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2599 2600 2601 2602 2603 2604
			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2605
			if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 2611
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
			}
2612
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2613
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2614 2615 2616 2617 2618 2619 2620 2621 2622 2623 2624 2625 2626 2627 2628 2629 2630
			{
			unsigned char *sdata = data;

			if (size < 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			
			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2631 2632 2633 2634
			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
			else
				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2635 2636 2637 2638 2639 2640 2641 2642

			if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			}
#endif
2643
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2644 2645 2646 2647 2648 2649 2650 2651 2652 2653 2654 2655
			{
			/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
			 * a status request message.
			 */ 
			if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
			}
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2656
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2657 2658
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2659 2660 2661 2662 2663
			{
			unsigned char *selected;
			unsigned char selected_len;

			/* We must have requested it. */
2664
			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2665 2666 2667 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 2679 2680 2681 2682 2683 2684 2685 2686 2687
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			/* The data must be valid */
			if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
			if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
			s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2688
			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2689 2690
			}
#endif
A
Adam Langley 已提交
2691 2692 2693 2694 2695 2696 2697 2698 2699 2700 2701 2702 2703 2704 2705 2706 2707 2708 2709 2710 2711 2712 2713 2714 2715 2716 2717 2718 2719 2720 2721 2722 2723 2724 2725 2726 2727 2728 2729 2730 2731 2732 2733 2734 2735

		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
			{
			unsigned len;

			/* We must have requested it. */
			if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
				return 0;
				}
			if (size < 4)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			/* The extension data consists of:
			 *   uint16 list_length
			 *   uint8 proto_length;
			 *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
			len = data[0];
			len <<= 8;
			len |= data[1];
			if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			len = data[2];
			if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
			s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
			if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
				{
				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
			memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
			s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
			}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2736 2737 2738 2739 2740 2741 2742 2743 2744 2745 2746 2747
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
			{
			switch(data[0])
				{
				case 0x01:	/* Server allows us to send HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							break;
				case 0x02:	/* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
							s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
							break;
2748 2749
				default:	*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
							return 0;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
2750 2751 2752
				}
			}
#endif
M
Matt Caswell 已提交
2753
		else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2754 2755 2756 2757 2758
                        {
                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
							      al))
                                return 0;
                        }
2759 2760 2761
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
			{
2762
			/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2763
			if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2764
			    && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2765 2766 2767
				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
			}
#endif
2768 2769 2770 2771 2772
		/* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
		 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
		 * callback */
		else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
				return 0;
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
2773 2774
 
		data += size;
2775
		}
2776 2777

	if (data != d+n)
2778 2779 2780 2781
		{
		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		return 0;
		}
2782

2783 2784 2785 2786 2787 2788
	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
		{
 		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
			{
			if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
				{
2789 2790
				s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);	
				if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2791 2792 2793 2794 2795 2796 2797 2798 2799 2800
					{
					*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
					return 0;
					}
				}
			else 
				{
				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				return 0;
				}
2801
			}
2802
		}
2803

2804
	*p = data;
2805 2806 2807 2808 2809 2810 2811 2812 2813 2814

	ri_check:

	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
	 * absence on initial connect only.
	 */
2815 2816
	if (!renegotiate_seen
		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2817
		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2818
		{
2819
		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2820
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2821 2822 2823 2824
				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
		return 0;
		}

2825
	return 1;
2826
	}
2827

2828

2829 2830
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
	{
2831 2832 2833 2834 2835 2836 2837 2838 2839 2840 2841 2842 2843 2844 2845 2846 2847

#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	{
		int r = 1;
	
		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
			{
			r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
			if (!r)
				return -1;
			}

		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
			{
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);

2848 2849 2850 2851
			if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
			else
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2852 2853 2854 2855 2856 2857 2858 2859 2860 2861 2862 2863 2864 2865
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				return -1;
				}
			s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
			}

		if (r == 2)
			/* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
			s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
	}
#endif

2866
	return 1;
2867
	}
2868 2869 2870 2871

int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
	{
	return 1;
2872
	}
2873

2874
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2875
	{
2876
	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2877 2878 2879
	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2880 2881 2882 2883 2884
	/* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 
	 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
	 */
	/* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 
	 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2885 2886 2887 2888 2889 2890 2891 2892
	 */
#endif

	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);

2893 2894 2895 2896
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	{
		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2897 2898
		 * so this has to happen here in
		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2899 2900 2901 2902 2903 2904 2905 2906 2907 2908 2909 2910 2911 2912 2913 2914 2915 2916 2917 2918 2919 2920 2921 2922 2923 2924

		int r = 1;
	
		if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
			{
			r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
			if (!r)
				{
				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				goto err;
				}
			}

