1. 15 10月, 2021 1 次提交
  2. 09 4月, 2021 2 次提交
  3. 08 2月, 2021 1 次提交
  4. 24 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  5. 03 10月, 2020 1 次提交
    • C
      tcp: use sendpage_ok() to detect misused .sendpage · cf83a17e
      Coly Li 提交于
      commit a10674bf ("tcp: detecting the misuse of .sendpage for Slab
      objects") adds the checks for Slab pages, but the pages don't have
      page_count are still missing from the check.
      
      Network layer's sendpage method is not designed to send page_count 0
      pages neither, therefore both PageSlab() and page_count() should be
      both checked for the sending page. This is exactly what sendpage_ok()
      does.
      
      This patch uses sendpage_ok() in do_tcp_sendpages() to detect misused
      .sendpage, to make the code more robust.
      
      Fixes: a10674bf ("tcp: detecting the misuse of .sendpage for Slab objects")
      Suggested-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NColy Li <colyli@suse.de>
      Cc: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
      Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cf83a17e
  6. 01 10月, 2020 1 次提交
  7. 15 9月, 2020 3 次提交
  8. 11 9月, 2020 2 次提交
  9. 25 8月, 2020 4 次提交
  10. 11 8月, 2020 1 次提交
    • J
      tcp: correct read of TFO keys on big endian systems · f19008e6
      Jason Baron 提交于
      When TFO keys are read back on big endian systems either via the global
      sysctl interface or via getsockopt() using TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY, the values
      don't match what was written.
      
      For example, on s390x:
      
      # echo "1-2-3-4" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key
      # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key
      02000000-01000000-04000000-03000000
      
      Instead of:
      
      # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen_key
      00000001-00000002-00000003-00000004
      
      Fix this by converting to the correct endianness on read. This was
      reported by Colin Ian King when running the 'tcp_fastopen_backup_key' net
      selftest on s390x, which depends on the read value matching what was
      written. I've confirmed that the test now passes on big and little endian
      systems.
      Signed-off-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
      Fixes: 438ac880 ("net: fastopen: robustness and endianness fixes for SipHash")
      Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-and-tested-by: NColin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f19008e6
  11. 01 8月, 2020 1 次提交
  12. 29 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  13. 25 7月, 2020 3 次提交
  14. 20 7月, 2020 1 次提交
  15. 10 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • C
      tcp: make sure listeners don't initialize congestion-control state · ce69e563
      Christoph Paasch 提交于
      syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg".
      tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock
      just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as
      well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener.
      If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control
      has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we
      will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular
      socket, opening the door to a double-free:
      
      [   11.413102] ==================================================================
      [   11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
      [   11.415329]
      [   11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80
      [   11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
      [   11.418148] Call Trace:
      [   11.418534]  <IRQ>
      [   11.418834]  dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0
      [   11.419297]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210
      [   11.422079]  kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80
      [   11.423433]  __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170
      [   11.424761]  kfree+0x8c/0x230
      [   11.425157]  tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
      [   11.425872]  tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0
      [   11.426493]  inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0
      [   11.427093]  tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100
      [   11.427731]  tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0
      [   11.429457]  cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500
      [   11.433189]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780
      [   11.433727]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10
      [   11.437143]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190
      [   11.437810]  ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350
      [   11.439566]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0
      [   11.441995]  process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0
      [   11.443148]  net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40
      [   11.445361]  __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a
      [   11.445881]  asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
      [   11.446409]  </IRQ>
      [   11.446716]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40
      [   11.447259]  do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30
      [   11.447827]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50
      [   11.448406]  ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0
      [   11.450109]  __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60
      [   11.451861]  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0
      [   11.453789]  tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a
      [   11.456810]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780
      [   11.457995]  __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0
      [   11.458529]  release_sock+0x4a/0x170
      [   11.459005]  __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80
      [   11.461435]  inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0
      [   11.462043]  __sys_connect+0x204/0x270
      [   11.465515]  __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0
      [   11.466088]  do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70
      [   11.466617]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      [   11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469
      [   11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value.
      [   11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
      [   11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469
      [   11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
      [   11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      [   11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
      [   11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003
      [   11.474321]
      [   11.474527] Allocated by task 4884:
      [   11.475031]  save_stack+0x1b/0x40
      [   11.475548]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
      [   11.476182]  tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150
      [   11.476744]  tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0
      [   11.477435]  tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f
      [   11.478088]  do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00
      [   11.478744]  __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0
      [   11.479259]  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150
      [   11.479895]  do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70
      [   11.480395]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      [   11.481097]
      [   11.481321] Freed by task 4872:
      [   11.481783]  save_stack+0x1b/0x40
      [   11.482230]  __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
      [   11.482839]  kfree+0x8c/0x230
      [   11.483240]  tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
      [   11.483948]  tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0
      [   11.484502]  inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0
      [   11.485144]  tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0
      [   11.485642]  inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0
      [   11.486131]  __sock_release+0xc0/0x270
      [   11.486697]  sock_close+0xc/0x10
      [   11.487145]  __fput+0x277/0x780
      [   11.487632]  task_work_run+0xeb/0x180
      [   11.488118]  __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160
      [   11.488834]  do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70
      [   11.489326]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      
      Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c1201444
      ("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly").
      
