alloc_nid_failed and scan_nat_page can be called at the same time,
and we haven't protected add_free_nid and update_free_nid_bitmap
with the same nid_list_lock. That could lead to

Thread A				Thread B
- __build_free_nids
 - scan_nat_page
  - add_free_nid
					- alloc_nid_failed
					 - update_free_nid_bitmap
  - update_free_nid_bitmap

scan_nat_page will clear the free bitmap since the nid is PREALLOC_NID,
but alloc_nid_failed needs to set the free bitmap. This results in
free nid with free bitmap cleared.
This patch update the bitmap under the same nid_list_lock in add_free_nid.
And use __GFP_NOFAIL to make sure to update status of free nid correctly.
Signed-off-by: NFan li <fanofcode.li@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

We forgot to remov memory footprint accounting of per-cpu type
variables, fix it.

Fixes: 35782b23 ("f2fs: remove percpu_count due to performance regression")
Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

No need to read nat block if nat_block_bitmap is set.
Signed-off-by: NYunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

During mkfs, quota sysfiles have already occupied nid resource,
it needs to adjust remaining available nid count in kernel side.
Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>

Pull MTD fixes from Richard Weinberger:
 "This contains the following regression fixes:

   - fix bitflip handling in brcmnand and gpmi nand drivers

   - revert a bad device tree binding for spi-nor

   - fix a copy&paste error in gpio-nand driver

   - fix a too strict length check in mtd core"

* tag 'for-linus-20171218' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-mtd:
  mtd: Fix mtd_check_oob_ops()
  mtd: nand: gpio: Fix ALE gpio configuration
  mtd: nand: brcmnand: Zero bitflip is not an error
  mtd: nand: gpmi: Fix failure when a erased page has a bitflip at BBM
  Revert "dt-bindings: mtd: add sst25wf040b and en25s64 to sip-nor list"

Pull parisc fixes from Helge Deller:
 "There are two important fixes here:

   - Add PCI quirks to disable built-in a serial AUX and a graphics
     cards from specific GSP (management board) PCI cards. This fixes
     boot via serial console on rp3410 and rp3440 machines.

   - Revert the "Re-enable interrups early" patch which was added to
     kernel v4.10. It can trigger stack overflows and thus silent data
     corruption. With this patch reverted we can lower our thread stack
     back to 16kb again.

  The other patches are minor cleanups: avoid duplicate includes,
  indenting fixes, correctly align variable in asm code"

* 'parisc-4.15-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
  parisc: Reduce thread stack to 16 kb
  Revert "parisc: Re-enable interrupts early"
  parisc: remove duplicate includes
  parisc: Hide Diva-built-in serial aux and graphics card
  parisc: Align os_hpmc_size on word boundary
  parisc: Fix indenting in puts()

Pull x86 syscall entry code changes for PTI from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main changes here are Andy Lutomirski's changes to switch the
  x86-64 entry code to use the 'per CPU entry trampoline stack'. This,
  besides helping fix KASLR leaks (the pending Page Table Isolation
  (PTI) work), also robustifies the x86 entry code"

* 'WIP.x86-pti.entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
  x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
  x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors
  x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single
  x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
  x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code
  x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary
  x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area
  x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline
  x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack
  x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries
  x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack
  x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0
  x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area
  x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct
  x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks
  x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss
  x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area
  x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area
  x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order
  x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack
  ...

The mtd_check_oob_ops() helper verifies if the operation defined by the
user is correct.

Fix the check that verifies if the entire requested area exists. This
check is too restrictive and will fail anytime the last data byte of the
very last page is included in an operation.

Fixes: 5cdd929d ("mtd: Add sanity checks in mtd_write/read_oob()")
Signed-off-by: NMiquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: NBoris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

This reverts commit 04e35f44.

SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions,
which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change
that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix
will need to be redesigned.
Reported-by: NLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NTomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull Page Table Isolation (PTI) v4.14 backporting base tree from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree contains the v4.14 PTI backport preparatory tree, which
  consists of four merges of upstream trees and 7 cherry-picked commits,
  which the upcoming PTI work depends on"

NOTE! The resulting tree is exactly the same as the original base tree
(ie the diff between this commit and its immediate first parent is
empty).

The only reason for this merge is literally to have a common point for
the actual PTI changes so that the commits can be shared in both the
4.15 and 4.14 trees.

