stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit da7f731f2ed5b4a082567967ce74be274aab2daf
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=da7f731f2ed5b4a082567967ce74be274aab2daf

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit a447e38a ]

Drop vmx_set_cr4()'s explicit check on the 'nested' module param now
that common x86 handles the check by incorporating VMXE into the CR4
reserved bits, via kvm_cpu_caps.  X86_FEATURE_VMX is set in kvm_cpu_caps
(by vmx_set_cpu_caps()), if and only if 'nested' is true.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201007014417.29276-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 8b8b376903b32d3d854f39eeebe018169c920cb6
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=8b8b376903b32d3d854f39eeebe018169c920cb6

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit d3a9e414 ]

Drop vmx_set_cr4()'s somewhat hidden guest_cpuid_has() check on VMXE now
that common x86 handles the check by incorporating VMXE into the CR4
reserved bits, i.e. in cr4_guest_rsvd_bits.  This fixes a bug where KVM
incorrectly rejects KVM_SET_SREGS with CR4.VMXE=1 if it's executed
before KVM_SET_CPUID{,2}.

Fixes: 5e1746d6 ("KVM: nVMX: Allow setting the VMXE bit in CR4")
Reported-by: NStas Sergeev <stsp@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201007014417.29276-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit e7ccee2f09b06303fb39f8cb19a2c21d388dc4e6
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e7ccee2f09b06303fb39f8cb19a2c21d388dc4e6

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 2368048b ]

Return '1', not '-1', when handling an illegal WRMSR to a MCi_CTL or
MCi_STATUS MSR.  The behavior of "all zeros' or "all ones" for CTL MSRs
is architectural, as is the "only zeros" behavior for STATUS MSRs.  I.e.
the intent is to inject a #GP, not exit to userspace due to an unhandled
emulation case.  Returning '-1' gets interpreted as -EPERM up the stack
and effecitvely kills the guest.

Fixes: 890ca9ae ("KVM: Add MCE support")
Fixes: 9ffd986c ("KVM: X86: #GP when guest attempts to write MCi_STATUS register w/o 0")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NJim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512222716.4112548-2-seanjc@google.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit f5385a590df78d7649876a2087646090e867e6eb
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f5385a590df78d7649876a2087646090e867e6eb

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 0471a7bd ]

Certain guest operating systems (e.g., UNIXWARE) clear bit 0 of
MC1_CTL to ignore single-bit ECC data errors.  Single-bit ECC data
errors are always correctable and thus are safe to ignore because they
are informational in nature rather than signaling a loss of data
integrity.

Prior to this patch, these guests would crash upon writing MC1_CTL,
with resultant error messages like the following:

error: kvm run failed Operation not permitted
EAX=fffffffe EBX=fffffffe ECX=00000404 EDX=ffffffff
ESI=ffffffff EDI=00000001 EBP=fffdaba4 ESP=fffdab20
EIP=c01333a5 EFL=00000246 [---Z-P-] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
ES =0108 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]
CS =0100 00000000 ffffffff 00c09b00 DPL=0 CS32 [-RA]
SS =0108 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]
DS =0108 00000000 ffffffff 00c09300 DPL=0 DS   [-WA]
FS =0000 00000000 ffffffff 00c00000
GS =0000 00000000 ffffffff 00c00000
LDT=0118 c1026390 00000047 00008200 DPL=0 LDT
TR =0110 ffff5af0 00000067 00008b00 DPL=0 TSS32-busy
GDT=     ffff5020 000002cf
IDT=     ffff52f0 000007ff
CR0=8001003b CR2=00000000 CR3=0100a000 CR4=00000230
DR0=00000000 DR1=00000000 DR2=00000000 DR3=00000000
DR6=ffff0ff0 DR7=00000400
EFER=0000000000000000
Code=08 89 01 89 51 04 c3 8b 4c 24 08 8b 01 8b 51 04 8b 4c 24 04 <0f>
30 c3 f7 05 a4 6d ff ff 10 00 00 00 74 03 0f 31 c3 33 c0 33 d2 c3 8d
74 26 00 0f 31 c3
Signed-off-by: NLev Kujawski <lkujaw@member.fsf.org>
Message-Id: <20220521081511.187388-1-lkujaw@member.fsf.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit ce19182b43a524e604773d75cc5e9f614afe64a1
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ce19182b43a524e604773d75cc5e9f614afe64a1

--------------------------------

commit 3a2ba42c upstream.

