ceph_msg_footer is 21 bytes long, while ceph_msg_footer_old is only 13.
Don't skip too much when CEPH_FEATURE_MSG_AUTH isn't negotiated.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

The contract between try_read() and try_write() is that when called
each processes as much data as possible.  When instructed by osd_client
to skip a message, try_read() is violating this contract by returning
after receiving and discarding a single message instead of checking for
more.  try_write() then gets a chance to write out more requests,
generating more replies/skips for try_read() to handle, forcing the
messenger into a starvation loop.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+
Reported-by: NVarada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NVarada Kari <Varada.Kari@sandisk.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

Empty request_redirect_t (struct ceph_request_redirect in the kernel
client) is now encoded with a bool.  NEW_OSDOPREPLY_ENCODING feature
bit overlaps with already supported CRUSH_TUNABLES5.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Also add missing \n while at it.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Add a tunable to fix the bug that chooseleaf may cause unnecessary pg
migrations when some device fails.

Reflects ceph.git commit fdb3f664448e80d984470f32f04e2e6f03ab52ec.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Ensure that the take argument is a valid bucket ID before indexing the
buckets array.

Reflects ceph.git commit 93ec538e8a667699876b72459b8ad78966d89c61.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

We were indexing the buckets array without verifying the index was
within the [0,max_buckets) range.  This could happen because
a multistep rule does not have enough buckets and has CRUSH_ITEM_NONE
for an intermediate result, which would feed in CRUSH_ITEM_NONE and
make us crash.

Reflects ceph.git commit 976a24a326da8931e689ee22fce35feab5b67b76.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

MClientMount{,Ack} are long gone.  The receipt of bare monmap doesn't
actually indicate a mount success as we are yet to authenticate at that
point in time.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

With it gone, no need to preserve ceph_timespec in process_one_ticket()
either.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

If we fault due to authentication, we invalidate the service ticket we
have and request a new one - the idea being that if a service rejected
our authorizer, it must have expired, despite mon_client's attempts at
periodic renewal.  (The other possibility is that our ticket is too new
and the service hasn't gotten it yet, in which case invalidating isn't
necessary but doesn't hurt.)

Invalidating just the service ticket is not enough, though.  If we
assume a failure on mon_client's part to renew a service ticket, we
have to assume the same for the AUTH ticket.  If our AUTH ticket is
bad, we won't get any service tickets no matter how hard we try, so
invalidate AUTH ticket along with the service ticket.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Back in 2013, commit 4b8e8b5d ("libceph: fix authorizer
invalidation") tried to fix authorizer invalidation issues by clearing
validity field.  However, nothing ever consults this field, so it
doesn't force us to request any new secrets in any way and therefore we
never get out of the exponential backoff mode:

    [  129.973812] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  130.706785] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  131.710088] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  133.708321] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    [  137.706598] libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6810 connect authorization failure
    ...

AFAICT this was the case at the time 4b8e8b5d was merged, too.

Using timespec solely as a bool isn't nice, so introduce a new have_key
flag, specifically for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Commit 20e55c4c ("libceph: clear messenger auth_retry flag when we
authenticate") got us only half way there.  We clear the flag if the
second attempt succeeds, but it also needs to be cleared if that
attempt fails, to allow for the exponential backoff to kick in.
Otherwise, if ->should_authenticate() thinks our keys are valid, we
will busy loop, incrementing auth_retry to no avail:

    process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 1
    process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 2
    process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 3
    process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 4
    process_connect ffff880079a63830 got BADAUTHORIZER attempt 5
    ...
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

There are a number of problems with revoking a "was sending" message:

(1) We never make any attempt to revoke data - only kvecs contibute to
con->out_skip.  However, once the header (envelope) is written to the
socket, our peer learns data_len and sets itself to expect at least
data_len bytes to follow front or front+middle.  If ceph_msg_revoke()
is called while the messenger is sending message's data portion,
anything we send after that call is counted by the OSD towards the now
revoked message's data portion.  The effects vary, the most common one
is the eventual hang - higher layers get stuck waiting for the reply to
the message that was sent out after ceph_msg_revoke() returned and
treated by the OSD as a bunch of data bytes.  This is what Matt ran
into.

(2) Flat out zeroing con->out_kvec_bytes worth of bytes to handle kvecs
is wrong.  If ceph_msg_revoke() is called before the tag is sent out or
while the messenger is sending the header, we will get a connection
reset, either due to a bad tag (0 is not a valid tag) or a bad header
CRC, which kind of defeats the purpose of revoke.  Currently the kernel
client refuses to work with header CRCs disabled, but that will likely
change in the future, making this even worse.

(3) con->out_skip is not reset on connection reset, leading to one or
more spurious connection resets if we happen to get a real one between
con->out_skip is set in ceph_msg_revoke() and before it's cleared in
write_partial_skip().