		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
		s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;

		if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
			{
			if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
				s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
				{
				/* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
				 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */

2925 2926 2927 2928
				if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
					s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
				else
					s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2929 2930 2931 2932 2933 2934 2935 2936 2937 2938 2939 2940 2941 2942 2943 2944 2945 2946 2947 2948 2949 2950
				if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
					{
					ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
					al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
					goto err;
					}
				s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
				}
			}

		if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
			{
			/* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
			 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
			 * abort the handshake.
			 */
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
			}
	}

 err:
2951
#endif
2952 2953
	switch (ret)
		{
2954 2955 2956 2957 2958 2959 2960 2961 2962 2963 2964 2965
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
			return -1;

		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
			return 1; 
					
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
			s->servername_done=0;
			default:
		return 1;
2966
		}
2967
	}
2968

2969 2970 2971 2972 2973 2974 2975 2976 2977 2978 2979 2980 2981 2982 2983 2984 2985 2986 2987 2988 2989 2990 2991 2992 2993 2994 2995 2996 2997 2998 2999 3000 3001 3002 3003 3004 3005 3006 3007 3008 3009 3010 3011 3012
int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
	{
	int al;
	size_t i;
	/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
	if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
		s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
		}
	/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
		{
		s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
		s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
		}

	/* If sigalgs received process it. */
	if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
		{
		if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			goto err;
			}
		/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
		if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
					SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
			goto err;
			}
		}
	else
		ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
	return 1;
	err:
	ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
	return 0;
	}

3013 3014 3015 3016 3017 3018 3019 3020 3021 3022 3023 3024 3025
int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
	int al;

	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
 	 */
	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
		{
		int r;
3026 3027 3028 3029 3030 3031 3032 3033 3034 3035 3036 3037
		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
		if (certpkey == NULL)
			{
			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
			return 1;
			}
		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
		 */
		s->cert->key = certpkey;
3038 3039 3040 3041 3042 3043 3044 3045 3046 3047 3048 3049 3050 3051 3052 3053 3054 3055 3056 3057 3058 3059 3060 3061 3062 3063 3064 3065 3066 3067 3068 3069 3070 3071 3072 3073 3074 3075 3076 3077
		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
		switch (r)
			{
			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
				break;
			/* status request response should be sent */
			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
				else
					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
				break;
			/* something bad happened */
			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				goto err;
			}
		}
	else
		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;

 err:
	switch (ret)
		{
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
			return -1;

		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
			return 1; 

		default:
			return 1;
		}
	}

3078 3079 3080
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
	{
	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3081
	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3082

3083
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3084 3085 3086
	/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
	 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
	 * it must contain uncompressed.
3087
	 */
3088 3089
	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3090
	if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3091
	    (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
3092
	    ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3093 3094
		{
		/* we are using an ECC cipher */
N
Nils Larsch 已提交
3095
		size_t i;
3096 3097
		unsigned char *list;
		int found_uncompressed = 0;
3098
		list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3099 3100 3101 3102 3103 3104 3105 3106 3107 3108
		for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
			{
			if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
				{
				found_uncompressed = 1;
				break;
				}
			}
		if (!found_uncompressed)
			{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3109
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3110 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115
			return -1;
			}
		}
	ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */

3116
	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
3117
		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3118
	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
3119
		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3120

3121 3122 3123 3124 3125 3126 3127 3128 3129 3130 3131 3132 3133 3134 3135 3136 3137 3138 3139 3140 3141 3142 3143
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
		{
		/* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
		 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */

		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
			{
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
			}
		
		/* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
		 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
		if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
		    s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
			{
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
			}
		}
#endif

3144 3145 3146 3147
	/* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
 	 * tell the callback
 	 */
	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3148
			&& s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3149 3150 3151 3152 3153 3154 3155 3156 3157 3158 3159 3160 3161 3162 3163 3164 3165 3166 3167 3168 3169 3170 3171 3172
		{
		int r;
		/* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
 		 * there is no response.
 		 */
		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
			{
			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
			s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
			}
		s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
		if (r == 0)
			{
			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			}
		if (r < 0)
			{
			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
			}
		}

3173 3174
	switch (ret)
		{
3175 3176 3177 3178 3179 3180 3181 3182 3183 3184 3185 3186
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
			return -1;

		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
			return 1; 
					
		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
			s->servername_done=0;
			default:
		return 1;
3187
		}
3188
	}
3189

3190 3191 3192 3193 3194 3195 3196 3197 3198 3199 3200 3201 3202 3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
	{
	int al = -1;
	if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
		return 1;
	if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
		{
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
		return 0;
		}

	if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
		return 0;
		}
	return 1;
}

