Add three Suite B modes to TLS code, supporting RFC6460.

CHANGES

@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+     of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+     only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+     strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
      algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
      [Steve Henson]

apps/s_server.c

@@ -2623,8 +2623,8 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:%s\n",
 				X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
 			}
-		else
-			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+		/* Always print any error messages */
+		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		return(0);
 		}
 

ssl/s23_clnt.c

@@ -367,6 +367,12 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
 			version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
 			}
+		else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
+					SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
 			{
 			version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;

ssl/s23_srvr.c

@@ -425,6 +425,13 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+				SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
 		{

ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -3154,8 +3154,9 @@ err:
 	}
 
 /* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently
- * check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2  and if
- * static DH client certificates can be used.
+ * check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if
+ * static DH client certificates can be used and optionally checks
+ * suitability for Suite B.
  */
 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	{
@@ -3165,6 +3166,12 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
 	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && !s->cert->key->digest)
 		return 0;
+	/* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
+	 * This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
+		!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
+		return 0;
 	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
 	if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))

ssl/s3_lib.c

@@ -3966,7 +3966,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 	    }
 #endif
 
-	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || tls1_suiteb(s))
 		{
 		prio = srvr;
 		allow = clnt;
@@ -4040,7 +4040,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 		/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses
 		 * an ephemeral EC key check it */
 		if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
-			ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s);
+			ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 
@@ -4059,7 +4059,7 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 	{
 	int ret=0;
 	const unsigned char *sig;
-	size_t siglen;
+	size_t i, siglen;
 	int have_rsa_sign = 0, have_dsa_sign = 0, have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
 	int nostrict = 1;
 	unsigned long alg_k;
@@ -4070,48 +4070,27 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
 		memcpy(p, s->cert->ctypes, s->cert->ctype_num);
 		return (int)s->cert->ctype_num;
 		}
-	/* Else see if we have any signature algorithms configured */
-	if (s->cert->client_sigalgs)
+	/* get configured sigalgs */
+	siglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sig);
+	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+		nostrict = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < siglen; i+=2, sig+=2)
 		{
-		sig = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
-		siglen = s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		sig = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
-		siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
-		}
-	/* If we have sigalgs work out if we can sign with RSA, DSA, ECDSA */
-	if (sig)
-		{
-		size_t i;
-		if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
-			nostrict = 0;
-		for (i = 0; i < siglen; i+=2, sig+=2)
+		switch(sig[1])
 			{
-			switch(sig[1])
-				{
-			case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-				have_rsa_sign = 1;
-				break;
+		case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+			have_rsa_sign = 1;
+			break;
 
-			case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
-				have_dsa_sign = 1;
-				break;
+		case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+			have_dsa_sign = 1;
+			break;
 
-			case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-				have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
-				break;
-				}
+		case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+			have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
+			break;
 			}
 		}
-	/* Otherwise allow anything */
-	else
-		{
-		have_rsa_sign = 1;
-		have_dsa_sign = 1;
-		have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
-		}
 
 	alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 

ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -1704,8 +1704,8 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
 			if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
 				{
-				/* Get NID of first shared curve */
-				int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
+				/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+				int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
 				if (nid != NID_undef)
 					ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
 				}

ssl/ssl.h

@@ -654,7 +654,16 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 /* Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as
  * enforcing certifcate chain algorithms. When this is set we enforce them.
  */
-#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT	0x00000001L
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT		0x00000001L
+
+/* Suite B modes, takes same values as certificate verify flags */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY	0x10000
+/* Suite B 192 bit only mode */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS		0x20000
+/* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS		0x30000
+
+
 
 /* Flags for building certificate chains */
 /* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */
@@ -681,6 +690,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME	0x200
 /* Cert type matches client types (always set for server cert) */
 #define CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE	0x400
+/* Cert chain suitable to Suite B */
+#define CERT_PKEY_SUITEB	0x800
 
