Skip to content

R
raspberrypi-kernel

openeuler / raspberrypi-kernel

通知 13
Star 1
Fork 0
R
raspberrypi-kernel
切换分支/标签
  1. 27 9月, 2012 1 次提交
    • C
      procfs: Move /proc/pid/fd[info] handling code to fd.[ch] · faf60af1
      由 Cyrill Gorcunov 提交于 
      This patch prepares the ground for further extension of
/proc/pid/fd[info] handling code by moving fdinfo handling
code into fs/proc/fd.c.

I think such move makes both fs/proc/base.c and fs/proc/fd.c
easier to read.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: James Bottomley <jbottomley@parallels.com>
CC: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
CC: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
CC: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
CC: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      faf60af1
  3. 31 7月, 2012 2 次提交
    • D
      proc: do not allow negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ · bc452b4b
      由 Djalal Harouni 提交于 
      __mem_open() which is called by both /proc/<pid>/environ and
/proc/<pid>/mem ->open() handlers will allow the use of negative offsets.
/proc/<pid>/mem has negative offsets but not /proc/<pid>/environ.

Clean this by moving the 'force FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET flag' to mem_open()
to allow negative offsets only on /proc/<pid>/mem.
Signed-off-by: NDjalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bc452b4b
    • D
      proc: environ_read() make sure offset points to environment address range · e8905ec2
      由 Djalal Harouni 提交于 
      Currently the following offset and environment address range check in
environ_read() of /proc/<pid>/environ is buggy:

  int this_len = mm->env_end - (mm->env_start + src);
  if (this_len <= 0)
    break;

Large or negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ converted to 'unsigned
long' may pass this check since '(mm->env_start + src)' can overflow and
'this_len' will be positive.

This can turn /proc/<pid>/environ to act like /proc/<pid>/mem since
(mm->env_start + src) will point and read from another VMA.

There are two fixes here plus some code cleaning:

1) Fix the overflow by checking if the offset that was converted to
   unsigned long will always point to the [mm->env_start, mm->env_end]
   address range.

2) Remove the truncation that was made to the result of the check,
   storing the result in 'int this_len' will alter its value and we can
   not depend on it.

For kernels that have commit b409e578 ("proc: clean up
/proc/<pid>/environ handling") which adds the appropriate ptrace check and
saves the 'mm' at ->open() time, this is not a security issue.

This patch is taken from the grsecurity patch since it was just made
available.
Signed-off-by: NDjalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e8905ec2
  5. 14 7月, 2012 4 次提交
  7. 05 6月, 2012 1 次提交
    • L
      vfs: Fix /proc/<tid>/fdinfo/<fd> file handling · 0640113b
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Cyrill Gorcunov reports that I broke the fdinfo files with commit
30a08bf2 ("proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into
tid_fd_revalidate()"), and he's quite right.

The tid_fd_revalidate() function is not just used for the <tid>/fd
symlinks, it's also used for the <tid>/fdinfo/<fd> files, and the
permission model for those are different.

So do the dynamic symlink permission handling just for symlinks, making
the fdinfo files once more appear as the proper regular files they are.

Of course, Al Viro argued (probably correctly) that we shouldn't do the
symlink permission games at all, and make the symlinks always just be
the normal 'lrwxrwxrwx'.  That would have avoided this issue too, but
since somebody noticed that the permissions had changed (which was the
reason for that original commit 30a08bf2 in the first place), people
do apparently use this feature.

[ Basically, you can use the symlink permission data as a cheap "fdinfo"
  replacement, since you see whether the file is open for reading and/or
  writing by just looking at st_mode of the symlink.  So the feature
  does make sense, even if the pain it has caused means we probably
  shouldn't have done it to begin with. ]
Reported-and-tested-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0640113b
  9. 01 6月, 2012 6 次提交
  11. 30 5月, 2012 1 次提交
  13. 19 5月, 2012 1 次提交
    • L
      proc: move fd symlink i_mode calculations into tid_fd_revalidate() · 30a08bf2
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Instead of doing the i_mode calculations at proc_fd_instantiate() time,
move them into tid_fd_revalidate(), which is where the other inode state
(notably uid/gid information) is updated too.