* 'WIP.x86-pti.base-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow
  locking/barriers: Convert users of lockless_dereference() to READ_ONCE()
  locking/barriers: Add implicit smp_read_barrier_depends() to READ_ONCE()
  bpf: fix build issues on um due to mising bpf_perf_event.h
  perf/x86: Enable free running PEBS for REGS_USER/INTR
  x86: Make X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK detectable in CPUID on AMD
  x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions

Merge branch 'WIP.x86-pti.base.prep-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull Page Table Isolation (PTI) preparatory tree from Ingo Molnar:
 "This does a rename to free up linux/pti.h to be used by the upcoming
  page table isolation feature"

* 'WIP.x86-pti.base.prep-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  drivers/misc/intel/pti: Rename the header file to free up the namespace

Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "A single bugfix which prevents arbitrary sigev_notify values in
  posix-timers"

* 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify

Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:
 "This time consisting of fixes in a bunch of drivers and the dmatest
  module:

   - Fix for disable clk on error path in fsl-edma driver
   - Disable clk fail fix in jz4740 driver
   - Fix long pending bug in dmatest driver for dangling pointer
   - Fix potential NULL pointer dereference in at_hdmac driver
   - Error handling path in ioat driver"

* tag 'dmaengine-fix-4.15-rc4' of git://git.infradead.org/users/vkoul/slave-dma:
  dmaengine: fsl-edma: disable clks on all error paths
  dmaengine: jz4740: disable/unprepare clk if probe fails
  dmaengine: dmatest: move callback wait queue to thread context
  dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix potential NULL pointer dereference in atc_prep_dma_interleaved
  dmaengine: ioat: Fix error handling path

With CONFIG_MTD=m and CONFIG_CRAMFS=y, we now get a link failure:

  fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mount': inode.c:(.text+0x220): undefined reference to `mount_mtd'
  fs/cramfs/inode.o: In function `cramfs_mtd_fill_super':
  inode.c:(.text+0x6d8): undefined reference to `mtd_point'
  inode.c:(.text+0xae4): undefined reference to `mtd_unpoint'

This adds a more specific Kconfig dependency to avoid the broken
configuration.

Alternatively we could make CRAMFS itself depend on "MTD || !MTD" with a
similar result.

Fixes: 99c18ce5 ("cramfs: direct memory access support")
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "The alloc_super() one is a regression in this merge window, lazytime
  thing is older..."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  VFS: Handle lazytime in do_mount()
  alloc_super(): do ->s_umount initialization earlier

Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "Fix a regression which caused us to fail to interpret symlinks in very
  ancient ext3 file system images.

  Also fix two xfstests failures, one of which could cause an OOPS, plus
  an additional bug fix caught by fuzz testing"

* tag 'ext4_for_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
  ext4: fix crash when a directory's i_size is too small
  ext4: add missing error check in __ext4_new_inode()
  ext4: fix fdatasync(2) after fallocate(2) operation
  ext4: support fast symlinks from ext3 file systems

In testing, I found that the thread stack can be 16 kB when using an irq
stack.  Without it, the thread stack needs to be 32 kB. Currently, the irq
stack is 32 kB. While it probably could be 16 kB, I would prefer to leave it
as is for safety.
Signed-off-by: NJohn David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

This reverts commit 5c38602d.

Interrupts can't be enabled early because the register saves are done on
the thread stack prior to switching to the IRQ stack.  This caused stack
overflows and the thread stack needed increasing to 32k.  Even then,
stack overflows still occasionally occurred.

Background:
Even with a 32 kB thread stack, I have seen instances where the thread
stack overflowed on the mx3210 buildd.  Detection of stack overflow only
occurs when we have an external interrupt.  When an external interrupt
occurs, we switch to the thread stack if we are not already on a kernel
stack.  Then, registers and specials are saved to the kernel stack.

The bug occurs in intr_return where interrupts are reenabled prior to
returning from the interrupt.  This was done incase we need to schedule
or deliver signals.  However, it introduces the possibility that
multiple external interrupts may occur on the thread stack and cause a
stack overflow.  These might not be detected and cause the kernel to
misbehave in random ways.

This patch changes the code back to only reenable interrupts when we are
going to schedule or deliver signals.  As a result, we generally return
from an interrupt before reenabling interrupts.  This minimizes the
growth of the thread stack.

Fixes: 5c38602d ("parisc: Re-enable interrupts early")
Signed-off-by: NJohn David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

These duplicate includes have been found with scripts/checkincludes.pl
but they have been removed manually to avoid removing false positives.
Signed-off-by: NPravin Shedge <pravin.shedge4linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

Diva GSP card has built-in serial AUX port and ATI graphic card which simply
don't work and which both don't have external connectors.  User Guides even
mention that those devices shouldn't be used.
So, prevent that Linux drivers try to enable those devices.
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.0+

The os_hpmc_size variable sometimes wasn't aligned at word boundary and thus
triggered the unaligned fault handler at startup.
Fix it by aligning it properly.
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+

Static analysis tools complain that we intended to have curly braces
around this indent block. In this case this assumption is wrong, so fix
the indenting.

Fixes: 2f3c7b81 ("parisc: Add core code for self-extracting kernel")
Reported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+

There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That
makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all
upcoming CPUs.

Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.992156574@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

There is no generic way to test whether a kernel is running on a specific
hypervisor. But that's required to prevent the upcoming user address space
separation feature in certain guest modes.

Make the hypervisor type enum unconditionally available and provide a
helper function which allows to test for a specific type.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.912938129@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

native_flush_tlb_single() will be changed with the upcoming
PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION feature. This requires to have more code in
there than INVLPG.

Remove the paravirt patching for it.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.828111617@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR.  Make it
read-only on x86_64.

On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults.  I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.

[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO.  So
  	it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
  	might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
  	confirmation. ]
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The existing code was a mess, mainly because C arrays are nasty.  Turn
SYSENTER_stack into a struct, add a helper to find it, and do all the
obvious cleanups this enables.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.653244723@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary
to detect overflow after the fact.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The IST stacks are needed when an IST exception occurs and are accessed
before any kernel code at all runs.  Move them into struct cpu_entry_area.

The IST stacks are unlike the rest of cpu_entry_area: they're used even for
entries from kernel mode.  This means that they should be set up before we
load the final IDT.  Move cpu_entry_area setup to trap_init() for the boot
CPU and set it up for all possible CPUs at once in native_smp_prepare_cpus().
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.480598743@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Handling SYSCALL is tricky: the SYSCALL handler is entered with every
single register (except FLAGS), including RSP, live.  It somehow needs
to set RSP to point to a valid stack, which means it needs to save the
user RSP somewhere and find its own stack pointer.  The canonical way
to do this is with SWAPGS, which lets us access percpu data using the
%gs prefix.

With PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION-like pagetable switching, this is
problematic.  Without a scratch register, switching CR3 is impossible, so
%gs-based percpu memory would need to be mapped in the user pagetables.
Doing that without information leaks is difficult or impossible.

Instead, use a different sneaky trick.  Map a copy of the first part
of the SYSCALL asm at a different address for each CPU.  Now RIP
varies depending on the CPU, so we can use RIP-relative memory access
to access percpu memory.  By putting the relevant information (one
scratch slot and the stack address) at a constant offset relative to
RIP, we can make SYSCALL work without relying on %gs.

A nice thing about this approach is that we can easily switch it on
and off if we want pagetable switching to be configurable.

The compat variant of SYSCALL doesn't have this problem in the first
place -- there are plenty of scratch registers, since we don't care
about preserving r8-r15.  This patch therefore doesn't touch SYSCALL32
at all.

This patch actually seems to be a small speedup.  With this patch,
SYSCALL touches an extra cache line and an extra virtual page, but
the pipeline no longer stalls waiting for SWAPGS.  It seems that, at
least in a tight loop, the latter outweights the former.

Thanks to David Laight for an optimization tip.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.403607157@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

By itself, this is useless.  It gives us the ability to run some final code
before exit that cannnot run on the kernel stack.  This could include a CR3
switch a la PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION or some kernel stack erasing, for
example.  (Or even weird things like *changing* which kernel stack gets
used as an ASLR-strengthening mechanism.)

The SYSRET32 path is not covered yet.  It could be in the future or
we could just ignore it and force the slow path if needed.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.306546484@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
to the running task's kernel stack.  Rearrange it so that we enter on
a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.

The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
it can wait.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When we start using an entry trampoline, a #GP from userspace will
be delivered on the entry stack, not on the task stack.  Fix the
espfix64 #DF fixup to set up #GP according to TSS.SP0, rather than
assuming that pt_regs + 1 == SP0.  This won't change anything
without an entry stack, but it will make the code continue to work
when an entry stack is added.

While we're at it, improve the comments to explain what's actually
going on.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.130778051@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

On 64-bit kernels, we used to assume that TSS.sp0 was the current
top of stack.  With the addition of an entry trampoline, this will
no longer be the case.  Store the current top of stack in TSS.sp1,
which is otherwise unused but shares the same cacheline.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.050864668@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This has a secondary purpose: it puts the entry stack into a region
with a well-controlled layout.  A subsequent patch will take
advantage of this to streamline the SYSCALL entry code to be able to
find it more easily.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.962042855@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

SYSENTER_stack should have reliable overflow detection, which
means that it needs to be at the bottom of a page, not the top.
Move it to the beginning of struct tss_struct and page-align it.

Also add an assertion to make sure that the fixed hardware TSS
doesn't cross a page boundary.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.881827433@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We currently special-case stack overflow on the task stack.  We're
going to start putting special stacks in the fixmap with a custom
layout, so they'll have guard pages, too.  Teach the unwinder to be
able to unwind an overflow of any of the stacks.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.802057305@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

A future patch will move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of cpu_tss
to help detect overflow.  Before this can happen, fix several code
paths that hardcode assumptions about the old layout.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.722425540@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The cpu_entry_area will contain stacks.  Make sure that KASAN has
appropriate shadow mappings for them.
Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150605.642806442@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>