1. 07 1月, 2021 1 次提交
  2. 01 12月, 2020 1 次提交
  3. 19 11月, 2020 3 次提交
    • M
      docs: bootconfig: Update file format on initrd image · fbc6e1c6
      Masami Hiramatsu 提交于
      To align the total file size, add padding null character when appending
      the bootconfig to initrd image.
      
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160576522916.320071.4145530996151028855.stgit@devnote2Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      fbc6e1c6
    • N
      powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses · 9a32a7e7
      Nicholas Piggin 提交于
      IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
      before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
      is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
      memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
      hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
      protected data could be leaked.
      
      However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
      the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
      the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
      "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
      Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
      but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
      side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
      attack.
      
      This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
      boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
      
      This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
      Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      9a32a7e7
    • N
      powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry · f7964378
      Nicholas Piggin 提交于
      IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
      before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
      is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
      memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
      hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
      protected data could be leaked.
      
      However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
      the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
      the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
      "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
      Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
      but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
      side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
      attack.
      
      This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
      boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
      
      This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
      Signed-off-by: NNicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
      Signed-off-by: NMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
      f7964378
  4. 03 11月, 2020 2 次提交
  5. 30 10月, 2020 5 次提交
  6. 29 10月, 2020 2 次提交
  7. 23 10月, 2020 2 次提交
  8. 22 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  9. 20 10月, 2020 1 次提交
    • J
      xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events · e99502f7
      Juergen Gross 提交于
      In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
      happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
      dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.
      
      In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
      time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
      worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.
      
      The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
      via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
      maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
      after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
      only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
      performed an event storm).
      
      How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
      parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
      value was chosen after testing with different delay values).
      
      This is part of XSA-332.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reported-by: NJulien Grall <julien@xen.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Reviewed-by: NStefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
      Reviewed-by: NWei Liu <wl@xen.org>
      e99502f7
  10. 17 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  11. 15 10月, 2020 2 次提交
    • M
      docs: pstore-blk.rst: fix kernel-doc tags · b30fd8e9
      Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
      There is currently a problem with kernel-doc tags from blk.c:
      
      	.../Documentation/admin-guide/pstore-blk:239: ./fs/pstore/blk.c:175: WARNING: Duplicate C declaration, also defined in 'admin-guide/pstore-blk'.
      	Declaration is 'register_pstore_device'.
      	.../Documentation/admin-guide/pstore-blk:239: ./fs/pstore/blk.c:432: WARNING: Duplicate C declaration, also defined in 'admin-guide/pstore-blk'.
      	Declaration is 'register_pstore_blk'.
      	.../Documentation/admin-guide/pstore-blk:242: ./include/linux/pstore_blk.h:43: WARNING: Duplicate C declaration, also defined in 'admin-guide/pstore-blk'.
      	Declaration is 'pstore_device_info'.
      
      Basically, the internal parts is shown with :export:, instead
      of :internal:. Yet, there are some other exported docs that
      aren't at the document, because they lack :identifiers:.
      
      So, instead, let's just use :export: at the kAPI part of
      the documentation.
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
      b30fd8e9
    • M
      docs: remove some replace macros like |struct foo| · abc59fd4
      Mauro Carvalho Chehab 提交于
      There are three files with replace macros for structs,
      mapping them into Sphinx 2.x C domain references.
      
      Well, this is broken on Sphinx 3.x. Also, for Sphinx 2.x,
      the automarkup macro should be able to take care of them.
      
      So, let's just drop those.
      Signed-off-by: NMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
      abc59fd4
  12. 14 10月, 2020 3 次提交
  13. 13 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  14. 09 10月, 2020 2 次提交
  15. 06 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  16. 03 10月, 2020 2 次提交
  17. 02 10月, 2020 3 次提交
  18. 01 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  19. 30 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  20. 29 9月, 2020 1 次提交
  21. 27 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  22. 26 9月, 2020 1 次提交
    • J
      nfsd: remove fault injection code · e56dc9e2
      J. Bruce Fields 提交于
      It was an interesting idea but nobody seems to be using it, it's buggy
      at this point, and nfs4state.c is already complicated enough without it.
      The new nfsd/clients/ code provides some of the same functionality, and
      could probably do more if desired.
      
      This feature has been deprecated since 9d60d931 ("Deprecate nfsd
      fault injection").
      Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
      e56dc9e2