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3209 3210 3211 3212 3213 3214 3215 3216 3217 3218 3219 3220 3221 3222 3223 3224 3225 3226 3227 3228 3229 3230 3231 3232 3233 3234 3235 3236 3237 3238 3239 3240
/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
 *
 *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
 *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
 *       extension, if any.
 *   len: the length of the session ID.
 *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
 *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
 *       point to the resulting session.
 *
 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
 *
 * Returns:
 *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
 *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
 *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
 *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
 *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
 *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
 *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
 *
 * Side effects:
 *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
 *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
 *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
 *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
 *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
 *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3241 3242
 */
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3243
			const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3244 3245 3246 3247
	{
	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
	unsigned short i;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3248

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3249 3250 3251
	*ret = NULL;
	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3252
	/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3253 3254
	 * to permit stateful resumption.
	 */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3255
	if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3256
		return 0;
3257
	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3258
		return 0;
3259 3260
	if (p >= limit)
		return -1;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3261
	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3262
	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3263 3264 3265 3266 3267 3268
		{
		i = *(p++);
		p+= i;
		if (p >= limit)
			return -1;
		}
3269 3270 3271 3272 3273 3274 3275 3276 3277 3278 3279 3280
	/* Skip past cipher list */
	n2s(p, i);
	p+= i;
	if (p >= limit)
		return -1;
	/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
	i = *(p++);
	p += i;
	if (p > limit)
		return -1;
	/* Now at start of extensions */
	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3281
		return 0;
3282 3283 3284 3285 3286 3287 3288
	n2s(p, i);
	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
		{
		unsigned short type, size;
		n2s(p, type);
		n2s(p, size);
		if (p + size > limit)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3289
			return 0;
3290 3291
		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
			{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3292
			int r;
3293 3294
			if (size == 0)
				{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3295 3296
				/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
				 * currently have one. */
3297
				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3298
				return 1;
3299
				}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3300 3301
			if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
				{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3302 3303 3304 3305 3306 3307 3308 3309 3310 3311 3312 3313 3314 3315 3316 3317 3318 3319 3320 3321
				/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
				 * decrypted rather than generating the session
				 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
				 * handshake based on external mechanism to
				 * calculate the master secret later. */
				return 2;
				}
			r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
			switch (r)
				{
				case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
					return 2;
				case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
					return r;
				case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
					return 3;
				default: /* fatal error */
					return -1;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3322
				}
3323 3324 3325
			}
		p += size;
		}
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3326
	return 0;
3327 3328
	}

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3329 3330 3331 3332 3333 3334 3335 3336 3337 3338 3339 3340 3341 3342 3343
/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
 *
 *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
 *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
 *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
 *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
 *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
 *       point to the resulting session.
 *
 * Returns:
 *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
 *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
 *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
 *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
 */
3344 3345 3346 3347 3348 3349 3350
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
				SSL_SESSION **psess)
	{
	SSL_SESSION *sess;
	unsigned char *sdec;
	const unsigned char *p;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3351
	int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3352 3353 3354
	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
	HMAC_CTX hctx;
	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3355
	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3356 3357
	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
	if (eticklen < 48)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3358
		return 2;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3359 3360 3361
	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3362
	if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3363 3364
		{
		unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3365
		int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3366 3367 3368 3369
							&ctx, &hctx, 0);
		if (rv < 0)
			return -1;
		if (rv == 0)
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3370
			return 2;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3371 3372 3373 3374 3375 3376
		if (rv == 2)
			renew_ticket = 1;
		}
	else
		{
		/* Check key name matches */
3377
		if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3378
			return 2;
3379
		HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3380 3381
					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
		EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3382
				tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3383
		}
3384
	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3385 3386
	 * integrity checks on ticket.
	 */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3387
	mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3388 3389 3390 3391 3392
	if (mlen < 0)
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		return -1;
		}
3393 3394 3395 3396 3397
	eticklen -= mlen;
	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
B
Ben Laurie 已提交
3398
	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3399 3400
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3401
		return 2;
3402
		}
3403 3404
	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3405 3406
	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
	eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3407 3408 3409 3410 3411 3412 3413 3414
	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
	if (!sdec)
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		return -1;
		}
	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3415 3416 3417
		{
		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		OPENSSL_free(sdec);
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3418
		return 2;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3419
		}
3420 3421 3422
	slen += mlen;
	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
	p = sdec;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3423

3424 3425 3426 3427
	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
	if (sess)
		{
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3428 3429 3430 3431 3432
		/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
		 * as required by standard.
		 */
3433 3434 3435 3436
		if (sesslen)
			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
		*psess = sess;
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3437 3438 3439 3440
		if (renew_ticket)
			return 4;
		else
			return 3;
3441
		}
B
Bodo Möller 已提交
3442 3443 3444 3445
        ERR_clear_error();
	/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
	 * ticket. */
	return 2;
3446 3447
	}

