1. 12 12月, 2019 3 次提交
    • D
      docs: stop using syntax highlighting for man page code blocks · 572ce352
      Daniel P. Berrangé 提交于
      Some versions of the rst2man convertor are buggy failing to
      cope with syntax highlighting in code blocks.
      
      This isn't something we really need for the man page code
      blocks, so we can just delete the highlighting directive.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
      572ce352
    • M
      doc: vtpm only support secrets by UUID at this point · 4bccb996
      Marc-André Lureau 提交于
      Support by usage name can be considered separately (with a 'usage'
      attribute?).
      Reviewed-by: NStefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
      Reviewed-by: NChristophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
      Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NMarc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
      4bccb996
    • D
      qemu: keep capabilities when running QEMU as root · 19023562
      Daniel P. Berrangé 提交于
      When QEMU uid/gid is set to non-root this is pointless as if we just
      used a regular setuid/setgid call, the process will have all its
      capabilities cleared anyway by the kernel.
      
      When QEMU uid/gid is set to root, this is almost (always?) never
      what people actually want. People make QEMU run as root in order
      to access some privileged resource that libvirt doesn't support
      yet and this often requires capabilities. As a result they have
      to go find the qemu.conf param to turn this off. This is not
      viable for libguestfs - they want to control everything via the
      XML security label to request running as root regardless of the
      qemu.conf settings for user/group.
      
      Clearing capabilities was implemented originally because there
      was a proposal in Fedora to change permissions such that root,
      with no capabilities would not be able to compromise the system.
      ie a locked down root account. This never went anywhere though,
      and as a result clearing capabilities when running as root does
      not really get us any security benefit AFAICT. The root user
      can easily do something like create a cronjob, which will then
      faithfully be run with full capabilities, trivially bypassing
      the restriction we place.
      
      IOW, our clearing of capabilities is both useless from a security
      POV, and breaks valid use cases when people need to run as root.
      
      This removes the clear_emulator_capabilities configuration
      option from qemu.conf, and always runs QEMU with capabilities
      when root.  The behaviour when non-root is unchanged.
      Reviewed-by: NCole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
      19023562
  2. 11 12月, 2019 14 次提交
  3. 10 12月, 2019 2 次提交
    • P
      conf: domaincaps: Add 'backup' feature flag · 528191c7
      Peter Krempa 提交于
      This flag will allow figuring out whether the hypervisor supports the
      incremental backup and checkpoint features.
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJán Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
      528191c7
    • E
      backup: Document new XML for backups · 252958ee
      Eric Blake 提交于
      Prepare for new backup APIs by describing the XML that will represent
      a backup.  The XML resembles snapshots and checkpoints in being able
      to select actions for a set of disks, but has other differences.  It
      can support both push model (the hypervisor does the backup directly
      into the destination file) and pull model (the hypervisor exposes an
      access port for a third party to grab what is necessary).  Add
      testsuite coverage for some minimal uses of the XML.
      
      The <disk> element within <domainbackup> tries to model the same
      elements as a <disk> under <domain>, but sharing the RNG grammar
      proved to be hairy. That is in part because while <domain> use
      <source> to describe a host resource in use by the guest, a backup job
      is using a host resource that is not visible to the guest: a push
      backup action is instead describing a <target> (which ultimately could
      be a remote network resource, but for simplicity the RNG just
      validates a local file for now), and a pull backup action is instead
      describing a temporary local file <scratch> (which probably should not
      be a remote resource).  A future refactoring may thus introduce some
      way to parameterize RNG to accept <disk type='FOO'>...</disk> so that
      the name of the subelement can be <source> for domain, or <target> or
      <scratch> as needed for backups. Future patches may improve this area
      of code.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPeter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NJán Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
      252958ee
  4. 09 12月, 2019 1 次提交
    • D
      conf: pass in default architecture via domain XML options · 6430c005
      Daniel P. Berrangé 提交于
      When parsing the guest XML we must fill in the default guest arch if it
      is not already present because later parts of the parsing process need
      this information.
      
      If no arch is specified we lookup the first guest in the capabilities
      data matching the os type and virt type. In most cases this will result
      in picking the host architecture but there are some exceptions...
      
       - The test driver is hardcoded to always use i686 arch
       - The VMWare/ESX drivers will always place i686 guests ahead
         of x86_64 guests in capabilities, so effectively they always
         use i686
       - The QEMU driver can potentially return any arch at all
         depending on what combination of QEMU binaries are installed.
      
      The domain XML hardware configurations are inherently architecture
      specific in many places. As a result whomever/whatever created the
      domain XML will have had a particular architecture in mind when
      specifying the config. In pretty much any sensible case this arch
      will have been the native host architecture. i686 on x86_64 is
      the only sensible divergance because both these archs are
      compatible from a domaain XML config POV.
      
      IOW, although the QEMU driver can pick an almost arbitrary arch as its
      default, in the real world no application or user is likely to be
      relying on this default arch being anything other than native.
      
      With all this in mind, it is reasonable to change the XML parser to
      allow the default architecture to be passed via the domain XML options
      struct. If no info is explicitly given then it is safe & sane to pick
      the host native architecture as the default for the guest.
      Reviewed-by: NMichal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
      6430c005
  5. 06 12月, 2019 3 次提交
  6. 05 12月, 2019 10 次提交
  7. 04 12月, 2019 7 次提交