Fixing (1) and (3) is trivial.  The idea behind fixing (2) is to never
zero the tag or the header, i.e. send out tag+header regardless of when
ceph_msg_revoke() is called.  That way the header is always correct, no
unnecessary resets are induced and revoke stands ready for disabled
CRCs.  Since ceph_msg_revoke() rips out con->out_msg, introduce a new
"message out temp" and copy the header into it before sending.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.0+
Reported-by: NMatt Conner <matt.conner@keepertech.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NMatt Conner <matt.conner@keepertech.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Use list_for_each_entry_safe() instead of list_for_each_safe() to
simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: NGeliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
[idryomov@gmail.com: nuke call to list_splice_init() as well]
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next
with it.
Signed-off-by: NGeliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

The following bit in ceph_msg_revoke_incoming() is unsafe:

    struct ceph_connection *con = msg->con;
    if (!con)
            return;
    mutex_lock(&con->mutex);
    <more msg->con use>

There is nothing preventing con from getting destroyed right after
msg->con test.  One easy way to reproduce this is to disable message
signing only on the server side and try to map an image.  The system
will go into a

    libceph: read_partial_message ffff880073f0ab68 signature check failed
    libceph: osd0 192.168.255.155:6801 bad crc/signature
    libceph: read_partial_message ffff880073f0ab68 signature check failed
    libceph: osd0 192.168.255.155:6801 bad crc/signature

loop which has to be interrupted with Ctrl-C.  Hit Ctrl-C and you are
likely to end up with a random GP fault if the reset handler executes
"within" ceph_msg_revoke_incoming():

                     <yet another reply w/o a signature>
                                   ...
          <Ctrl-C>
    rbd_obj_request_end
      ceph_osdc_cancel_request
        __unregister_request
          ceph_osdc_put_request
            ceph_msg_revoke_incoming
                                   ...
                                osd_reset
                                  __kick_osd_requests
                                    __reset_osd
                                      remove_osd
                                        ceph_con_close
                                          reset_connection
                                            <clear con->in_msg->con>
                                            <put con ref>
                                              put_osd
                                                <free osd/con>
              <msg->con use> <-- !!!

If ceph_msg_revoke_incoming() executes "before" the reset handler,
osd/con will be leaked because ceph_msg_revoke_incoming() clears
con->in_msg but doesn't put con ref, while reset_connection() only puts
con ref if con->in_msg != NULL.

The current msg->con scheme was introduced by commits 38941f80
("libceph: have messages point to their connection") and 92ce034b
("libceph: have messages take a connection reference"), which defined
when messages get associated with a connection and when that
association goes away.  Part of the problem is that this association is
supposed to go away in much too many places; closing this race entirely
requires either a rework of the existing or an addition of a new layer
of synchronization.

In lieu of that, we can make it *much* less likely to hit by
disassociating messages only on their destruction and resend through
a different connection.  This makes the code simpler and is probably
a good thing to do regardless - this patch adds a msg_con_set() helper
which is is called from only three places: ceph_con_send() and
ceph_con_in_msg_alloc() to set msg->con and ceph_msg_release() to clear
it.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Support for message signing was merged into 3.19, along with
nocephx_require_signatures option.  But, all that option does is allow
the kernel client to talk to clusters that don't support MSG_AUTH
feature bit.  That's pretty useless, given that it's been supported
since bobtail.

Meanwhile, if one disables message signing on the server side with
"cephx sign messages = false", it becomes impossible to use the kernel
client since it expects messages to be signed if MSG_AUTH was
negotiated.  Add nocephx_sign_messages option to support this use case.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

supported_features and required_features serve no purpose at all, while
nocrc and tcp_nodelay belong to ceph_options::flags.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

I don't see a way for auth->authorizer to be NULL in
ceph_x_sign_message() or ceph_x_check_message_signature().
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

We can use msg->con instead - at the point we sign an outgoing message
or check the signature on the incoming one, msg->con is always set.  We
wouldn't know how to sign a message without an associated session (i.e.
msg->con == NULL) and being able to sign a message using an explicitly
provided authorizer is of no use.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

This patch changes the osd_req_op_data() macro to not evaluate
arguments more than once in order to follow the kernel coding style.
Signed-off-by: NIoana Ciornei <ciorneiioana@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
[idryomov@gmail.com: changelog, formatting]
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Commit ae385eaf ("libceph: store session key in cephx authorizer")
introduced ceph_x_authorizer::session_key, but didn't update all the
exit/error paths.  Introduce ceph_x_authorizer_cleanup() to encapsulate
ceph_x_authorizer cleanup and switch to it.  This fixes ceph_x_destroy(),
which currently always leaks key and ceph_x_build_authorizer() error
paths.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>

Use local variable cursor in place of &msg->cursor in
read_partial_msg_data() and write_partial_msg_data().
Signed-off-by: NShraddha Barke <shraddha.6596@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Since handle_reply() does not use its con argument, remove it.
Signed-off-by: NShraddha Barke <shraddha.6596@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net

This covers only the simplest case - an object size sized write, but
it's still useful in tiering setups when EC is used for the base tier
as writefull op can be proxied, saving an object promotion.

Even though updating ceph_osdc_new_request() to allow writefull should
just be a matter of fixing an assert, I didn't do it because its only
user is cephfs.  All other sites were updated.