Otherwise we'll end up with stale i_mode information if an fd is re-used
while the dentry still hangs around.  Not that anything really *cares*
(symlink permissions don't really matter), but Tetsuo Handa noticed that
the owner read/write bits don't always match the state of the
readability of the file descriptor, and we _used_ to get this right a
long time ago in a galaxy far, far away.

Besides, aside from fixing an ugly detail (that has apparently been this
way since commit 61a28784: "proc: Remove the hard coded inode
numbers" in 2006), this removes more lines of code than it adds.  And it
just makes sense to update i_mode in the same place we update i_uid/gid.

Al Viro correctly points out that we could just do the inode fill in the
inode iops ->getattr() function instead.  However, that does require
somewhat slightly more invasive changes, and adds yet *another* lookup
of the file descriptor.  We need to do the revalidate() for other
reasons anyway, and have the file descriptor handy, so we might as well
fill in the information at this point.
Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NEric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      30a08bf2
  15. 18 5月, 2012 1 次提交
    • C
      fs, proc: fix ABBA deadlock in case of execution attempt of map_files/ entries · eb94cd96
      由 Cyrill Gorcunov 提交于 
      map_files/ entries are never supposed to be executed, still curious
minds might try to run them, which leads to the following deadlock

  ======================================================
  [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
  3.4.0-rc4-24406-g841e6a6 #121 Not tainted
  -------------------------------------------------------
  bash/1556 is trying to acquire lock:
   (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}, at: do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1

  but task is already holding lock:
   (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2d/0x69

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
         validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
         __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
         lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
         __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
         mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x40/0x45
         lock_trace+0x24/0x59
         proc_map_files_lookup+0x5a/0x165
         __lookup_hash+0x52/0x73
         do_lookup+0x276/0x2b1
         walk_component+0x3d/0x114
         do_last+0xfc/0x540
         path_openat+0xd3/0x306
         do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
         do_sys_open+0x74/0x106
         sys_open+0x21/0x23
         tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

  -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){+.+.+.}:
         check_prev_add+0x6a/0x1ef
         validate_chain+0x444/0x4f4
         __lock_acquire+0x387/0x3f8
         lock_acquire+0x12b/0x158
         __mutex_lock_common+0x56/0x3a9
         mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x45
         do_lookup+0x267/0x2b1
         walk_component+0x3d/0x114
         link_path_walk+0x1f9/0x48f
         path_openat+0xb6/0x306
         do_filp_open+0x3d/0x89
         open_exec+0x25/0xa0
         do_execve_common+0xea/0x2f9
         do_execve+0x43/0x45
         sys_execve+0x43/0x5a
         stub_execve+0x6c/0xc0

This is because prepare_bprm_creds grabs task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
and when do_lookup happens we try to grab task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
again in lock_trace.

Fix it using plain ptrace_may_access() helper in proc_map_files_lookup()
and in proc_map_files_readdir() instead of lock_trace(), the caller must
be CAP_SYS_ADMIN granted anyway.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: NSasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      eb94cd96
  17. 16 5月, 2012 1 次提交
  19. 26 4月, 2012 1 次提交
    • E
      userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping support · 22d917d8
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      - Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers
- Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel
  internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed.
  * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel
    internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today,
    leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test.
- Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map
  These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added
  if a mapping does not exist.
- Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping.
  Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids
  still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't
  have local mappings.  The requirement for things to work are global uid
  and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid
  and gid mapping.
  Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies
  the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing
  the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the
  slight weirdness worth it.
- Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global
  uid/gid space explicit.  Today it is an identity mapping
  but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar
  to what we do with jiffies.
- Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and
  gid mappings.  We only allow the mappings to be set once
  and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are
  trivial but a little atypical.

