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  1. 04 7月, 2015 1 次提交
  3. 26 6月, 2015 2 次提交
    • I
      fs, proc: introduce CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN · 2e13ba54
      由 Iago López Galeiras 提交于 
      Commit 81841161 ("fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children
entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the
file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS)
because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore.
I would like to use it in rkt.  The rkt process exec() another program
it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child
process.  I would like to find the pid of the child process from an
external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find
which one has a parent pid equal to rkt.

This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it.  This allows enabling
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children without needing to enable
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT.

Alban tested that /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children is present when the
kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Signed-off-by: NIago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Tested-by: NAlban Crequy <alban@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: NCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <djalal@endocode.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2e13ba54
    • A
      proc: fix PAGE_SIZE limit of /proc/$PID/cmdline · c2c0bb44
      由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于 
      /proc/$PID/cmdline truncates output at PAGE_SIZE. It is easy to see with

	$ cat /proc/self/cmdline $(seq 1037) 2>/dev/null

However, command line size was never limited to PAGE_SIZE but to 128 KB
and relatively recently limitation was removed altogether.

People noticed and ask questions:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/199130/how-do-i-increase-the-proc-pid-cmdline-4096-byte-limit

seq file interface is not OK, because it kmalloc's for whole output and
open + read(, 1) + sleep will pin arbitrary amounts of kernel memory.  To
not do that, limit must be imposed which is incompatible with arbitrary
sized command lines.

I apologize for hairy code, but this it direct consequence of command line
layout in memory and hacks to support things like "init [3]".

The loops are "unrolled" otherwise it is either macros which hide control
flow or functions with 7-8 arguments with equal line count.

There should be real setproctitle(2) or something.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a billion min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: NJarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c2c0bb44
  5. 11 5月, 2015 2 次提交
    • A
      don't pass nameidata to ->follow_link() · 6e77137b
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain
it from current->nameidata
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      6e77137b
    • A
      new ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventions · 680baacb
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning
an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_
that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns
the symlink body.  Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic
symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks.  Stored pointer
is ignored in all cases except the last one.

Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call
of ->put_link().

b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata).
Now only the opaque pointer is.  In the cases when we used the symlink body
to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition
to returning it.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      680baacb
  7. 16 4月, 2015 2 次提交
  9. 12 12月, 2014 1 次提交
    • E
      userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis · 9cc46516
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      - Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups

  A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
  current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
  future in this user namespace.

  A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.

- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
  their parents.

- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
  not allow checking the permissions at open time.

- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
  for the user namespace is set.

  This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
  level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
  from a process that already has that ability.

  A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
  creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
  setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
  Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
  is a noop.  Prodcess with privilege become processes without
  privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
  to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
  setgroups.  So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
  without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      9cc46516
  11. 11 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  13. 20 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  15. 10 10月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 09 10月, 2014 2 次提交
  19. 19 9月, 2014 2 次提交
  21. 09 8月, 2014 14 次提交
  23. 05 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  25. 08 4月, 2014 3 次提交
  27. 20 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  29. 11 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  31. 24 1月, 2014 4 次提交
    • O
      proc: fix ->f_pos overflows in first_tid() · 9f6e963f
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      1. proc_task_readdir()->first_tid() path truncates f_pos to int, this
   is wrong even on 64bit.

   We could check that f_pos < PID_MAX or even INT_MAX in
   proc_task_readdir(), but this patch simply checks the potential
   overflow in first_tid(), this check is nop on 64bit.  We do not care if
   it was negative and the new unsigned value is huge, all we need to
   ensure is that we never wrongly return !NULL.

2. Remove the 2nd "nr != 0" check before get_nr_threads(),
   nr_threads == 0 is not distinguishable from !pid_task() above.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9f6e963f
    • O
      proc: don't (ab)use ->group_leader in proc_task_readdir() paths · d855a4b7
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      proc_task_readdir() does not really need "leader", first_tid() has to
revalidate it anyway.  Just pass proc_pid(inode) to first_tid() instead,
it can do pid_task(PIDTYPE_PID) itself and read ->group_leader only if
necessary.

The patch also extracts the "inode is dead" code from
pid_delete_dentry(dentry) into the new trivial helper,
proc_inode_is_dead(inode), proc_task_readdir() uses it to return -ENOENT
if this dir was removed.

This is a bit racy, but the race is very inlikely and the getdents() after
openndir() can see the empty "." + ".." dir only once.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d855a4b7
    • O
      proc: change first_tid() to use while_each_thread() rather than next_thread() · c986c14a
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      Rerwrite the main loop to use while_each_thread() instead of
next_thread().  We are going to fix or replace while_each_thread(),
next_thread() should be avoided whenever possible.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c986c14a
    • O
      proc: fix the potential use-after-free in first_tid() · 940fe479
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      proc_task_readdir() verifies that the result of get_proc_task() is
pid_alive() and thus its ->group_leader is fine too.  However this is not
necessarily true after rcu_read_unlock(), we need to recheck this again
after first_tid() does rcu_read_lock().  Otherwise
leader->thread_group.next (used by next_thread()) can be invalid if the
rcu grace period expires in between.

The race is subtle and unlikely, but still it is possible afaics.  To
simplify lets ignore the "likely" case when tid != 0, f_version can be
cleared by proc_task_operations->llseek().

Suppose we have a main thread M and its subthread T.  Suppose that f_pos
== 3, iow first_tid() should return T.  Now suppose that the following
happens between rcu_read_unlock() and rcu_read_lock():

	1. T execs and becomes the new leader. This removes M from
	    ->thread_group but next_thread(M) is still T.

	2. T creates another thread X which does exec as well, T
	   goes away.

	3. X creates another subthread, this increments nr_threads.

	4. first_tid() does next_thread(M) and returns the already
	   dead T.

Note also that we need 2.  and 3.  only because of get_nr_threads() check,
and this check was supposed to be optimization only.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      940fe479