Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-5.17-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.17, take #1

- Correctly update the shadow register on exception injection when
  running in nVHE mode

- Correctly use the mm_ops indirection when performing cache invalidation
  from the page-table walker

- Restrict the vgic-v3 workaround for SEIS to the two known broken
  implementations

Fix the following false positive warning:
 =============================
 WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
 5.16.0-rc4+ #57 Not tainted
 -----------------------------
 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:484 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 3 locks held by fc_vcpu 0/330:
  #0: ffff8884835fc0b0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x88/0x6f0 [kvm]
  #1: ffffc90004c0bb68 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: vcpu_enter_guest+0x600/0x1860 [kvm]
  #2: ffffc90004c0c1d0 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_notify_acked_irq+0x36/0x180 [kvm]

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 26 PID: 330 Comm: fc_vcpu 0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x57
  kvm_notify_acked_gsi+0x6b/0x70 [kvm]
  kvm_notify_acked_irq+0x8d/0x180 [kvm]
  kvm_ioapic_update_eoi+0x92/0x240 [kvm]
  kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated+0x2a/0xe0 [kvm]
  handle_apic_eoi_induced+0x3d/0x60 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_handle_exit+0x19c/0x6a0 [kvm_intel]
  vcpu_enter_guest+0x66e/0x1860 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x438/0x7f0 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x38a/0x6f0 [kvm]
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x89/0xc0
  do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Since kvm_unregister_irq_ack_notifier() does synchronize_srcu(&kvm->irq_srcu),
kvm->irq_ack_notifier_list is protected by kvm->irq_srcu. In fact,
kvm->irq_srcu SRCU read lock is held in kvm_notify_acked_irq(), making it
a false positive warning. So use hlist_for_each_entry_srcu() instead of
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu().
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NHou Wenlong <houwenlong93@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <f98bac4f5052bad2c26df9ad50f7019e40434512.1643265976.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Hyper-V TLFS explicitly forbids VMREAD and VMWRITE instructions when
Enlightened VMCS interface is in use:

"Any VMREAD or VMWRITE instructions while an enlightened VMCS is
active is unsupported and can result in unexpected behavior.""

Windows 11 + WSL2 seems to ignore this, attempts to VMREAD VMCS field
0x4404 ("VM-exit interruption information") are observed. Failing
these attempts with nested_vmx_failInvalid() makes such guests
unbootable.

Microsoft confirms this is a Hyper-V bug and claims that it'll get fixed
eventually but for the time being we need a workaround. (Temporary) allow
VMREAD to get data from the currently loaded Enlightened VMCS.

Note: VMWRITE instructions remain forbidden, it is not clear how to
handle them properly and hopefully won't ever be needed.
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-6-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In preparation to allowing reads from Enlightened VMCS from
handle_vmread(), implement evmcs_field_offset() to get the correct
read offset. get_evmcs_offset(), which is being used by KVM-on-Hyper-V,
is almost what's needed but a few things need to be adjusted. First,
WARN_ON() is unacceptable for handle_vmread() as any field can (in
theory) be supplied by the guest and not all fields are defined in
eVMCS v1. Second, we need to handle 'holes' in eVMCS (missing fields).
It also sounds like a good idea to WARN_ON() if such fields are ever
accessed by KVM-on-Hyper-V.

Implement dedicated evmcs_field_offset() helper.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-5-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

vmcs_to_field_offset{,_table} may sound misleading as VMCS is an opaque
blob which is not supposed to be accessed directly. In fact,
vmcs_to_field_offset{,_table} are related to KVM defined VMCS12 structure.

Rename vmcs_field_to_offset() to get_vmcs12_field_offset() for clarity.

No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-4-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Enlightened VMCS v1 doesn't have VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE field,
PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER is also filtered out already so it makes
sense to filter out VM_EXIT_SAVE_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER too.

Note, none of the currently existing Windows/Hyper-V versions are known
to enable 'save VMX-preemption timer value' when eVMCS is in use, the
change is aimed at making the filtering future proof.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Similar to MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS/MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS,
MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS/MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS pair,
MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS needs to be filtered the same way
MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS is currently filtered as guests may solely rely
on 'true' MSR data.