The bitops compile-time optimization series revealed one more
problem in olpc-xo1-sci.c:send_ebook_state(), resulted in GCC
warnings:

arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c: In function 'send_ebook_state':
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:63: warning: logical not is only applied to the left hand side of comparison [-Wlogical-not-parentheses]
   83 |         if (!!test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == state)
      |                                                               ^~
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:13: note: add parentheses around left hand side expression to silence this warning

Despite this code working as intended, this redundant double
negation of boolean value, together with comparing to `char`
with no explicit conversion to bool, makes compilers think
the author made some unintentional logical mistakes here.
Make it the other way around and negate the char instead
to silence the warnings.

Fixes: d2aa3741 ("x86/olpc/xo1/sci: Produce wakeup events for buttons and switches")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Reported-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: NGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NYury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 43e059d01628137ea9b9082483c4917856b336ae
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=43e059d01628137ea9b9082483c4917856b336ae

--------------------------------

commit ac6c1b2c upstream.

When a ftrace_bug happens (where ftrace fails to modify a location) it is
helpful to have what was at that location as well as what was expected to
be there.

But with the conversion to text_poke() the variable that assigns the
expected for debugging was dropped. Unfortunately, I noticed this when I
needed it. Add it back.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220726101851.069d2e70@gandalf.local.home

Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 768ae440 ("x86/ftrace: Use text_poke()")
Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit fd96b61389f8650d880df4b7f8f55f880c19bff9
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fd96b61389f8650d880df4b7f8f55f880c19bff9

--------------------------------

commit e6cfcdda upstream.

AMD's "Technical Guidance for Mitigating Branch Type Confusion,
Rev. 1.0 2022-07-12" whitepaper, under section 6.1.2 "IBPB On
Privileged Mode Entry / SMT Safety" says:

  Similar to the Jmp2Ret mitigation, if the code on the sibling thread
  cannot be trusted, software should set STIBP to 1 or disable SMT to
  ensure SMT safety when using this mitigation.

So, like already being done for retbleed=unret, and now also for
retbleed=ibpb, force STIBP on machines that have it, and report its SMT
vulnerability status accordingly.

 [ bp: Remove the "we" and remove "[AMD]" applicability parameter which
   doesn't work here. ]

Fixes: 3ebc1700 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: NKim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10, 5.15, 5.19
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220804192201.439596-1-kim.phillips@amd.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit a9943942a501114d5ea1093329e3b04da597b085
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a9943942a501114d5ea1093329e3b04da597b085

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit de979c83 ]

With CONFIG_PREEMPTION disabled, arch/x86/entry/thunk_$(BITS).o becomes
an empty object file.

With some old versions of binutils (i.e., 2.35.90.20210113-1ubuntu1) the
GNU assembler doesn't generate a symbol table for empty object files and
objtool fails with the following error when a valid symbol table cannot
be found:

  arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.o: warning: objtool: missing symbol table

To prevent this from happening, build thunk_$(BITS).o only if
CONFIG_PREEMPTION is enabled.

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1911359

Fixes: 320100a5 ("x86/entry: Remove the TRACE_IRQS cruft")
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Ys/Ke7EWjcX+ZlXO@arighi-desktopSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 94398c1fec345b013d5d9c6ee1ec61c7487ac144
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=94398c1fec345b013d5d9c6ee1ec61c7487ac144

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 625395c4 ]

GCC-12 started triggering a new warning:

  arch/x86/mm/numa.c: In function ‘cpumask_of_node’:
  arch/x86/mm/numa.c:916:39: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘false’ for the address of ‘node_to_cpumask_map’ will never be NULL [-Waddress]
    916 |         if (node_to_cpumask_map[node] == NULL) {
        |                                       ^~

node_to_cpumask_map is of type cpumask_var_t[].

When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is set, cpumask_var_t is typedef'd to a
pointer for dynamic allocation, else to an array of one element. The
"wicked game" can be checked on line 700 of include/linux/cpumask.h.

The original code in debug_cpumask_set_cpu() and cpumask_of_node() were
probably written by the original authors with CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y
(i.e. dynamic allocation) in mind, checking if the cpumask was available
via a direct NULL check.

When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is not set, GCC gives the above warning
while compiling the kernel.

Fix that by using cpumask_available(), which does the NULL check when
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is set, otherwise returns true. Use it wherever
such checks are made.

Conditional definitions of cpumask_available() can be found along with
the definition of cpumask_var_t. Check the cpumask.h reference mentioned
above.

