Since:

  commit 9f4e35dc
  Author: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
  Date:   Mon Mar 18 17:31:21 2019 +0000

    network: improve error report when firewall chain creation fails

We cache an error when failing to create the top level firewall chains.
This commit failed to account for fact that we may invoke
networkPreReloadFirewallRules() many times while libvirtd is running.
For example when firewalld is restarted.

When this happens the original failure may no longer occurr and we'll
successfully create our top level chains. We failed to clear the cached
error resulting in us failing to start virtual networks.
Reviewed-by: NLaine Stump <laine@laine.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

During startup libvirtd creates top level chains for both ipv4
and ipv6 protocols. If this fails for any reason then startup
of virtual networks is blocked.

The default virtual network, however, only requires use of ipv4
and some servers have ipv6 disabled so it is expected that ipv6
chain creation will fail. There could equally be servers with
no ipv4, only ipv6.

This patch thus makes error reporting a little more fine grained
so that it works more sensibly when either ipv4 or ipv6 is
disabled on the server. Only the protocols that are actually
used by the virtual network have errors reported.
Reviewed-by: NAndrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

During startup we create some top level chains in which all
virtual network firewall rules will be placed. The upfront
creation is done to avoid slowing down creation of individual
virtual networks by checking for chain existance every time.

There are some factors which can cause this upfront creation
to fail and while a message will get into the libvirtd log
this won't be seen by users who later try to start a virtual
network. Instead they'll just get a message saying that the
libvirt top level chain does not exist. This message is
accurate, but unhelpful for solving the root cause.

This patch thus saves any error during daemon startup and
reports it when trying to create a virtual network later.
Reviewed-by: NAndrea Bolognani <abologna@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Since we're setting the zone anyway, it will be useful to allow
setting a different (custom) zone for each network. This will be done
by adding a "zone" attribute to the "bridge" element, e.g.:

   ...
   <bridge name='virbr0' zone='myzone'/>
   ...

If a zone is specified in the config and it can't be honored, this
will be an error.
Signed-off-by: NLaine Stump <laine@laine.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

This patch restores broken guest network connectivity after a host
firewalld is switched to using an nftables backend. It does this by
adding libvirt networks' bridge interfaces to the new "libvirt" zone
in firewalld.

After this patch, the bridge interface of any network created by
libvirt (when firewalld is active) will be added to the firewalld
zone called "libvirt" if it exists (regardless of the firewalld
backend setting). This behavior does *not* depend on whether or not
libvirt has installed the libvirt zone file (set with
"--with[out]-firewalld-zone" during the configure phase of the package
build).

If the libvirt zone doesn't exist (either because the package was
configured to not install it, or possibly it was installed, but
firewalld doesn't support rule priorities, resulting in a parse
error), the bridge will remain in firewalld's default zone, which
could be innocuous (in the case that the firewalld backend is
iptables, guest networking will still function properly with the
bridge in the default zone), or it could be disastrous (if the
firewalld backend is nftables, we can be assured that guest networking
will fail). In order to be unobtrusive in the former case, and
informative in the latter, when the libvirt zone doesn't exist we
then check the firewalld version to see if it's new enough to support
the nftables backend, and then if the backend is actually set to
nftables, before logging an error (and failing the net-start
operation, since the network couldn't possibly work anyway).

When the libvirt zone is used, network behavior is *slightly*
different from behavior of previous libvirt. In the past, libvirt
network behavior would be affected by the configuration of firewalld's
default zone (usually "public"), but now it is affected only by the
"libvirt" zone), and thus almost surely warrants a release note for
any distro upgrading to libvirt 5.1 or above. Although it's
unfortunate that we have to deal with a mandatory behavior change, the
architecture of multiple hooks makes it impossible to *not* change
behavior in some way, and the new behavior is arguably better (since
it will now be possible to manage access to the host from virtual
machines vs from public interfaces separately).

Creates-and-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1650320
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1638342Signed-off-by: NLaine Stump <laine@laine.org>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

The previous commit created new chains to hold the firewall rules. This
commit changes the code that creates rules to place them in the new
private chains instead of the builtin top level chains.

