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  1. 14 8月, 2019 4 次提交
  3. 09 8月, 2019 9 次提交
    • W
      arm64: mm: Simplify definition of virt_addr_valid() · d2d73d2f
      由 Will Deacon 提交于 
      _virt_addr_valid() is defined as the same value in two places and rolls
its own version of virt_to_pfn() in both cases.

Consolidate these definitions by inlining a simplified version directly
into virt_addr_valid().
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      d2d73d2f
    • S
      arm64: mm: Remove vabits_user · 2c624fe6
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      Previous patches have enabled 52-bit kernel + user VAs and there is no
longer any scenario where user VA != kernel VA size.

This patch removes the, now redundant, vabits_user variable and replaces
usage with vabits_actual where appropriate.
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      2c624fe6
    • S
      arm64: mm: Introduce 52-bit Kernel VAs · b6d00d47
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      Most of the machinery is now in place to enable 52-bit kernel VAs that
are detectable at boot time.

This patch adds a Kconfig option for 52-bit user and kernel addresses
and plumbs in the requisite CONFIG_ macros as well as sets TCR.T1SZ,
physvirt_offset and vmemmap at early boot.

To simplify things this patch also removes the 52-bit user/48-bit kernel
kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      b6d00d47
    • S
      arm64: mm: Modify calculation of VMEMMAP_SIZE · ce3aaed8
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      In a later patch we will need to have a slightly larger VMEMMAP region
to accommodate boot time selection between 48/52-bit kernel VAs.

This patch modifies the formula for computing VMEMMAP_SIZE to depend
explicitly on the PAGE_OFFSET and start of kernel addressable memory.
(This allows for a slightly larger direct linear map in future).
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      ce3aaed8
    • S
      arm64: mm: Introduce vabits_actual · 5383cc6e
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      In order to support 52-bit kernel addresses detectable at boot time, one
needs to know the actual VA_BITS detected. A new variable vabits_actual
is introduced in this commit and employed for the KVM hypervisor layout,
KASAN, fault handling and phys-to/from-virt translation where there
would normally be compile time constants.

In order to maintain performance in phys_to_virt, another variable
physvirt_offset is introduced.
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      5383cc6e
    • S
      arm64: mm: Introduce VA_BITS_MIN · 90ec95cd
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      In order to support 52-bit kernel addresses detectable at boot time, the
kernel needs to know the most conservative VA_BITS possible should it
need to fall back to this quantity due to lack of hardware support.

A new compile time constant VA_BITS_MIN is introduced in this patch and
it is employed in the KASAN end address, KASLR, and EFI stub.

For Arm, if 52-bit VA support is unavailable the fallback is to 48-bits.

In other words: VA_BITS_MIN = min (48, VA_BITS)
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      90ec95cd
    • S
      arm64: kasan: Switch to using KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET · 6bd1d0be
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is a constant that is supplied to gcc as a command
line argument and affects the codegen of the inline address sanetiser.

Essentially, for an example memory access:
    *ptr1 = val;
The compiler will insert logic similar to the below:
    shadowValue = *(ptr1 >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
    if (somethingWrong(shadowValue))
        flagAnError();

This code sequence is inserted into many places, thus
KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is essentially baked into many places in the kernel
text.

If we want to run a single kernel binary with multiple address spaces,
then we need to do this with KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET fixed.

Thankfully, due to the way the KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET is used to provide
shadow addresses we know that the end of the shadow region is constant
w.r.t. VA space size:
    KASAN_SHADOW_END = ~0 >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET

This means that if we increase the size of the VA space, the start of
the KASAN region expands into lower addresses whilst the end of the
KASAN region is fixed.

Currently the arm64 code computes KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET at build time via
build scripts with the VA size used as a parameter. (There are build
time checks in the C code too to ensure that expected values are being
derived). It is sufficient, and indeed is a simplification, to remove
the build scripts (and build time checks) entirely and instead provide
KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET values.

This patch removes the logic to compute the KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET in the
arm64 Makefile, and instead we adopt the approach used by x86 to supply
offset values in kConfig. To help debug/develop future VA space changes,
the Makefile logic has been preserved in a script file in the arm64
Documentation folder.
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      6bd1d0be
    • S
      arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space · 14c127c9
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      In order to allow for a KASAN shadow that changes size at boot time, one
must fix the KASAN_SHADOW_END for both 48 & 52-bit VAs and "grow" the
start address. Also, it is highly desirable to maintain the same
function addresses in the kernel .text between VA sizes. Both of these
requirements necessitate us to flip the kernel address space halves s.t.
the direct linear map occupies the lower addresses.

