There is no reason the DAC perms on reading the policy file need to be root
only.  There are selinux checks which should control this access.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

sesearch uses:
lseek(3, 0, SEEK_SET)                   = -1 ESPIPE (Illegal seek)

Make that work.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.

So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we
start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it.
We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare
it there.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We don't use the argument, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We do not use it.  Remove it.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union.  To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack.  Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures.  I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path.  We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Now that all the slow-path code is gone from these functions, we can
inline them into the main caller - avc_has_perm_flags().

Now the compiler can see that 'avc' is allocated on the stack for this
case, which helps register pressure a bit.  It also actually shrinks the
total stack frame, because the stack frame that avc_has_perm_flags()
always needed (for that 'avc' allocation) is now sufficient for the
inlined functions too.

Inlining isn't bad - but mindless inlining of cold code (see the
previous commit) is.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The selinux AVC paths remain some of the hottest (and deepest) codepaths
at filename lookup time, and we make it worse by having the slow path
cases take up I$ and stack space even when they don't trigger.  Gcc
tends to always want to inline functions that are just called once -
never mind that this might make for slower and worse code in the caller.

So this tries to improve on it a bit by making the slow-path cases
explicitly separate functions that are marked noinline, causing gcc to
at least no longer allocate stack space for them unless they are
actually called.  It also seems to help register allocation a tiny bit,
since gcc now doesn't take the slow case code into account.

Uninlining the slow path may also allow us to inline the remaining hot
path into the one caller that actually matters: avc_has_perm_flags().
I'll have to look at that separately, but both avc_audit() and
avc_has_perm_noaudit() are now small and lean enough that inlining them
may make sense.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing
it.  Performed with the following command:

perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *`
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Fix failure in aa_change_onexec api when the request is made from a confined
task.  This failure was caused by two problems

 The AA_MAY_ONEXEC perm was not being mapped correctly for this case.

 The executable name was being checked as second time instead of using the
 requested onexec profile name, which may not be the same as the exec
 profile name. This mistake can not be exploited to grant extra permission
 because of the above flaw where the ONEXEC permission was not being mapped
 so it will not be granted.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/963756Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

selinux/xfrm.h needs to #include net/flow.h or else suffer:

In file included from security/selinux/ss/services.c:69:0:
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h: In function 'selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload':
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: error: 'flow_cache_genid' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

No functional changes.  It is not sane to use UMH_KILLABLE with enum
umh_wait, but obviously we do not want another argument in
call_usermodehelper_* helpers.  Kill this enum, use the plain int.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

A few call_usermodehelper() callers use the hardcoded constant instead of
the proper UMH_WAIT_PROC, fix them.
Reported-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Lars Ellenberg <drbd-dev@lists.linbit.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Michal Januszewski <spock@gentoo.org>
Cc: Florian Tobias Schandinat <FlorianSchandinat@gmx.de>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

avc_audit() did a lot of jumping around and had a big stack frame, all
for the uncommon case.

Split up the uncommon case (which we really can't make go fast anyway)
into its own slow function, and mark the conditional branches
appropriately for the common likely case.

This causes avc_audit() to no longer show up as one of the hottest
functions on the branch profiles (the new "perf -b" thing), and makes
the cycle profiles look really nice and dense too.

The whole audit path is still annoyingly very much one of the biggest
costs of name lookup, so these things are worth optimizing for.  I wish
we could just tell people to turn it off, but realistically we do need
it: we just need to make sure that the overhead of the necessary evil is
as low as possible.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Acked-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>

Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Call sequence:
tomoyo_write_domain() --> tomoyo_delete_domain()

In 'tomoyo_delete_domain', return -EINTR if locking attempt is
interrupted by signal.

At present it returns success to its caller 'tomoyo_write_domain()'
even though domain is not deleted. 'tomoyo_write_domain()' assumes
domain is deleted and returns success to its caller. This is wrong behaviour.

'tomoyo_write_domain' should return error from tomoyo_delete_domain() to its
caller.
Signed-off-by: NSantosh Nayak <santoshprasadnayak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@medozas.de>
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Add the base support for the new policy extensions. This does not bring
any additional functionality, or change current semantics.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

"struct file_operations"->poll() expects "unsigned int" return value.
All files in /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory other than
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query and /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit should
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM rather than -ENOSYS.
Also, /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query and /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit
should return POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM rather than 0 when there is no data to read.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Move the path name lookup failure messages into the main path name lookup
routine, as the information is useful in more than just aa_path_perm.

Also rename aa_get_name to aa_path_name as it is not getting a reference
counted object with a corresponding put fn.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

Update aa_dfa_match so that it doesn't result in an input string being
walked twice (once to get its length and another time to match)

Add a single step functions
  aa_dfa_next
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

When __d_path and d_absolute_path fail due to the name being outside of
the current namespace no name is reported.  Use dentry_path to provide
some hint as to which file was being accessed.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Post unpacking of policy a verification pass is made on x transition
indexes.  When this fails a call to audit_iface is made resulting in an
oops, because audit_iface is expecting a valid buffer position but
since the failure comes from post unpack verification there is none.

Make the position argument optional so that audit_iface can be called
from post unpack verification.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The returning of -ESATLE when a path lookup fails as disconnected is wrong.
Since AppArmor is rejecting the access return -EACCES instead.

This also fixes a bug in complain (learning) mode where disconnected paths
are denied because -ESTALE errors are not ignored causing failures that
can change application behavior.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The test for "if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {"
should actually testing that the (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) bit is set.
The current code actually checks for KEY_FLAG_DEAD.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

The keyctl_set_timeout function isn't exported to other parts of the
kernel, but I want to use it for the NFS idmapper.  I already have the
key, but I wanted a generic way to set the timeout.
Signed-off-by: NBryan Schumaker <bjschuma@netapp.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount().

If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are
passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND.

If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which
should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had
higher priority than MS_REMOUNT.

Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND ->
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does.

Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not
generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount
flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be
exclusively passed.
Signed-off-by: NTetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Fix IMA kconfig warning on non-X86 architectures:

warning: (IMA) selects TCG_TIS which has unmet direct dependencies
(TCG_TPM && X86)
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Reported-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: NRajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

When a chroot relative pathname lookup fails it is falling through to
do a d_absolute_path lookup.  This is incorrect as d_absolute_path should
only be used to lookup names for namespace absolute paths.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

The mapping of AA_MAY_META_READ for the allow mask was also being mapped
to the audit and quiet masks. This would result in some operations being
audited when the should not.

This flaw was hidden by the previous audit bug which would drop some
messages that where supposed to be audited.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

If the xindex value stored in the accept tables is 0, the extraction of
that value will result in an underflow (0 - 4).

In properly compiled policy this should not happen for file rules but
it may be possible for other rule types in the future.

To exploit this underflow a user would have to be able to load a corrupt
policy, which requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN, overwrite system policy in kernel
memory or know of a compiler error resulting in the flaw being present
for loaded policy (no such flaw is known at this time).
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

The audit permission flag, that specifies an audit message should be
provided when an operation is allowed, was being ignored in some cases.

This is because the auto audit mode (which determines the audit mode from
system flags) was incorrectly assigned the same value as audit mode. The
shared value would result in messages that should be audited going through
a second evaluation as to whether they should be audited based on the
auto audit, resulting in some messages being dropped.
Signed-off-by: NJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>