Fixes: c032ef60 ("cpumask: convert node_to_cpumask_map[] to cpumask_var_t")
Fixes: de2d9445 ("x86: Unify node_to_cpumask_map handling between 32 and 64bit")
Signed-off-by: NSiddh Raman Pant <code@siddh.me>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220731160913.632092-1-code@siddh.meSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit fb086aea39106d9096a8062c15a394526979292a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=fb086aea39106d9096a8062c15a394526979292a

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 8bcedb4c ]

When kernel is booted with idle=nomwait do not use MWAIT as the
default idle state.

If the user boots the kernel with idle=nomwait, it is a clear
direction to not use mwait as the default idle state.
However, the current code does not take this into consideration
while selecting the default idle state on x86.

Fix it by checking for the idle=nomwait boot option in
prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt().

Also update the documentation around idle=nomwait appropriately.

[ dhansen: tweak commit message ]
Signed-off-by: NWyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: NZhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fdc2dc2d0a1bc21c2f53d989ea2d2ee3ccbc0dbe.1654538381.git-series.wyes.karny@amd.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 230e369d49976824e7af70d2ac814f0f4584352b
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=230e369d49976824e7af70d2ac814f0f4584352b

--------------------------------

commit 982bae43 upstream.

Mark kvm_mmu_x86_module_init() with __init, the entire reason it exists
is to initialize variables when kvm.ko is loaded, i.e. it must never be
called after module initialization.

Fixes: 1d0e8480 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Resolve nx_huge_pages when kvm.ko is loaded")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NKai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: NMichael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220803224957.1285926-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 0dd8ba6670f4e38eab2f2985019030cd88cc4174
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0dd8ba6670f4e38eab2f2985019030cd88cc4174

--------------------------------

commit 26262069 upstream.

When injecting a #GP on LLDT/LTR due to a non-canonical LDT/TSS base, set
the error code to the selector.  Intel SDM's says nothing about the #GP,
but AMD's APM explicitly states that both LLDT and LTR set the error code
to the selector, not zero.

Note, a non-canonical memory operand on LLDT/LTR does generate a #GP(0),
but the KVM code in question is specific to the base from the descriptor.

Fixes: e37a75a1 ("KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-3-seanjc@google.comSigned-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 68ba319b88889b76e0afcb83ee3f9a07d2ae5f1b
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=68ba319b88889b76e0afcb83ee3f9a07d2ae5f1b

--------------------------------

commit ec6e4d86 upstream.

Wait to mark the TSS as busy during LTR emulation until after all fault
checks for the LTR have passed.  Specifically, don't mark the TSS busy if
the new TSS base is non-canonical.

Opportunistically drop the one-off !seg_desc.PRESENT check for TR as the
only reason for the early check was to avoid marking a !PRESENT TSS as
busy, i.e. the common !PRESENT is now done before setting the busy bit.

Fixes: e37a75a1 ("KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR")
Reported-by: syzbot+760a73552f47a8cd0fd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NMaxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-2-seanjc@google.comSigned-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit b670a585498e8225d2040d28af5f8fa8268faf31
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b670a585498e8225d2040d28af5f8fa8268faf31

--------------------------------

commit f8ae08f9 upstream.

Restrict the nVMX MSRs based on KVM's config, not based on the guest's
current config.  Using the guest's config to audit the new config
prevents userspace from restoring the original config (KVM's config) if
at any point in the past the guest's config was restricted in any way.

Fixes: 62cc6b9d ("KVM: nVMX: support restore of VMX capability MSRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 8bb683490278005b4caf61e22b0828a04d282e86
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=8bb683490278005b4caf61e22b0828a04d282e86

--------------------------------

commit f17c31c4 upstream.

Don't BUG/WARN on interrupt injection due to GIF being cleared,
since it's trivial for userspace to force the situation via
KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS (even if having at least a WARN there would be correct
for KVM internally generated injections).

  kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3386!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 15 PID: 926 Comm: smm_test Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #264
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:svm_inject_irq+0xab/0xb0 [kvm_amd]
  Code: <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 80 3d ac b3 01 00 00 55 48 89 f5 53
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b37d88 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810a234ac0 RCX: 0000000000000006
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc90000b37df7 RDI: ffff88810a234ac0
  RBP: ffffc90000b37df7 R08: ffff88810a1fa410 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff888109571000 R14: ffff88810a234ac0 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  0000000001821380(0000) GS:ffff88846fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007f74fc550008 CR3: 000000010a6fe000 CR4: 0000000000350ea0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   inject_pending_event+0x2f7/0x4c0 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x791/0x17a0 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x26d/0x650 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
   </TASK>

Fixes: 219b65dc ("KVM: SVM: Improve nested interrupt injection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMaciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <35426af6e123cbe91ec7ce5132ce72521f02b1b5.1651440202.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 860e3343958a03ba8ad78750bdbe5dd1fe35ce02
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=860e3343958a03ba8ad78750bdbe5dd1fe35ce02

--------------------------------

commit 764643a6 upstream.