This patch puts the direct linear map in the lower addresses of the
kernel VA range and everything else in the higher ranges.

We need to adjust:
 *) KASAN shadow region placement logic,
 *) KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET computation logic,
 *) virt_to_phys, phys_to_virt checks,
 *) page table dumper.

These are all small changes, that need to take place atomically, so they
are bundled into this commit.

As part of the re-arrangement, a guard region of 2MB (to preserve
alignment for fixed map) is added after the vmemmap. Otherwise the
vmemmap could intersect with IS_ERR pointers.
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      14c127c9
    • S
      arm64: mm: Remove bit-masking optimisations for PAGE_OFFSET and VMEMMAP_START · 9cb1c5dd
      由 Steve Capper 提交于 
      Currently there are assumptions about the alignment of VMEMMAP_START
and PAGE_OFFSET that won't be valid after this series is applied.

These assumptions are in the form of bitwise operators being used
instead of addition and subtraction when calculating addresses.

This patch replaces these bitwise operators with addition/subtraction.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      9cb1c5dd
  5. 01 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • Q
      arm64/mm: fix variable 'tag' set but not used · 7732d20a
      由 Qian Cai 提交于 
      When CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=n, set_tag() is compiled away. GCC throws a
warning,

mm/kasan/common.c: In function '__kasan_kmalloc':
mm/kasan/common.c:464:5: warning: variable 'tag' set but not used
[-Wunused-but-set-variable]
  u8 tag = 0xff;
     ^~~

Fix it by making __tag_set() a static inline function the same as
arch_kasan_set_tag() in mm/kasan/kasan.h for consistency because there
is a macro in arch/arm64/include/asm/kasan.h,

 #define arch_kasan_set_tag(addr, tag) __tag_set(addr, tag)

However, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=n and CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP=y,
page_to_virt() will call __tag_set() with incorrect type of a
parameter, so fix that as well. Also, still let page_to_virt() return
"void *" instead of "const void *", so will not need to add a similar
cast in lowmem_page_address().
Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
      7732d20a
  7. 19 6月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 15 5月, 2019 1 次提交
  11. 16 4月, 2019 1 次提交
    • M
      arm64: mm: check virtual addr in virt_to_page() if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y · eea1bb22
      由 Miles Chen 提交于 
      This change uses the original virt_to_page() (the one with __pa()) to
check the given virtual address if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.

Recently, I worked on a bug: a driver passes a symbol address to
dma_map_single() and the virt_to_page() (called by dma_map_single())
does not work for non-linear addresses after commit 9f287591
("arm64: mm: restrict virt_to_page() to the linear mapping").

I tried to trap the bug by enabling CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL but it
did not work - bacause the commit removes the __pa() from
virt_to_page() but CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL checks the virtual address
in __pa()/__virt_to_phys().

A simple solution is to use the original virt_to_page()
(the one with__pa()) if CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.

Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NMiles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      eea1bb22
  13. 06 3月, 2019 1 次提交
  15. 01 3月, 2019 1 次提交
  17. 16 2月, 2019 1 次提交
    • A
      arm64, mm, efi: Account for GICv3 LPI tables in static memblock reserve table · 8a5b403d
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      In the irqchip and EFI code, we have what basically amounts to a quirk
to work around a peculiarity in the GICv3 architecture, which permits
the system memory address of LPI tables to be programmable only once
after a CPU reset. This means kexec kernels must use the same memory
as the first kernel, and thus ensure that this memory has not been
given out for other purposes by the time the ITS init code runs, which
is not very early for secondary CPUs.

On systems with many CPUs, these reservations could overflow the
memblock reservation table, and this was addressed in commit:

  eff89628 ("efi/arm: Defer persistent reservations until after paging_init()")

However, this turns out to have made things worse, since the allocation
of page tables and heap space for the resized memblock reservation table
itself may overwrite the regions we are attempting to reserve, which may
cause all kinds of corruption, also considering that the ITS will still
be poking bits into that memory in response to incoming MSIs.