3448 3449 3450 3451 3452 3453 3454 3455 3456 3457 3458 3459 3460 3461 3462 3463 3464 3465 3466 3467 3468 3469 3470 3471 3472 3473 3474 3475 3476 3477 3478 3479 3480
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */

typedef struct 
	{
	int nid;
	int id;
	} tls12_lookup;

static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
	{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
	{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
	{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
	{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
	{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
	{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
};

static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
	{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
	{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
	{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
};

static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
	{
	size_t i;
	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
		{
		if (table[i].nid == nid)
			return table[i].id;
		}
	return -1;
	}
3481

3482 3483 3484 3485 3486
static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
	{
	size_t i;
	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
		{
3487
		if ((table[i].id) == id)
3488 3489
			return table[i].nid;
		}
3490
	return NID_undef;
3491
	}
3492 3493

int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3494 3495
	{
	int sig_id, md_id;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3496 3497
	if (!md)
		return 0;
3498 3499 3500 3501
	md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
				sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
	if (md_id == -1)
		return 0;
3502
	sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3503 3504 3505 3506 3507 3508 3509
	if (sig_id == -1)
		return 0;
	p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
	p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
	return 1;
	}

3510 3511 3512 3513 3514 3515
int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
	{
	return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
	}

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3516
typedef struct 
3517
	{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3518 3519 3520 3521 3522 3523 3524 3525 3526 3527
	int nid;
	int secbits;
	const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
	} tls12_hash_info;

static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
	{NID_md5, 64, 0},
#else
	{NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3528
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3529 3530 3531 3532
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
	{NID_sha1, 80, 0},
#else
	{NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3533
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3534 3535 3536 3537 3538 3539
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
	{NID_sha224, 112, 0},
	{NID_sha256, 128, 0},
#else
	{NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
	{NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3540
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3541 3542 3543 3544 3545 3546
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
	{NID_sha384, 192, 0},
	{NID_sha512, 256, 0}
#else
	{NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
	{NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3547
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3548
};
3549

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3550 3551 3552 3553 3554
static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
	{
	if (hash_alg == 0)
		return NULL;
	if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3555
		return NULL;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3556 3557
	return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
	}
3558

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3559 3560 3561 3562 3563 3564 3565 3566 3567 3568 3569
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
	{
	const tls12_hash_info *inf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
	if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
		return NULL;
#endif
	inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
	if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
		return NULL; 
	return inf->mfunc();
3570 3571
	}

3572 3573 3574 3575 3576 3577 3578 3579 3580 3581 3582 3583 3584 3585 3586 3587 3588 3589 3590 3591 3592 3593 3594 3595
static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
	{
	switch(sig_alg)
		{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
		return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
	case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
		return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
	case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
		return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
		}
	return -1;
	}

/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
			int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
	{
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3596
	int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3597 3598 3599 3600 3601 3602 3603 3604 3605 3606 3607 3608 3609 3610 3611 3612 3613 3614 3615 3616 3617 3618 3619 3620 3621
	if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
		return;
	if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
		{
		hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
		if (phash_nid)
			*phash_nid = hash_nid;
		}
	if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
		{
		sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
					sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
		if (psign_nid)
			*psign_nid = sign_nid;
		}
	if (psignhash_nid)
		{
		if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
			OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
							hash_nid, sign_nid);
		else
			*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
		}
	}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3622 3623 3624 3625 3626 3627 3628 3629 3630 3631 3632 3633 3634 3635 3636 3637 3638 3639 3640 3641 3642 3643 3644 3645 3646 3647 3648 3649 3650 3651 3652 3653 3654 3655 3656 3657 3658 3659 3660 3661 3662 3663 3664 3665 3666 3667 3668 3669 3670 3671 3672 3673 3674 3675 3676 3677 3678 3679 3680 3681 3682 3683 3684 3685 3686 3687 3688 3689 3690 3691 3692 3693 3694 3695 3696 3697 3698 3699
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
	{
	/* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
	const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
	if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
		return 0;
	/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
	if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
		return 0;
	/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
	return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
	}

/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
 * then RSA is disabled.
 */

void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
	{
	const unsigned char *sigalgs;
	size_t i, sigalgslen;
	int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
	/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
	 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
	 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
	 * if we have to.
	 */
	sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
		{
		switch(sigalgs[1])
			{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
			if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
				have_rsa = 1;
			break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
			if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
				have_dsa = 1;
			break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
		case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
			if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
				have_ecdsa = 1;
			break;
#endif
			}
		}
	if (!have_rsa)
		*pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
	if (!have_dsa)
		*pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
	if (!have_ecdsa)
		*pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
	}

size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
				const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
	{
	unsigned char *tmpout = out;
	size_t i;
	for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
		{
		if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
			{
			*tmpout++ = psig[0];
			*tmpout++ = psig[1];
			}
		}
	return tmpout - out;
	}