Note, none of the currently existing Windows/Hyper-V versions are known
to stumble upon the unfiltered MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS, the change
is aimed at making the filtering future proof.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220112170134.1904308-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Provide coverage for the new API.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Because KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID is meant to be passed (by simple-minded
VMMs) to KVM_SET_CPUID2, it cannot include any dynamic xsave states that
have not been enabled.  Probing those, for example so that they can be
passed to ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM, requires a new ioctl or arch_prctl.
The latter is in fact worse, even though that is what the rest of the
API uses, because it would require supported_xcr0 to be moved from the
KVM module to the kernel just for this use.  In addition, the value
would be nonsensical (or an error would have to be returned) until
the KVM module is loaded in.

Therefore, to limit the growth of system ioctls, add a /dev/kvm
variant of KVM_{GET,HAS}_DEVICE_ATTR, and implement it in x86
with just one group (0) and attribute (KVM_X86_XCOMP_GUEST_SUPP).
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a helper to handle converting the u64 userspace address embedded in
struct kvm_device_attr into a userspace pointer, it's all too easy to
forget the intermediate "unsigned long" cast as well as the truncation
check.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

There is no need for tests other than amx_test to enable dynamic xsave
states.  Remove the call to vm_xsave_req_perm from generic code,
and move it inside the test.  While at it, allow customizing the bit
that is requested, so that future tests can use it differently.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

XCR0 is reset to 1 by RESET but not INIT and IA32_XSS is zeroed by
both RESET and INIT. The kvm_set_msr_common()'s handling of MSR_IA32_XSS
also needs to update kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(). In the above cases, the
size in bytes of the XSAVE area containing all states enabled by XCR0 or
(XCRO | IA32_XSS) needs to be updated.

For simplicity and consistency, existing helpers are used to write values
and call kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(), and it's not exactly a fast path.

Fixes: a554d207 ("KVM: X86: Processor States following Reset or INIT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220126172226.2298529-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Do a runtime CPUID update for a vCPU if MSR_IA32_XSS is written, as the
size in bytes of the XSAVE area is affected by the states enabled in XSS.

Fixes: 20300099 ("kvm: vmx: add MSR logic for XSAVES")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
[sean: split out as a separate patch, adjust Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220126172226.2298529-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

It has been corrected from SDM version 075 that MSR_IA32_XSS is reset to
zero on Power up and Reset but keeps unchanged on INIT.

Fixes: a554d207 ("KVM: X86: Processor States following Reset or INIT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NXiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220126172226.2298529-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Free the "struct kvm_cpuid_entry2" array on successful post-KVM_RUN
KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} to fix a memory leak, the callers of kvm_set_cpuid()
free the array only on failure.

 BUG: memory leak
 unreferenced object 0xffff88810963a800 (size 2048):
  comm "syz-executor025", pid 3610, jiffies 4294944928 (age 8.080s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00  ................
    47 65 6e 75 6e 74 65 6c 69 6e 65 49 00 00 00 00  GenuntelineI....
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff814948ee>] kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
    [<ffffffff814948ee>] kvmalloc_node+0x3e/0x100 mm/util.c:580
    [<ffffffff814950f2>] kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:732 [inline]
    [<ffffffff814950f2>] vmemdup_user+0x22/0x100 mm/util.c:199
    [<ffffffff8109f5ff>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2+0x8f/0xf0 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c:423
    [<ffffffff810711b9>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xb99/0x1e60 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5251
    [<ffffffff8103e92d>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4ad/0x950 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4066
    [<ffffffff815afacc>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    [<ffffffff815afacc>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline]
    [<ffffffff815afacc>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline]
    [<ffffffff815afacc>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:860
    [<ffffffff844a3335>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844a3335>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    [<ffffffff84600068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Fixes: c6617c61 ("KVM: x86: Partially allow KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+be576ad7655690586eec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125210445.2053429-1-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

WARN if KVM attempts to allocate a shadow VMCS for vmcs02.  KVM emulates
VMCS shadowing but doesn't virtualize it, i.e. KVM should never allocate
a "real" shadow VMCS for L2.