So instead, let's grow the static memblock reservation table on such
systems so it can accommodate these reservations at an earlier time.
This will permit us to revert the above commit in a subsequent patch.

[ mingo: Minor cleanups. ]
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190215123333.21209-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      8a5b403d
  19. 29 12月, 2018 5 次提交
  21. 15 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  23. 14 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace · ec6e822d
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      When pointer authentication is in use, data/instruction pointers have a
number of PAC bits inserted into them. The number and position of these
bits depends on the configured TCR_ELx.TxSZ and whether tagging is
enabled. ARMv8.3 allows tagging to differ for instruction and data
pointers.

For userspace debuggers to unwind the stack and/or to follow pointer
chains, they need to be able to remove the PAC bits before attempting to
use a pointer.

This patch adds a new structure with masks describing the location of
the PAC bits in userspace instruction and data pointers (i.e. those
addressable via TTBR0), which userspace can query via PTRACE_GETREGSET.
By clearing these bits from pointers (and replacing them with the value
of bit 55), userspace can acquire the PAC-less versions.

This new regset is exposed when the kernel is built with (user) pointer
authentication support, and the address authentication feature is
enabled. Otherwise, the regset is hidden.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NKristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
[will: Fix to use vabits_user instead of VA_BITS and rename macro]
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      ec6e822d
  25. 12 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • W
      arm64: mm: Introduce MAX_USER_VA_BITS definition · 9b31cf49
      由 Will Deacon 提交于 
      With the introduction of 52-bit virtual addressing for userspace, we are
now in a position where the virtual addressing capability of userspace
may exceed that of the kernel. Consequently, the VA_BITS definition
cannot be used blindly, since it reflects only the size of kernel
virtual addresses.

This patch introduces MAX_USER_VA_BITS which is either VA_BITS or 52
depending on whether 52-bit virtual addressing has been configured at
build time, removing a few places where the 52 is open-coded based on
explicit CONFIG_ guards.
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      9b31cf49
  27. 11 12月, 2018 1 次提交
  29. 05 12月, 2018 1 次提交
    • A
      arm64/bpf: don't allocate BPF JIT programs in module memory · 91fc957c
      由 Ard Biesheuvel 提交于 
      The arm64 module region is a 128 MB region that is kept close to
the core kernel, in order to ensure that relative branches are
always in range. So using the same region for programs that do
not have this restriction is wasteful, and preferably avoided.

Now that the core BPF JIT code permits the alloc/free routines to
be overridden, implement them by vmalloc()/vfree() calls from a
dedicated 128 MB region set aside for BPF programs. This ensures
that BPF programs are still in branching range of each other, which
is something the JIT currently depends upon (and is not guaranteed
when using module_alloc() on KASLR kernels like we do currently).
It also ensures that placement of BPF programs does not correlate
with the placement of the core kernel or modules, making it less
likely that leaking the former will reveal the latter.

This also solves an issue under KASAN, where shadow memory is
needlessly allocated for all BPF programs (which don't require KASAN
shadow pages since they are not KASAN instrumented)
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      91fc957c
  31. 27 11月, 2018 1 次提交
  33. 09 7月, 2018 1 次提交
  35. 12 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  37. 07 2月, 2018 1 次提交
  39. 05 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • M
      arm64: Use larger stacks when KASAN is selected · b02faed1
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      AddressSanitizer instrumentation can significantly bloat the stack, and
with GCC 7 this can result in stack overflows at boot time in some
configurations.

We can avoid this by doubling our stack size when KASAN is in use, as is
already done on x86 (and has been since KASAN was introduced).
Regardless of other patches to decrease KASAN's stack utilization,
kernels built with KASAN will always require more stack space than those
built without, and we should take this into account.
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      b02faed1
  41. 02 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  43. 16 8月, 2017 4 次提交
    • M
      arm64: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection · 872d8327
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      This patch adds stack overflow detection to arm64, usable when vmap'd stacks
are in use.

Overflow is detected in a small preamble executed for each exception entry,
which checks whether there is enough space on the current stack for the general
purpose registers to be saved. If there is not enough space, the overflow
handler is invoked on a per-cpu overflow stack. This approach preserves the
original exception information in ESR_EL1 (and where appropriate, FAR_EL1).