With two networks running, the rules in the filter table now look like

  -N LIBVIRT_FWI
  -N LIBVIRT_FWO
  -N LIBVIRT_FWX
  -N LIBVIRT_INP
  -N LIBVIRT_OUT
  -A INPUT -j LIBVIRT_INP
  -A FORWARD -j LIBVIRT_FWX
  -A FORWARD -j LIBVIRT_FWI
  -A FORWARD -j LIBVIRT_FWO
  -A OUTPUT -j LIBVIRT_OUT
  -A LIBVIRT_FWI -d 192.168.0.0/24 -o virbr0 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_FWI -o virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A LIBVIRT_FWI -d 192.168.1.0/24 -o virbr1 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_FWI -o virbr1 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A LIBVIRT_FWO -s 192.168.0.0/24 -i virbr0 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_FWO -i virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A LIBVIRT_FWO -s 192.168.1.0/24 -i virbr1 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_FWO -i virbr1 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A LIBVIRT_FWX -i virbr0 -o virbr0 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_FWX -i virbr1 -o virbr1 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr1 -p udp -m udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr1 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr1 -p udp -m udp --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_INP -i virbr1 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_OUT -o virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 68 -j ACCEPT
  -A LIBVIRT_OUT -o virbr1 -p udp -m udp --dport 68 -j ACCEPT

While in the nat table:

  -N LIBVIRT_PRT
  -A POSTROUTING -j LIBVIRT_PRT
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.0.0/24 -d 224.0.0.0/24 -j RETURN
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.0.0/24 -d 255.255.255.255/32 -j RETURN
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.0.0/24 ! -d 192.168.0.0/24 -p tcp -j MASQUERADE --to-ports 1024-65535
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.0.0/24 ! -d 192.168.0.0/24 -p udp -j MASQUERADE --to-ports 1024-65535
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.0.0/24 ! -d 192.168.0.0/24 -j MASQUERADE
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.1.0/24 -d 224.0.0.0/24 -j RETURN
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.1.0/24 -d 255.255.255.255/32 -j RETURN
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.1.0/24 ! -d 192.168.1.0/24 -p tcp -j MASQUERADE --to-ports 1024-65535
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.1.0/24 ! -d 192.168.1.0/24 -p udp -j MASQUERADE --to-ports 1024-65535
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -s 192.168.1.0/24 ! -d 192.168.1.0/24 -j MASQUERADE

And finally the mangle table:

  -N LIBVIRT_PRT
  -A POSTROUTING -j LIBVIRT_PRT
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -o virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 68 -j CHECKSUM --checksum-fill
  -A LIBVIRT_PRT -o virbr1 -p udp -m udp --dport 68 -j CHECKSUM --checksum-fill
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Historically firewall rules for virtual networks were added straight
into the base chains. This works but has a number of bugs and design
limitations:

  - It is inflexible for admins wanting to add extra rules ahead
    of libvirt's rules, via hook scripts.

  - It is not clear to the admin that the rules were created by
    libvirt

  - Each rule must be deleted by libvirt individually since they
    are all directly in the builtin chains

  - The ordering of rules in the forward chain is incorrect
    when multiple networks are created, allowing traffic to
    mistakenly flow between networks in one direction.

To address all of these problems, libvirt needs to move to creating
rules in its own private chains. In the top level builtin chains,
libvirt will add links to its own private top level chains.

Addressing the traffic ordering bug requires some extra steps. With
everything going into the FORWARD chain there was interleaving of rules
for outbound traffic and inbound traffic for each network:

  -A FORWARD -d 192.168.3.0/24 -o virbr1 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -s 192.168.3.0/24 -i virbr1 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -i virbr1 -o virbr1 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -o virbr1 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A FORWARD -i virbr1 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A FORWARD -d 192.168.2.0/24 -o virbr0 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -s 192.168.2.0/24 -i virbr0 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -i virbr0 -o virbr0 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -o virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A FORWARD -i virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable

The rule allowing outbound traffic from virbr1 would mistakenly
allow packets from virbr1 to virbr0, before the rule denying input
to virbr0 gets a chance to run.

What we really need todo is group the forwarding rules into three
distinct sets:

 * Cross rules - LIBVIRT_FWX

  -A FORWARD -i virbr1 -o virbr1 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -i virbr0 -o virbr0 -j ACCEPT

 * Incoming rules - LIBVIRT_FWI

  -A FORWARD -d 192.168.3.0/24 -o virbr1 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -o virbr1 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A FORWARD -d 192.168.2.0/24 -o virbr0 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -o virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable

 * Outgoing rules - LIBVIRT_FWO

  -A FORWARD -s 192.168.3.0/24 -i virbr1 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -i virbr1 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable
  -A FORWARD -s 192.168.2.0/24 -i virbr0 -j ACCEPT
  -A FORWARD -i virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable

There is thus no risk of outgoing rules for one network mistakenly
allowing incoming traffic for another network, as all incoming rules
are evalated first.

With this in mind, we'll thus need three distinct chains linked from
the FORWARD chain, so we end up with:

        INPUT --> LIBVIRT_INP   (filter)

       OUTPUT --> LIBVIRT_OUT   (filter)

      FORWARD +-> LIBVIRT_FWX   (filter)
              +-> LIBVIRT_FWO
              \-> LIBVIRT_FWI

  POSTROUTING --> LIBVIRT_PRT   (nat & mangle)
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Allow the platform driver impls to run logic before and after the
firewall reload process.
Reviewed-by: NLaine Stump <laine@laine.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

In many files there are header comments that contain an Author:
statement, supposedly reflecting who originally wrote the code.
In a large collaborative project like libvirt, any non-trivial
file will have been modified by a large number of different
contributors. IOW, the Author: comments are quickly out of date,
omitting people who have made significant contribitions.