Performance:

In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to
stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same.

The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where
all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and
kgids to uids and gids.  So I benchmarked that case on my laptop
with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache.

My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else
was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping
through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the
individuals files.  This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times
where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were
not in the processors cache.  My results:

v3.4-rc1:         ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled)
v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled)

All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests
that ran in the cpu cache.

So in summary the performance impact is:
1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out.
8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in.
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      22d917d8
  21. 22 3月, 2012 1 次提交
    • S
      procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/maps · b7643757
      由 Siddhesh Poyarekar 提交于 
      Stack for a new thread is mapped by userspace code and passed via
sys_clone.  This memory is currently seen as anonymous in
/proc/<pid>/maps, which makes it difficult to ascertain which mappings
are being used for thread stacks.  This patch uses the individual task
stack pointers to determine which vmas are actually thread stacks.

For a multithreaded program like the following:

	#include <pthread.h>

	void *thread_main(void *foo)
	{
		while(1);
	}

	int main()
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&t, NULL, thread_main, NULL);
		pthread_join(t, NULL);
	}

proc/PID/maps looks like the following:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

Here, one could guess that 7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 is a stack since
the earlier vma that has no permissions (7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000) but
that is not always a reliable way to find out which vma is a thread
stack.  Also, /proc/PID/maps and /proc/PID/task/TID/maps has the same
content.

With this patch in place, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps are treated as 'maps
as the task would see it' and hence, only the vma that that task uses as
stack is marked as [stack].  All other 'stack' vmas are marked as
anonymous memory.  /proc/PID/maps acts as a thread group level view,
where all thread stack vmas are marked as [stack:TID] where TID is the
process ID of the task that uses that vma as stack, while the process
stack is marked as [stack].

So /proc/PID/maps will look like this:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack:1442]
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

Thus marking all vmas that are used as stacks by the threads in the
thread group along with the process stack.  The task level maps will
however like this:

    00400000-00401000 r-xp 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    00600000-00601000 rw-p 00000000 fd:0a 3671804                            /home/siddhesh/a.out
    019ef000-01a10000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                                  [heap]
    7f8a44491000-7f8a44492000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    7f8a44c92000-7f8a44e3d000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a44e3d000-7f8a4503d000 ---p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4503d000-7f8a45041000 r--p 001ab000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45041000-7f8a45043000 rw-p 001af000 fd:00 2097482                    /lib64/libc-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45043000-7f8a45048000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45048000-7f8a4505f000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4505f000-7f8a4525e000 ---p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525e000-7f8a4525f000 r--p 00016000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a4525f000-7f8a45260000 rw-p 00017000 fd:00 2099938                    /lib64/libpthread-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45260000-7f8a45264000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45264000-7f8a45286000 r-xp 00000000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45457000-7f8a4545a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45484000-7f8a45485000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7f8a45485000-7f8a45486000 r--p 00021000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45486000-7f8a45487000 rw-p 00022000 fd:00 2097348                    /lib64/ld-2.14.90.so
    7f8a45487000-7f8a45488000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
    7fff627ff000-7fff62800000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                          [vdso]
    ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0                  [vsyscall]

where only the vma that is being used as a stack by *that* task is
marked as [stack].

Analogous changes have been made to /proc/PID/smaps,
/proc/PID/numa_maps, /proc/PID/task/TID/smaps and
/proc/PID/task/TID/numa_maps. Relevant snippets from smaps and
numa_maps:

    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ pgrep a.out
    1441
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack:1442]
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7f8a44492000-7f8a44c92000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/smaps | grep "\[stack"
    7fff6273b000-7fff6275c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0                          [stack]
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7f8a44492000 default stack:1442 anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
    7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1442/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7f8a44492000 default stack anon=2 dirty=2 N0=2
    [siddhesh@localhost ~ ]$ cat /proc/1441/task/1441/numa_maps | grep "stack"
    7fff6273a000 default stack anon=3 dirty=3 N0=3

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: NSiddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b7643757
  23. 02 3月, 2012 1 次提交
  25. 20 2月, 2012 1 次提交
    • D
      Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable · 1dce27c5
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Wrap accesses to the fd_sets in struct fdtable (for recording open files and
close-on-exec flags) so that we can move away from using fd_sets since we
abuse the fd_set structs by not allocating the full-sized structure under
normal circumstances and by non-core code looking at the internals of the
fd_sets.