Task and IRQ stacks are aligned to double their size, enabling overflow to be
detected with a single bit test. For example, a 16K stack is aligned to 32K,
ensuring that bit 14 of the SP must be zero. On an overflow (or underflow),
this bit is flipped. Thus, overflow (of less than the size of the stack) can be
detected by testing whether this bit is set.

The overflow check is performed before any attempt is made to access the
stack, avoiding recursive faults (and the loss of exception information
these would entail). As logical operations cannot be performed on the SP
directly, the SP is temporarily swapped with a general purpose register
using arithmetic operations to enable the test to be performed.

This gives us a useful error message on stack overflow, as can be trigger with
the LKDTM overflow test:

[  305.388749] lkdtm: Performing direct entry OVERFLOW
[  305.395444] Insufficient stack space to handle exception!
[  305.395482] ESR: 0x96000047 -- DABT (current EL)
[  305.399890] FAR: 0xffff00000a5e7f30
[  305.401315] Task stack:     [0xffff00000a5e8000..0xffff00000a5ec000]
[  305.403815] IRQ stack:      [0xffff000008000000..0xffff000008004000]
[  305.407035] Overflow stack: [0xffff80003efce4e0..0xffff80003efcf4e0]
[  305.409622] CPU: 0 PID: 1219 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00021-g9636aea #5
[  305.412785] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[  305.415756] task: ffff80003d051c00 task.stack: ffff00000a5e8000
[  305.419221] PC is at recursive_loop+0x10/0x48
[  305.421637] LR is at recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.423768] pc : [<ffff00000859f330>] lr : [<ffff00000859f358>] pstate: 40000145
[  305.428020] sp : ffff00000a5e7f50
[  305.430469] x29: ffff00000a5e8350 x28: ffff80003d051c00
[  305.433191] x27: ffff000008981000 x26: ffff000008f80400
[  305.439012] x25: ffff00000a5ebeb8 x24: ffff00000a5ebeb8
[  305.440369] x23: ffff000008f80138 x22: 0000000000000009
[  305.442241] x21: ffff80003ce65000 x20: ffff000008f80188
[  305.444552] x19: 0000000000000013 x18: 0000000000000006
[  305.446032] x17: 0000ffffa2601280 x16: ffff0000081fe0b8
[  305.448252] x15: ffff000008ff546d x14: 000000000047a4c8
[  305.450246] x13: ffff000008ff7872 x12: 0000000005f5e0ff
[  305.452953] x11: ffff000008ed2548 x10: 000000000005ee8d
[  305.454824] x9 : ffff000008545380 x8 : ffff00000a5e8770
[  305.457105] x7 : 1313131313131313 x6 : 00000000000000e1
[  305.459285] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[  305.461781] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000400
[  305.465119] x1 : 0000000000000013 x0 : 0000000000000012
[  305.467724] Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow
[  305.470561] CPU: 0 PID: 1219 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00021-g9636aea #5
[  305.473325] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[  305.475070] Call trace:
[  305.476116] [<ffff000008088ad8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x378
[  305.478991] [<ffff000008088e64>] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[  305.481237] [<ffff00000895a178>] dump_stack+0x98/0xb8
[  305.483294] [<ffff0000080c3288>] panic+0x118/0x280
[  305.485673] [<ffff0000080c2e9c>] nmi_panic+0x6c/0x70
[  305.486216] [<ffff000008089710>] handle_bad_stack+0x118/0x128
[  305.486612] Exception stack(0xffff80003efcf3a0 to 0xffff80003efcf4e0)
[  305.487334] f3a0: 0000000000000012 0000000000000013 0000000000000400 0000000000000000
[  305.488025] f3c0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000000000e1 1313131313131313
[  305.488908] f3e0: ffff00000a5e8770 ffff000008545380 000000000005ee8d ffff000008ed2548
[  305.489403] f400: 0000000005f5e0ff ffff000008ff7872 000000000047a4c8 ffff000008ff546d
[  305.489759] f420: ffff0000081fe0b8 0000ffffa2601280 0000000000000006 0000000000000013
[  305.490256] f440: ffff000008f80188 ffff80003ce65000 0000000000000009 ffff000008f80138
[  305.490683] f460: ffff00000a5ebeb8 ffff00000a5ebeb8 ffff000008f80400 ffff000008981000
[  305.491051] f480: ffff80003d051c00 ffff00000a5e8350 ffff00000859f358 ffff00000a5e7f50
[  305.491444] f4a0: ffff00000859f330 0000000040000145 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  305.492008] f4c0: 0001000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff00000a5e8350 ffff00000859f330
[  305.493063] [<ffff00000808205c>] __bad_stack+0x88/0x8c
[  305.493396] [<ffff00000859f330>] recursive_loop+0x10/0x48
[  305.493731] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.494088] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.494425] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.494649] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.494898] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.495205] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.495453] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.495708] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.496000] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.496302] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.496644] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.496894] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.497138] [<ffff00000859f358>] recursive_loop+0x38/0x48
[  305.497325] [<ffff00000859f3dc>] lkdtm_OVERFLOW+0x14/0x20
[  305.497506] [<ffff00000859f314>] lkdtm_do_action+0x1c/0x28
[  305.497786] [<ffff00000859f178>] direct_entry+0xe0/0x170
[  305.498095] [<ffff000008345568>] full_proxy_write+0x60/0xa8
[  305.498387] [<ffff0000081fb7f4>] __vfs_write+0x1c/0x128
[  305.498679] [<ffff0000081fcc68>] vfs_write+0xa0/0x1b0
[  305.498926] [<ffff0000081fe0fc>] SyS_write+0x44/0xa0
[  305.499182] Exception stack(0xffff00000a5ebec0 to 0xffff00000a5ec000)
[  305.499429] bec0: 0000000000000001 000000001c4cf5e0 0000000000000009 000000001c4cf5e0
[  305.499674] bee0: 574f4c465245564f 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 8000000080808080
[  305.499904] bf00: 0000000000000040 0000000000000038 fefefeff1b4bc2ff 7f7f7f7f7f7fff7f
[  305.500189] bf20: 0101010101010101 0000000000000000 000000000047a4c8 0000000000000038
[  305.500712] bf40: 0000000000000000 0000ffffa2601280 0000ffffc63f6068 00000000004b5000
[  305.501241] bf60: 0000000000000001 000000001c4cf5e0 0000000000000009 000000001c4cf5e0
[  305.501791] bf80: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 00000000004b5000 000000001c4cc458
[  305.502314] bfa0: 0000000000000000 0000ffffc63f7950 000000000040a3c4 0000ffffc63f70e0
[  305.502762] bfc0: 0000ffffa2601268 0000000080000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000040
[  305.503207] bfe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[  305.503680] [<ffff000008082fb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
[  305.504720] Kernel Offset: disabled
[  305.505189] CPU features: 0x002082
[  305.505473] Memory Limit: none
[  305.506181] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow

This patch was co-authored by Ard Biesheuvel and Mark Rutland.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
      872d8327
    • M
      arm64: add basic VMAP_STACK support · e3067861
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      This patch enables arm64 to be built with vmap'd task and IRQ stacks.

As vmap'd stacks are mapped at page granularity, stacks must be a multiple of
PAGE_SIZE. This means that a 64K page kernel must use stacks of at least 64K in
size.

To minimize the increase in Image size, IRQ stacks are dynamically allocated at
boot time, rather than embedding the boot CPU's IRQ stack in the kernel image.

This patch was co-authored by Ard Biesheuvel and Mark Rutland.
Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
      e3067861
    • M
      arm64: move SEGMENT_ALIGN to <asm/memory.h> · 8018ba4e
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      Currently we define SEGMENT_ALIGN directly in our vmlinux.lds.S.

This is unfortunate, as the EFI stub currently open-codes the same
number, and in future we'll want to fiddle with this.

This patch moves the definition to our <asm/memory.h>, where it can be
used by both vmlinux.lds.S and the EFI stub code.
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
      8018ba4e
    • M
      arm64: clean up irq stack definitions · f60ad4ed
      由 Mark Rutland 提交于 
      Before we add yet another stack to the kernel, it would be nice to
ensure that we consistently organise stack definitions and related
helper functions.

This patch moves the basic IRQ stack defintions to <asm/memory.h> to
live with their task stack counterparts. Helpers used for unwinding are
moved into <asm/stacktrace.h>, where subsequent patches will add helpers
for other stacks. Includes are fixed up accordingly.

This patch is a pure refactoring -- there should be no functional
changes as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Tested-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
      f60ad4ed