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  1. 23 11月, 2010 1 次提交
    • K
      xen: set IO permission early (before early_cpu_init()) · ec35a69c
      由 Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 提交于 
      This patch is based off "xen dom0: Set up basic IO permissions for dom0."
by Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>.

On AMD machines when we boot the kernel as Domain 0 we get this nasty:

mapping kernel into physical memory
Xen: setup ISA identity maps
about to get started...
(XEN) traps.c:475:d0 Unhandled general protection fault fault/trap [#13] on VCPU 0 [ec=0000]
(XEN) domain_crash_sync called from entry.S
(XEN) Domain 0 (vcpu#0) crashed on cpu#0:
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.1-101116  x86_64  debug=y  Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU:    0
(XEN) RIP:    e033:[<ffffffff8130271b>]
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000282   EM: 1   CONTEXT: pv guest
(XEN) rax: 000000008000c068   rbx: ffffffff8186c680   rcx: 0000000000000068
(XEN) rdx: 0000000000000cf8   rsi: 000000000000c000   rdi: 0000000000000000
(XEN) rbp: ffffffff81801e98   rsp: ffffffff81801e50   r8:  ffffffff81801eac
(XEN) r9:  ffffffff81801ea8   r10: ffffffff81801eb4   r11: 00000000ffffffff
(XEN) r12: ffffffff8186c694   r13: ffffffff81801f90   r14: ffffffffffffffff
(XEN) r15: 0000000000000000   cr0: 000000008005003b   cr4: 00000000000006f0
(XEN) cr3: 0000000221803000   cr2: 0000000000000000
(XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: e02b   cs: e033
(XEN) Guest stack trace from rsp=ffffffff81801e50:

RIP points to read_pci_config() function.

The issue is that we don't set IO permissions for the Linux kernel early enough.

The call sequence used to be:

    xen_start_kernel()
	x86_init.oem.arch_setup = xen_setup_arch;
        setup_arch:
           - early_cpu_init
               - early_init_amd
                  - read_pci_config
           - x86_init.oem.arch_setup [ xen_arch_setup ]
               - set IO permissions.

We need to set the IO permissions earlier on, which this patch does.
Acked-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      ec35a69c
  3. 13 11月, 2010 1 次提交
  5. 28 10月, 2010 1 次提交
  7. 23 10月, 2010 5 次提交
  9. 22 10月, 2010 1 次提交
    • A
      x86, kexec: Make sure to stop all CPUs before exiting the kernel · 76fac077
      由 Alok Kataria 提交于 
      x86 smp_ops now has a new op, stop_other_cpus which takes a parameter
"wait" this allows the caller to specify if it wants to stop until all
the cpus have processed the stop IPI.  This is required specifically
for the kexec case where we should wait for all the cpus to be stopped
before starting the new kernel.  We now wait for the cpus to stop in
all cases except for panic/kdump where we expect things to be broken
and we are doing our best to make things work anyway.

This patch fixes a legitimate regression, which was introduced during
2.6.30, by commit id 4ef702c1.
Signed-off-by: NAlok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
LKML-Reference: <1286833028.1372.20.camel@ank32.eng.vmware.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> v2.6.30-36
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      76fac077
  11. 18 10月, 2010 1 次提交
  13. 12 10月, 2010 1 次提交
  15. 05 8月, 2010 4 次提交
  17. 30 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  19. 27 7月, 2010 3 次提交
  21. 23 7月, 2010 3 次提交
  23. 21 7月, 2010 1 次提交
  25. 08 6月, 2010 1 次提交
  27. 30 3月, 2010 1 次提交
    • T
      include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking... · 5a0e3ad6
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h

percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: NChristoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
      5a0e3ad6
  29. 28 2月, 2010 1 次提交
    • I
      x86, xen: Disable highmem PTE allocation even when CONFIG_HIGHPTE=y · 817a824b
      由 Ian Campbell 提交于 
      There's a path in the pagefault code where the kernel deliberately
breaks its own locking rules by kmapping a high pte page without
holding the pagetable lock (in at least page_check_address). This
breaks Xen's ability to track the pinned/unpinned state of the
page. There does not appear to be a viable workaround for this
behaviour so simply disable HIGHPTE for all Xen guests.
Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
LKML-Reference: <1267204562-11844-1-git-send-email-ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Pasi Kärkkäinen <pasik@iki.fi>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # .32.x: 14315592: Allow highmem user page tables to be disabled at boot time
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # .32.x
Cc: <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      817a824b
  31. 13 1月, 2010 1 次提交
    • I
      x86: xen: 64-bit kernel RPL should be 0 · e68266b7
      由 Ian Campbell 提交于 
      Under Xen 64 bit guests actually run their kernel in ring 3,
however the hypervisor takes care of squashing descriptor the
RPLs transparently (in order to allow them to continue to
differentiate between user and kernel space CS using the RPL).
Therefore the Xen paravirt backend should use RPL==0 instead of
1 (or 3). Using RPL==1 causes generic arch code to take
incorrect code paths because it uses "testl $3, <CS>, je foo"
type tests for a userspace CS and this considers 1==userspace.

This issue was previously masked because get_kernel_rpl() was
omitted when setting CS in kernel_thread(). This was fixed when
kernel_thread() was unified with 32 bit in
f443ff42.
Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <Jeremy.Fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1263377768-19600-2-git-send-email-ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      e68266b7
  33. 05 12月, 2009 1 次提交
    • C
      PCI: add pci_request_acs · 5d990b62
      由 Chris Wright 提交于 
      Commit ae21ee65 "PCI: acs p2p upsteram
forwarding enabling" doesn't actually enable ACS.

Add a function to pci core to allow an IOMMU to request that ACS
be enabled.  The existing mechanism of using iommu_found() in the pci
core to know when ACS should be enabled doesn't actually work due to
initialization order;  iommu has only been detected not initialized.

Have Intel and AMD IOMMUs request ACS, and Xen does as well during early
init of dom0.

Cc: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NJesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
      5d990b62
  35. 04 12月, 2009 3 次提交
  37. 17 11月, 2009 1 次提交
    • H
      x86, mm: Clean up and simplify NX enablement · 4763ed4d
      由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于 
      The 32- and 64-bit code used very different mechanisms for enabling
NX, but even the 32-bit code was enabling NX in head_32.S if it is
available.  Furthermore, we had a bewildering collection of tests for
the available of NX.

This patch:

a) merges the 32-bit set_nx() and the 64-bit check_efer() function
   into a single x86_configure_nx() function.  EFER control is left
   to the head code.

b) eliminates the nx_enabled variable entirely.  Things that need to
   test for NX enablement can verify __supported_pte_mask directly,
   and cpu_has_nx gives the supported status of NX.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
LKML-Reference: <1258154897-6770-5-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
      4763ed4d
  39. 05 11月, 2009 1 次提交
  41. 04 11月, 2009 1 次提交
  43. 28 10月, 2009 1 次提交
  45. 22 9月, 2009 1 次提交
  47. 16 9月, 2009 1 次提交
  49. 10 9月, 2009 1 次提交
    • J
      xen: make -fstack-protector work under Xen · 577eebea
      由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于 
      -fstack-protector uses a special per-cpu "stack canary" value.
gcc generates special code in each function to test the canary to make
sure that the function's stack hasn't been overrun.

On x86-64, this is simply an offset of %gs, which is the usual per-cpu
base segment register, so setting it up simply requires loading %gs's
base as normal.

On i386, the stack protector segment is %gs (rather than the usual kernel
percpu %fs segment register).  This requires setting up the full kernel
GDT and then loading %gs accordingly.  We also need to make sure %gs is
initialized when bringing up secondary cpus too.

To keep things consistent, we do the full GDT/segment register setup on
both architectures.

Because we need to avoid -fstack-protected code before setting up the GDT
and because there's no way to disable it on a per-function basis, several
files need to have stack-protector inhibited.

[ Impact: allow Xen booting with stack-protector enabled ]
Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
      577eebea
  51. 01 9月, 2009 1 次提交
    • H
      x86, msr: Have the _safe MSR functions return -EIO, not -EFAULT · 0cc0213e
      由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于 
      For some reason, the _safe MSR functions returned -EFAULT, not -EIO.
However, the only user which cares about the return code as anything
other than a boolean is the MSR driver, which wants -EIO.  Change it
to -EIO across the board.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
      0cc0213e
  53. 31 8月, 2009 1 次提交