If a nested run isn't pending, snapshot vmcs01.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL
irrespective of whether or not VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set in
vmcs12.  When restoring nested state, e.g. after migration, without a
nested run pending, prepare_vmcs02() will propagate
nested.vmcs01_debugctl to vmcs02, i.e. will load garbage/zeros into
vmcs02.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

If userspace restores nested state before MSRs, then loading garbage is a
non-issue as loading DEBUGCTL will also update vmcs02.  But if usersepace
restores MSRs first, then KVM is responsible for propagating L2's value,
which is actually thrown into vmcs01, into vmcs02.

Restoring L2 MSRs into vmcs01, i.e. loading all MSRs before nested state
is all kinds of bizarre and ideally would not be supported.  Sadly, some
VMMs do exactly that and rely on KVM to make things work.

Note, there's still a lurking SMM bug, as propagating vmcs01's DEBUGCTL
to vmcs02 across RSM may corrupt L2's DEBUGCTL.  But KVM's entire VMX+SMM
emulation is flawed as SMI+RSM should not toouch _any_ VMCS when use the
"default treatment of SMIs", i.e. when not using an SMI Transfer Monitor.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yobt1XwOfb5M6Dfa@google.com
Fixes: 8fcc4b59 ("kvm: nVMX: Introduce KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220614215831.3762138-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit ab4805c2638cc1f30697e7e8405c4355a13999ff
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ab4805c2638cc1f30697e7e8405c4355a13999ff

--------------------------------

commit fa578398 upstream.

If a nested run isn't pending, snapshot vmcs01.GUEST_BNDCFGS irrespective
of whether or not VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS is set in vmcs12.  When restoring
nested state, e.g. after migration, without a nested run pending,
prepare_vmcs02() will propagate nested.vmcs01_guest_bndcfgs to vmcs02,
i.e. will load garbage/zeros into vmcs02.GUEST_BNDCFGS.

If userspace restores nested state before MSRs, then loading garbage is a
non-issue as loading BNDCFGS will also update vmcs02.  But if usersepace
restores MSRs first, then KVM is responsible for propagating L2's value,
which is actually thrown into vmcs01, into vmcs02.

Restoring L2 MSRs into vmcs01, i.e. loading all MSRs before nested state
is all kinds of bizarre and ideally would not be supported.  Sadly, some
VMMs do exactly that and rely on KVM to make things work.

Note, there's still a lurking SMM bug, as propagating vmcs01.GUEST_BNDFGS
to vmcs02 across RSM may corrupt L2's BNDCFGS.  But KVM's entire VMX+SMM
emulation is flawed as SMI+RSM should not toouch _any_ VMCS when use the
"default treatment of SMIs", i.e. when not using an SMI Transfer Monitor.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yobt1XwOfb5M6Dfa@google.com
Fixes: 62cf9bd8 ("KVM: nVMX: Fix emulation of VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lei Wang <lei4.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220614215831.3762138-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.137
commit 4ad6a94c68a18cead34ea5397b925b85ebc408f5
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I60PLB

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=4ad6a94c68a18cead34ea5397b925b85ebc408f5

--------------------------------

commit ffcf9c57 upstream.

Users of GNU ld (BFD) from binutils 2.39+ will observe multiple
instances of a new warning when linking kernels in the form:

  ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/pmjump.o: missing .note.GNU-stack section implies executable stack
  ld: NOTE: This behaviour is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of the linker
  ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions

Generally, we would like to avoid the stack being executable.  Because
there could be a need for the stack to be executable, assembler sources
have to opt-in to this security feature via explicit creation of the
.note.GNU-stack feature (which compilers create by default) or command
line flag --noexecstack.  Or we can simply tell the linker the
production of such sections is irrelevant and to link the stack as
--noexecstack.

