This will make it easier to splice two lists together which will
be needed in future patch.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

When a write to one of the legs of a RAID10 fails, the failure is
recorded in the metadata of the other legs so that after a restart
the data on the failed drive wont be trusted even if that drive seems
to be working again (maybe a cable was unplugged).

Currently there is no interlock between the write request completing
and the metadata update.  So it is possible that the write will
complete, the app will confirm success in some way, and then the
machine will crash before the metadata update completes.

This is an extremely small hole for a racy to fit in, but it is
theoretically possible and so should be closed.

So:
 - set MD_CHANGE_PENDING when requesting a metadata update for a
   failed device, so we can know with certainty when it completes
 - queue requests that experienced an error on a new queue which
   is only processed after the metadata update completes
 - call raid_end_bio_io() on bios in that queue when the time comes.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

When a write to one of the legs of a RAID1 fails, the failure is
recorded in the metadata of the other leg(s) so that after a restart
the data on the failed drive wont be trusted even if that drive seems
to be working again  (maybe a cable was unplugged).

Similarly when we record a bad-block in response to a write failure,
we must not let the write complete until the bad-block update is safe.

Currently there is no interlock between the write request completing
and the metadata update.  So it is possible that the write will
complete, the app will confirm success in some way, and then the
machine will crash before the metadata update completes.

This is an extremely small hole for a racy to fit in, but it is
theoretically possible and so should be closed.

So:
 - set MD_CHANGE_PENDING when requesting a metadata update for a
   failed device, so we can know with certainty when it completes
 - queue requests that experienced an error on a new queue which
   is only processed after the metadata update completes
 - call raid_end_bio_io() on bios in that queue when the time comes.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

md_setup_cluster already calls try_module_get(), so this
try_module_get isn't needed.
Also, there is no matching module_put (except in error patch),
so this leaves an unbalanced module count.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

This code looks racy.

The only possible race is if two modules try to register at the same
time and that won't happen.  But make the code look safe anyway.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

In gather_all_resync_info, we need to read the disk bitmap sb and
check if it needs recovery.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

Introduce MD_CLUSTER_BEGIN_JOIN_CLUSTER flag to make sure
complete(&cinfo->completion) is only be invoked when node
join cluster. Otherwise node failure could also call the
complete, and it doesn't make sense to do it.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

We also need to free the lock resource before goto out.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

The sb_lock is not used anywhere, so let's remove it.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

If the node just join the cluster, and receive the msg from other nodes
before init suspend_list, it will cause kernel crash due to NULL pointer
dereference, so move the initializations early to fix the bug.

md-cluster: Joined cluster 3578507b-e0cb-6d4f-6322-696cd7b1b10c slot 3
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
... ... ...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa0444924>] process_recvd_msg+0x2e4/0x330 [md_cluster]
[<ffffffffa0444a06>] recv_daemon+0x96/0x170 [md_cluster]
[<ffffffffa045189d>] md_thread+0x11d/0x170 [md_mod]
[<ffffffff810768c4>] kthread+0xb4/0xc0
[<ffffffff8151927c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
... ... ...
RIP  [<ffffffffa0443581>] __remove_suspend_info+0x11/0xa0 [md_cluster]
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

In complicated cluster environment, it is possible that the
dlm lock couldn't be get/convert on purpose, the related err
info is added for better debug potential issue.

For lockres_free, if the lock is blocking by a lock request or
conversion request, then dlm_unlock just put it back to grant
queue, so need to ensure the lock is free finally.
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

We should init completion within lockres_init, otherwise
completion could be initialized more than one time during
it's life cycle.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

There is problem with previous communication mechanism, and we got below
deadlock scenario with cluster which has 3 nodes.

	Sender                	    Receiver        		Receiver

	token(EX)
       message(EX)
      writes message
   downconverts message(CR)
      requests ack(EX)
		                  get message(CR)            gets message(CR)
                		  reads message                reads message
		               requests EX on message    requests EX on message

To fix this problem, we do the following changes:

1. the sender downconverts MESSAGE to CW rather than CR.
2. and the receiver request PR lock not EX lock on message.