 /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
  * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -2579,6 +2590,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST			 155
 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST				 156
 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING				 283
+#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST			 380
 #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION			 340
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF			 371
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA			 374
@@ -2653,6 +2665,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED			 196
 #define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED		 197
 #define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
+#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE	 379
 #define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE		 297
 #define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG			 327
 #define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 198

ssl/ssl_cert.c

@@ -692,6 +692,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
 		return(0);
 		}
+	/* Set suite B flags if needed */
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
 #if 0
 	if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
 		X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
@@ -1151,6 +1153,8 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
 		return 0;
 		}
+	/* Set suite B flags if needed */
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
 
 	i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
 	if (i > 0)

ssl/ssl_ciph.c

@@ -1347,10 +1347,49 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 	return(retval);
 	}
 
+static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
+					const char **prule_str)
+	{
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0;
+	if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128"))
+		suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+	else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY"))
+		suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+	else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192"))
+		suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
+
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+		c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags;
+		}
+	else
+		suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+
+	if (!suiteb_flags)
+		return 1;
+	/* Check version */
+
+	switch(suiteb_flags)
+		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+		break;
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+		break;
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+		break;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
 		STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
-		const char *rule_str)
+		const char *rule_str, CERT *c)
 	{
 	int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
 	unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl;
@@ -1365,6 +1404,10 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
 	if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
+		return NULL;
+
+
 	/*
 	 * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
 	 * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.

ssl/ssl_err.c

@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST)   ,"https proxy request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST)          ,"http request"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING)       ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST) ,"illegal Suite B digest"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF)   ,"invalid audit proof"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA)    ,"invalid authz data"},
@@ -472,6 +473,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE),"only TLS 1.2 allowed in Suite B mode"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),"opaque PRF input too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"},

ssl/ssl_lib.c

@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 
 	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
 		&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
-		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
 	if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 	
 	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
-		&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+		&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert);
 	/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
 	 * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
 	 * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
 	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 	
 	sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
-		&s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
+		&s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert);
 	/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		return 0;
@@ -1787,7 +1787,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 
 	ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
 		&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
-		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
+		meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
 	if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
 	    || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
 		{

ssl/ssl_locl.h

@@ -489,6 +489,11 @@ typedef struct cert_pkey_st
 	 */
 	int valid_flags;
 	} CERT_PKEY;
+/* Retrieve Suite B flags */
+#define tls1_suiteb(s)	(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
+/* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */
+#define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \
+	(SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
 
 typedef struct cert_st
 	{
@@ -910,7 +915,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
 					     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
 					     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
-					     const char *rule_str);
+					     const char *rule_str, CERT *c);
 void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
 int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		       const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
@@ -1184,7 +1189,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
 			int *curves, size_t ncurves);
 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 
 				const char *str);
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s);
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id);
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -241,6 +241,12 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
 		0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
 	};
 
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
+	{
+		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+	};
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -320,13 +326,29 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
 		{
 		*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
 		*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+		return;
 		}
-	else
+	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
 		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+		*pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+		*pcurveslen = 2;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+		*pcurveslen = 2;
+		break;
+	default:
 		*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
 		*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
 		}
-	/* If not set use default: for now static structure */
 	if (!*pcurves)
 		{
 		*pcurves = eccurves_default;
@@ -338,8 +360,28 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
 	{
 	const unsigned char *curves;
 	size_t curveslen, i;
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
 	if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
 		return 0;
+	/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+		if (p[1])
+			return 0;
+		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+			{
+			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+			{
+			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else	/* Should never happen */
+			return 0;
+		}
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
 	for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
 		{
@@ -350,7 +392,8 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
 	}
 
 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
- * matches.
+ * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key.
  */
 
