by passing a filename to a separate iovec regardless of its length.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteven French <steven@steven-GA-970A-DS3.(none)>

and eliminated unused file_attribute parms of SMB2_open.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteven French <steven@steven-GA-970A-DS3.(none)>

to prevent missing RqLs context if it's not the first one.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSteven French <steven@steven-GA-970A-DS3.(none)>

Certain servers may not set the NumberOfLinks field in query file/path
info responses. In such a case, cifs_inode_needs_reval() assumes that
all regular files are hardlinks and triggers revalidation, leading to
excessive and unnecessary network traffic.

This change hardcodes cf_nlink (and subsequently i_nlink) when not
returned by the server, similar to what already occurs in cifs_mkdir().

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of cifs, smb2 or smb3 crypto
secmech structures unless needed.  Currently cifs allocates all crypto
mechanisms when the first session is established (4 functions and
4 contexts), rather than only allocating these when needed (smb3 needs
two, the rest of the dialects only need one).
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Having a global lock that protects all of this code is a clear
scalability problem. Instead of doing that, move most of the code to be
protected by the i_lock instead. The exceptions are the global lists
that the ->fl_link sits on, and the ->fl_block list.

->fl_link is what connects these structures to the
global lists, so we must ensure that we hold those locks when iterating
over or updating these lists.

Furthermore, sound deadlock detection requires that we hold the
blocked_list state steady while checking for loops. We also must ensure
that the search and update to the list are atomic.

For the checking and insertion side of the blocked_list, push the
acquisition of the global lock into __posix_lock_file and ensure that
checking and update of the  blocked_list is done without dropping the
lock in between.

On the removal side, when waking up blocked lock waiters, take the
global lock before walking the blocked list and dequeue the waiters from
the global list prior to removal from the fl_block list.

With this, deadlock detection should be race free while we minimize
excessive file_lock_lock thrashing.

Finally, in order to avoid a lock inversion problem when handling
/proc/locks output we must ensure that manipulations of the fl_block
list are also protected by the file_lock_lock.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

commit 66189be7 (CIFS: Fix VFS lock usage for oplocked files) exported
the locks_delete_block symbol. There's already an exported helper
function that provides this capability however, so make cifs use that
instead and turn locks_delete_block back into a static function.

Note that if fl->fl_next == NULL then this lock has already been through
locks_delete_block(), so we should be OK to ignore an ENOENT error here
and simply not retry the lock.

Cc: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Instances either don't look at it at all (the majority of cases) or
only want it to find the superblock (which can be had as dentry->d_sb).
A few cases that want more are actually safe with dentry->d_inode -
the only precaution needed is the check that it hadn't been replaced with
NULL by rmdir() or by overwriting rename(), which case should be simply
treated as cache miss.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Currently the trans2 ByteCount field is incorrectly left zero in
TRANS2_QUERY_FILE_INFO info_level=SMB_QUERY_FILE_ALL_INFO and
info_level=SMB_QUERY_FILE_UNIX_BASIC requests. The field should properly
reflect the FID, information_level and padding bytes carried in these
requests.

Leaving this field zero causes such requests to fail against Novell CIFS
servers. Other SMB servers (e.g. Samba) use the parameter count fields
for data length calculations instead, so do not suffer the same fate.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Disseldorp <ddiss@suse.de>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Commit 9ddec561 (cifs: move handling of signed connections into
separate function) broke signing on SMB2/3 connections. While the code
to enable signing on the connections was very similar between the two,
the bits that get set in the sec_mode are different.

Declare a couple of new smb_version_values fields and set them
appropriately for SMB1 and SMB2/3. Then change cifs_enable_signing to
use those instead.
Reported-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Fix build warning in Shirish's recent SMB3 signing patch
which occurs when SMB2 support is disabled in Kconfig.

fs/built-in.o: In function `cifs_setup_session':
>> (.text+0xa1767): undefined reference to `generate_smb3signingkey'

Pointed out by: automated 0-DAY kernel build testing backend
Intel Open Source Technology Center

CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

SMB3 uses a much faster method of signing (which is also better in other ways),
AES-CMAC.  With the kernel now supporting AES-CMAC since last release, we
are overdue to allow SMB3 signing (today only CIFS and SMB2 and SMB2.1,
but not SMB3 and SMB3.1 can sign) - and we need this also for checking
secure negotation and also per-share encryption (two other new SMB3 features
which we need to implement).