The previous code WARNed but continued anyway with the allocation,
presumably in an attempt to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
However, alloc_vmcs (and hence alloc_shadow_vmcs) can fail, and
indeed the sole caller does:

	if (enable_shadow_vmcs && !alloc_shadow_vmcs(vcpu))
		goto out_shadow_vmcs;

which makes it not a useful attempt.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125220527.2093146-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Don't skip the vmcall() in l2_guest_code() prior to re-entering L2, doing
so will result in L2 running to completion, popping '0' off the stack for
RET, jumping to address '0', and ultimately dying with a triple fault
shutdown.

It's not at all obvious why the test re-enters L2 and re-executes VMCALL,
but presumably it serves a purpose.  The VMX path doesn't skip vmcall(),
and the test can't possibly have passed on SVM, so just do what VMX does.

Fixes: d951b221 ("KVM: selftests: smm_test: Test SMM enter from L2")
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125221725.2101126-1-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

kvm_cpuid_check_equal() checks for the (full) equality of the supplied
CPUID data so .flags need to be checked too.
Reported-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Fixes: c6617c61 ("KVM: x86: Partially allow KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220126131804.2839410-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM
state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS.  If userspace
forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI,
vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both
vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated.

Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions
are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't
sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access
to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede
KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting
the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as
being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active.

Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX
due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond
just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU
in an architecturally impossible state.

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656
  Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123
   kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
   kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460
   kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline]
   kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676
   kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline]
   kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250
   kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273
   __fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311
   task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
   exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline]
   do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806
   do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
   get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862
   arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868
   handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
   do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
   </TASK>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+8112db3ab20e70d50c31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125220358.2091737-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Commit 3fa5e8fd ("KVM: SVM: delay svm_vcpu_init_msrpm after
svm->vmcb is initialized") re-arranged svm_vcpu_init_msrpm() call in
svm_create_vcpu(), thus making the comment about vmcb being NULL
obsolete. Drop it.

While on it, drop superfluous vmcb_is_clean() check: vmcb_mark_dirty()
is a bit flip, an extra check is unlikely to bring any performance gain.
Drop now-unneeded vmcb_is_clean() helper as well.

Fixes: 3fa5e8fd ("KVM: SVM: delay svm_vcpu_init_msrpm after svm->vmcb is initialized")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211220152139.418372-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Commit c4327f15 ("KVM: SVM: hyper-v: Enlightened MSR-Bitmap support")
introduced enlightened MSR-Bitmap support for KVM-on-Hyper-V but it didn't
actually enable the support. Similar to enlightened NPT TLB flush and
direct TLB flush features, the guest (KVM) has to tell L0 (Hyper-V) that
it's using the feature by setting the appropriate feature fit in VMCB
control area (sw reserved fields).

Fixes: c4327f15 ("KVM: SVM: hyper-v: Enlightened MSR-Bitmap support")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211220152139.418372-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Inject a #GP instead of synthesizing triple fault to try to avoid killing
the guest if emulation of an SEV guest fails due to encountering the SMAP
erratum.  The injected #GP may still be fatal to the guest, e.g. if the
userspace process is providing critical functionality, but KVM should
make every attempt to keep the guest alive.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Resume the guest instead of synthesizing a triple fault shutdown if the
instruction bytes buffer is empty due to the #NPF being on the code fetch
itself or on a page table access.  The SMAP errata applies if and only if
the code fetch was successful and ucode's subsequent data read from the
code page encountered a SMAP violation.  In practice, the guest is likely
hosed either way, but crashing the guest on a code fetch to emulated MMIO
is technically wrong according to the behavior described in the APM.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Inject #UD if KVM attempts emulation for an SEV guests without an insn
buffer and instruction decoding is required.  The previous behavior of
allowing emulation if there is no insn buffer is undesirable as doing so
means KVM is reading guest private memory and thus decoding cyphertext,
i.e. is emulating garbage.  The check was previously necessary as the
emulation type was not provided, i.e. SVM needed to allow emulation to
handle completion of emulation after exiting to userspace to handle I/O.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