 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
@@ -361,6 +404,25 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
 	/* Can't do anything on client side */
 	if (s->server == 0)
 		return -1;
+	if (nmatch == -2)
+		{
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
+			 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
+			 * checks.
+			 */
+			unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+				return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+				return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+			/* Should never happen */
+			return NID_undef;
+			}
+		/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+		nmatch = 0;
+		}
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
 				&supp, &supplen);
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
@@ -540,6 +602,8 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 		if (i == plen)
 			return 0;
 		}
+	if (!curve_id)
+		return 1;
 	/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
 	for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
 		{
@@ -551,6 +615,9 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 			}
 		if (i == plen)
 			return 0;
+		/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+		if (!s->server)
+			return 1;
 		}
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -558,7 +625,7 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
  * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
  */
-static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
 	{
 	unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
@@ -576,13 +643,82 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 	if (!rv)
 		return 0;
-	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
+	/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
+	 * supported curves extension.
+	 */
+	rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+	if (!rv)
+		return 0;
+	/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+	 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		int check_md;
+		size_t i;
+		CERT *c = s->cert;
+		if (curve_id[0])
+			return 0;
+		/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+		if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+		else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+		else
+			return 0; /* Should never happen */
+		for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+			if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+				break;
+		if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+			return 0;
+		if (set_ee_md == 2)
+			{
+			if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+			else
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+			}
+		}
+	return rv;
 	}
 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
 	{
 	unsigned char curve_id[2];
 	EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+	/* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
+	 * no other curves permitted.
+	 */
+	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+		else
+			return 0;
+		curve_id[0] = 0;
+		/* Check this curve is acceptable */
+		if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+			return 0;
+		/* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+			return 1;
+		/* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+		else 
+			{
+			unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+			if (!ec)
+				return 0;
+			if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+				return 0;
+			if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+				return 1;
+			return 0;
+			}
+			
+		}
 	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
 		{
 		/* Need a shared curve */
@@ -655,8 +791,31 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #endif
 };
 
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+
 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
 	{
+	/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+	 * preferences.
+	 */
+	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+		return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+		return 2;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+		return 2;
+		}
+
 	/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
 	if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
 		{
@@ -698,6 +857,44 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
 		return 0;
 		}
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+		/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+		if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+			return 0;
+		if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
+			return 0;
+		/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			if (curve_id[0])
+				return 0;
+			if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+				{
+				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+				{
+				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			else
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
 	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
 	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
@@ -706,7 +903,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
 			break;
 		}
 	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
-	if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
+	if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
 		return 0;
@@ -3123,27 +3320,21 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
 	size_t nmatch;
 	TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
 	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
 	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
-	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
+	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
 		{
 		conf = c->client_sigalgs;
 		conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
 		}
-	else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+	else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
 		{
 		conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
 		conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
 		}
 	else
-		{
-		conf = tls12_sigalgs;
-		conflen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		if (FIPS_mode())
-			conflen -= 2;
-#endif
-		}
-	if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+		conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+	if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
 		{
 		pref = conf;
 		preflen = conflen;
@@ -3214,7 +3405,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 	/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
 	 * use the certificate for signing.
 	 */
-	if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
+	if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
 		{
 		/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
 		 * not supported it stays as NULL.
@@ -3588,14 +3779,22 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
 	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
 	CERT *c = s->cert;
-	/* idx != -1 means checking server chains */
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
 	if (idx != -1)
 		{
-		cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+		/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+		if (idx == -2)
+			{
+			cpk = c->key;
+			idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+			}
+		else
+			cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
 		x = cpk->x509;
 		pk = cpk->privatekey;
 		chain = cpk->chain;
-		strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT;
+		strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
 		/* If no cert or key, forget it */
 		if (!x || !pk)
 			goto end;
@@ -3608,13 +3807,27 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 		if (idx == -1)
 			goto end;
 		cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
-		if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
+		if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
 			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
 		else
 			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
 		strict_mode = 1;
 		}
 
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		int ok;
+		if (check_flags)
+			check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+		ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+		if (ok != X509_V_OK)
+			{
+			if (check_flags)
+				rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+			else
+				goto end;
+			}
+		}
 
 	/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
 	 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
@@ -3702,8 +3915,8 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 	else if(check_flags)
 		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
 	skip_sigs:
-	/* Check cert parameters are consistent: server certs only */
-	if (!s->server || tls1_check_cert_param(s, x))
+	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
 		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
 	else if (!check_flags)
 		goto end;
@@ -3715,7 +3928,8 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
 		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
 			{
-			if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i)))
+			X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+			if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
 				{
 				if (check_flags)
 					{
@@ -3832,7 +4046,11 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 		if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
 			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
 		else
-			cpk->valid_flags = 0;
+			{
+			/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+			cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			return 0;
+			}
 		}
 	return rv;
 	}

ssl/tls1.h

@@ -285,6 +285,11 @@ extern "C" {
 /* Flag set for unrecognised algorithms */
 #define TLSEXT_nid_unknown				0x1000000
 
+/* ECC curves */
+
+#define TLSEXT_curve_P_256				23
+#define TLSEXT_curve_P_384				24
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 
 #define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255