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  1. 02 8月, 2007 1 次提交
  3. 31 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  5. 20 7月, 2007 1 次提交
    • P
      mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create(). · 20c2df83
      由 Paul Mundt 提交于 
      Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      20c2df83
  7. 19 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  9. 18 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  11. 08 6月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      xfrm: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPD · 4aa2e62c
      由 Joy Latten 提交于 
      Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and
SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete())
However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks
patch.

This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and
SPD.  It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial.
If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the
entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error
without removing anything.

This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete
its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that
same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the
entire database.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      4aa2e62c
  13. 31 5月, 2007 1 次提交
  15. 25 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • D
      [XFRM]: Allow packet drops during larval state resolution. · 14e50e57
      由 David S. Miller 提交于 
      The current IPSEC rule resolution behavior we have does not work for a
lot of people, even though technically it's an improvement from the
-EAGAIN buisness we had before.

Right now we'll block until the key manager resolves the route.  That
works for simple cases, but many folks would rather packets get
silently dropped until the key manager resolves the IPSEC rules.

We can't tell these folks to "set the socket non-blocking" because
they don't have control over the non-block setting of things like the
sockets used to resolve DNS deep inside of the resolver libraries in
libc.

With that in mind I coded up the patch below with some help from
Herbert Xu which provides packet-drop behavior during larval state
resolution, controllable via sysctl and off by default.

This lays the framework to either:

1) Make this default at some point or...

2) Move this logic into xfrm{4,6}_policy.c and implement the
   ARP-like resolution queue we've all been dreaming of.
   The idea would be to queue packets to the policy, then
   once the larval state is resolved by the key manager we
   re-resolve the route and push the packets out.  The
   packets would timeout if the rule didn't get resolved
   in a certain amount of time.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      14e50e57
  17. 14 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Check validity of direction in xfrm_policy_byid · b5505c6e
      由 Herbert Xu 提交于 
      The function xfrm_policy_byid takes a dir argument but finds the policy
using the index instead.  We only use the dir argument to update the
policy count for that direction.  Since the user can supply any value
for dir, this can corrupt our policy count.

I know this is the problem because a few days ago I was deleting
policies by hand using indicies and accidentally typed in the wrong
direction.  It still deleted the policy and at the time I thought
that was cool.  In retrospect it isn't such a good idea :)

I decided against letting it delete the policy anyway just in case
we ever remove the connection between indicies and direction.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b5505c6e
  19. 05 5月, 2007 1 次提交
  21. 30 4月, 2007 1 次提交
    • M
      [XFRM]: Restrict upper layer information by bundle. · 157bfc25
      由 Masahide NAKAMURA 提交于 
      On MIPv6 usage, XFRM sub policy is enabled.
When main (IPsec) and sub (MIPv6) policy selectors have the same
address set but different upper layer information (i.e. protocol
number and its ports or type/code), multiple bundle should be created.
However, currently we have issue to use the same bundle created for
the first time with all flows covered by the case.

It is useful for the bundle to have the upper layer information
to be restructured correctly if it does not match with the flow.

1. Bundle was created by two policies
Selector from another policy is added to xfrm_dst.
If the flow does not match the selector, it goes to slow path to
restructure new bundle by single policy.

2. Bundle was created by one policy
Flow cache is added to xfrm_dst as originated one. If the flow does
not match the cache, it goes to slow path to try searching another
policy.
Signed-off-by: NMasahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      157bfc25
  23. 29 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  25. 26 4月, 2007 2 次提交
  27. 20 3月, 2007 1 次提交
  29. 08 3月, 2007 1 次提交
    • E
      [IPSEC]: xfrm_policy delete security check misplaced · ef41aaa0
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were
actually done after the policy was removed.  Since the unlinking and
deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks
inside those 2 functions.  There we have all the information needed to
do the security check and it can be done before the deletion.  Since
auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed
back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions.

This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security
check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy
(xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken
by xfrm_policy_by*)

It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in
xfrm_add_pol_expire.  In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err
wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the
initialization would cause err to be ENOENT.  But since err has since
been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by*
function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT.  Also
fixed some white space damage in the same area.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ef41aaa0
  31. 14 2月, 2007 1 次提交
  33. 13 2月, 2007 1 次提交
  35. 11 2月, 2007 1 次提交
  37. 09 2月, 2007 2 次提交
  39. 24 1月, 2007 1 次提交
  41. 08 12月, 2006 1 次提交
  43. 07 12月, 2006 3 次提交
  45. 03 12月, 2006 3 次提交
  47. 22 11月, 2006 1 次提交
  49. 12 10月, 2006 3 次提交
    • V
      IPsec: fix handling of errors for socket policies · 3bccfbc7
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This treats the security errors encountered in the case of
socket policy matching, the same as how these are treated in
the case of main/sub policies, which is to return a full lookup
failure.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      3bccfbc7
    • V
      IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching · 5b368e61
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.

The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.

This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).

Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL.  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).

This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.

This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.

Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      5b368e61
    • J
      IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup · 134b0fc5
      由 James Morris 提交于 
      When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
(or other error).  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.

However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
transformation.

The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      134b0fc5
  51. 04 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  53. 23 9月, 2006 6 次提交