WARN if KVM attempts to emulate in response to #UD or #GP for SEV guests,
i.e. if KVM intercepts #UD or #GP, as emulation on any fault except #NPF
is impossible since KVM cannot read guest private memory to get the code
stream, and the CPU's DecodeAssists feature only provides the instruction
bytes on #NPF.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-7-seanjc@google.com>
[Warn on EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED according to Liam Merwick's review. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Pass the emulation type to kvm_x86_ops.can_emulate_insutrction() so that
a future commit can harden KVM's SEV support to WARN on emulation
scenarios that should never happen.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a sanity check on DECODEASSIST being support if SEV is supported, as
KVM cannot read guest private memory and thus relies on the CPU to
provide the instruction byte stream on #NPF for emulation.  The intent of
the check is to document the dependency, it should never fail in practice
as producing hardware that supports SEV but not DECODEASSISTS would be
non-sensical.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Never intercept #GP for SEV guests as reading SEV guest private memory
will return cyphertext, i.e. emulating on #GP can't work as intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Revert a completely broken check on an "invalid" RIP in SVM's workaround
for the DecodeAssists SMAP errata.  kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot() obviously
expects a gfn, i.e. operates in the guest physical address space, whereas
RIP is a virtual (not even linear) address.  The "fix" worked for the
problematic KVM selftest because the test identity mapped RIP.

Fully revert the hack instead of trying to translate RIP to a GPA, as the
non-SEV case is now handled earlier, and KVM cannot access guest page
tables to translate RIP.

This reverts commit e72436bc.

Fixes: e72436bc ("KVM: SVM: avoid infinite loop on NPF from bad address")
Reported-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Always signal that emulation is possible for !SEV guests regardless of
whether or not the CPU provided a valid instruction byte stream.  KVM can
read all guest state (memory and registers) for !SEV guests, i.e. can
fetch the code stream from memory even if the CPU failed to do so because
of the SMAP errata.

Fixes: 05d5a486 ("KVM: SVM: Workaround errata#1096 (insn_len maybe zero on SMAP violation)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NLiam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20220120010719.711476-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The bug occurs on #GP triggered by VMware backdoor when eax value is
unaligned. eax alignment check should not be applied to non-SVM
instructions because it leads to incorrect omission of the instructions
emulation.
Apply the alignment check only to SVM instructions to fix.

Fixes: d1cba6c9 ("KVM: x86: nSVM: test eax for 4K alignment for GP errata workaround")
Signed-off-by: NDenis Valeev <lemniscattaden@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <Yexlhaoe1Fscm59u@q>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

With the help of xstate_get_guest_group_perm(), KVM can exclude unpermitted
xfeatures in cpuid.0xd.0.eax, in which case the corresponding xfeatures
sizes should also be matched to the permitted xfeatures.

To fix this inconsistency, the permitted_xcr0 and permitted_xss are defined
consistently, which implies 'supported' plus certain permissions for this
task, and it also fixes cpuid.0xd.1.ebx and later leaf-by-leaf queries.

Fixes: 445ecdf7 ("kvm: x86: Exclude unpermitted xfeatures at KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID")
Signed-off-by: NLike Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <20220125115223.33707-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The below warning is splatting during guest reboot.

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1931 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10322 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x874/0x880 [kvm]
  CPU: 0 PID: 1931 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G          I       5.17.0-rc1+ #5
  RIP: 0010:kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x874/0x880 [kvm]
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x710 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x7fd39797350b

This can be triggered by not exposing tsc-deadline mode and doing a reboot in
the guest. The lapic_shutdown() function which is called in sys_reboot path
will not disarm the flying timer, it just masks LVTT. lapic_shutdown() clears
APIC state w/ LVT_MASKED and timer-mode bit is 0, this can trigger timer-mode
switch between tsc-deadline and oneshot/periodic, which can result in preemption
timer be cancelled in apic_update_lvtt(). However, We can't depend on this when
not exposing tsc-deadline mode and oneshot/periodic modes emulated by preemption
timer. Qemu will synchronise states around reset, let's cancel preemption timer
under KVM_SET_LAPIC.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1643102220-35667-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The maximum size of a VMCS (or VMXON region) is 4096. By definition,
these are order 0 allocations.
Signed-off-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220125004359.147600-1-jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Make kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page() static
as it is no longer invoked directly by vmx
and it is also no longer exported.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NQuanfa Fu <quanfafu@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20211219091446.174584-1-quanfafu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This selftest was accidentally removed by commit 6a581508
("selftest: KVM: Add intra host migration tests"). Add it back.

