While SELinux largely ignores namespaces, for good reason, there are
some places where it needs to at least be aware of namespaces in order
to function correctly.  Network namespaces are one example.  Basic
awareness of network namespaces are necessary in order to match a
network interface's index number to an actual network device.

This patch corrects a problem with network interfaces added to a
non-init namespace, and can be reproduced with the following commands:

 [NOTE: the NetLabel configuration is here only to active the dynamic
        networking controls ]

 # netlabelctl unlbl add default address:0.0.0.0/0 \
   label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
 # netlabelctl unlbl add default address:::/0 \
   label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
 # netlabelctl cipsov4 add pass doi:100 tags:1
 # netlabelctl map add domain:lspp_test_netlabel_t \
   protocol:cipsov4,100

 # ip link add type veth
 # ip netns add myns
 # ip link set veth1 netns myns
 # ip a add dev veth0 10.250.13.100/24
 # ip netns exec myns ip a add dev veth1 10.250.13.101/24
 # ip l set veth0 up
 # ip netns exec myns ip l set veth1 up

 # ping -c 1 10.250.13.101
 # ip netns exec myns ping -c 1 10.250.13.100
Reported-by: NJiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Push ipv4 and ipv6 nf hooks into single array and register/unregister
them via single call.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

A previous commit c0828e50 ("selinux:
process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in
selinux_ip_postroute()") mistakenly left out a 'break' from a switch
statement which caused problems with IPv6 traffic.

Thanks to Florian Westphal for reporting and debugging the issue.
Reported-by: NFlorian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

If the callee SID is bounded by the caller SID, then allowing
the transition to occur poses no risk of privilege escalation and we can
therefore safely allow the transition to occur.  Add this exemption
for both the case where a transition was explicitly requested by the
application and the case where an automatic transition is defined in
policy.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data
structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel
code and anyone who uses NetLabel.  This patch renames the catmap
functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*"
which improves things greatly.

There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

The NetLabel secattr catmap functions, and the SELinux import/export
glue routines, were broken in many horrible ways and the SELinux glue
code fiddled with the NetLabel catmap structures in ways that we
probably shouldn't allow.  At some point this "worked", but that was
likely due to a bit of dumb luck and sub-par testing (both inflicted
by yours truly).  This patch corrects these problems by basically
gutting the code in favor of something less obtuse and restoring the
NetLabel abstractions in the SELinux catmap glue code.

Everything is working now, and if it decides to break itself in the
future this code will be much easier to debug than the code it
replaces.

One noteworthy side effect of the changes is that it is no longer
necessary to allocate a NetLabel catmap before calling one of the
NetLabel APIs to set a bit in the catmap.  NetLabel will automatically
allocate the catmap nodes when needed, resulting in less allocations
when the lowest bit is greater than 255 and less code in the LSMs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NChristian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

When flushing the AVC, such as during a policy load, the various
network caches are also flushed, with each making a call to
synchronize_net() which has shown to be expensive in some cases.
This patch consolidates the network cache flushes into a single AVC
callback which only calls synchronize_net() once for each AVC cache
flush.
Reported-by: NJaejyn Shin <flagon22bass@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

With the introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock()
may hang the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere
in between.

With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G            E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
 (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170

but task is already holding lock:
 (policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(policy_rwlock);
  lock(policy_rwlock);

This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock by adding a helper function __security_genfs_sid()
which requires caller to take the lock before calling it. The
security_fs_use() was then modified to call the new helper function.
Signed-off-by: NWaiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

The cond_read_node() should free the given node on error path as it's
not linked to p->cond_list yet.  This is done via cond_node_destroy()
but it's not called when next_entry() fails before the expr loop.
Signed-off-by: NNamhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

The node->cur_state and len can be read in a single call of next_entry().
And setting len before reading is a dead write so can be eliminated.
Signed-off-by: NNamhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
(Minor tweak to the length parameter in the call to next_entry())
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

To increase compiler portability there is <linux/compiler.h> which
provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs.  Eg: __packed
for __attribute__((packed)).

This patch is part of a large task I've taken to clean the gcc
specific attributes and use the the macros instead.
Signed-off-by: NGideon Israel Dsouza <gidisrael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

There're some code duplication for reading a string value during
policydb_read().  Add str_read() helper to fix it.
Signed-off-by: NNamhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

ARRAY_SIZE is more concise to use when the size of an array is divided
by the size of its type or the size of its first element.

The Coccinelle semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:

// <smpl>
@@
type T;
T[] E;
@@

- (sizeof(E)/sizeof(E[...]))
+ ARRAY_SIZE(E)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: NHimangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take
a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector
gets triggered.

The backtrace looks like this..

 > BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045]
 > Call Trace:
 >  [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20
 >  [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0
 >  [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460
 >  [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240
 >  [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
 >  [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
 >  [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
 >  [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 >  [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0
 >  [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
 >  [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770
 >  [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200
 >  [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0
 >  [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200
 >  [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0
 >  [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0
 >  [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

Stephen Smalley suggested:

 > Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit()
 > loop in mls_convert_context()?

That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted.
Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem.  This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take
a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector
gets triggered.

The backtrace looks like this..

 > BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045]
 > Call Trace:
 >  [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20
 >  [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0
 >  [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460
 >  [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240
 >  [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
 >  [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
 >  [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
 >  [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 >  [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0
 >  [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
 >  [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770
 >  [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200
 >  [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0
 >  [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200
 >  [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0
 >  [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0
 >  [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

Stephen Smalley suggested:

 > Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit()
 > loop in mls_convert_context()?

