1. 15 3月, 2012 2 次提交
    • K
      xen/acpi-processor: C and P-state driver that uploads said data to hypervisor. · 59a56802
      Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 提交于
      This driver solves three problems:
       1). Parse and upload ACPI0007 (or PROCESSOR_TYPE) information to the
           hypervisor - aka P-states (cpufreq data).
       2). Upload the the Cx state information (cpuidle data).
       3). Inhibit CPU frequency scaling drivers from loading.
      
      The reason for wanting to solve 1) and 2) is such that the Xen hypervisor
      is the only one that knows the CPU usage of different guests and can
      make the proper decision of when to put CPUs and packages in proper states.
      Unfortunately the hypervisor has no support to parse ACPI DSDT tables, hence it
      needs help from the initial domain to provide this information. The reason
      for 3) is that we do not want the initial domain to change P-states while the
      hypervisor is doing it as well - it causes rather some funny cases of P-states
      transitions.
      
      For this to work, the driver parses the Power Management data and uploads said
      information to the Xen hypervisor. It also calls acpi_processor_notify_smm()
      to inhibit the other CPU frequency scaling drivers from being loaded.
      
      Everything revolves around the 'struct acpi_processor' structure which
      gets updated during the bootup cycle in different stages. At the startup, when
      the ACPI parser starts, the C-state information is processed (processor_idle)
      and saved in said structure as 'power' element. Later on, the CPU frequency
      scaling driver (powernow-k8 or acpi_cpufreq), would call the the
      acpi_processor_* (processor_perflib functions) to parse P-states information
      and populate in the said structure the 'performance' element.
      
      Since we do not want the CPU frequency scaling drivers from loading
      we have to call the acpi_processor_* functions to parse the P-states and
      call "acpi_processor_notify_smm" to stop them from loading.
      
      There is also one oddity in this driver which is that under Xen, the
      physical online CPU count can be different from the virtual online CPU count.
      Meaning that the macros 'for_[online|possible]_cpu' would process only
      up to virtual online CPU count. We on the other hand want to process
      the full amount of physical CPUs. For that, the driver checks if the ACPI IDs
      count is different from the APIC ID count - which can happen if the user
      choose to use dom0_max_vcpu argument. In such a case a backup of the PM
      structure is used and uploaded to the hypervisor.
      
      [v1-v2: Initial RFC implementations that were posted]
      [v3: Changed the name to passthru suggested by Pasi Kärkkäinen <pasik@iki.fi>]
      [v4: Added vCPU != pCPU support - aka dom0_max_vcpus support]
      [v5: Cleaned up the driver, fix bug under Athlon XP]
      [v6: Changed the driver to a CPU frequency governor]
      [v7: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> suggestion to make it a cpufreq scaling driver
           made me rework it as driver that inhibits cpufreq scaling driver]
      [v8: Per Jan's review comments, fixed up the driver]
      [v9: Allow to continue even if acpi_processor_preregister_perf.. fails]
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      59a56802
    • J
      xen: constify all instances of "struct attribute_group" · ead1d014
      Jan Beulich 提交于
      The functions these get passed to have been taking pointers to const
      since at least 2.6.16.
      Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      ead1d014
  2. 14 3月, 2012 2 次提交
  3. 27 2月, 2012 1 次提交
  4. 13 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  5. 09 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  6. 08 1月, 2012 2 次提交
  7. 05 1月, 2012 4 次提交
    • I
      xen/xenbus: don't reimplement kvasprintf via a fixed size buffer · a800651e
      Ian Campbell 提交于
      Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
      Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NJan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      a800651e
    • I
      xenbus: maximum buffer size is XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX · 50bf7379
      Ian Campbell 提交于
      Use this now that it is defined even though it happens to be == PAGE_SIZE.
      
      The code which takes requests from userspace already validates against the size
      of this buffer so no further checks are required to ensure that userspace
      requests comply with the protocol in this respect.
      Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
      Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      50bf7379
    • I
      xen/xenbus: Reject replies with payload > XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX. · 9e7860ce
      Ian Campbell 提交于
      Haogang Chen found out that:
      
       There is a potential integer overflow in process_msg() that could result
       in cross-domain attack.
      
       	body = kmalloc(msg->hdr.len + 1, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
      
       When a malicious guest passes 0xffffffff in msg->hdr.len, the subsequent
       call to xb_read() would write to a zero-length buffer.
      
       The other end of this connection is always the xenstore backend daemon
       so there is no guest (malicious or otherwise) which can do this. The
       xenstore daemon is a trusted component in the system.
      
       However this seem like a reasonable robustness improvement so we should
       have it.
      
      And Ian when read the API docs found that:
              The payload length (len field of the header) is limited to 4096
              (XENSTORE_PAYLOAD_MAX) in both directions.  If a client exceeds the
              limit, its xenstored connection will be immediately killed by
              xenstored, which is usually catastrophic from the client's point of
              view.  Clients (particularly domains, which cannot just reconnect)
              should avoid this.
      
      so this patch checks against that instead.
      
      This also avoids a potential integer overflow pointed out by Haogang Chen.
      Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
      Cc: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
      CC: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      9e7860ce
    • J
      Xen: consolidate and simplify struct xenbus_driver instantiation · 73db144b
      Jan Beulich 提交于
      The 'name', 'owner', and 'mod_name' members are redundant with the
      identically named fields in the 'driver' sub-structure. Rather than
      switching each instance to specify these fields explicitly, introduce
      a macro to simplify this.
      
      Eliminate further redundancy by allowing the drvname argument to
      DEFINE_XENBUS_DRIVER() to be blank (in which case the first entry from
      the ID table will be used for .driver.name).
      
      Also eliminate the questionable xenbus_register_{back,front}end()
      wrappers - their sole remaining purpose was the checking of the
      'owner' field, proper setting of which shouldn't be an issue anymore
      when the macro gets used.
      
      v2: Restore DRV_NAME for the driver name in xen-pciback.
      Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
      Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
      Cc: Florian Tobias Schandinat <FlorianSchandinat@gmx.de>
      Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
      Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      73db144b
  8. 04 1月, 2012 1 次提交
    • J
      xen-gntalloc: introduce missing kfree · 2e163414
      Julia Lawall 提交于
      Error handling code following a kmalloc should free the allocated data.
      Out_unlock is used on both success and failure, so free vm_priv before
      jumping to that label.
      
      A simplified version of the semantic match that finds the problem is as
      follows: (http://coccinelle.lip6.fr)
      
      // <smpl>
      @r exists@
      local idexpression x;
      statement S;
      identifier f1;
      position p1,p2;
      expression *ptr != NULL;
      @@
      
      x@p1 = \(kmalloc\|kzalloc\|kcalloc\)(...);
      ...
      if (x == NULL) S
      <... when != x
           when != if (...) { <+...x...+> }
      x->f1
      ...>
      (
       return \(0\|<+...x...+>\|ptr\);
      |
       return@p2 ...;
      )
      
      @script:python@
      p1 << r.p1;
      p2 << r.p2;
      @@
      
      print "* file: %s kmalloc %s return %s" % (p1[0].file,p1[0].line,p2[0].line)
      // </smpl>
      Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
      [v1: Altered the description a bit]
      Signed-off-by: NKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      2e163414
  9. 22 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  10. 21 12月, 2011 3 次提交
  11. 20 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  12. 19 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  13. 17 12月, 2011 11 次提交
  14. 16 12月, 2011 2 次提交
  15. 15 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  16. 06 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  17. 22 11月, 2011 5 次提交