      This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners
      setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it
      (thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to
      reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards.
      
      (The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.)
      
      Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Fixes: 2b0a8c9e ("tcp: add CDG congestion control")
      Signed-off-by: NChristoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ce69e563
  16. 03 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: md5: allow changing MD5 keys in all socket states · 1ca0fafd
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      This essentially reverts commit 72123032 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG
      or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets")
      
      Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can
      actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows.
      
      Quoting Mathieu :
         Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior
         with respect to TCP MD5:
      
         - Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down
           timer (~180 seconds).
         - Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will
           reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network
           resets.
         - Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not.
         - Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until
           both sides are ok with new passwords.
         - Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is
           attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP
           connection on a change.
         - Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable.
         - Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected.
      
      We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7 ("tcp: md5: fix potential
      overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to
      the wire that was the main reason for my patch.
      
      While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading
      to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert :
      
       Commit 6a2febec ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
       Commit e6ced831 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers")
      
      Fixes: 72123032 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets"
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1ca0fafd
  17. 02 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers · e6ced831
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu.
      
      Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent
      keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb()
      
      Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports,
      if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path,
      using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler.
      
      data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports,
      this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is
      not yet backported.
      
      v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add()
      
      Fixes: 6a2febec ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e6ced831
  18. 01 7月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() · 6a2febec
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add()
      might update in-place a prior key.
      
      Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece
      of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might
      be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could
      see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value,
      since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic
      anyway.
      
      We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen
      is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use
      uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was
      read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt()
      
      Fixes: 9ea88a15 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6a2febec
  19. 25 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  20. 10 6月, 2020 2 次提交
  21. 09 6月, 2020 1 次提交
  22. 29 5月, 2020 8 次提交
  23. 15 5月, 2020 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: fix error recovery in tcp_zerocopy_receive() · e776af60
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      If user provides wrong virtual address in TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE
      operation we want to return -EINVAL error.
      
      But depending on zc->recv_skip_hint content, we might return
      -EIO error if the socket has SOCK_DONE set.
      
      Make sure to return -EINVAL in this case.
      
      BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_zerocopy_receive net/ipv4/tcp.c:1833 [inline]
      BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in do_tcp_getsockopt+0x4494/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3685
      CPU: 1 PID: 625 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
       kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:121
       __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
       tcp_zerocopy_receive net/ipv4/tcp.c:1833 [inline]
       do_tcp_getsockopt+0x4494/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3685
       tcp_getsockopt+0xf8/0x1f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3728
       sock_common_getsockopt+0x13f/0x180 net/core/sock.c:3131
       __sys_getsockopt+0x533/0x7b0 net/socket.c:2177
       __do_sys_getsockopt net/socket.c:2192 [inline]
       __se_sys_getsockopt+0xe1/0x100 net/socket.c:2189
       __x64_sys_getsockopt+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:2189
       do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:297
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      RIP: 0033:0x45c829
      Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
      RSP: 002b:00007f1deeb72c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000037
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004e01e0 RCX: 000000000045c829
      RDX: 0000000000000023 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000009
      RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000020000200 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
      R13: 00000000000001d8 R14: 00000000004d3038 R15: 00007f1deeb736d4
      
      Local variable ----zc@do_tcp_getsockopt created at:
       do_tcp_getsockopt+0x1a74/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3670
       do_tcp_getsockopt+0x1a74/0x6320 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3670
      
      Fixes: 05255b82 ("tcp: add TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE support for zerocopy receive")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Reported-by: Nsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Acked-by: NSoheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e776af60