While SELinux largely ignores namespaces, for good reason, there are
some places where it needs to at least be aware of namespaces in order
to function correctly.  Network namespaces are one example.  Basic
awareness of network namespaces are necessary in order to match a
network interface's index number to an actual network device.

This patch corrects a problem with network interfaces added to a
non-init namespace, and can be reproduced with the following commands:

 [NOTE: the NetLabel configuration is here only to active the dynamic
        networking controls ]

 # netlabelctl unlbl add default address:0.0.0.0/0 \
   label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
 # netlabelctl unlbl add default address:::/0 \
   label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
 # netlabelctl cipsov4 add pass doi:100 tags:1
 # netlabelctl map add domain:lspp_test_netlabel_t \
   protocol:cipsov4,100

 # ip link add type veth
 # ip netns add myns
 # ip link set veth1 netns myns
 # ip a add dev veth0 10.250.13.100/24
 # ip netns exec myns ip a add dev veth1 10.250.13.101/24
 # ip l set veth0 up
 # ip netns exec myns ip l set veth1 up

 # ping -c 1 10.250.13.101
 # ip netns exec myns ping -c 1 10.250.13.100
Reported-by: NJiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Push ipv4 and ipv6 nf hooks into single array and register/unregister
them via single call.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

A previous commit c0828e50 ("selinux:
process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in
selinux_ip_postroute()") mistakenly left out a 'break' from a switch
statement which caused problems with IPv6 traffic.

Thanks to Florian Westphal for reporting and debugging the issue.
Reported-by: NFlorian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

If the callee SID is bounded by the caller SID, then allowing
the transition to occur poses no risk of privilege escalation and we can
therefore safely allow the transition to occur.  Add this exemption
for both the case where a transition was explicitly requested by the
application and the case where an automatic transition is defined in
policy.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

When flushing the AVC, such as during a policy load, the various
network caches are also flushed, with each making a call to
synchronize_net() which has shown to be expensive in some cases.
This patch consolidates the network cache flushes into a single AVC
callback which only calls synchronize_net() once for each AVC cache
flush.
Reported-by: NJaejyn Shin <flagon22bass@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem.  This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem.  This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now*
people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new
file-private locks suck.

...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck.

We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's
important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them.
The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as
"open file description locks".

The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not
visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The
glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to
look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a
programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier
to spot this difference when reading code.

This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before
v3.15 ships:

1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi
   headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that
   glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to
   be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest.

2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK"

Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

Due to some unfortunate history, POSIX locks have very strange and
unhelpful semantics. The thing that usually catches people by surprise
is that they are dropped whenever the process closes any file descriptor
associated with the inode.

This is extremely problematic for people developing file servers that
need to implement byte-range locks. Developers often need a "lock
management" facility to ensure that file descriptors are not closed
until all of the locks associated with the inode are finished.

Additionally, "classic" POSIX locks are owned by the process. Locks
taken between threads within the same process won't conflict with one
another, which renders them useless for synchronization between threads.

This patchset adds a new type of lock that attempts to address these
issues. These locks conflict with classic POSIX read/write locks, but
have semantics that are more like BSD locks with respect to inheritance
and behavior on close.

This is implemented primarily by changing how fl_owner field is set for
these locks. Instead of having them owned by the files_struct of the
process, they are instead owned by the filp on which they were acquired.
Thus, they are inherited across fork() and are only released when the
last reference to a filp is put.

These new semantics prevent them from being merged with classic POSIX
locks, even if they are acquired by the same process. These locks will
also conflict with classic POSIX locks even if they are acquired by
the same process or on the same file descriptor.

The new locks are managed using a new set of cmd values to the fcntl()
syscall. The initial implementation of this converts these values to
"classic" cmd values at a fairly high level, and the details are not
exposed to the underlying filesystem. We may eventually want to push
this handing out to the lower filesystem code but for now I don't
see any need for it.