The first abuse means that use of FD_ZERO() on these fd_sets is not permitted,
since that cannot be told about their abnormal lengths.

This introduces six wrapper functions for setting, clearing and testing
close-on-exec flags and fd-is-open flags:

	void __set_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_close_on_exec(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool close_on_exec(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __set_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	void __clear_open_fd(int fd, struct fdtable *fdt);
	bool fd_is_open(int fd, const struct fdtable *fdt);

Note that I've prepended '__' to the names of the set/clear functions because
they require the caller to hold a lock to use them.

Note also that I haven't added wrappers for looking behind the scenes at the
the array.  Possibly that should exist too.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120216174942.23314.1364.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.ukSigned-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      1dce27c5
  27. 03 2月, 2012 1 次提交
  29. 02 2月, 2012 3 次提交
  31. 18 1月, 2012 3 次提交
    • L
      proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem handling · e268337d
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
other related files.

This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open.  That
simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
VM.

That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler.  If
somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
this commit.

I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
addresses will also have changed as part of the execve.  So you cannot
actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
the offsets for IO would have changed too.
Reported-by: NJüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e268337d
    • E
      audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1 · 633b4545
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.  In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset.  We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd.  Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.

Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should.  With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly.  The system will restart the service for
them.  Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.

If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used!  Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      633b4545
    • E
      audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid · 0a300be6
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      The function always deals with current.  Don't expose an option
pretending one can use it for something.  You can't.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      0a300be6
  33. 13 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  35. 11 1月, 2012 4 次提交
    • V
      procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options · 0499680a
      由 Vasiliy Kulikov 提交于 
      Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/
directories.  The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left
untouched.

The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much
info about processes we want to be available for non-owners:

hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all
world-readable /proc/PID/* files.

hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but
their own.  Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected
against other users.  As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission()
and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific
files' modes are not confused.

hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other
users.  It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be
learned by other means, e.g.  by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid
and egid.  It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running
processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether
another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any
program at all, etc.

gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
(as in hidepid=0 mode).  This group should be used instead of putting
nonroot user in sudoers file or something.  However, untrusted users (like
daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole
system should not be added to the group.

hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which
might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes
timings:

http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3

hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools.  ps, top, pgrep, and
conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is
the only user running processes.  pstree shows the process subtree which
contains "pstree" process.

Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping
preopened descriptors of procfs files (like
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368).  We rely on that the leaked
information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten
anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the
counters.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      0499680a
    • P
      procfs: introduce the /proc/<pid>/map_files/ directory · 640708a2
      由 Pavel Emelyanov 提交于 
      This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
"vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.

For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/

 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
 | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so

This *helps* checkpointing process in three ways:

1. When dumping a task mappings we do know exact file that is mapped
   by particular region.  We do this by opening
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address symlink the way we do with file
   descriptors.

2. This also helps in determining which anonymous shared mappings are
   shared with each other by comparing the inodes of them.

3. When restoring a set of processes in case two of them has a mapping
   shared, we map the memory by the 1st one and then open its
   /proc/$pid/map_files/$address file and map it by the 2nd task.

