1. 13 12月, 2013 13 次提交
  2. 07 12月, 2013 12 次提交
  3. 04 12月, 2013 4 次提交
  4. 03 12月, 2013 4 次提交
  5. 02 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  6. 30 11月, 2013 6 次提交
    • M
      ixgbe: Make ixgbe_identify_qsfp_module_generic static · 88217547
      Mark Rustad 提交于
      Correct a namespace complaint by making the function static
      and moving the prototype into the .c file.
      Signed-off-by: NMark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com>
      Tested-by: NPhil Schmitt <phillip.j.schmitt@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      88217547
    • J
      ixgbe: turn NETIF_F_HW_L2FW_DOFFLOAD off by default · 8bf1264d
      John Fastabend 提交于
      NETIF_F_HW_L2FW_DOFFLOAD allows upper layer net devices such
      as macvlan to use queues in the hardware to directly submit and
      receive skbs.
      
      This creates a subtle change in the datapath though. One change
      being the skb may no longer use the root devices qdisc.
      
      Because users may not expect this we can't enable the feature
      by default unless the hardware can offload all the software
      functionality above it. So for now disable it by default and
      let users opt in.
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
      Tested-by: NPhil Schmitt <phillip.j.schmitt@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      8bf1264d
    • J
      ixgbe: ixgbe_fwd_ring_down needs to be static · ae72c8d0
      John Fastabend 提交于
      When compiling with -Wstrict-prototypes gcc catches a static
      I missed.
      
      ./ixgbe_main.c:4254: warning: no previous prototype for 'ixgbe_fwd_ring_down'
      Reported-by: NPhillip Schmitt <phillip.j.schmitt@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJohn Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
      Tested-by: NPhil Schmitt <phillip.j.schmitt@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      ae72c8d0
    • V
      e1000: fix possible reset_task running after adapter down · 74a1b1ea
      Vladimir Davydov 提交于
      On e1000_down(), we should ensure every asynchronous work is canceled
      before proceeding. Since the watchdog_task can schedule other works
      apart from itself, it should be stopped first, but currently it is
      stopped after the reset_task. This can result in the following race
      leading to the reset_task running after the module unload:
      
      e1000_down_and_stop():			e1000_watchdog():
      ----------------------			-----------------
      
      cancel_work_sync(reset_task)
      					schedule_work(reset_task)
      cancel_delayed_work_sync(watchdog_task)
      
      The patch moves cancel_delayed_work_sync(watchdog_task) at the beginning
      of e1000_down_and_stop() thus ensuring the race is impossible.
      
      Cc: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@intel.com>
      Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
      Signed-off-by: NVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
      Tested-by: NAaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      74a1b1ea
    • V
      e1000: fix lockdep warning in e1000_reset_task · b2f963bf
      Vladimir Davydov 提交于
      The patch fixes the following lockdep warning, which is 100%
      reproducible on network restart:
      
      ======================================================
      [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
      3.12.0+ #47 Tainted: GF
      -------------------------------------------------------
      kworker/1:1/27 is trying to acquire lock:
       ((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] flush_work+0x0/0x70
      
      but task is already holding lock:
       (&adapter->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0177c0a>] e1000_reset_task+0x4a/0xa0 [e1000]
      
      which lock already depends on the new lock.
      
      the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
      
      -> #1 (&adapter->mutex){+.+...}:
             [<ffffffff810bdb5d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x120
             [<ffffffff816b8cbc>] mutex_lock_nested+0x4c/0x390
             [<ffffffffa017233d>] e1000_watchdog+0x7d/0x5b0 [e1000]
             [<ffffffff8108b972>] process_one_work+0x1d2/0x510
             [<ffffffff8108ca80>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
             [<ffffffff81092c1e>] kthread+0xee/0x110
             [<ffffffff816c3d7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
      
      -> #0 ((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work)){+.+...}:
             [<ffffffff810bd9c0>] __lock_acquire+0x1710/0x1810
             [<ffffffff810bdb5d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x120
             [<ffffffff8108a5eb>] flush_work+0x3b/0x70
             [<ffffffff8108b5d8>] __cancel_work_timer+0x98/0x140
             [<ffffffff8108b693>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20
             [<ffffffffa0170cec>] e1000_down_and_stop+0x3c/0x60 [e1000]
             [<ffffffffa01775b1>] e1000_down+0x131/0x220 [e1000]
             [<ffffffffa0177c12>] e1000_reset_task+0x52/0xa0 [e1000]
             [<ffffffff8108b972>] process_one_work+0x1d2/0x510
             [<ffffffff8108ca80>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
             [<ffffffff81092c1e>] kthread+0xee/0x110
             [<ffffffff816c3d7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
      
      other info that might help us debug this:
      
       Possible unsafe locking scenario:
      
             CPU0                    CPU1
             ----                    ----
        lock(&adapter->mutex);
                                     lock((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work));
                                     lock(&adapter->mutex);
        lock((&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work));
      
