- 27 6月, 2013 7 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
This is RH bug 970891 Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars. Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage. [To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated by sparse -- steve f.] Reported-by: Nsteve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
We've had a long-standing problem with DFS referral points. CIFS servers generally try to make them look like directories in FIND_FIRST/NEXT responses. When you go to try to do a FIND_FIRST on them though, the server will then (correctly) return STATUS_PATH_NOT_COVERED. Mostly this manifests as spurious EREMOTE errors back to userland. This patch attempts to fix this by marking directories that are discovered via FIND_FIRST/NEXT for revaldiation. When the lookup code runs across them again, we'll reissue a QPathInfo against them and that will make it chase the referral properly. There is some performance penalty involved here and no I haven't measured it -- it'll be highly dependent upon the workload and contents of the mounted share. To try and mitigate that though, the code only marks the inode for revalidation when it's possible to run across a DFS referral. i.e.: when the kernel has DFS support built in and the share is "in DFS" [At the Microsoft plugfest we noted that usually the DFS links had the REPARSE attribute tag enabled - DFS junctions are reparse points after all - so I just added a check for that flag too so the performance impact should be smaller - Steve] Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
This worker function is needed to send SMB2 fsctl (and ioctl) requests including: validating negotiation info (secure negotiate) querying the servers network interfaces copy offload (refcopy) Followon patches for the above three will use this. This patch also does general validation of the response. In the future, as David Disseldorp notes, for the copychunk ioctl case, we will want to enhance the response processing to allow returning the chunk request limits to the caller (even though the server returns an error, in that case we would return data that the caller could use - see 2.2.32.1). See MS-SMB2 Section 2.2.31 for more details on format of fsctl. Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
In SMB2.1 and later the server will usually set the large MTU flag, and we need to charge at least one credit, if server says that since it supports multicredit. Windows seems to let us get away with putting a zero there, but they confirmed that it is wrong and the spec says to put one there (if the request is under 64K and the CAP_LARGE_MTU was returned during protocol negotiation by the server. CC: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
Cut and paste likely introduced accidentally inserted spurious #define in d60622eb causes no harm but looks weird Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Zhao Hongjiang 提交于
for NUL terminated string, need alway set '\0' in the end. Signed-off-by: NZhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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- 24 6月, 2013 25 次提交
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由 Steve French 提交于
MS-SMB2 Section 2.2.31 lists fsctls. Update our list of valid cifs/smb2/smb3 fsctls and some related structs based on more recent version of docs. Additional detail on less common ones can be found in MS-FSCC section 2.3. CopyChunk (server side copy, ie refcopy) will depend on a few of these Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
More than 160 fixes since we last bumped the version number of cifs.ko. Update to version 2.01 so it is easier in modinfo to tell that fixes are in. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
SMB3 protocol adds various optional per-share capabilities (and SMB3.02 adds one more beyond that). Add ability to dump (/proc/fs/cifs/DebugData) the share capabilities and share flags to improve debugging. Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
A few missing flags from SMB3.0 dialect, one missing from 2.1, and the new #define flags for SMB3.02 Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
The new Windows update supports SMB3.02 dialect, a minor update to SMB3. This patch adds support for mounting with vers=3.02 Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
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由 Steve French 提交于
Fix minor endian error in Jeff's auth rewrite Reviewed-by: NJeff Laytonn <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
The SecurityFlags handler uses an obsolete simple_strtoul() call, and doesn't really handle the bounds checking well. Fix it to use kstrtouint() instead. Clean up the error messages as well and fix a bogus check for an unsigned int to be less than 0. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Before this patchset, the global_secflags could only offer up a single sectype. With the new set though we have the ability to allow different sectypes since we sort out the one to use after talking to the server. Change the global_secflags to allow NTLMSSP or NTLMv2 by default. If the server sets the extended security bit in the Negotiate response, then we'll use NTLMSSP. If it doesn't then we'll use raw NTLMv2. Mounting a LANMAN server will still require a sec= option by default. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth. Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response. With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle this correctly. Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the places that need to determine this to use that flag. This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session. SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement per-session signing in the future though. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
