Commit f1c6366e ("KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under
SEV-ES") prevents hypervisor accesses guest register state when the guest is
running under SEV-ES. The initial value of vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected
is false, it will not be updated in preemption notifiers after this commit which
means that the kernel spinlock lock holder will always be skipped to boost. Let's
fix it by always treating preempted is in the guest kernel mode, false positive
is better than skip completely.

Fixes: f1c6366e (KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES)
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1619080459-30032-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Async PF 'page ready' event may happen when LAPIC is (temporary) disabled.
In particular, Sebastien reports that when Linux kernel is directly booted
by Cloud Hypervisor, LAPIC is 'software disabled' when APF mechanism is
initialized. On initialization KVM tries to inject 'wakeup all' event and
puts the corresponding token to the slot. It is, however, failing to inject
an interrupt (kvm_apic_set_irq() -> __apic_accept_irq() -> !apic_enabled())
so the guest never gets notified and the whole APF mechanism gets stuck.
The same issue is likely to happen if the guest temporary disables LAPIC
and a previously unavailable page becomes available.

Do two things to resolve the issue:
- Avoid dequeuing 'page ready' events from APF queue when LAPIC is
  disabled.
- Trigger an attempt to deliver pending 'page ready' events when LAPIC
  becomes enabled (SPIV or MSR_IA32_APICBASE).
Reported-by: NSebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210422092948.568327-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Take "enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs" in scattered specific CPUID helpers
(which is obvious in hindsight), and use "unsigned int" for leafs that
can be the kernel's standard "enum cpuid_leaf" or the aforementioned
KVM-only variant.  Loss of the enum params is a bit disapponting, but
gcc obviously isn't providing any extra sanity checks, and the various
BUILD_BUG_ON() assertions ensure the input is in range.

This fixes implicit enum conversions that are detected by clang-11:

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:499:29: warning: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs' to different enumeration type 'enum cpuid_leafs' [-Wenum-conversion]
        kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered(CPUID_12_EAX,
        ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:837:31: warning: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs' to different enumeration type 'enum cpuid_leafs' [-Wenum-conversion]
                cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX);
                ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~        ^~~~~~~~~~~~
2 warnings generated.

Fixes: 4e66c0cb ("KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features")
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210421010850.3009718-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use symbolic value, EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED, instead of 0x100
in handle_ept_violation().
Signed-off-by: NYao Yuan <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NIsaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Message-Id: <724e8271ea301aece3eb2afe286a9e2e92a70b18.1619136576.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM/arm64 updates for Linux 5.13

New features:

- Stage-2 isolation for the host kernel when running in protected mode
- Guest SVE support when running in nVHE mode
- Force W^X hypervisor mappings in nVHE mode
- ITS save/restore for guests using direct injection with GICv4.1
- nVHE panics now produce readable backtraces
- Guest support for PTP using the ptp_kvm driver
- Performance improvements in the S2 fault handler
- Alexandru is now a reviewer (not really a new feature...)

Fixes:
- Proper emulation of the GICR_TYPER register
- Handle the complete set of relocation in the nVHE EL2 object
- Get rid of the oprofile dependency in the PMU code (and of the
  oprofile body parts at the same time)
- Debug and SPE fixes
- Fix vcpu reset

Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

perf_pmu_name() and perf_num_counters() are unused. Drop them.
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414134409.1266357-6-maz@kernel.org

perf_pmu_name() and perf_num_counters() are unused. Drop them.
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414134409.1266357-5-maz@kernel.org

perf_pmu_name() and perf_num_counters() are unused. Drop them.
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NHeiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414134409.1266357-4-maz@kernel.org

perf_pmu_name() and perf_num_counters() are now unused. Drop them.
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414134409.1266357-3-maz@kernel.org

KVM/arm64 is the sole user of perf_num_counters(), and really
could do without it. Stop using the obsolete API by relying on
the existing probing code.
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414134409.1266357-2-maz@kernel.org

Use the local stack to "allocate" the structures used to communicate with
the PSP.  The largest struct used by KVM, sev_data_launch_secret, clocks
in at 52 bytes, well within the realm of reasonable stack usage.  The
smallest structs are a mere 4 bytes, i.e. the pointer for the allocation
is larger than the allocation itself.

Now that the PSP driver plays nice with vmalloc pointers, putting the
data on a virtually mapped stack (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) will not cause
explosions.

Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-9-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Apply same treatment to PSP migration commands. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Drop the dedicated init_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable.  Now
that the low level helper uses an internal buffer for all commands,
using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when running with
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-8-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Drop the dedicated status_cmd_buf and instead use a local variable for
PLATFORM_STATUS.  Now that the low level helper uses an internal buffer
for all commands, using the stack for the upper layers is safe even when
running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-7-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For commands with small input/output buffers, use the local stack to
"allocate" the structures used to communicate with the PSP.   Now that
__sev_do_cmd_locked() gracefully handles vmalloc'd buffers, there's no
reason to avoid using the stack, e.g. CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y will just work.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-6-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Copy the incoming @data comman to an internal buffer so that callers can
put SEV command buffers on the stack without running afoul of
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, i.e. without bombing on vmalloc'd pointers.  As of
today, the largest supported command takes a 68 byte buffer, i.e. pretty
much every command can be put on the stack.  Because sev_cmd_mutex is
held for the entirety of a transaction, only a single bounce buffer is
required.