       *** DEADLOCK ***
      
      3 locks held by kworker/1:1/27:
       #0:  (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8108b906>] process_one_work+0x166/0x510
       #1:  ((&adapter->reset_task)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8108b906>] process_one_work+0x166/0x510
       #2:  (&adapter->mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa0177c0a>] e1000_reset_task+0x4a/0xa0 [e1000]
      
      stack backtrace:
      CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/1:1 Tainted: GF            3.12.0+ #47
      Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P5B-VM SE, BIOS 0501    05/31/2007
      Workqueue: events e1000_reset_task [e1000]
       ffffffff820f6000 ffff88007b9dba98 ffffffff816b54a2 0000000000000002
       ffffffff820f5e50 ffff88007b9dbae8 ffffffff810ba936 ffff88007b9dbac8
       ffff88007b9dbb48 ffff88007b9d8f00 ffff88007b9d8780 ffff88007b9d8f00
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff816b54a2>] dump_stack+0x49/0x5f
       [<ffffffff810ba936>] print_circular_bug+0x216/0x310
       [<ffffffff810bd9c0>] __lock_acquire+0x1710/0x1810
       [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] ? __flush_work+0x250/0x250
       [<ffffffff810bdb5d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x120
       [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] ? __flush_work+0x250/0x250
       [<ffffffff8108a5eb>] flush_work+0x3b/0x70
       [<ffffffff8108a5b0>] ? __flush_work+0x250/0x250
       [<ffffffff8108b5d8>] __cancel_work_timer+0x98/0x140
       [<ffffffff8108b693>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20
       [<ffffffffa0170cec>] e1000_down_and_stop+0x3c/0x60 [e1000]
       [<ffffffffa01775b1>] e1000_down+0x131/0x220 [e1000]
       [<ffffffffa0177c12>] e1000_reset_task+0x52/0xa0 [e1000]
       [<ffffffff8108b972>] process_one_work+0x1d2/0x510
       [<ffffffff8108b906>] ? process_one_work+0x166/0x510
       [<ffffffff8108ca80>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
       [<ffffffff8108c960>] ? manage_workers+0x2c0/0x2c0
       [<ffffffff81092c1e>] kthread+0xee/0x110
       [<ffffffff81092b30>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
       [<ffffffff816c3d7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
       [<ffffffff81092b30>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
      
      == The issue background ==
      
      The problem occurs, because e1000_down(), which is called under
      adapter->mutex by e1000_reset_task(), tries to synchronously cancel
      e1000 auxiliary works (reset_task, watchdog_task, phy_info_task,
      fifo_stall_task), which take adapter->mutex in their handlers. So the
      question is what does adapter->mutex protect there?
      
      The adapter->mutex was introduced by commit 0ef4ee ("e1000: convert to
      private mutex from rtnl") as a replacement for rtnl_lock() taken in the
      asynchronous handlers. It targeted on fixing a similar lockdep warning
      issued when e1000_down() was called under rtnl_lock(), and it fixed it,
      but unfortunately it introduced the lockdep warning described above.
      Anyway, that said the source of this bug is that the asynchronous works
      were made to take rtnl_lock() some time ago, so let's look deeper and
      find why it was added there.
      
      The rtnl_lock() was added to asynchronous handlers by commit 338c15
      ("e1000: fix occasional panic on unload") in order to prevent
      asynchronous handlers from execution after the module is unloaded
      (e1000_down() is called) as it follows from the comment to the commit:
      
      > Net drivers in general have an issue where timers fired
      > by mod_timer or work threads with schedule_work are running
      > outside of the rtnl_lock.
      >
      > With no other lock protection these routines are vulnerable
      > to races with driver unload or reset paths.
      >
      > The longer term solution to this might be a redesign with
      > safer locks being taken in the driver to guarantee no
      > reentrance, but for now a safe and effective fix is
      > to take the rtnl_lock in these routines.
      
      I'm not sure if this locking scheme fixed the problem or just made it
      unlikely, although I incline to the latter. Anyway, this was long time
      ago when e1000 auxiliary works were implemented as timers scheduling
      real work handlers in their routines. The e1000_down() function only
      canceled the timers, but left the real handlers running if they were
      running, which could result in work execution after module unload.
      Today, the e1000 driver uses sane delayed works instead of the pair
      timer+work to implement its delayed asynchronous handlers, and the
      e1000_down() synchronously cancels all the works so that the problem
      that commit 338c15 tried to cope with disappeared, and we don't need any
      locks in the handlers any more. Moreover, any locking there can
      potentially result in a deadlock.
      
      So, this patch reverts commits 0ef4ee and 338c15.
      
      Fixes: 0ef4eedc ("e1000: convert to private mutex from rtnl")
      Fixes: 338c15e4 ("e1000: fix occasional panic on unload")
      Cc: Tushar Dave <tushar.n.dave@intel.com>
      Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
      Signed-off-by: NVladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
      Tested-by: NAaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      b2f963bf
    • Y
      e1000: prevent oops when adapter is being closed and reset simultaneously · 6a7d64e3
      yzhu1 提交于
      This change is based on a similar change made to e1000e support in
      commit bb9e44d0 ("e1000e: prevent oops when adapter is being closed
      and reset simultaneously").  The same issue has also been observed
      on the older e1000 cards.
      
      Here, we have increased the RESET_COUNT value to 50 because there are too
      many accesses to e1000 nic on stress tests to e1000 nic, it is not enough
      to set RESET_COUT 25. Experimentation has shown that it is enough to set
      RESET_COUNT 50.
      Signed-off-by: Nyzhu1 <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
      Tested-by: NAaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      6a7d64e3