And in case we failed to down-convert EX to CW on message, it is better to
unlock message otherthan still hold the lock.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NLidong Zhong <ldzhong@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

When node A stops an array while the array is doing a resync, we need
to let another node B take over the resync task.

To achieve the goal, we need the A send an explicit BITMAP_NEEDS_SYNC
message to the cluster. And the node B which received that message will
invoke __recover_slot to do resync.
Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

Make recover_slot as a wraper to __recover_slot, since the
logic of __recover_slot can be reused for the condition
when other nodes need to take over the resync job.
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

Reviewed-by: NGoldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NGuoqing Jiang <gqjiang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

We used to set up the safemode_timer timer in md_run. If md_run
would fail before the timer was set up we'd end up trying to modify
a timer that doesn't have a callback function when we access safe_delay_store,
which would trigger a BUG.

neilb: delete init_timer() call as setup_timer() does that.
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

It is possible (though unlikely) for a reshape to be
interrupted between the time that end_reshape is called
and the time when raid5_finish_reshape is called.

This can leave conf->reshape_progress set to MaxSector,
but mddev->reshape_position not.

This combination confused reshape_request() when ->reshape_backwards.
As conf->reshape_progress is so high, it seems the reshape hasn't
really begun.  But assuming MaxSector is a valid address only
leads to sorrow.

So ensure reshape_position and reshape_progress both agree,
and add an extra check in reshape_request() just in case they don't.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

There can be a small window between the moment that recovery
actually writes the last block and the time when various sysfs
and /proc/mdstat attributes report that it has finished.
During this time, 'sync_completed' can have the wrong value.
This can confuse monitoring software.

So:
 - don't set curr_resync_completed beyond the end of the devices,
 - set it correctly when resync/recovery has completed.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

While it generally shouldn't happen, it is not impossible for
curr_resync_completed to exceed resync_max.
This can particularly happen when reshaping RAID5 - the current
status isn't copied to curr_resync_completed promptly, so when it
is, it can exceed resync_max.
This happens when the reshape is 'frozen', resync_max is set low,
and reshape is re-enabled.

Taking a difference between two unsigned numbers is always dangerous
anyway, so add a test to behave correctly if
   curr_resync_completed > resync_max
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

This ensures that 'sync_action' will show 'recover' immediately the
array is started.  If there is no spare the status will change to
'idle' once that is detected.

Clear MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER for a read-only array to ensure this change
happens.

This allows scripts which monitor status not to get confused -
particularly my test scripts.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

This code is calculating:
  writepos, which is the furthest along address (device-space) that we
     *will* be writing to
  readpos, which is the earliest address that we *could* possible read
     from, and
  safepos, which is the earliest address in the 'old' section that we
     might read from after a crash when the reshape position is
     recovered from metadata.

  The first is a precise calculation, so clipping at zero doesn't
  make sense.  As the reshape position is now guaranteed to always be
  a multiple of reshape_sectors and as we already BUG_ON when
  reshape_progress is zero, there is no point in this min_t() call.

  The readpos and safepos are worst case - actual value depends on
  precise geometry.  That worst case could be negative, which is only
  a problem because we are storing the value in an unsigned.
  So leave the min_t() for those.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

When reshaping, we work in units of the largest chunk size.
If changing from a larger to a smaller chunk size, that means we
reshape more than one stripe at a time.  So the required alignment
of reshape_position needs to take into account both the old
and new chunk size.

This means that both 'here_new' and 'here_old' are calculated with
respect to the same (maximum) chunk size, so testing if they are the
same when delta_disks is zero becomes pointless.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

The chunk_sectors and new_chunk_sectors fields of mddev can be changed
any time (via sysfs) that the reconfig mutex can be taken.  So raid5
keeps internal copies in 'conf' which are stable except for a short
locked moment when reshape stops/starts.

So any access that does not hold reconfig_mutex should use the 'conf'
values, not the 'mddev' values.
Several don't.

This could result in corruption if new values were written at awkward
times.