3700
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3701
static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3702 3703 3704 3705 3706 3707 3708 3709
				const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
				const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
	{
	const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
	size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
	for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
		{
		/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3710
		if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3711 3712 3713 3714 3715 3716 3717 3718 3719 3720 3721 3722 3723 3724 3725 3726 3727 3728 3729 3730 3731 3732 3733 3734 3735 3736 3737 3738 3739 3740 3741
			continue;
		for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
			{
			if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
				{
				nmatch++;
				if (shsig)
					{
					shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
					shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
					tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
						&shsig->sign_nid,
						&shsig->signandhash_nid,
						ptmp);
					shsig++;
					}
				break;
				}
			}
		}
	return nmatch;
	}

/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
	{
	const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
	size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
	size_t nmatch;
	TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
	CERT *c = s->cert;
3742
	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3743 3744 3745 3746 3747
	if (c->shared_sigalgs)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
		c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
		}
3748
	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3749
	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3750 3751 3752 3753
		{
		conf = c->client_sigalgs;
		conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
		}
3754
	else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3755 3756
		{
		conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3757
		conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3758
		}
3759
	else
3760 3761
		conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
	if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3762 3763 3764 3765 3766 3767 3768 3769 3770 3771 3772 3773 3774
		{
		pref = conf;
		preflen = conflen;
		allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
		allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
		}
	else
		{
		allow = conf;
		allowlen = conflen;
		pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
		preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
		}
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3775
	nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3776 3777 3778 3779 3780
	if (!nmatch)
		return 1;
	salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
	if (!salgs)
		return 0;
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3781
	nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3782 3783 3784 3785 3786 3787
	c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
	c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
	return 1;
	}
		

3788 3789
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */

3790
int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3791 3792
	{
	CERT *c = s->cert;
3793 3794
	/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
	if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3795
		return 1;
3796 3797 3798
	/* Should never happen */
	if (!c)
		return 0;
3799

3800 3801
	if (c->peer_sigalgs)
		OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3802
	c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3803
	if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3804
		return 0;
3805 3806
	c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
	memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3807 3808
	return 1;
	}
3809

3810 3811 3812 3813 3814 3815 3816 3817 3818
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
	{
	int idx;
	size_t i;
	const EVP_MD *md;
	CERT *c = s->cert;
	TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
	if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
		return 0;
3819

3820
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3821
	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3822 3823 3824 3825 3826 3827 3828 3829 3830 3831 3832 3833 3834 3835 3836 3837 3838 3839 3840 3841 3842 3843 3844 3845
		{
		/* Use first set signature preference to force message
		 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
		 */
		const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
		if (s->server)
			sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
		else
			sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
		if (sigs)
			{
			idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
			md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
				{
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
				}
			}
		}
#endif

3846 3847 3848 3849 3850
	for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
			i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
		{
		idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
		if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3851
			{
3852
			md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3853
			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3854
			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3855
			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3856 3857
				{
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3858
				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3859
				}
3860 3861 3862
			}

		}
3863 3864
	/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
	 * use the certificate for signing.
3865
	 */
3866
	if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3867 3868 3869 3870
		{
		/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
		 * not supported it stays as NULL.
	 	 */
3871
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3872 3873
		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3874 3875
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3876 3877 3878 3879 3880
		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
			{
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
			}
3881 3882
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3883 3884
		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3885
#endif
3886
		}
3887 3888 3889
	return 1;
	}

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3890

3891
int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3892
			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3893 3894
			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
	{
3895 3896
	const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
	if (psig == NULL)
3897 3898 3899
		return 0;
	if (idx >= 0)
		{
3900
		idx <<= 1;
3901
		if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3902
			return 0;
3903
		psig += idx;
3904
		if (rhash)
3905 3906 3907 3908
			*rhash = psig[0];
		if (rsig)
			*rsig = psig[1];
		tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3909
		}
3910 3911 3912 3913 3914 3915 3916 3917 3918 3919 3920 3921 3922 3923 3924 3925 3926 3927 3928 3929 3930 3931
	return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
	}

int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
	{
	TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
	if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
		return 0;
	shsigalgs += idx;
	if (phash)
		*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
	if (psign)
		*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
	if (psignhash)
		*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
	if (rsig)
		*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
	if (rhash)
		*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
	return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3932 3933 3934
	}
	