We have this to some degree already in secFlgs, but those get "or'ed" so there's no way to know what the last option requested was. Add new fields that will eventually supercede the secFlgs field in the cifs_ses. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Currently we have the overrideSecFlg field, but it's quite cumbersome to work with. Add some new fields that will eventually supercede it. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Track what sort of NEGOTIATE response we get from the server, as that will govern what sort of authentication types this socket will support. There are three possibilities: LANMAN: server sent legacy LANMAN-type response UNENCAP: server sent a newer-style response, but extended security bit wasn't set. This socket will only support unencapsulated auth types. EXTENDED: server sent a newer-style response with the extended security bit set. This is necessary to support krb5 and ntlmssp auth types. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Add a new securityEnum value to cover the case where a sec= option was not explicitly set. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Move the sanity checks for signed connections into a separate function. SMB2's was a cut-and-paste job from CIFS code, so we can make them use the same function. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
...this also gets rid of some #ifdef ugliness too. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
...cleanup. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
This field is completely unused: CIFS_SES_W9X is completely unused. CIFS_SES_LANMAN and CIFS_SES_OS2 are set but never checked. CIFS_SES_NT4 is checked, but never set. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
These look pretty cargo-culty to me, but let's be certain. Leave them in place for now. Pop a WARN if it ever does happen. Also, move to a more standard idiom for setting the "server" pointer. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
...rc is always set to 0. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
It turns out that CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE == CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE, so this memset doesn't do anything useful. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
The field that held this was removed quite some time ago. Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Jeff Layton 提交于
Some servers set max_vcs to 1 and actually do enforce that limit. Add a new mount option to work around this behavior that forces a mount request to open a new socket to the server instead of reusing an existing one. I'd prefer to come up with a solution that doesn't require this, so consider this a debug patch that you can use to determine whether this is the real problem. Cc: Jim McDonough <jmcd@samba.org> Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
Fix new kernel-doc warning in fs/splice.c: Warning(fs/splice.c:1298): No description found for parameter 'opos' Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 20 6月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 15 6月, 2013 6 次提交
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由 Al Viro 提交于
a couple of places got missed back when Linus has introduced that one... Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
fput() assumes that it can't be called after exit_task_work() but this is not true, for example free_ipc_ns()->shm_destroy() can do this. In this case fput() silently leaks the file. Change it to fallback to delayed_fput_work if task_work_add() fails. The patch looks complicated but it is not, it changes the code from if (PF_KTHREAD) { schedule_work(...); return; } task_work_add(...) to if (!PF_KTHREAD) { if (!task_work_add(...)) return; /* fallback */ } schedule_work(...); As for shm_destroy() in particular, we could make another fix but I think this change makes sense anyway. There could be another similar user, it is not safe to assume that task_work_add() can't fail. Reported-by: NAndrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee that items logged multiple times and replayed by log recovery do not take objects back in time. When they are taken back in time, the go into an intermediate state which is corrupt, and hence verification that occurs on this intermediate state causes log recovery to abort with a corruption shutdown. Instead of causing a shutdown and unmountable filesystem, don't verify post-recovery items before they are written to disk. This is less than optimal, but there is no way to detect this issue for non-CRC filesystems If log recovery successfully completes, this will be undone and the object will be consistent by subsequent transactions that are replayed, so in most cases we don't need to take drastic action. For CRC enabled filesystems, leave the verifiers in place - we need to call them to recalculate the CRCs on the objects anyway. This recovery problem can be solved for such filesystems - we have a LSN stamped in all metadata at writeback time that we can to determine whether the item should be replayed or not. This is a separate piece of work, so is not addressed by this patch. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit 9222a9cf)
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
