There is the case where cpu affinites for vcpu of qemu doesn't work
correctly. For example, if only one vcpupin setting entry is provided
and its setting is not for vcpu0, it doesn't work.

   # virsh dumpxml VM
   ...
   <vcpu>4</vcpu>
   <cputune>
     <vcpupin vcpu='3' cpuset='9-11'/>
   </cputune>
   ...

   # virsh start VM
   Domain VM started

   # virsh vcpuinfo VM
   VCPU:           0
   CPU:            31
   State:          running
   CPU time:       2.5s
   CPU Affinity:   yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy

   VCPU:           1
   CPU:            12
   State:          running
   CPU time:       0.9s
   CPU Affinity:   yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy

   VCPU:           2
   CPU:            30
   State:          running
   CPU time:       1.5s
   CPU Affinity:   yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy

   VCPU:           3
   CPU:            13
   State:          running
   CPU time:       1.7s
   CPU Affinity:   yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy

This patch fixes this problem.
Signed-off-by: NTaku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com>

v2:
    Have virCommand cleanup intermediate process for us

v3:
    Preserve original FD closing behavior
Signed-off-by: NCole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>

The error code for virKillProcess is returned in the errno variable
not the return value. THis mistake caused the logs to be filled with
errors when shutting down QEMU processes

* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Fix process kill check.

Detected by Coverity.  This leaked a cpumap on every iteration
of the loop.  Leak introduced in commit 1cc4d025 (v0.9.0).

* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessSetVcpuAffinites): Plug
leak, and hoist allocation outside loop.

The QEMU integrates with the lock manager instructure in a number
of key places

 * During startup, a lock is acquired in between the fork & exec
 * During startup, the libvirtd process acquires a lock before
   setting file labelling
 * During shutdown, the libvirtd process acquires a lock
   before restoring file labelling
 * During hotplug, unplug & media change the libvirtd process
   holds a lock while setting/restoring labels

The main content lock is only ever held by the QEMU child process,
or libvirtd during VM shutdown. The rest of the operations only
require libvirtd to hold the metadata locks, relying on the active
QEMU still holding the content lock.

* src/qemu/qemu_conf.c, src/qemu/qemu_conf.h,
  src/qemu/libvirtd_qemu.aug, src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug:
  Add config parameter for configuring lock managers
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Add calls to the lock manager

Currently whenever there is any failure with parsing the monitor,
this is treated in the same was as end-of-file (ie QEMU quit).
The domain is terminated, if not already dead.

With this change, failures in parsing the monitor stream do not
result in the death of QEMU. The guest continues running unchanged,
but all further use of the monitor will be disabled.

The VMM_FAILURE event will be emitted, and the mgmt application
can decide when to kill/restart the guest to re-gain control

* src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c, src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h: Run a
  different callback for monitor EOF vs error conditions.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Emit VMM_FAILURE event when monitor
  fails

A qemu domain can get paused when libvirtd is stopped (e.g., because of
I/O error) so we should check its current state when reconnecting to it.

Only in drivers which use virDomainObj, drivers that query hypervisor
for domain status need to be updated separately in case their hypervisor
supports this functionality.

The reason is also saved into domain state XML so if a domain is not
running (i.e., no state XML exists) the reason will be lost by libvirtd
restart. I think this is an acceptable limitation.

These VIR_XXXX0 APIs make us confused, use the non-0-suffix APIs instead.

How do these coversions works? The magic is using the gcc extension of ##.
When __VA_ARGS__ is empty, "##" will swallow the "," in "fmt," to
avoid compile error.

example: origin				after CPP
	high_level_api("%d", a_int)	low_level_api("%d", a_int)
	high_level_api("a  string")	low_level_api("a  string")

About 400 conversions.

8 special conversions:
VIR_XXXX0("") -> VIR_XXXX("msg") (avoid empty format) 2 conversions
VIR_XXXX0(string_literal_with_%) -> VIR_XXXX(%->%%) 0 conversions
VIR_XXXX0(non_string_literal) -> VIR_XXXX("%s", non_string_literal)
  (for security) 6 conversions
Signed-off-by: NLai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>

Introduce a virProcessKill function that can be safely called
even when the job mutex is held. This allows virDomainDestroy
to kill any VM even if it is asleep in a monitor job. The PID
will die and the thread asleep on the monitor will then wake
up releasing the job mutex.

* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Kill process before using qemuProcessStop
  to ensure job is released
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Add virProcessKill for killing off
  QEMU processes

As well as taint warnings going to the main libvirt log,
add taint warnings to the per-domain logfile

  Domain id=3 is tainted: high-privileges
  Domain id=3 is tainted: disk-probing
  Domain id=3 is tainted: shell-scripts
  Domain id=3 is tainted: custom-monitor

* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c, src/qemu/qemu_domain.h: Enhance
  qemuDomainTaint to also log to the domain logfile
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Pass -1 for logFD to taint methods to
  auto-append to logfile
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Pass open logFD at startup for taint
  methods

Move the qemuProcessLogReadFD and qemuProcessLogFD methods
into qemu_domain.c, renaming them to qemuDomainCreateLog
and qemuDomainOpenLog.

* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c, src/qemu/qemu_domain.h: Add
  qemuDomainCreateLog and qemuDomainOpenLog.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Remove qemuProcessLogFD
  and qemuProcessLogReadFD

Wire up logging of VM tainting to the QEMU driver

 - If running QEMU as root user/group or without capabilities
   being cleared
 - If passing custom QEMU command line args
 - If issuing custom QEMU monitor commands
 - If using a network interface config with an associated
   shell script
 - If using a disk config relying on format probing

The warnings, per-VM appear in the main libvirtd logs

  11:56:17.571: 10832: warning : qemuDomainObjTaint:712 : Domain id=1 name='l2' uuid=c7a3edbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1802 is tainted: high-privileges
  11:56:17.571: 10832: warning : qemuDomainObjTaint:712 : Domain id=1 name='l2' uuid=c7a3edbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1802 is tainted: disk-probing

The taint flags are reset when the VM is stopped.

* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c, src/qemu/qemu_domain.h: Helper APIs
  for logging taint warnings
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Log tainting with custom QEMU monitor
  commands and disk/net hotplug with unsupported configs
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Log tainting at startup based on
  unsupported configs

To cope with the QEMU binary being changed while a VM is running,
it is neccessary to persist the original qemu capabilities at the
time the VM is booted.

* src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c, src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h: Add
  an enum for a string rep of every capability
* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c, src/qemu/qemu_domain.h: Support for
  storing capabilities in the domain status XML
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Populate & free QEMU capabilities at
  domain startup

If vm is unlocked in virDomainObjUnref(), the return value is 0, not less
than 0.

This last minute addition caused a build failure

cc1: warnings being treated as errors
qemu/qemu_process.c: In function 'qemuProcessHandleWatchdog':
qemu/qemu_process.c:436:34: error: ignoring return value of 'virDomainObjUnref', declared with attribute warn_unused_result [-Wunused-result]
make[3]: *** [libvirt_driver_qemu_la-qemu_process.lo] Error 1

This patch does the following two things:
1. hold an extra reference while handling watchdog event
   If the domain is not persistent, and qemu quits unexpectedly before
   calling processWatchdogEvent(), vm will be freed and the function
   processWatchdogEvent() will be dangerous.

2. unlock qemu driver and vm before returning from processWatchdogEvent()
   When the function processWatchdogEvent() failed, we only free wdEvent,
   but forget to unlock qemu driver and vm, free dumpfile.

Jim Meyering recently improved gnulib to catch various grammar
errors during 'make syntax-check'.

* .gnulib: Update to latest, for syntax-check improvements.
* include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in (virConnectAuthCallbackPtr): Use
cannot rather than two words.
* src/driver.c: Likewise.
* src/driver.h (VIR_SECRET_GET_VALUE_INTERNAL_CALL): Likewise.
* src/remote/remote_driver.c (initialize_gnutls): Likewise.
* src/util/pci.c (pciBindDeviceToStub): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend.c (virStorageBackendCreateQemuImg):
Likewise.
(virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfoFD): Avoid doubled word.
* docs/formatdomain.html.in: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStart): Likewise.
* cfg.mk (exclude_file_name_regexp--sc_prohibit_can_not)
(exclude_file_name_regexp--sc_prohibit_doubled_word): Exclude
existing translation problems.

This patch adds max_processes option to qemu.conf which can be used to
override system default limit on number of processes that are allowed to
be running for qemu user.

The macro is huge and gives us nothing but headache when maintaining it.

Removing a 4kb stack allocation.

Reduce stack buffer for virStrerror to the common 1kb instead of 4kb.