LLVM's LLD linker defaults to -z noexecstack, so this flag isn't
strictly necessary when linking with LLD, only BFD, but it doesn't hurt
to be explicit here for all linkers IMO.  --no-warn-rwx-segments is
currently BFD specific and only available in the current latest release,
so it's wrapped in an ld-option check.

While the kernel makes extensive usage of ELF sections, it doesn't use
permissions from ELF segments.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/3af4127a-f453-4cf7-f133-a181cce06f73@kernel.dk/
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/57009Reported-and-tested-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Suggested-by: NFangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.136
commit 45b69848a2fea11c03f3a54241416e36eb94e38c
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ZWNE

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=45b69848a2fea11c03f3a54241416e36eb94e38c

--------------------------------

commit b648ab48 upstream.

The mitigations for RETBleed are currently ineffective on x86_32 since
entry_32.S does not use the required macros.  However, for an x86_32
target, the kconfig symbols for them are still enabled by default and
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed will wrongly report
that mitigations are in place.

Make all of these symbols depend on X86_64, and only enable RETHUNK by
default on X86_64.

Fixes: f43b9876 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YtwSR3NNsWp1ohfV@decadent.org.uk
[bwh: Backported to 5.10/5.15/5.18: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.135
commit 545fc3524ccc454d9f24273ee1c3aeadd7ab1421
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ZWFM

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=545fc3524ccc454d9f24273ee1c3aeadd7ab1421

--------------------------------

commit 571c30b1 upstream.

Some cloud hypervisors do not provide IBPB on very recent CPU processors,
including AMD processors affected by Retbleed.

Using IBPB before firmware calls on such systems would cause a GPF at boot
like the one below. Do not enable such calls when IBPB support is not
present.

  EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17
  general protection fault, maybe for address 0x1: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #7
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
  RIP: 0010:efi_call_rts
  Code: e8 37 33 58 ff 41 bf 48 00 00 00 49 89 c0 44 89 f9 48 83 c8 01 4c 89 c2 48 c1 ea 20 66 90 b9 49 00 00 00 b8 01 00 00 00 31 d2 <0f> 30 e8 7b 9f 5d ff e8 f6 f8 ff ff 4c 89 f1 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 48
  RSP: 0018:ffffb373800d7e38 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000000049
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff94fbc19d8fe0 RDI: ffff94fbc1b2b300
  RBP: ffffb373800d7e70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 000000000000000b R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffffb3738001fd78
  R13: ffff94fbc2fcfc00 R14: ffffb3738001fd80 R15: 0000000000000048
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94fc3da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffff94fc30201000 CR3: 000000006f610000 CR4: 00000000000406f0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __wake_up
   process_one_work
   worker_thread
   ? rescuer_thread
   kthread
   ? kthread_complete_and_exit
   ret_from_fork
   </TASK>
  Modules linked in:

Fixes: 28a99e95 ("x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls")
Reported-by: NDimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728122602.2500509-1-cascardo@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.134
commit c0a3a9eb262a5e86a36fd5fc4f9fc38470713f13
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ZVR7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c0a3a9eb262a5e86a36fd5fc4f9fc38470713f13

--------------------------------

commit 65cdf0d6 upstream.

Debugging missing return thunks is easier if we can see where they're
happening.
Suggested-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ys66hwtFcGbYmoiZ@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.134
commit b7b9e5cc8b24d6c800b2b7f8bba44c5914bd6c8f
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ZVR7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b7b9e5cc8b24d6c800b2b7f8bba44c5914bd6c8f

--------------------------------

commit 28a99e95 upstream.

On AMD IBRS does not prevent Retbleed; as such use IBPB before a
firmware call to flush the branch history state.

And because in order to do an EFI call, the kernel maps a whole lot of
the kernel page table into the EFI page table, do an IBPB just in case
in order to prevent the scenario of poisoning the BTB and causing an EFI
call using the unprotected RET there.

  [ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715194550.793957-1-cascardo@canonical.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

 Conflicts:
	arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.134
commit cdcd20aa2cd44b83433aa6bf3f86cb48dc58a20a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ZVR7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=cdcd20aa2cd44b83433aa6bf3f86cb48dc58a20a

--------------------------------

commit eb23b5ef upstream.

IBRS mitigation for spectre_v2 forces write to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL at
every kernel entry/exit. On Enhanced IBRS parts setting
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL[IBRS] only once at boot is sufficient. MSR writes at
every kernel entry/exit incur unnecessary performance loss.