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3935 3936 3937 3938 3939 3940 3941 3942 3943 3944 3945 3946 3947 3948
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
int
tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
	unsigned short hbtype;
	unsigned int payload;
	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */

	if (s->msg_callback)
		s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
			&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
			s, s->msg_callback_arg);

3949 3950 3951 3952 3953 3954 3955 3956 3957
	/* Read type and payload length first */
	if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
		return 0; /* silently discard */
	hbtype = *p++;
	n2s(p, payload);
	if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
		return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
	pl = p;

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3958 3959 3960 3961 3962 3963 3964 3965 3966 3967 3968 3969 3970 3971 3972 3973
	if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
		{
		unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
		int r;

		/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
		 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
		 * payload, plus padding
		 */
		buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
		bp = buffer;
		
		/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
		*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
		s2n(payload, bp);
		memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3974 3975 3976 3977
		bp += payload;
		/* Random padding */
		RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);

D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
3978 3979 3980 3981 3982 3983 3984 3985 3986 3987 3988 3989 3990 3991 3992 3993 3994 3995 3996 3997 3998 3999 4000 4001 4002 4003 4004 4005 4006 4007 4008 4009 4010 4011 4012 4013 4014 4015 4016 4017 4018 4019 4020 4021 4022 4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4033 4034 4035 4036 4037 4038 4039 4040 4041 4042 4043 4044 4045 4046 4047 4048 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053 4054 4055 4056 4057 4058 4059 4060 4061 4062 4063 4064 4065 4066 4067 4068 4069 4070 4071 4072 4073 4074 4075 4076 4077 4078 4079 4080 4081 4082
		r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);

		if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
				buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
				s, s->msg_callback_arg);

		OPENSSL_free(buffer);

		if (r < 0)
			return r;
		}
	else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
		{
		unsigned int seq;
		
		/* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
		 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
		 * sequence number */
		n2s(pl, seq);
		
		if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
			{
			s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
			s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
			}
		}

	return 0;
	}

int
tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *buf, *p;
	int ret;
	unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
	unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */

	/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
	if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
	    s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
		return -1;
		}

	/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
		return -1;
		}
		
	/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
	if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
		return -1;
		}
		
	/* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
	 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
	 */
	OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);

	/* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
	 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
	 * some random stuff.
	 *  - Message Type, 1 byte
	 *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
	 *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
	 *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
	 *  - Padding
	 */
	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
	p = buf;
	/* Message Type */
	*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
	/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
	s2n(payload, p);
	/* Sequence number */
	s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
	/* 16 random bytes */
	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
	p += 16;
	/* Random padding */
	RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);

	ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
	if (ret >= 0)
		{
		if (s->msg_callback)
			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
				buf, 3 + payload + padding,
				s, s->msg_callback_arg);

		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
		}
		
	OPENSSL_free(buf);

	return ret;
	}
#endif
4083

4084
#define MAX_SIGALGLEN	(TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4085 4086 4087 4088 4089 4090 4091 4092 4093 4094 4095 4096 4097 4098 4099 4100 4101 4102 4103 4104 4105 4106 4107 4108 4109 4110 4111 4112 4113 4114 4115 4116 4117 4118 4119 4120 4121 4122 4123 4124 4125 4126 4127 4128 4129 4130 4131 4132 4133 4134 4135 4136 4137 4138

typedef struct
	{
	size_t sigalgcnt;
	int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
	} sig_cb_st;

static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
	{
	sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
	size_t i;
	char etmp[20], *p;
	int sig_alg, hash_alg;
	if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
		return 0;
	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
		return 0;
	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
	etmp[len] = 0;
	p = strchr(etmp, '+');
	if (!p)
		return 0;
	*p = 0;
	p++;
	if (!*p)
		return 0;

	if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
	else return 0;

	hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
		hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
		return 0;

	for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
		{
		if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
			&& sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
			return 0;
		}
	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
	return 1;
	}

/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4139
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4140 4141 4142 4143 4144
	{
	sig_cb_st sig;
	sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
		return 0;
4145 4146
	if (c == NULL)
		return 1;
4147
	return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4148 4149
	}

4150
int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4151
	{
4152
	unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4153 4154 4155 4156
	int rhash, rsign;
	size_t i;
	if (salglen & 1)
		return 0;
4157
	sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4158 4159
	if (sigalgs == NULL)
		return 0;
4160
	for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4161
		{
4162
		rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4163
					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4164
		rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4165 4166 4167 4168
				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));

		if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
			goto err;
4169 4170
		*sptr++ = rhash;
		*sptr++ = rsign;
4171 4172
		}