This patch needs some work in a few areas - for example we need to
move signing for SMB2/SMB3 from per-socket to per-user (we may be able to
use the "nosharesock" mount option in the interim for the multiuser case),
and Shirish found a bug in the earlier authentication overhaul
(setting signing flags properly) - but those can be done in followon
patches.
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

If we would set SMB2_FLAGS_DFS_OPERATIONS on open we also would have
to pass the path on the Open SMB prefixed by \\server\share.
Not sure when we would need to do the augmented path (if ever) and
setting this flag breaks the SMB2 open operation since it is
illegal to send an empty path name (without \\server\share prefix)
when the DFS flag is set in the SMB open header. We could
consider setting the flag on all operations other than open
but it is safer to net set it for now.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Dan Carpenter wrote:

The patch 7f420cee8bd6: "[CIFS] Charge at least one credit, if server
says that it supports multicredit" from Jun 23, 2013, leads to the
following Smatch complaint:

fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c:120 smb2_hdr_assemble()
         warn: variable dereferenced before check 'tcon->ses' (see line 115)

CC: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The cifs.ko SecurityFlags interface wins my award for worst-designed
interface ever, but we're sort of stuck with it since it's documented
and people do use it (even if it doesn't work correctly).

Case in point -- you can specify multiple sets of "MUST" flags. It makes
absolutely no sense, but you can do it.

What should the effect be in such a case? No one knows or seems to have
considered this so far, so let's define it now. If you try to specify
multiple MUST flags, clear any other MAY or MUST bits except for the
ones that involve signing.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

According to MS-SMB2 section 2.2.4: if no blob, client picks default which
for us will be
	ses->sectype = RawNTLMSSP;
but for time being this is also our only auth choice so doesn't matter
as long as we include this fix (which does not treat the empty
SecurityBuffer as an error as the code had been doing).
We just found a server which sets blob length to zero expecting raw so
this fixes negotiation with that server.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This is RH bug 970891
Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails
because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars.

Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage.

[To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed
this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated
by sparse -- steve f.]
Reported-by: Nsteve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NShirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

We've had a long-standing problem with DFS referral points. CIFS servers
generally try to make them look like directories in FIND_FIRST/NEXT
responses. When you go to try to do a FIND_FIRST on them though, the
server will then (correctly) return STATUS_PATH_NOT_COVERED. Mostly this
manifests as spurious EREMOTE errors back to userland.

This patch attempts to fix this by marking directories that are
discovered via FIND_FIRST/NEXT for revaldiation. When the lookup code
runs across them again, we'll reissue a QPathInfo against them and that
will make it chase the referral properly.

There is some performance penalty involved here and no I haven't
measured it -- it'll be highly dependent upon the workload and contents
of the mounted share. To try and mitigate that though, the code only
marks the inode for revalidation when it's possible to run across a DFS
referral. i.e.: when the kernel has DFS support built in and the share
is "in DFS"

[At the Microsoft plugfest we noted that usually the DFS links had
the REPARSE attribute tag enabled - DFS junctions are reparse points
after all - so I just added a check for that flag too so the
performance impact should be smaller - Steve]
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NSachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

This worker function is needed to send SMB2 fsctl
(and ioctl) requests including:

validating negotiation info (secure negotiate)
querying the servers network interfaces
copy offload (refcopy)

Followon patches for the above three will use this.
This patch also does general validation of the response.

In the future, as David Disseldorp notes, for the copychunk ioctl
case, we will want to enhance the response processing to allow
returning the chunk request limits to the caller (even
though the server returns an error, in that case we would
return data that the caller could use - see 2.2.32.1).