Use the internal buffer unconditionally, as the majority of in-kernel
users will soon switch to using the stack.  At that point, checking
virt_addr_valid() becomes (negligible) overhead in most cases, and
supporting both paths slightly increases complexity.  Since the commands
are all quite small, the cost of the copies is insignificant compared to
the latency of communicating with the PSP.

Allocate a full page for the buffer as opportunistic preparation for
SEV-SNP, which requires the command buffer to be in firmware state for
commands that trigger memory writes from the PSP firmware.  Using a full
page now will allow SEV-SNP support to simply transition the page as
needed.

Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-5-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

WARN on and reject SEV commands that provide a valid data pointer, but do
not have a known, non-zero length.  And conversely, reject commands that
take a command buffer but none is provided (data is null).

Aside from sanity checking input, disallowing a non-null pointer without
a non-zero size will allow a future patch to cleanly handle vmalloc'd
data by copying the data to an internal __pa() friendly buffer.

Note, this also effectively prevents callers from using commands that
have a non-zero length and are not known to the kernel.  This is not an
explicit goal, but arguably the side effect is a good thing from the
kernel's perspective.

Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-4-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Explicitly reject using pointers that are not virt_to_phys() friendly
as the source for SEV commands that are sent to the PSP.  The PSP works
with physical addresses, and __pa()/virt_to_phys() will not return the
correct address in these cases, e.g. for a vmalloc'd pointer.  At best,
the bogus address will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to
system instability.

While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use a bad pointer for
SEV buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when
running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the
command buffers on the stack would be bad.  The command buffers are
relative  small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not
document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous,
__pa() friendly pointer.

Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Fixes: 200664d5 ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-3-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Free the SEV device if later initialization fails.  The memory isn't
technically leaked as it's tracked in the top-level device's devres
list, but unless the top-level device is removed, the memory won't be
freed and is effectively leaked.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210406224952.4177376-2-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command finalize the guest receiving process and make the SEV guest
ready for the execution.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d08914dc259644de94e29b51c3b68a13286fc5a3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the
SEV guest memory space.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5d0e3e719db7bb37ea85d79ed4db52e9da06257.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming
SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor
to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c7400111ed7458eee01007c4d8d57cdf2cbb0fc2.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

After completion of SEND_START, but before SEND_FINISH, the source VMM can
issue the SEND_CANCEL command to stop a migration. This is necessary so
that a cancelled migration can restart with a new target later.
Reviewed-by: NNathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210412194408.2458827-1-srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with
KVM_SEV_SEND_START command.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5082bd6a8539d24bc55a1dd63a1b341245bb168f.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption
context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d6a6ea740b0c668b30905ae31eac5ad7da048bb3.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NSteve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NVenu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Message-Id: <2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618498113.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Both lock holder vCPU and IPI receiver that has halted are condidate for
boost. However, the PLE handler was originally designed to deal with the
lock holder preemption problem. The Intel PLE occurs when the spinlock
waiter is in kernel mode. This assumption doesn't hold for IPI receiver,
they can be in either kernel or user mode. the vCPU candidate in user mode
will not be boosted even if they should respond to IPIs. Some benchmarks
like pbzip2, swaptions etc do the TLB shootdown in kernel mode and most
of the time they are running in user mode. It can lead to a large number
of continuous PLE events because the IPI sender causes PLE events
repeatedly until the receiver is scheduled while the receiver is not
candidate for a boost.

This patch boosts the vCPU candidiate in user mode which is delivery
interrupt. We can observe the speed of pbzip2 improves 10% in 96 vCPUs
VM in over-subscribe scenario (The host machine is 2 socket, 48 cores,
96 HTs Intel CLX box). There is no performance regression for other
benchmarks like Unixbench spawn (most of the time contend read/write
lock in kernel mode), ebizzy (most of the time contend read/write sem
and TLB shoodtdown in kernel mode).
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1618542490-14756-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The main thread could start to send SIG_IPI at any time, even before signal
blocked on vcpu thread.  Therefore, start the vcpu thread with the signal
blocked.

Without this patch, on very busy cores the dirty_log_test could fail directly
on receiving a SIGUSR1 without a handler (when vcpu runs far slower than main).
Reported-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a bug that can trigger with e.g. "taskset -c 0 ./dirty_log_test" or
when the testing host is very busy.

A similar previous attempt is done [1] but that is not enough, the reason is
stated in the reply [2].