Even with -Wuninitialized (which is part of autobuild.sh
--enable-compile-warnings=error), gcc does NOT catch this
use of an uninitialized variable:

{
  if (cond)
    goto error;
  int a = 1;
error:
  printf("%d", a);
}

which prints 0 (supposing the stack started life wiped) if
cond was true.  Clang will catch it, but we don't use clang
as often.  Using gcc -Wjump-misses-init catches it, but also
gives false positives:

{
  if (cond)
    goto error;
  int a = 1;
  return a;
error:
  return 0;
}

Here, a was never used in the scope of the error block, so
declaring it after goto is technically fine (and clang agrees).
However, given that our HACKING already documents a preference
to C89 decl-before-statement, the false positive warning is
enough of a prod to comply with HACKING.

[Personally, I'd _really_ rather use C99 decl-after-statement
to minimize scope, but until gcc can efficiently and reliably
catch scoping and uninitialized usage bugs, I'll settle with
the compromise of enforcing a coding standard that happens to
reject false positives if it can also detect real bugs.]

* acinclude.m4 (LIBVIRT_COMPILE_WARNINGS): Add -Wjump-misses-init.
* src/util/util.c (__virExec): Adjust offenders.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainTimerDefParseXML): Likewise.
* src/remote/remote_driver.c (doRemoteOpen): Likewise.
* src/phyp/phyp_driver.c (phypGetLparNAME, phypGetLparProfile)
(phypGetVIOSFreeSCSIAdapter, phypVolumeGetKey)
(phypGetStoragePoolDevice)
(phypVolumeGetPhysicalVolumeByStoragePool)
(phypVolumeGetPath): Likewise.
* src/vbox/vbox_tmpl.c (vboxNetworkUndefineDestroy)
(vboxNetworkCreate, vboxNetworkDumpXML)
(vboxNetworkDefineCreateXML): Likewise.
* src/xenapi/xenapi_driver.c (getCapsObject)
(xenapiDomainDumpXML): Likewise.
* src/xenapi/xenapi_utils.c (createVMRecordFromXml): Likewise.
* src/security/security_selinux.c (SELinuxGenNewContext):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_command.c (qemuBuildCommandLine): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainChangeEjectableMedia):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessWaitForMonitor): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor_text.c (qemuMonitorTextGetPtyPaths):
Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainShutdown)
(qemudDomainBlockStats, qemudDomainMemoryPeek): Likewise.
* src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c
(virStorageBackendCreateIfaceIQN): Likewise.
* src/node_device/node_device_udev.c (udevProcessPCI): Likewise.

If strdup("x509dname") or strdup("saslUsername") success, but
strdup(x509dname) or strdup(saslUsername) failed, subject->nidentity
is not the num elements of subject->identities, and we will leak some
memory.

There is no need to lock vm while allocating memory. If allocating
memory failed, we forgot to unlock vm.

qemu driver uses a 4K buffer for reading qemu log file. This is enough
when only qemu's output is present in the log file. However, when
debugging messages are turned on, intermediate libvirt process fills the
log with a bunch of debugging messages before it executes qemu binary.
In such a case the buffer may become too small. However, we are not
really interested in libvirt messages so they can be filtered out from
the buffer.

When domain startup, setting cpu affinity and cpu shares according
to the cputune xml specified in domain xml.

Modify "qemudDomainPinVcpu" to update domain config for vcpupin,
and modify "qemuSetSchedulerParameters" to update domain config
for cpu shares.

v1 - v2:
   * Use "VIR_ALLOC_N" instead of "VIR_ALLOC_VAR"
   * But keep raising error when it fails on adding vcpupin xml
     entry, as I still don't have a better idea yet.

* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStart, qemuProcessStop): Fix
typos.
* docs/hooks.html.in: Document 'prepare' and 'release' hooks.

Add the compiler attribute to ensure we don't introduce any more
ref bugs like were just patched in commit 9741f346, then explicitly
mark the remaining places in code that are safe.

* src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h (qemuMonitorUnref): Mark
ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK.
* src/conf/domain_conf.h (virDomainObjUnref): Likewise.
* src/conf/domain_conf.c (virDomainObjParseXML)
(virDomainLoadStatus): Fix offenders.
* src/openvz/openvz_conf.c (openvzLoadDomains): Likewise.
* src/vmware/vmware_conf.c (vmwareLoadDomains): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_domain.c (qemuDomainObjBeginJob)
(qemuDomainObjBeginJobWithDriver)
(qemuDomainObjExitRemoteWithDriver): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c (QEMU_MONITOR_CALLBACK): Likewise.
Suggested by Daniel P. Berrange.