Also use min() or max() rather than open-coding.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

These aren't really needed when no reshape is happening,
but it is safer to have them always set to a meaningful value.
The next patch will use ->prev_chunk_sectors without checking
if a reshape is happening (because that makes the code simpler),
and this patch makes that safe.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

md/raid5 only updates ->reshape_position (which is stored in
metadata and is authoritative) occasionally, but particularly
when getting closed to ->resync_max as it must be correct
when ->resync_max is reached.

When mdadm tries to stop an array which is reshaping it will:
 - freeze the reshape,
 - set resync_max to where the reshape has reached.
 - unfreeze the reshape.
When this happens, the reshape is aborted and then restarted.

The restart doesn't check that resync_max is close, and so doesn't
update ->reshape_position like it should.
This results in the reshape stopping, but ->reshape_position being
incorrect.

So on that first call to reshape_request, make sure ->reshape_position
is updated if needed.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

When checking sync_action in a script, we want to be sure it is
as accurate as possible.
As resync/reshape etc doesn't always start immediately (a separate
thread is scheduled to do it), it is best if 'action_show'
checks if MD_RECOVER_NEEDED is set (which it does) and in that
case reports what is likely to start soon (which it only sometimes
does).

So:
 - report 'reshape' if reshape_position suggests one might start.
 - set MD_RECOVERY_RECOVER in raid1_reshape(), because that is very
   likely to happen next.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

Currently when a recovery completes, mdstat shows that it has finished
before the new device is marked as a full member.  Because of this it
can appear to a script that the recovery finished but the array isn't
in sync.

So while MD_RECOVERY_DONE is still set, keep mdstat reporting "recovery".
Once md_reap_sync_thread() completes, the spare will be active and then
MD_RECOVERY_DONE will be cleared.

To ensure this is race-free, set MD_RECOVERY_DONE before clearning
curr_resync.
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

When a (e.g.) RAID5 array is reshaped to RAID0, the updating
of queue parameters (e.g. max number of sectors per bio) is
done in the wrong place.
It should be part of ->run, but it is actually part of ->takeover.
This means it happens before level_store() calls:

	blk_set_stacking_limits(&mddev->queue->limits);

and so it ineffective.  This can lead to errors from underlying
devices.

So move all the relevant settings out of create_stripe_zones()
and into raid0_run().

As this can lead to a bug-on it is suitable for any -stable
kernel which supports reshape to RAID0.  So 2.6.35 or later.
As the bug has been present for five years there is no urgency,
so no need to rush into -stable.

Fixes: 9af204cf ("md: Add support for Raid5->Raid0 and Raid10->Raid0 takeover")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v2.6.35+ - please delay until after -final release).
Reported-by: NYi Zhang <yizhan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

There is no point assigning '\0' to file->pathname[0] as
file is now zeroed out, so remove that branch and
simplify the code.

[Original patch combined this with the change to use
 kzalloc.  I split the two so that the change to kzalloc
 is easier to backport. - neilb]
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

I have a report of drop_one_stripe() called from
raid5_cache_scan() apparently finding ->max_nr_stripes == 0.

This should not be allowed.

So add a test to keep max_nr_stripes above min_nr_stripes.

Also use a 'mask' rather than a 'mod' in drop_one_stripe
to ensure 'hash' is valid even if max_nr_stripes does reach zero.


Fixes: edbe83ab ("md/raid5: allow the stripe_cache to grow and shrink.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (4.1 - please release with 2d5b569b)
Reported-by: NTomas Papan <tomas.papan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".

5769         file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770         if (!file)
5771                 return -ENOMEM;

This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.

5786         if (err == 0 &&
5787             copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788                 err = -EFAULT

But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.

5775         /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776         if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777                 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

raid1_end_read_request() assumes that the In_sync bits are consistent
with the ->degaded count.
raid1_spare_active updates the In_sync bit before the ->degraded count
and so exposes an inconsistency, as does error()
So extend the spinlock in raid1_spare_active() and error() to hide those
inconsistencies.

This should probably be part of
  Commit: 34cab6f4 ("md/raid1: fix test for 'was read error from
  last working device'.")
as it addresses the same issue.  It fixes the same bug and should go
to -stable for same reasons.