When Enhanced IBRS feature is present, print a warning about this
unnecessary performance loss.
Signed-off-by: NPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2a5eaf54583c2bfe0edc4fea64006656256cca17.1657814857.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.134
commit 73bf070408a7f07e813ab26ebde1b09fca159cd6
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ZVR7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=73bf070408a7f07e813ab26ebde1b09fca159cd6

--------------------------------

commit 455880df upstream.

In the multi-MSI case, hv_arch_irq_unmask() will only operate on the first
MSI of the N allocated.  This is because only the first msi_desc is cached
and it is shared by all the MSIs of the multi-MSI block.  This means that
hv_arch_irq_unmask() gets the correct address, but the wrong data (always
0).

This can break MSIs.

Lets assume MSI0 is vector 34 on CPU0, and MSI1 is vector 33 on CPU0.

hv_arch_irq_unmask() is called on MSI0.  It uses a hypercall to configure
the MSI address and data (0) to vector 34 of CPU0.  This is correct.  Then
hv_arch_irq_unmask is called on MSI1.  It uses another hypercall to
configure the MSI address and data (0) to vector 33 of CPU0.  This is
wrong, and results in both MSI0 and MSI1 being routed to vector 33.  Linux
will observe extra instances of MSI1 and no instances of MSI0 despite the
endpoint device behaving correctly.

For the multi-MSI case, we need unique address and data info for each MSI,
but the cached msi_desc does not provide that.  However, that information
can be gotten from the int_desc cached in the chip_data by
compose_msi_msg().  Fix the multi-MSI case to use that cached information
instead.  Since hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc() is no longer applicable,
remove it.

5.10 backport - removed unused hv_set_msi_entry_from_desc function from
mshyperv.h instead of pci-hyperv.c. msi_entry.address/data.as_uint32
changed to direct reference (as they are u32's, just sans union).
Signed-off-by: NJeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: NMichael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651068453-29588-1-git-send-email-quic_jhugo@quicinc.comSigned-off-by: NWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NCarl Vanderlip <quic_carlv@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.0-rc3
commit fc2e426b
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5Q4RA
CVE: NA

--------------------------------

When meeting ftrace trampolines in ORC unwinding, unwinder uses address
of ftrace_{regs_}call address to find the ORC entry, which gets next frame at
sp+176.

If there is an IRQ hitting at sub $0xa8,%rsp, the next frame should be
sp+8 instead of 176. It makes unwinder skip correct frame and throw
warnings such as "wrong direction" or "can't access registers", etc,
depending on the content of the incorrect frame address.

By adding the base address ftrace_{regs_}caller with the offset
*ip - ops->trampoline*, we can get the correct address to find the ORC entry.

Also change "caller" to "tramp_addr" to make variable name conform to
its content.

[ mingo: Clarified the changelog a bit. ]

Fixes: 6be7fa3c ("ftrace, orc, x86: Handle ftrace dynamically allocated trampolines")
Signed-off-by: NChen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220819084334.244016-1-chenzhongjin@huawei.comSigned-off-by: NChen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NKuohai Xu <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit ecc0d92a9f6cc3f74b67d2c9887d0c800018e661
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YVKO

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ecc0d92a9f6cc3f74b67d2c9887d0c800018e661

--------------------------------

commit 3131ef39 upstream.

The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit

  9bb2ec60 (objtool: Update Retpoline validation)

with:

  arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe'

ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is
missing this include. Fix this.

Fixes: 9bb2ec60 ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation")
Signed-off-by: NJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit 38a80a3ca2cb069dd5608703b015a206a672aae5
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YVKO

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=38a80a3ca2cb069dd5608703b015a206a672aae5

--------------------------------

commit d4b5a5c9 upstream.

Make sure we can see the text changes when booting with
'debug-alternative'.

Example output:

 [ ] SMP alternatives: retpoline at: __traceiter_initcall_level+0x1f/0x30 (ffffffff8100066f) len: 5 to: __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x0/0x20
 [ ] SMP alternatives: ffffffff82603e58: [2:5) optimized NOPs: ff d0 0f 1f 00
 [ ] SMP alternatives: ffffffff8100066f: orig: e8 cc 30 00 01
 [ ] SMP alternatives: ffffffff8100066f: repl: ff d0 0f 1f 00
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.422273830@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit 3d13ee0d411a078ca1538d823c2c759b8b266fb1
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YVKO

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3d13ee0d411a078ca1538d823c2c759b8b266fb1

--------------------------------

commit bbe2df3f upstream.

