1. 02 8月, 2007 1 次提交
  2. 31 7月, 2007 2 次提交
  3. 20 7月, 2007 1 次提交
    • P
      mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create(). · 20c2df83
      Paul Mundt 提交于
      Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
      c59def9f change. They've been
      BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
      either.
      
      This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
      completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
      about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
      or the documentation references).
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      20c2df83
  4. 19 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  5. 18 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  6. 11 7月, 2007 1 次提交
  7. 19 6月, 2007 1 次提交
  8. 08 6月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      xfrm: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPD · 4aa2e62c
      Joy Latten 提交于
      Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and
      SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete())
      However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
      the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks
      patch.
      
      This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and
      SPD.  It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial.
      If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the
      entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error
      without removing anything.
      
      This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete
      its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that
      same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the
      entire database.
      
      Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      4aa2e62c
  9. 31 5月, 2007 2 次提交
  10. 25 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • D
      [XFRM]: Allow packet drops during larval state resolution. · 14e50e57
      David S. Miller 提交于
      The current IPSEC rule resolution behavior we have does not work for a
      lot of people, even though technically it's an improvement from the
      -EAGAIN buisness we had before.
      
      Right now we'll block until the key manager resolves the route.  That
      works for simple cases, but many folks would rather packets get
      silently dropped until the key manager resolves the IPSEC rules.
      
      We can't tell these folks to "set the socket non-blocking" because
      they don't have control over the non-block setting of things like the
      sockets used to resolve DNS deep inside of the resolver libraries in
      libc.
      
      With that in mind I coded up the patch below with some help from
      Herbert Xu which provides packet-drop behavior during larval state
      resolution, controllable via sysctl and off by default.
      
      This lays the framework to either:
      
      1) Make this default at some point or...
      
      2) Move this logic into xfrm{4,6}_policy.c and implement the
         ARP-like resolution queue we've all been dreaming of.
         The idea would be to queue packets to the policy, then
         once the larval state is resolved by the key manager we
         re-resolve the route and push the packets out.  The
         packets would timeout if the rule didn't get resolved
         in a certain amount of time.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      14e50e57
  11. 23 5月, 2007 1 次提交
  12. 20 5月, 2007 1 次提交
  13. 14 5月, 2007 2 次提交
  14. 05 5月, 2007 2 次提交
  15. 30 4月, 2007 1 次提交
    • M
      [XFRM]: Restrict upper layer information by bundle. · 157bfc25
      Masahide NAKAMURA 提交于
      On MIPv6 usage, XFRM sub policy is enabled.
      When main (IPsec) and sub (MIPv6) policy selectors have the same
      address set but different upper layer information (i.e. protocol
      number and its ports or type/code), multiple bundle should be created.
      However, currently we have issue to use the same bundle created for
      the first time with all flows covered by the case.
      
      It is useful for the bundle to have the upper layer information
      to be restructured correctly if it does not match with the flow.
      
      1. Bundle was created by two policies
      Selector from another policy is added to xfrm_dst.
      If the flow does not match the selector, it goes to slow path to
      restructure new bundle by single policy.
      
      2. Bundle was created by one policy
      Flow cache is added to xfrm_dst as originated one. If the flow does
      not match the cache, it goes to slow path to try searching another
      policy.
      Signed-off-by: NMasahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      157bfc25
  16. 29 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  17. 28 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  18. 27 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  19. 26 4月, 2007 14 次提交
  20. 14 4月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      [IPSEC] XFRM_USER: kernel panic when large security contexts in ACQUIRE · 661697f7
      Joy Latten 提交于
      When sending a security context of 50+ characters in an ACQUIRE 
      message, following kernel panic occurred.
      
      kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781!
      cpu 0x3: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c0000000421bb2e0]
          pc: c00000000033b074: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x240/0x2c8
          lr: c00000000033b014: .xfrm_send_acquire+0x1e0/0x2c8
          sp: c0000000421bb560
         msr: 8000000000029032
        current = 0xc00000000fce8f00
        paca    = 0xc000000000464b00
          pid   = 2303, comm = ping
      kernel BUG in xfrm_send_acquire at net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1781!
      enter ? for help
      3:mon> t
      [c0000000421bb650] c00000000033538c .km_query+0x6c/0xec
      [c0000000421bb6f0] c000000000337374 .xfrm_state_find+0x7f4/0xb88
      [c0000000421bb7f0] c000000000332350 .xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xc4/0x21c
      [c0000000421bb8d0] c0000000003326e8 .xfrm_lookup+0x1a0/0x5b0
      [c0000000421bba00] c0000000002e6ea0 .ip_route_output_flow+0x88/0xb4
      [c0000000421bbaa0] c0000000003106d8 .ip4_datagram_connect+0x218/0x374
      [c0000000421bbbd0] c00000000031bc00 .inet_dgram_connect+0xac/0xd4
      [c0000000421bbc60] c0000000002b11ac .sys_connect+0xd8/0x120
      [c0000000421bbd90] c0000000002d38d0 .compat_sys_socketcall+0xdc/0x214
      [c0000000421bbe30] c00000000000869c syscall_exit+0x0/0x40
      --- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 0000000007f0ca9c
      SP (fc0ef8f0) is in userspace
      
      We are using size of security context from xfrm_policy to determine
      how much space to alloc skb and then putting security context from
      xfrm_state into skb. Should have been using size of security context 
      from xfrm_state to alloc skb. Following fix does that
      Signed-off-by: NJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
      Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      661697f7
  21. 05 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  22. 23 3月, 2007 1 次提交
  23. 20 3月, 2007 1 次提交