In some places Author: lines have been added despite the person
merely being responsible for creating the file by moving existing
code out of another file. IOW, the Author: lines give an incorrect
record of authorship.

With this all in mind, the comments are useless as a means to identify
who to talk to about code in a particular file. Contributors will always
be better off using 'git log' and 'git blame' if they need to  find the
author of a particular bit of code.

This commit thus deletes all Author: comments from the source and adds
a rule to prevent them reappearing.

The Copyright headers are similarly misleading and inaccurate, however,
we cannot delete these as they have legal meaning, despite being largely
inaccurate. In addition only the copyright holder is permitted to change
their respective copyright statement.
Reviewed-by: NErik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NShi Lei <shi_lei@massclouds.com>

These functions all need to be called from a utility function that
must be located in the util directory, so we move them all into
util/virnetdevip.[ch] now that it exists.

Function and struct names were appropriately changed for the new
location, but all code is unchanged aside from motion and renaming.

I'm tired of mistyping this all the time, so let's do it the same all
the time (similar to how we changed all "Pci" to "PCI" awhile back).

(NB: I've left alone some things in the esx and vbox drivers because
I'm unable to compile them and they weren't obviously *not* a part of
some API. I also didn't change a couple of variables named,
e.g. "somethingIptables", because they were derived from the name of
the "iptables" command)

The comment above that function says: "This function can be a lot more
exhaustive, ...", so let's be.

Check for collisions between routes in the system and static routes
being added explicitly from the <route/> element of the network XML.

Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1094205Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Wikipedia's list of common misspellings [1] has a machine-readable
version.  This patch fixes those misspellings mentioned in the list
which don't have multiple right variants (as e.g. "accension", which can
be both "accession" and "ascension"), such misspellings are left
untouched.  The list of changes was manually re-checked for false
positives.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Lists_of_common_misspellings/For_machinesSigned-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMartin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>

The networkCheckRouteCollision, networkAddFirewallRules and
networkRemoveFirewallRules APIs all take a virNetworkObjPtr
instance, but only ever access the 'def' member. It thus
simplifies testing if the APIs are changed to just take a
virNetworkDefPtr instead
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

Update the iptablesXXXX methods so that instead of directly
executing iptables commands, they populate rules in an
instance of virFirewallPtr. The bridge driver can thus
construct the ruleset and then invoke it in one operation
having rollback handled automatically.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

Any source file which calls the logging APIs now needs
to have a VIR_LOG_INIT("source.name") declaration at
the start of the file. This provides a static variable
of the virLogSource type.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

The bridge_driver_platform.h defines many functions that
a platform driver must implement. Only two of these
functions are actually called from the main bridge driver
code. The remainder can be made internal to the linux
driver only.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>

When the host is configured with very restrictive firewall (default policy
is DROP for all chains, including OUTPUT), the bridge driver for Linux
adds netfilter entries to allow DHCP and DNS requests to go from the VM
to the dnsmasq of the host.

The issue that this commit fixes is the fact that a DROP policy on the OUTPUT
chain blocks the DHCP replies from the host’s dnsmasq to the VM.
As DHCP replies are sent in UDP, they are not caught by any --ctstate ESTABLISHED
rule and so, need to be explicitly allowed.
Signed-off-by: NLénaïc Huard <lenaic@lhuard.fr.eu.org>

Packets sent by guests on virbrN, *or* by dnsmasq on the same, to
- 255.255.255.255/32 (netmask-independent local network broadcast
  address), or to
- 224.0.0.0/24 (local subnetwork multicast range)
are never forwarded, hence it is not necessary to masquerade them.

In fact we must not masquerade them: translating their source addresses or
source ports (where applicable) may confuse receivers on virbrN.

One example is the DHCP client in OVMF (= UEFI firmware for virtual
machines):

  http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.tianocore.devel/1506/focus=2640

It expects DHCP replies to arrive from remote source port 67. Even though
dnsmasq conforms to that, the destination address (255.255.255.255) and
the source address (eg. 192.168.122.1) in the reply allow the UDP
masquerading rule to match, which rewrites the source port to or above
1024. This prevents the DHCP client in OVMF from accepting the packet.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=709418Signed-off-by: NLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>

* Move platform specific things (e.g. firewalling and route
  collision checks) into bridge_driver_platform
* Create two platform specific implementations:
    - bridge_driver_linux: Linux implementation using iptables,
      it's actually the code moved from bridge_driver.c
    - bridge_driver_nop: dumb implementation that does nothing
Signed-off-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>