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  1. 12 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  3. 11 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  5. 10 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 05 12月, 2013 3 次提交
    • P
      selinux: pull address family directly from the request_sock struct · 0b1f24e6
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      0b1f24e6
    • P
      selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute() · 7f721643
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label.  For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets.  In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket.  Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.

See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      7f721643
    • P
      selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output() · da2ea0d0
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket.  While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.

Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: NJanak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
      da2ea0d0
  9. 05 10月, 2013 2 次提交
  11. 29 8月, 2013 2 次提交
    • E
      Revert "SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flag" · 0b4bdb35
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      This reverts commit 308ab70c.

It breaks my FC6 test box.  /dev/pts is not mounted.  dmesg says

SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)

Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      0b4bdb35
    • A
      selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies · 102aefdd
      由 Anand Avati 提交于 
      Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support
for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace
filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS,
a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing
FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time
deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a
different subtype) have the mount time deadlock.

By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies,
allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way:

fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0);

This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and
subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes.
Signed-off-by: NAnand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      102aefdd
  13. 26 7月, 2013 12 次提交
  15. 25 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  17. 29 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      SELinux: Institute file_path_has_perm() · 13f8e981
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Create a file_path_has_perm() function that is like path_has_perm() but
instead takes a file struct that is the source of both the path and the
inode (rather than getting the inode from the dentry in the path).  This
is then used where appropriate.

This will be useful for situations like unionmount where it will be
possible to have an apparently-negative dentry (eg. a fallthrough) that is
open with the file struct pointing to an inode on the lower fs.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      13f8e981
  19. 09 6月, 2013 5 次提交
  21. 10 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  23. 02 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch · 094f7b69
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:

    # mount server:/export /mnt/test1
    # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test1
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test1
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test2
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test2

When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.

This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.

Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.

For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:

    # mount server:/ /mnt/test1
    # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified

...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.

OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:

    # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
    -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy

The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.

Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      094f7b69
  25. 29 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  27. 28 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  29. 23 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  31. 15 1月, 2013 1 次提交
    • P
      tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices · 5dbbaf2d
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset.  The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open).  For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.

We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device.  In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.

The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls.  This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation.  On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Tested-by: NJason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5dbbaf2d
  33. 17 10月, 2012 1 次提交
    • A
      fix a leak in replace_fd() users · 45525b26
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      replace_fd() began with "eats a reference, tries to insert into
descriptor table" semantics; at some point I'd switched it to
much saner current behaviour ("try to insert into descriptor
table, grabbing a new reference if inserted; caller should do
fput() in any case"), but forgot to update the callers.
Mea culpa...

[Spotted by Pavel Roskin, who has really weird system with pipe-fed
coredumps as part of what he considers a normal boot ;-)]
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      45525b26
  35. 12 10月, 2012 1 次提交
  37. 27 9月, 2012 3 次提交