Reflects ceph.git commit 7bfb7f9025a8ee0d2305f49bf0336d2424da5b5b.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

This

    struct ceph_timespec ceph_ts;
    ...
    con_out_kvec_add(con, sizeof(ceph_ts), &ceph_ts);

wraps ceph_ts into a kvec and adds it to con->out_kvec array, yet
ceph_ts becomes invalid on return from prepare_write_keepalive().  As
a result, we send out bogus keepalive2 stamps.  Fix this by encoding
into a ceph_timespec member, similar to how acks are read and written.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>

Only ->alloc_msg() should check data_len of the incoming message
against the preallocated ceph_msg, doing it in the messenger is not
right.  The contract is that either ->alloc_msg() returns a ceph_msg
which will fit all of the portions of the incoming message, or it
returns NULL and possibly sets skip, signaling whether NULL is due to
an -ENOMEM.  ->alloc_msg() should be the only place where we make the
skip/no-skip decision.

I stumbled upon this while looking at con/osd ref counting.  Right now,
if we get a non-extent message with a larger data portion than we are
prepared for, ->alloc_msg() returns a ceph_msg, and then, when we skip
it in the messenger, we don't put the con/osd ref acquired in
ceph_con_in_msg_alloc() (which is normally put in process_message()),
so this also fixes a memory leak.

An existing BUG_ON in ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() ensures we don't
corrupt random memory should a buggy ->alloc_msg() return an unfit
ceph_msg.

While at it, I changed the "unknown tid" dout() to a pr_warn() to make
sure all skips are seen and unified format strings.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

Signed-off-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: NYan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Even though it's static, con_work(), being a work func, shows up in
various stacktraces a lot.  Prefix it with ceph_.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

ceph_msgr_slab_init may fail due to a temporary ENOMEM.

Delay a bit the initialization of zero_page in ceph_msgr_init and
reorder its cleanup in _ceph_msgr_exit so it's done in reverse
order of setup.

BUG_ON() will not suffer to be postponed in case it is triggered.
Signed-off-by: NBenoît Canet <benoit.canet@nodalink.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

This removes the no longer used macro AES_KEY_SIZE as no functions use
this macro anymore and thus this macro can be removed due it no longer
being required.
Signed-off-by: NNicholas Krause <xerofoify@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g.  new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files.  This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else.  This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.

Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink).  Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:

  $ BASE="ovl"
  $ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
  $ LOW="$BASE/lower"
  $ UP="$BASE/upper"
  $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
  $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
  $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
  $ fusermount -u /proc
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory

This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed.  Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

addr_is_blank() should return true if family is neither AF_INET nor
AF_INET6.  This is what its counterpart entity_addr_t::is_blank_ip() is
doing and it is the right thing to do: in process_banner() we check if
our address is blank and if it is "learn" it from our peer.  As it is,
we never learn our address and always send out a blank one.  This goes
way back to ceph.git commit dd732cbfc1c9 ("use sockaddr_storage; and
some ipv6 support groundwork") from 2009.

While at at, do not open-code ipv6_addr_any() and use INADDR_ANY
constant instead of 0.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Grab a reference on a network namespace of the 'rbd map' (in case of
rbd) or 'mount' (in case of ceph) process and use that to open sockets
instead of always using init_net and bailing if network namespace is
anything but init_net.  Be careful to not share struct ceph_client
instances between different namespaces and don't add any code in the
!CONFIG_NET_NS case.

This is based on a patch from Hong Zhiguo <zhiguohong@tencent.com>.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

struct crush_bucket_tree::num_nodes is u8, so ceph_decode_8_safe()
should be used.  -Wconversion catches this, but I guess it went
unnoticed in all the noise it spews.  The actual problem (at least for
common crushmaps) isn't the u32 -> u8 truncation though - it's the
advancement by 4 bytes instead of 1 in the crushmap buffer.

Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/2759

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Durgin <jdurgin@redhat.com>

From struct ceph_msg_data_cursor in include/linux/ceph/messenger.h:

bool    last_piece;     /* current is last piece */

In ceph_msg_data_next():

*last_piece = cursor->last_piece;

A call to ceph_msg_data_next() is followed by:

ret = ceph_tcp_sendpage(con->sock, page, page_offset,
                        length, last_piece);

while ceph_tcp_sendpage() is:

static int ceph_tcp_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page,
                             int offset, size_t size, bool more)

The logic is inverted: correct it.
Signed-off-by: NBenoît Canet <benoit.canet@nodalink.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

ceph_tcp_sendpage already does the work of mapping/unmapping
the zero page if needed.
Signed-off-by: NBenoît Canet <benoit.canet@nodalink.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>

.. up to ceph.git commit 1db1abc8328d ("crush: eliminate ad hoc diff
between kernel and userspace").  This fixes a bunch of recently pulled
coding style issues and makes includes a bit cleaner.

A patch "crush:Make the function crush_ln static" from Nicholas Krause
<xerofoify@gmail.com> is folded in as crush_ln() has been made static
in userspace as well.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>