Try and replace retpoline thunk calls with:

  LFENCE
  CALL    *%\reg

for spectre_v2=retpoline,amd.

Specifically, the sequence above is 5 bytes for the low 8 registers,
but 6 bytes for the high 8 registers. This means that unless the
compilers prefix stuff the call with higher registers this replacement
will fail.

Luckily GCC strongly favours RAX for the indirect calls and most (95%+
for defconfig-x86_64) will be converted. OTOH clang strongly favours
R11 and almost nothing gets converted.

Note: it will also generate a correct replacement for the Jcc.d32
case, except unless the compilers start to prefix stuff that, it'll
never fit. Specifically:

  Jncc.d8 1f
  LFENCE
  JMP     *%\reg
1:

is 7-8 bytes long, where the original instruction in unpadded form is
only 6 bytes.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.359986601@infradead.org
[cascardo: RETPOLINE_AMD was renamed to RETPOLINE_LFENCE]
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit b0e2dc950654162bc68cec530156251e7ad3f03a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YVKO

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b0e2dc950654162bc68cec530156251e7ad3f03a

--------------------------------

commit 2f0cbb2a upstream.

Handle the rare cases where the compiler (clang) does an indirect
conditional tail-call using:

  Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg

For the !RETPOLINE case this can be rewritten to fit the original (6
byte) instruction like:

  Jncc.d8	1f
  JMP		*%\reg
  NOP
1:
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120310.296470217@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.133
commit e6f8dc86a1c15b862486a61abcb54b88e8c177e3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YVKO

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e6f8dc86a1c15b862486a61abcb54b88e8c177e3

--------------------------------

commit 6e8c83d2 upstream.

Now that the different instruction-inspecting functions return a value,
test that and return early from callers if error has been encountered.

While at it, do not call insn_get_modrm() when calling
insn_get_displacement() because latter will make sure to call
insn_get_modrm() if ModRM hasn't been parsed yet.
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210304174237.31945-6-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.132
commit 06a5dc3911a3b29acefd53470bdeccb88deb155e
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YS3T

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=06a5dc3911a3b29acefd53470bdeccb88deb155e

--------------------------------

commit 230ec83d upstream.

x86_has_pat_wp() is using a wrong test, as it relies on the normal
PAT configuration used by the kernel. In case the PAT MSR has been
setup by another entity (e.g. Xen hypervisor) it might return false
even if the PAT configuration is allowing WP mappings. This due to the
fact that when running as Xen PV guest the PAT MSR is setup by the
hypervisor and cannot be changed by the guest. This results in the WP
related entry to be at a different position when running as Xen PV
guest compared to the bare metal or fully virtualized case.

The correct way to test for WP support is:

1. Get the PTE protection bits needed to select WP mode by reading
   __cachemode2pte_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] (depending on the PAT MSR
   setting this might return protection bits for a stronger mode, e.g.
   UC-)
2. Translate those bits back into the real cache mode selected by those
   PTE bits by reading __pte2cachemode_tbl[__pte2cm_idx(prot)]
3. Test for the cache mode to be _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP

Fixes: f88a68fa ("x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs")
Signed-off-by: NJuergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503132207.17234-1-jgross@suse.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.132
commit eb58fd350a851b5cda9f4c9a2cefb15c7ccf33f3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YS3T

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=eb58fd350a851b5cda9f4c9a2cefb15c7ccf33f3

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 8a414f94 ]

'vector' and 'trig_mode' fields of 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' are left
uninitialized in kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(). While these fields are normally
not needed for APIC_DM_REMRD, they're still referenced by
__apic_accept_irq() for trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(). Fully initialize
the structure to avoid consuming random stack memory.

Fixes: a183b638 ("KVM: x86: make apic_accept_irq tracepoint more generic")
Reported-by: syzbot+d6caa905917d353f0d07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220708125147.593975-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.132
commit eb360267e1e972475023d06546e18365a222698c
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5YS3T

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=eb360267e1e972475023d06546e18365a222698c

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit af16df54 ]

Currently, an unsigned kernel could be kexec'ed when IMA arch specific
policy is configured unless lockdown is enabled. Enforce kernel
signature verification check in the kexec_file_load syscall when IMA
arch specific policy is configured.

