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  1. 15 7月, 2022 12 次提交
  3. 08 7月, 2022 12 次提交
  5. 30 6月, 2022 10 次提交
  7. 24 6月, 2022 4 次提交
    • Y
      crypto: qat - Removes the x86 dependency on the QAT drivers · 9c846c5d
      由 Yoan Picchi 提交于 
      This dependency looks outdated. After the previous patch, we have been able
to use this driver to encrypt some data and to create working VF on arm64.
We have not tested it yet on any big endian machine, hence the new dependency
Signed-off-by: NYoan Picchi <yoan.picchi@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      9c846c5d
    • A
      crypto: qat - replace get_current_node() with numa_node_id() · c2a1b91e
      由 Andre Przywara 提交于 
      Currently the QAT driver code uses a self-defined wrapper function
called get_current_node() when it wants to learn the current NUMA node.
This implementation references the topology_physical_package_id[] array,
which more or less coincidentally contains the NUMA node id, at least
on x86.

Because this is not universal, and Linux offers a direct function to
learn the NUMA node ID, replace that function with a call to
numa_node_id(), which would work everywhere.

This fixes the QAT driver operation on arm64 machines.
Reported-by: NYoan Picchi <Yoan.Picchi@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NYoan Picchi <yoan.picchi@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      c2a1b91e
    • I
      crypto: rsa - implement Chinese Remainder Theorem for faster private key operations · f145d411
      由 Ignat Korchagin 提交于 
      Changes from v1:
  * exported mpi_sub and mpi_mul, otherwise the build fails when RSA is a module

The kernel RSA ASN.1 private key parser already supports only private keys with
additional values to be used with the Chinese Remainder Theorem [1], but these
values are currently not used.

This rudimentary CRT implementation speeds up RSA private key operations for the
following Go benchmark up to ~3x.

This implementation also tries to minimise the allocation of additional MPIs,
so existing MPIs are reused as much as possible (hence the variable names are a
bit weird).

The benchmark used:

```
package keyring_test

import (
	"crypto"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/x509"
	"io"
	"syscall"
	"testing"
	"unsafe"
)

type KeySerial int32
type Keyring int32

const (
	KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING Keyring = -2
	KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN                 = 27
)

var (
	keyTypeAsym = []byte("asymmetric\x00")
	sha256pkcs1 = []byte("enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256\x00")
)

func (keyring Keyring) LoadAsym(desc string, payload []byte) (KeySerial, error) {
	cdesc := []byte(desc + "\x00")
	serial, _, errno := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_ADD_KEY, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&keyTypeAsym[0])), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&cdesc[0])), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&payload[0])), uintptr(len(payload)), uintptr(keyring), uintptr(0))
	if errno == 0 {
		return KeySerial(serial), nil
	}

	return KeySerial(serial), errno
}

type pkeyParams struct {
	key_id         KeySerial
	in_len         uint32
	out_or_in2_len uint32
	__spare        [7]uint32
}

// the output signature buffer is an input parameter here, because we want to
// avoid Go buffer allocation leaking into our benchmarks
func (key KeySerial) Sign(info, digest, out []byte) error {
	var params pkeyParams
	params.key_id = key
	params.in_len = uint32(len(digest))
	params.out_or_in2_len = uint32(len(out))

	_, _, errno := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_KEYCTL, KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&params)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&info[0])), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&digest[0])), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&out[0])), uintptr(0))
	if errno == 0 {
		return nil
	}

	return errno
}

func BenchmarkSign(b *testing.B) {
	priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
	if err != nil {
		b.Fatalf("failed to generate private key: %v", err)
	}

	pkcs8, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(priv)
	if err != nil {
		b.Fatalf("failed to serialize the private key to PKCS8 blob: %v", err)
	}

	serial, err := KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING.LoadAsym("test rsa key", pkcs8)
	if err != nil {
		b.Fatalf("failed to load the private key into the keyring: %v", err)
	}

	b.Logf("loaded test rsa key: %v", serial)

	digest := make([]byte, 32)
	_, err = io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, digest)
	if err != nil {
		b.Fatalf("failed to generate a random digest: %v", err)
	}

	sig := make([]byte, 256)
	for n := 0; n < b.N; n++ {
		err = serial.Sign(sha256pkcs1, digest, sig)
		if err != nil {
			b.Fatalf("failed to sign the digest: %v", err)
		}
	}

	err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(&priv.PublicKey, crypto.SHA256, digest, sig)
	if err != nil {
		b.Fatalf("failed to verify the signature: %v", err)
	}
}
```

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem)#Using_the_Chinese_remainder_algorithmSigned-off-by: NIgnat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      f145d411
    • T
      crypto: ccp - During shutdown, check SEV data pointer before using · 1b05ece0
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      On shutdown, each CCP device instance performs shutdown processing.
However, __sev_platform_shutdown_locked() uses the controlling psp
structure to obtain the pointer to the sev_device structure. However,
during driver initialization, it is possible that an error can be received
from the firmware that results in the sev_data pointer being cleared from
the controlling psp structure. The __sev_platform_shutdown_locked()
function does not check for this situation and will segfault.

While not common, this scenario should be accounted for. Add a check for a
NULL sev_device structure before attempting to use it.

Fixes: 5441a07a ("crypto: ccp - shutdown SEV firmware on kexec")
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      1b05ece0
  9. 17 6月, 2022 2 次提交