4173 4174 4175 4176 4177 4178 4179 4180 4181 4182 4183 4184 4185 4186
	if (client)
		{
		if (c->client_sigalgs)
			OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
		c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
		c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
		}
	else
		{
		if (c->conf_sigalgs)
			OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
		c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
		c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
		}
4187 4188 4189 4190 4191 4192 4193

	return 1;

	err:
	OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
	return 0;
	}
4194

4195 4196 4197 4198 4199 4200 4201 4202 4203 4204 4205 4206 4207 4208
static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
	{
	int sig_nid;
	size_t i;
	if (default_nid == -1)
		return 1;
	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
	if (default_nid)
		return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
	for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
		if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
			return 1;
	return 0;
	}
4209 4210 4211 4212 4213 4214 4215 4216 4217 4218 4219 4220 4221
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
	{
	X509_NAME *nm;
	int i;
	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
		{
		if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
			return 1;
		}
	return 0;
	}
4222 4223

/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4224 4225 4226
 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 
 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4227
 */
4228 4229 4230 4231 4232 4233 4234 4235 4236 4237

/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */

#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
	(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
/* Strict mode flags */
#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
	 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
	 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)

4238 4239 4240 4241
int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
									int idx)
	{
	int i;
4242 4243
	int rv = 0;
	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4244 4245
	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
	CERT *c = s->cert;
4246 4247
	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4248 4249
	if (idx != -1)
		{
4250 4251 4252 4253 4254 4255 4256 4257
		/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
		if (idx == -2)
			{
			cpk = c->key;
			idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
			}
		else
			cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4258 4259 4260
		x = cpk->x509;
		pk = cpk->privatekey;
		chain = cpk->chain;
4261
		strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4262 4263 4264
		/* If no cert or key, forget it */
		if (!x || !pk)
			goto end;
4265 4266
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
		/* Allow any certificate to pass test */
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
4267
		if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4268 4269 4270 4271 4272 4273
			{
			rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
			return rv;
			}
#endif
4274 4275 4276
		}
	else
		{
4277 4278
		if (!x || !pk)
			goto end;
4279 4280 4281
		idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
		if (idx == -1)
			goto end;
4282
		cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4283
		if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4284 4285 4286 4287
			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
		else
			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
		strict_mode = 1;
4288 4289
		}

4290 4291 4292 4293 4294 4295 4296 4297 4298 4299 4300 4301 4302 4303
	if (suiteb_flags)
		{
		int ok;
		if (check_flags)
			check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
		ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
		if (ok != X509_V_OK)
			{
			if (check_flags)
				rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
			else
				goto end;
			}
		}
4304

4305 4306 4307 4308
	/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
	 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
	 * and strict mode.
	 */
4309
	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4310 4311 4312 4313 4314 4315 4316 4317 4318 4319 4320 4321 4322 4323 4324 4325 4326 4327 4328 4329 4330 4331 4332 4333 4334 4335 4336 4337 4338 4339 4340 4341 4342 4343 4344 4345 4346
		{
		int default_nid;
		unsigned char rsign = 0;
		if (c->peer_sigalgs)
			default_nid = 0;
		/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
		else
			{
			switch(idx)
				{	
			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
				default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
				break;

			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
				default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
				break;

			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
				default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
				break;

			default:
				default_nid = -1;
				break;
				}
			}
		/* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
		 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
		 * sha1.
		 */
4347
		if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4348 4349 4350 4351 4352 4353 4354 4355 4356
			{
			size_t j;
			const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
			for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
				{
				if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
					break;
				}
			if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4357 4358 4359 4360 4361 4362
				{
				if (check_flags)
					goto skip_sigs;
				else
					goto end;
				}
4363 4364 4365
			}
		/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
		if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4366 4367 4368 4369 4370 4371
			{
			if (!check_flags) goto end;
			}
		else
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4372 4373 4374 4375
		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
			{
			if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
							default_nid))
4376 4377 4378 4379 4380 4381 4382 4383 4384
				{
				if (check_flags)
					{
					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
					break;
					}
				else
					goto end;
				}
4385 4386
			}
		}
4387 4388 4389 4390
	/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
	else if(check_flags)
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
	skip_sigs:
4391 4392
	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4393 4394
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
	else if (!check_flags)
4395
		goto end;
4396 4397
	if (!s->server)
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4398
	/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4399
	else if (strict_mode)
4400
		{
4401
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4402 4403
		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
			{
4404 4405
			X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
			if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4406 4407 4408 4409 4410 4411 4412 4413 4414 4415 4416 4417 4418 4419 4420 4421 4422 4423 4424 4425 4426 4427 4428 4429 4430 4431 4432 4433 4434 4435 4436 4437 4438 4439 4440 4441 4442 4443 4444 4445 4446 4447 4448 4449 4450 4451 4452 4453 4454 4455 4456 4457 4458 4459 4460 4461 4462 4463 4464
				{
				if (check_flags)
					{
					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
					break;
					}
				else
					goto end;
				}
			}
		}
	if (!s->server && strict_mode)
		{
		STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
		int check_type = 0;
		switch (pk->type)
			{
		case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
			check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
			break;
		case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
			check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
			break;
		case EVP_PKEY_EC:
			check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
			break;
		case EVP_PKEY_DH:
		case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
				{
				int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
					check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
					check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
				}
			}
		if (check_type)
			{
			const unsigned char *ctypes;
			int ctypelen;
			if (c->ctypes)
				{
				ctypes = c->ctypes;
				ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
				}
			else
				{
				ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
				ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
				}
			for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
				{
				if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
					{
					rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
					break;
					}
				}
			if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4465 4466
				goto end;
			}
4467 4468 4469 4470 4471 4472 4473 4474 4475 4476 4477 4478 4479 4480 4481 4482 4483 4484 4485 4486 4487 4488 4489 4490 4491 4492 4493 4494
		else
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;


		ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;

		if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;

		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
			{
			if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
				rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
			}
		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
			{
			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
				{
				X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
				if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
					{
					rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
					break;
					}
				}
			}
		if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
			goto end;
4495
		}
4496 4497 4498 4499 4500
	else
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;

	if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4501 4502

	end:
4503 4504

	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4505
		{
4506 4507 4508
		if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
		else if (cpk->digest)
4509
			rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4510 4511 4512 4513 4514 4515 4516 4517 4518 4519 4520 4521
		}
	else
		rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;

	/* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
	 * if the chain is invalid.
	 */
	if (!check_flags)
		{
		if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
		else
4522 4523 4524 4525 4526
			{
			/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
			cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
			return 0;
			}
4527 4528 4529 4530 4531 4532 4533 4534 4535 4536 4537 4538 4539 4540
		}
	return rv;
	}

/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
	{
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
	}
4541 4542 4543 4544 4545
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
	{
	return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
	}
4546

4547
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
4548 4549 4550 4551 4552 4553 4554 4555 4556 4557 4558 4559 4560 4561 4562 4563 4564 4565 4566 4567 4568 4569 4570 4571 4572 4573 4574 4575 4576 4577 4578 4579 4580 4581 4582 4583 4584 4585 4586 4587 4588 4589 4590 4591

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
	{
	int dh_secbits = 80;
	if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
		return DH_get_1024_160();
	if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
		{
		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
			dh_secbits = 128;
		else
			dh_secbits = 80;
		}
	else
		{
		CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
		dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
		}

	if (dh_secbits >= 128)
		{
		DH *dhp = DH_new();
		if (!dhp)
			return NULL;
		dhp->g = BN_new();
		if (dhp->g)
			BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
		if (dh_secbits >= 192)
			dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
		else
			dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
		if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
			{
			DH_free(dhp);
			return NULL;
			}
		return dhp;
		}
	if (dh_secbits >= 112)
		return DH_get_2048_224();
	return DH_get_1024_160();
	}
#endif
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
4592 4593 4594 4595 4596 4597 4598 4599 4600 4601 4602 4603 4604 4605 4606 4607 4608 4609 4610 4611 4612 4613 4614 4615 4616 4617 4618 4619 4620 4621 4622 4623 4624 4625 4626 4627 4628 4629 4630 4631 4632 4633 4634 4635 4636 4637 4638 4639 4640 4641 4642 4643 4644 4645 4646 4647 4648 4649 4650 4651 4652 4653 4654 4655 4656 4657 4658 4659 4660 4661 4662 4663 4664 4665 4666 4667 4668 4669 4670 4671 4672 4673 4674 4675

static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
	{
	int secbits;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
	if (pkey)
		{
		secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
		}
	else
		secbits = -1;
	if (s)
		return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
	else
		return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
	}

static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
	{
	/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
	int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
	if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
		{
		const EVP_MD *md;
		if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
				secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
		}
	if (s)
		return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
	else
		return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
	}

int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
	{
	if (vfy)
		vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
	if (is_ee)
		{
		if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
			return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
		}
	else
		{
		if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
			return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
		}
	if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
		return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
	return 1;
	}

/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
 * not sending one to the peer.
 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
 */

int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
	{
	int rv, start_idx, i;
	if (x == NULL)
		{
		x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
		start_idx = 1;
		}
	else
		start_idx = 0;

	rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
	if (rv != 1)
		return rv;

	for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
		{
		x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
		rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
		if (rv != 1)
			return rv;
		}
	return 1;
	}