Also, note that with this implementation the new cmd values are only
available via fcntl64() on 32-bit arches. There's little need to
add support for legacy apps on a new interface like this.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:

  "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
   list of inodes to be initialized after policy load.  After policy
   load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
   on all inodes accessed before policy load.  In the case of inodes
   in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:

     /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
     isec->sid = sbsec->sid;

     if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
             if (opt_dentry) {
                     isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                     rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                               isec->sclass,
                                               &sid);
                     if (rc)
                             goto out_unlock;
                     isec->sid = sid;
             }
     }

   Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
   and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
   I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs.  Look
   for an alias of the inode.  If it can't be found, just leave the
   inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
   should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."

On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).

Example:

 # cat mmap_test.c
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        int rc;
        void *mem;

        mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
                   PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
        if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
                return errno;
        printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
        munmap(mem, 4096);

        return 0;
  }
 # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
 # ./mmap_test
 mem = (nil)
 # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
 type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc:  denied  { mmap_zero }
   for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
   scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tclass=memprotect

This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.

Whilst we're at it:

 (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
     with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.

 (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
     it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
     directly to that.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>

security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:

  "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
   list of inodes to be initialized after policy load.  After policy
   load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
   on all inodes accessed before policy load.  In the case of inodes
   in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:

     /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
     isec->sid = sbsec->sid;

     if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
             if (opt_dentry) {
                     isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                     rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                               isec->sclass,
                                               &sid);
                     if (rc)
                             goto out_unlock;
                     isec->sid = sid;
             }
     }

   Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
   and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
   I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs.  Look
   for an alias of the inode.  If it can't be found, just leave the
   inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
   should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."

On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).

Example:

 # cat mmap_test.c
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        int rc;
        void *mem;

        mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
                   PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
        if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
                return errno;
        printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
        munmap(mem, 4096);

        return 0;
  }
 # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
 # ./mmap_test
 mem = (nil)
 # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
 type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc:  denied  { mmap_zero }
   for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
   scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tclass=memprotect

This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: NJingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Remove duplicated include.
Signed-off-by: NWei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

This reverts commit 102aefdd.

Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:

  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965

and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit.  Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.

Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: NTom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: NJosh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"

This reverts commit 102aefdd.

Explanation from Eric Paris:

	SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
	xattrs or not.  In current policy we have a specification that
	fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
	xattrs.  This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
	filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
	use xattrs.  If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
	question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
	command, they will deadlock.

	I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
	revert is still the correct solution.  The reason I believe
	that is because the code still does not work.  The s_subtype is
	not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
	the ".gluster" portion of the rule.  So we cannot match on the
	rule in question.  The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Pass the hook ops to the hookfn to allow for generic hook
functions. This change is required by nf_tables.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Now avc_audit() has no more users with that parameter. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Every single user passes in '0'.  I think we had non-zero users back in
some stone age when selinux_inode_permission() was implemented in terms
of inode_has_perm(), but that complicated case got split up into a
totally separate code-path so that we could optimize the much simpler
special cases.

See commit 2e334057 ("SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in
selinux_inode_permission") for example.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

- Move sysctl_local_ports from a global variable into struct netns_ipv4.
- Modify inet_get_local_port_range to take a struct net, and update all
  of the callers.
- Move the initialization of sysctl_local_ports into
   sysctl_net_ipv4.c:ipv4_sysctl_init_net from inet_connection_sock.c

v2:
- Ensure indentation used tabs
- Fixed ip.h so it applies cleanly to todays net-next

v3:
- Compile fixes of strange callers of inet_get_local_port_range.
  This patch now successfully passes an allmodconfig build.
  Removed manual inlining of inet_get_local_port_range in ipv4_local_port_range
Originally-by: NSamya <samya@twitter.com>
Acked-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This reverts commit 308ab70c.

It breaks my FC6 test box.  /dev/pts is not mounted.  dmesg says

SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)

Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>