As a summary (partly quotting from [2]):

The problem is I think one guest memory write operation (of this specific test)
contains a few micro-steps when page is during kvm dirty tracking (here I'm
only considering write-protect rather than pml but pml should be similar at
least when the log buffer is full):

  (1) Guest read 'iteration' number into register, prepare to write, page fault
  (2) Set dirty bit in either dirty bitmap or dirty ring
  (3) Return to guest, data written

When we verify the data, we assumed that all these steps are "atomic", say,
when (1) happened for this page, we assume (2) & (3) must have happened.  We
had some trick to workaround "un-atomicity" of above three steps, as previous
version of this patch wanted to fix atomicity of step (2)+(3) by explicitly
letting the main thread wait for at least one vmenter of vcpu thread, which
should work.  However what I overlooked is probably that we still have race
when (1) and (2) can be interrupted.

One example calltrace when it could happen that we read an old interation, got
interrupted before even setting the dirty bit and flushing data:

    __schedule+1742
    __cond_resched+52
    __get_user_pages+530
    get_user_pages_unlocked+197
    hva_to_pfn+206
    try_async_pf+132
    direct_page_fault+320
    kvm_mmu_page_fault+103
    vmx_handle_exit+288
    vcpu_enter_guest+2460
    kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+325
    kvm_vcpu_ioctl+526
    __x64_sys_ioctl+131
    do_syscall_64+51
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+68

It means iteration number cached in vcpu register can be very old when dirty
bit set and data flushed.

So far I don't see an easy way to guarantee all steps 1-3 atomicity but to sync
at the GUEST_SYNC() point of guest code when we do verification of the dirty
bits as what this patch does.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210413213641.23742-1-peterx@redhat.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210417140956.GV4440@xz-x1/

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPeter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210417143602.215059-2-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a capability for userspace to mirror SEV encryption context from
one vm to another. On our side, this is intended to support a
Migration Helper vCPU, but it can also be used generically to support
other in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. The intention is for
the primary guest and the mirror to have nearly identical memslots.

The primary benefits of this are that:
1) The VMs do not share KVM contexts (think APIC/MSRs/etc), so they
can't accidentally clobber each other.
2) The VMs can have different memory-views, which is necessary for post-copy
migration (the migration vCPUs on the target need to read and write to
pages, when the primary guest would VMEXIT).

This does not change the threat model for AMD SEV. Any memory involved
is still owned by the primary guest and its initial state is still
attested to through the normal SEV_LAUNCH_* flows. If userspace wanted
to circumvent SEV, they could achieve the same effect by simply attaching
a vCPU to the primary VM.
This patch deliberately leaves userspace in charge of the memslots for the
mirror, as it already has the power to mess with them in the primary guest.

This patch does not support SEV-ES (much less SNP), as it does not
handle handing off attested VMSAs to the mirror.

For additional context, we need a Migration Helper because SEV PSP
migration is far too slow for our live migration on its own. Using
an in-guest migrator lets us speed this up significantly.
Signed-off-by: NNathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210408223214.2582277-1-natet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

According to section "Canonicalization and Consistency Checks" in APM vol 2,
the following guest state is illegal:

    "The MSR or IOIO intercept tables extend to a physical address that
     is greater than or equal to the maximum supported physical address."
Suggested-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NKrish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210412215611.110095-5-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

Per include/linux/arm-smccc.h, the Function ID of PTP_KVM service is
defined as ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID. Fix the typo in
documentation to keep the git grep consistent.
Signed-off-by: NZenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210417113804.1992-1-yuzenghui@huawei.com

Commit 300bb1fe ("ptp: arm/arm64: Enable ptp_kvm for arm/arm64")
enable ptp_kvm support for ARM platforms and for any ARM platform that
does not support this, the following error message is displayed ...

 ERR KERN fail to initialize ptp_kvm

For platforms that do not support ptp_kvm this error is a bit misleading
and so fix this by only printing this message if the error returned by
kvm_arch_ptp_init() is not -EOPNOTSUPP. Note that -EOPNOTSUPP is only
returned by ARM platforms today if ptp_kvm is not supported.

Fixes: 300bb1fe ("ptp: arm/arm64: Enable ptp_kvm for arm/arm64")
Signed-off-by: NJon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: NRichard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210420132419.1318148-1-jonathanh@nvidia.com

Define the actual size of the IOPM and MSRPM tables so that the actual size
can be used when initializing them and when checking the consistency of their
physical address.
These #defines are placed in svm.h so that they can be shared.
Suggested-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NKrish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210412215611.110095-2-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace
to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a
file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.

The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.

To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
default.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <0b099d65e933e068e3ea934b0523bab070cb8cea.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed
to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU
model exposed to the guest.  Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an
admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel.

When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX
LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on
the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an
SGX-enabled guest.  With the exception of the provision key, all SGX
attribute bits may be exposed to the guest.  Guest access to the
provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a
future patch.

Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <a99e9c23310c79f2f4175c1af4c4cbcef913c3e5.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled
in the host.  When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the
hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers,
thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the
correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash).

Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as
writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each
WRMSR is ~400 cycles.  And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of
cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is
unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX
performance.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <57c92fa4d2083eb3be9e6355e3882fc90cffea87.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>