Fixes: 76073054 ("md/raid1: clean up read_balance.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.0+)
Signed-off-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>

Ted Ts'o reports that his Lenovo T540p ThinkPad crashes at boot if
attached to the docking station.  This is a regression that he was able
to bisect to commit 8c7b5ccb: "drm/i915: Use atomic helpers for
computing changed flags:"

The reason seems to be the new call to drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset()
added to intel_modeset_compute_config(), which in turn calls
update_connector_routing(), and somehow ends up picking a NULL crtc for
the connector state, causing the subsequent drm_crtc_index() to OOPS.

Daniel Vetter says that the fundamental issue seems to be confusion in
the encoder selection, and this isn't the right fix, but while he chases
down the proper fix, this at least avoids the NULL pointer dereference
and makes Ted's docking station work again.
Reported-bisected-and-tested-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Cc: Mani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Commit 50649ab1 ("stmmac: drop driver from stmmac platform code")
was a bit overzealous in removing code and dropped the MODULE_*
macro's that are still needed since stmmac_platform can be a module.
Fix this by putting the macro's remvoed in 50649ab1 back.

This fixes the following errors when used as a module:
  stmmac_platform: module license 'unspecified' taints kernel.
  Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol devm_kmalloc (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol stmmac_suspend (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol platform_get_irq_byname (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol stmmac_dvr_remove (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol platform_get_resource (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol of_get_phy_mode (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol of_property_read_u32_array (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol of_alias_get_id (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol stmmac_resume (err 0)
  stmmac_platform: Unknown symbol stmmac_dvr_probe (err 0)

Fixes: 50649ab1 ("stmmac: drop driver from stmmac platform code")
Reported-by: NIgor Gnatenko <i.gnatenko.brain@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJoachim Eastwood <manabian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The wol_en flag is 0 by default anyway, and we have the
following inconsistency: a MAGIC packet wol capable eth
interface is registered as a wake-up source but unable
to wake-up the system as wol_en is 0 (wake-on flag set to 'd').
Calling set_wakeup_enable() at netdev open is just redundant
because wol_en is 0 by default.
Let only ethtool call set_wakeup_enable() for now.

The bflock is obviously obsoleted, its utility has been corroded
over time.  The bitfield flags used today in gianfar are accessed
only on the init/ config path, with no real possibility of
concurrency - nothing that would justify smth. like bflock.
Signed-off-by: NClaudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If we disable NAPI in the first place we can mask the device's
interrupts (and halt it) without fearing that imask may be
concurrently accessed from interrupt context, so there's
no need to do local_irq_save() around gfar_halt_nodisable().
lock_rx_qs()/unlock_tx_qs() are just obsoleted and potentially
buggy routines.  The txlock is currently used in the driver only
to manage TX congestion, it has nothing to do with halting the
device.  With these changes, the TX processing is stopped before
gfar_halt().

Compact gfar_halt() is used instead of gfar_halt_nodisable(),
as it disables Rx/TX DMA h/w blocks and the Rx/TX h/w queues.
gfar_start() re-enables all these blocks on resume.  Enabling
the magic-packet mode remains the same, note that the RX block
is re-enabled just before entering sleep mode.

Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND flag for the error interrupt line, to signal
that the interrupt line must remain active during sleep in order
to wake the system by magic packet (MAG) reception interrupt.
(On some systems the MAG interrupt did trigger w/o this flag
as well, but on others it didn't.)

Without these fixes, when suspended during fair Tx traffic the
interface occasionally failed to be woken up by magic packet.
Signed-off-by: NClaudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

CC      drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.o
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c:568:13: warning: 'lock_tx_qs'
defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
 static void lock_tx_qs(struct gfar_private *priv)
             ^
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c:576:13: warning: 'unlock_tx_qs'
defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
 static void unlock_tx_qs(struct gfar_private *priv)
             ^
Reported-by: NScott Wood <scottwood@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: NClaudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This reverts commit b9855f03.
The patch break existing DMA usage case. For example, audio SOC
dmaengine never release channel and cause virt-dma to cache too
much memory in descriptor to exhaust system memory.
Signed-off-by: NVinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com>