Using /proc/$pid/maps for this is quite inconvenient since it brings
repeatable re-reading and reparsing for this text file which slows down
restore procedure significantly.  Also as being pointed in (3) it is a way
easier to use top level shared mapping in children as
/proc/$pid/map_files/$address when needed.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[gorcunov@openvz.org: make map_files depend on CHECKPOINT_RESTORE]
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Reviewed-by: N"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      640708a2
    • C
      procfs: make proc_get_link to use dentry instead of inode · 7773fbc5
      由 Cyrill Gorcunov 提交于 
      Prepare the ground for the next "map_files" patch which needs a name of a
link file to analyse.
Signed-off-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7773fbc5
    • K
      tracepoint: add tracepoints for debugging oom_score_adj · 43d2b113
      由 KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki 提交于 
      oom_score_adj is used for guarding processes from OOM-Killer.  One of
problem is that it's inherited at fork().  When a daemon set oom_score_adj
and make children, it's hard to know where the value is set.

This patch adds some tracepoints useful for debugging. This patch adds
3 trace points.
  - creating new task
  - renaming a task (exec)
  - set oom_score_adj

To debug, users need to enable some trace pointer. Maybe filtering is useful as

# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/task/
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_newtask/filter
# echo "oom_score_adj != 0" > $EVENT/task_rename/filter
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable
# EVENT=/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/oom/
# echo 1 > $EVENT/enable

output will be like this.
# grep oom /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
bash-7699  [007] d..3  5140.744510: oom_score_adj_update: pid=7699 comm=bash oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [007] ...1  5151.818022: task_newtask: pid=7729 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
ls-7729  [003] ...2  5151.818504: task_rename: pid=7729 oldcomm=bash newcomm=ls oom_score_adj=-1000
bash-7699  [002] ...1  5175.701468: task_newtask: pid=7730 comm=bash clone_flags=1200011 oom_score_adj=-1000
grep-7730  [007] ...2  5175.701993: task_rename: pid=7730 oldcomm=bash newcomm=grep oom_score_adj=-1000
Signed-off-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      43d2b113
  37. 04 1月, 2012 2 次提交
  39. 10 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  41. 03 11月, 2011 1 次提交
    • V
      proc: fix races against execve() of /proc/PID/fd** · aa6afca5
      由 Vasiliy Kulikov 提交于 
      fd* files are restricted to the task's owner, and other users may not get
direct access to them.  But one may open any of these files and run any
setuid program, keeping opened file descriptors.  As there are permission
checks on open(), but not on readdir() and read(), operations on the kept
file descriptors will not be checked.  It makes it possible to violate
procfs permission model.

Reading fdinfo/* may disclosure current fds' position and flags, reading
directory contents of fdinfo/ and fd/ may disclosure the number of opened
files by the target task.  This information is not sensible per se, but it
can reveal some private information (like length of a password stored in a
file) under certain conditions.

Used existing (un)lock_trace functions to check for ptrace_may_access(),
but instead of using EPERM return code from it use EACCES to be consistent
with existing proc_pid_follow_link()/proc_pid_readlink() return code.  If
they differ, attacker can guess what fds exist by analyzing stat() return
code.  Patched handlers: stat() for fd/*, stat() and read() for fdindo/*,
readdir() and lookup() for fd/ and fdinfo/.
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      aa6afca5
  43. 02 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  45. 01 11月, 2011 1 次提交
    • D
      oom: remove oom_disable_count · c9f01245
      由 David Rientjes 提交于 
      This removes mm->oom_disable_count entirely since it's unnecessary and
currently buggy.  The counter was intended to be per-process but it's
currently decremented in the exit path for each thread that exits, causing
it to underflow.

The count was originally intended to prevent oom killing threads that
share memory with threads that cannot be killed since it doesn't lead to
future memory freeing.  The counter could be fixed to represent all
threads sharing the same mm, but it's better to remove the count since:

 - it is possible that the OOM_DISABLE thread sharing memory with the
   victim is waiting on that thread to exit and will actually cause
   future memory freeing, and

 - there is no guarantee that a thread is disabled from oom killing just
   because another thread sharing its mm is oom disabled.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c9f01245