See MS-SMB2 Section 2.2.31 for more details on format of fsctl.
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

In SMB2.1 and later the server will usually set the large MTU flag, and
we need to charge at least one credit, if server says that since
it supports multicredit.  Windows seems to let us get away with putting
a zero there, but they confirmed that it is wrong and the spec says
to put one there (if the request is under 64K and the CAP_LARGE_MTU
was returned during protocol negotiation by the server.

CC: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Cut and paste likely introduced accidentally inserted spurious #define
in d60622eb causes no harm but looks weird
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

for NUL terminated string, need alway set '\0' in the end.
Signed-off-by: NZhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

MS-SMB2 Section 2.2.31 lists fsctls.  Update our list of valid
cifs/smb2/smb3 fsctls and some related structs
based on more recent version of docs.  Additional detail on
less common ones can be found in MS-FSCC section 2.3.

CopyChunk (server side copy, ie refcopy) will depend on a few
of these
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

More than 160 fixes since we last bumped the version number of cifs.ko.
Update to version 2.01 so it is easier in modinfo to tell
that fixes are in.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

SMB3 protocol adds various optional per-share capabilities (and
SMB3.02 adds one more beyond that).  Add ability to dump
(/proc/fs/cifs/DebugData) the share capabilities and share flags to
improve debugging.
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

A few missing flags from SMB3.0 dialect, one missing from 2.1, and the
new #define flags for SMB3.02
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The new Windows update supports SMB3.02 dialect, a minor update to SMB3.
This patch adds support for mounting with vers=3.02
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

Fix minor endian error in Jeff's auth rewrite
Reviewed-by: NJeff Laytonn <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

The SecurityFlags handler uses an obsolete simple_strtoul() call, and
doesn't really handle the bounds checking well. Fix it to use
kstrtouint() instead. Clean up the error messages as well and fix a
bogus check for an unsigned int to be less than 0.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Before this patchset, the global_secflags could only offer up a single
sectype. With the new set though we have the ability to allow different
sectypes since we sort out the one to use after talking to the server.

Change the global_secflags to allow NTLMSSP or NTLMv2 by default. If the
server sets the extended security bit in the Negotiate response, then
we'll use NTLMSSP. If it doesn't then we'll use raw NTLMv2. Mounting a
LANMAN server will still require a sec= option by default.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop
mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth.

Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype
a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on
a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response.

With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that
info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently, we determine this according to flags in the sec_mode, flags
in the global_secflags and via other methods. That makes the semantics
very hard to follow and there are corner cases where we don't handle
this correctly.

Add a new bool to the TCP_Server_Info that acts as a simple flag to tell
us whether signing is enabled on this connection or not, and fix up the
places that need to determine this to use that flag.

This is a bit weird for the SMB2 case, where signing is per-session.
SMB2 needs work in this area already though. The existing SMB2 code has
similar logic to what we're using here, so there should be no real
change in behavior. These changes should make it easier to implement
per-session signing in the future though.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

We have this to some degree already in secFlgs, but those get "or'ed" so
there's no way to know what the last option requested was. Add new fields
that will eventually supercede the secFlgs field in the cifs_ses.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Currently we have the overrideSecFlg field, but it's quite cumbersome
to work with. Add some new fields that will eventually supercede it.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Track what sort of NEGOTIATE response we get from the server, as that
will govern what sort of authentication types this socket will support.

There are three possibilities:

LANMAN: server sent legacy LANMAN-type response

UNENCAP: server sent a newer-style response, but extended security bit
wasn't set. This socket will only support unencapsulated auth types.

EXTENDED: server sent a newer-style response with the extended security
bit set. This is necessary to support krb5 and ntlmssp auth types.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Add a new securityEnum value to cover the case where a sec= option
was not explicitly set.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>

Move the sanity checks for signed connections into a separate function.
SMB2's was a cut-and-paste job from CIFS code, so we can make them use
the same function.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NPavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: NSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>