Fixes: 6a581508 ("selftest: KVM: Add intra host migration tests")
Signed-off-by: NDavid Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220120003826.2805036-1-dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Set vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS, a.k.a. the pending single-step
breakpoint flag, when re-injecting a #DB with RFLAGS.TF=1, and STI or
MOVSS blocking is active.  Setting the flag is necessary to make VM-Entry
consistency checks happy, as VMX has an invariant that if RFLAGS.TF is
set and STI/MOVSS blocking is true, then the previous instruction must
have been STI or MOV/POP, and therefore a single-step #DB must be pending
since the RFLAGS.TF cannot have been set by the previous instruction,
i.e. the one instruction delay after setting RFLAGS.TF must have already
expired.

Normally, the CPU sets vmcs.GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS appropriately
when recording guest state as part of a VM-Exit, but #DB VM-Exits
intentionally do not treat the #DB as "guest state" as interception of
the #DB effectively makes the #DB host-owned, thus KVM needs to manually
set PENDING_DBG.BS when forwarding/re-injecting the #DB to the guest.

Note, although this bug can be triggered by guest userspace, doing so
requires IOPL=3, and guest userspace running with IOPL=3 has full access
to all I/O ports (from the guest's perspective) and can crash/reboot the
guest any number of ways.  IOPL=3 is required because STI blocking kicks
in if and only if RFLAGS.IF is toggled 0=>1, and if CPL>IOPL, STI either
takes a #GP or modifies RFLAGS.VIF, not RFLAGS.IF.

MOVSS blocking can be initiated by userspace, but can be coincident with
a #DB if and only if DR7.GD=1 (General Detect enabled) and a MOV DR is
executed in the MOVSS shadow.  MOV DR #GPs at CPL>0, thus MOVSS blocking
is problematic only for CPL0 (and only if the guest is crazy enough to
access a DR in a MOVSS shadow).  All other sources of #DBs are either
suppressed by MOVSS blocking (single-step, code fetch, data, and I/O),
are mutually exclusive with MOVSS blocking (T-bit task switch), or are
already handled by KVM (ICEBP, a.k.a. INT1).

This bug was originally found by running tests[1] created for XSA-308[2].
Note that Xen's userspace test emits ICEBP in the MOVSS shadow, which is
presumably why the Xen bug was deemed to be an exploitable DOS from guest
userspace.  KVM already handles ICEBP by skipping the ICEBP instruction
and thus clears MOVSS blocking as a side effect of its "emulation".

[1] http://xenbits.xenproject.org/docs/xtf/xsa-308_2main_8c_source.html
[2] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-308.htmlReported-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reported-by: NAlexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220120000624.655815-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Full equality check of CPUID data on update (kvm_cpuid_check_equal()) may
fail for SGX enabled CPUs as CPUID.(EAX=0x12,ECX=1) is currently being
mangled in kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(). Move it to
__kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() and split off cpuid_get_supported_xcr0()
helper  as 'vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0' update needs (logically)
to stay in kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: feb627e8 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN")
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220124103606.2630588-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The async parameter of hva_to_pfn_remapped() is not used, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: NXianting Tian <xianting.tian@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <20220124020456.156386-1-xianting.tian@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Commit 14243b38 ("KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and
event channel delivery") adds superfluous .fixup usage after the whole
.fixup section was removed in commit e5eefda5 ("x86: Remove .fixup
section").

Fixes: 14243b38 ("KVM: x86/xen: Add KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_XEN_EVTCHN and event channel delivery")
Reported-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Message-Id: <20220123124219.GH20638@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>