That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted.
Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem.  This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace
process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now*
people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new
file-private locks suck.

...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck.

We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's
important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them.
The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as
"open file description locks".

The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not
visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The
glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to
look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a
programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier
to spot this difference when reading code.

This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before
v3.15 ships:

1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi
   headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that
   glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to
   be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest.

2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK"

Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

Due to some unfortunate history, POSIX locks have very strange and
unhelpful semantics. The thing that usually catches people by surprise
is that they are dropped whenever the process closes any file descriptor
associated with the inode.

This is extremely problematic for people developing file servers that
need to implement byte-range locks. Developers often need a "lock
management" facility to ensure that file descriptors are not closed
until all of the locks associated with the inode are finished.

Additionally, "classic" POSIX locks are owned by the process. Locks
taken between threads within the same process won't conflict with one
another, which renders them useless for synchronization between threads.

This patchset adds a new type of lock that attempts to address these
issues. These locks conflict with classic POSIX read/write locks, but
have semantics that are more like BSD locks with respect to inheritance
and behavior on close.

This is implemented primarily by changing how fl_owner field is set for
these locks. Instead of having them owned by the files_struct of the
process, they are instead owned by the filp on which they were acquired.
Thus, they are inherited across fork() and are only released when the
last reference to a filp is put.

These new semantics prevent them from being merged with classic POSIX
locks, even if they are acquired by the same process. These locks will
also conflict with classic POSIX locks even if they are acquired by
the same process or on the same file descriptor.

The new locks are managed using a new set of cmd values to the fcntl()
syscall. The initial implementation of this converts these values to
"classic" cmd values at a fairly high level, and the details are not
exposed to the underlying filesystem. We may eventually want to push
this handing out to the lower filesystem code but for now I don't
see any need for it.

Also, note that with this implementation the new cmd values are only
available via fcntl64() on 32-bit arches. There's little need to
add support for legacy apps on a new interface like this.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:

  "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
   list of inodes to be initialized after policy load.  After policy
   load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
   on all inodes accessed before policy load.  In the case of inodes
   in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:

     /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
     isec->sid = sbsec->sid;

     if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
             if (opt_dentry) {
                     isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                     rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                               isec->sclass,
                                               &sid);
                     if (rc)
                             goto out_unlock;
                     isec->sid = sid;
             }
     }

   Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
   and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
   I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs.  Look
   for an alias of the inode.  If it can't be found, just leave the
   inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
   should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."

On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).

Example:

 # cat mmap_test.c
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        int rc;
        void *mem;

        mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
                   PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
        if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
                return errno;
        printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
        munmap(mem, 4096);

        return 0;
  }
 # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
 # ./mmap_test
 mem = (nil)
 # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
 type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc:  denied  { mmap_zero }
   for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
   scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tclass=memprotect

This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.

Whilst we're at it:

 (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
     with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.

 (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
     it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
     directly to that.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>

security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:

  "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
   list of inodes to be initialized after policy load.  After policy
   load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
   on all inodes accessed before policy load.  In the case of inodes
   in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:

     /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
     isec->sid = sbsec->sid;

     if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
             if (opt_dentry) {
                     isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                     rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                               isec->sclass,
                                               &sid);
                     if (rc)
                             goto out_unlock;
                     isec->sid = sid;
             }
     }

   Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
   and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
   I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs.  Look
   for an alias of the inode.  If it can't be found, just leave the
   inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
   should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."

On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).

Example:

 # cat mmap_test.c
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        int rc;
        void *mem;

        mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
                   PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
        if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
                return errno;
        printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
        munmap(mem, 4096);

        return 0;
  }
 # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
 # ./mmap_test
 mem = (nil)
 # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
 type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc:  denied  { mmap_zero }
   for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
   scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
   tclass=memprotect

This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class
of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian.  On
x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like
ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from
le32_to_cpu.  So the values are all screwed up.  Write the values in le
format like it should have been to start.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Inserting a entry into flowcache, or flushing flowcache should be based
on per net scope. The reason to do so is flushing operation from fat
netns crammed with flow entries will also making the slim netns with only
a few flow cache entries go away in original implementation.

Since flowcache is tightly coupled with IPsec, so it would be easier to
put flow cache global parameters into xfrm namespace part. And one last
thing needs to do is bumping flow cache genid, and flush flow cache should
also be made in per net style.
Signed-off-by: NFan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>

The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: NJingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: NMatthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

The SELinux AF_NETLINK/NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG socket class was missing the
SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY definition which caused SELINUX_ERR messages when
the ss tool was run.

 # ss
 Netid  State  Recv-Q Send-Q  Local Address:Port   Peer Address:Port
 u_str  ESTAB  0      0                  * 14189             * 14190
 u_str  ESTAB  0      0                  * 14145             * 14144
 u_str  ESTAB  0      0                  * 14151             * 14150
 {...}
 # ausearch -m SELINUX_ERR
 ----
 time->Thu Jan 23 11:11:16 2014
 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1390493476.445:374):
  arch=c000003e syscall=44 success=yes exit=40
  a0=3 a1=7fff03aa11f0 a2=28 a3=0 items=0 ppid=1852 pid=1895
  auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0
  tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="ss" exe="/usr/sbin/ss"
  subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
 type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1390493476.445:374):
  SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message type=20 for sclass=32
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried.  Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met.  Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Hello.

I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .

[  681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)

Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy

Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.

  unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
    comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5                          W...kkk.
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
      [<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
      [<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
      [<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
      [<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
      [<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
      [<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
      [<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.

  systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().

And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: NEvan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>

Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: NChad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>