Fix for bug https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=618970

The "prepare" hook is called very early in the VM statup process
before device labeling, so that it can allocate ressources not
managed by libvirt, such as DRBD, or for instance create missing
bridges and vlan interfaces.
* src/util/hooks.c src/util/hooks.h: add definitions for new hooks
  VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_PREPARE and VIR_HOOK_QEMU_OP_RELEASE
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: use them in qemuProcessStart and
  qemuProcessStop()

THREADS.txt states that the contents of vm should not be read or
modified while the vm lock is not held, but that the lock must not
be held while performing a monitor command.  This fixes all the
offenders that I could find.

* src/qemu/qemu_process.c (qemuProcessStartCPUs)
(qemuProcessInitPasswords, qemuProcessStart): Don't modify or
refer to vm state outside lock.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c (qemudDomainHotplugVcpus): Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c (qemuDomainChangeGraphicsPasswords):
Likewise.

Some qemu monitor event handlers were issuing inadequate warning when
virDomainSaveStatus() failed. They copied the message from I/O error
handler without customizing it to provide better information on why
virDomainSaveStatus() was called.

Also add ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL markers.

* src/qemu/qemu_audit.h: The pattern qemuDomainXXXAudit is
inconsistent; prefer qemuAuditXXX instead.
* src/qemu/qemu_audit.c: Reflect the renames.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c: Likewise.
* src/qemu/qemu_process.c: Likewise.

This was also found while investigating

   https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=670848

An EOF on a domain's monitor socket results in an event being queued
to handle the EOF. The handler calls qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF. If
it is a transient domain, this leads to a call to
virDomainRemoveInactive, which removes the domain from the driver's
hashtable and unref's it. Nowhere in this code is the qemu driver lock
acquired.

However, all modifications to the driver's domain hashtable *must* be
done while holding the driver lock, otherwise the hashtable can become
corrupt, and (even more likely) another thread could call a different
hashtable function and acquire a pointer to the domain that is in the
process of being destroyed.

To prevent such a disaster, qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF must get the
qemu driver lock *before* it gets the DomainObj's lock, and hold it
until it is finished with the DomainObj. This guarantees that nobody
else modifies the hashtable at the same time, and that anyone who had
already gotten the DomainObj from the hashtable prior to this call has
finished with it before we remove/destroy it.

This was found while researching the root cause of:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=670848

virDomainUnref should only be called with the lock held for the
virDomainObj in question. However, when a transient qemu domain gets
EOF on its monitor socket, it queues an event which frees the monitor,
which unref's the virDomainObj without first locking it. If another
thread has already locked the virDomainObj, the modification of the
refcount could potentially be corrupted. In an extreme case, it could
also be potentially unlocked by virDomainObjFree, thus left open to
modification by anyone else who would have otherwise waited for the
lock (not to mention the fact that they would be accessing freed
data!).

The solution is to have qemuMonitorFree lock the domain object right
before unrefing it. Since the caller to qemuMonitorFree doesn't expect
this lock to be held, if the refcount doesn't go all the way to 0,
qemuMonitorFree must unlock it after the unref.

Relax the restriction that the hash table key must be a string
by allowing an arbitrary hash code generator + comparison func
to be provided

* util/hash.c, util/hash.h: Allow any pointer as a key
* internal.h: Include stdbool.h as standard.
* conf/domain_conf.c, conf/domain_conf.c,
  conf/nwfilter_params.c, nwfilter/nwfilter_gentech_driver.c,
  nwfilter/nwfilter_gentech_driver.h, nwfilter/nwfilter_learnipaddr.c,
  qemu/qemu_command.c, qemu/qemu_driver.c,
  qemu/qemu_process.c, uml/uml_driver.c,
  xen/xm_internal.c: s/char */void */ in hash callbacks

This is done for two reasons:
- we are getting very close to 64 flags which is the maximum we can use
  with unsigned long long
- by using LL constants in enum we already violates C99 constraint that
  enum values have to fit into int

The new name complies more with the fact that it contains a set of
qemuCapsFlags.

Three new functions (qemuCapsSet, qemuCapsClear, and qemuCapsGet) were
introduced replacing direct bit operations.

The new names comply more with the fact that they are all members of
enum qemuCapsFlags.