For CRC enabled filesystems, the BMBT is rooted in an inode, so it passes through a different code path on root splits than the freespace and inode btrees. This is much less traversed by xfstests than the other trees. When testing on a 1k block size filesystem, I've been seeing ASSERT failures in generic/234 like: XFS: Assertion failed: cur->bc_btnum != XFS_BTNUM_BMAP || cur->bc_private.b.allocated == 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_btree.c, line: 317 which are generally preceded by a lblock check failure. I noticed this in the bmbt stats: $ pminfo -f xfs.btree.block_map xfs.btree.block_map.lookup value 39135 xfs.btree.block_map.compare value 268432 xfs.btree.block_map.insrec value 15786 xfs.btree.block_map.delrec value 13884 xfs.btree.block_map.newroot value 2 xfs.btree.block_map.killroot value 0 ..... Very little coverage of root splits and merges. Indeed, on a 4k filesystem, block_map.newroot and block_map.killroot are both zero. i.e. the code is not exercised at all, and it's the only generic btree infrastructure operation that is not exercised by a default run of xfstests. Turns out that on a 1k filesystem, generic/234 accounts for one of those two root splits, and that is somewhat of a smoking gun. In fact, it's the same problem we saw in the directory/attr code where headers are memcpy()d from one block to another without updating the self describing metadata. Simple fix - when copying the header out of the root block, make sure the block number is updated correctly. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit ade1335a)
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
Michael L. Semon has been testing CRC patches on a 32 bit system and been seeing assert failures in the directory code from xfs/080. Thanks to Michael's heroic efforts with printk debugging, we found that the problem was that the last free space being left in the directory structure was too small to fit a unused tag structure and it was being corrupted and attempting to log a region out of bounds. Hence the assert failure looked something like: ..... #5 calling xfs_dir2_data_log_unused() 36 32 #1 4092 4095 4096 #2 8182 8183 4096 XFS: Assertion failed: first <= last && last < BBTOB(bp->b_length), file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 568 Where #1 showed the first region of the dup being logged (i.e. the last 4 bytes of a directory buffer) and #2 shows the corrupt values being calculated from the length of the dup entry which overflowed the size of the buffer. It turns out that the problem was not in the logging code, nor in the freespace handling code. It is an initial condition bug that only shows up on 32 bit systems. When a new buffer is initialised, where's the freespace that is set up: [ 172.316249] calling xfs_dir2_leaf_addname() from xfs_dir_createname() [ 172.316346] #9 calling xfs_dir2_data_log_unused() [ 172.316351] #1 calling xfs_trans_log_buf() 60 63 4096 [ 172.316353] #2 calling xfs_trans_log_buf() 4094 4095 4096 Note the offset of the first region being logged? It's 60 bytes into the buffer. Once I saw that, I pretty much knew that the bug was going to be caused by this. Essentially, all direct entries are rounded to 8 bytes in length, and all entries start with an 8 byte alignment. This means that we can decode inplace as variables are naturally aligned. With the directory data supposedly starting on a 8 byte boundary, and all entries padded to 8 bytes, the minimum freespace in a directory block is supposed to be 8 bytes, which is large enough to fit a unused data entry structure (6 bytes in size). The fact we only have 4 bytes of free space indicates a directory data block alignment problem. And what do you know - there's an implicit hole in the directory data block header for the CRC format, which means the header is 60 byte on 32 bit intel systems and 64 bytes on 64 bit systems. Needs padding. And while looking at the structures, I found the same problem in the attr leaf header. Fix them both. Note that this only affects 32 bit systems with CRCs enabled. Everything else is just fine. Note that CRC enabled filesystems created before this fix on such systems will not be readable with this fix applied. Reported-by: NMichael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Debugged-by: NMichael L. Semon <mlsemon35@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit 8a1fd295)
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由 Dave Chinner 提交于
We write the superblock every 30s or so which results in the verifier being called. Right now that results in this output every 30s: XFS (vda): Version 5 superblock detected. This kernel has EXPERIMENTAL support enabled! Use of these features in this kernel is at your own risk! And spamming the logs. We don't need to check for whether we support v5 superblocks or whether there are feature bits we don't support set as these are only relevant when we first mount the filesytem. i.e. on superblock read. Hence for the write verification we can just skip all the checks (and hence verbose output) altogether. Signed-off-by: NDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NBrian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NBen Myers <bpm@sgi.com> (cherry picked from commit 34510185)
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- 13 6月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Xue jiufei 提交于
dlm_mig_lockres_handler() is missing a dlm_lockres_put() on an error path. Signed-off-by: Njoyce <xuejiufei@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Nshencanquan <shencanquan@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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