Fixes: 99d5cadf ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
Reported-and-suggested-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NCoiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NXie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.144
commit 35371fd68807f41a4072c01c166de5425a2a47e5
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5WL0J
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-5.10.y&id=35371fd68807f41a4072c01c166de5425a2a47e5

--------------------------------

commit 1f001e9d upstream.

Use the return thunk in ftrace trampolines, if needed.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: use memcpy(text_gen_insn) as there is no __text_gen_insn]
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NOvidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.144
commit 4586df06a02049f4315c25b947c6dde2627c0d18
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5WL0J
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-5.10.y&id=4586df06a02049f4315c25b947c6dde2627c0d18

--------------------------------

commit e52fc2cf upstream.

Return trampoline must not use indirect branch to return; while this
preserves the RSB, it is fundamentally incompatible with IBT. Instead
use a retpoline like ROP gadget that defeats IBT while not unbalancing
the RSB.

And since ftrace_stub is no longer a plain RET, don't use it to copy
from. Since RET is a trivial instruction, poke it directly.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154318.347296408@infradead.org
[cascardo: remove ENDBR]
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[OP: adjusted context for 5.10-stable]
Signed-off-by: NOvidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.144
commit 33015556a943d6cbb18c555925a54b8c0e46f521
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5WL0J
CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-5.10.y&id=33015556a943d6cbb18c555925a54b8c0e46f521

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 00b136bb6254e0abf6aaafe62c4da5f6c4fea4cb.

This temporarily reverts the backport of upstream commit
1f001e9d. It was not correct to copy the
ftrace stub as it would contain a relative jump to the return thunk which
would not apply to the context where it was being copied to, leading to
ftrace support to be broken.
Signed-off-by: NThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NOvidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLin Yujun <linyujun809@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.127
commit a51c199e4d2bbb8748c12e2ce846024dea012e57
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5XDDK

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a51c199e4d2bbb8748c12e2ce846024dea012e57

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit ff672c67 ]

On x86-64 the tail call count is passed from one BPF function to another
through %rax. Additionally, on function entry, the tail call count value
is stored on stack right after the BPF program stack, due to register
shortage.

The stored count is later loaded from stack either when performing a tail
call - to check if we have not reached the tail call limit - or before
calling another BPF function call in order to pass it via %rax.

In the latter case, we miscalculate the offset at which the tail call count
was stored on function entry. The JIT does not take into account that the
allocated BPF program stack is always a multiple of 8 on x86, while the
actual stack depth does not have to be.

This leads to a load from an offset that belongs to the BPF stack, as shown
in the example below:

SEC("tc")
int entry(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
	/* Have data on stack which size is not a multiple of 8 */
	volatile char arr[1] = {};
	return subprog_tail(skb);
}

int entry(struct __sk_buff * skb):
   0: (b4) w2 = 0
   1: (73) *(u8 *)(r10 -1) = r2
   2: (85) call pc+1#bpf_prog_ce2f79bb5f3e06dd_F
   3: (95) exit

int entry(struct __sk_buff * skb):
   0xffffffffa0201788:  nop    DWORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
   0xffffffffa020178d:  xor    eax,eax
   0xffffffffa020178f:  push   rbp
   0xffffffffa0201790:  mov    rbp,rsp
   0xffffffffa0201793:  sub    rsp,0x8
   0xffffffffa020179a:  push   rax
   0xffffffffa020179b:  xor    esi,esi
   0xffffffffa020179d:  mov    BYTE PTR [rbp-0x1],sil
   0xffffffffa02017a1:  mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x9]	!!! tail call count
   0xffffffffa02017a8:  call   0xffffffffa02017d8       !!! is at rbp-0x10
   0xffffffffa02017ad:  leave
   0xffffffffa02017ae:  ret

Fix it by rounding up the BPF stack depth to a multiple of 8, when
calculating the tail call count offset on stack.

Fixes: ebf7d1f5 ("bpf, x64: rework pro/epilogue and tailcall handling in JIT")
Signed-off-by: NJakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NMaciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220616162037.535469-2-jakub@cloudflare.comSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.124
commit 401bef1f95de92c3a8c6eece46e02fa88d7285ee
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5L6E7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=401bef1f95de92c3a8c6eece46e02fa88d7285ee

--------------------------------

commit d22d2474 upstream.

For some sev ioctl interfaces, the length parameter that is passed maybe
less than or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data
that PSP firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory
that is the size of the input rather than the size of the data.
Since PSP firmware doesn't fully overwrite the allocated buffer, these
sev ioctl interface may return uninitialized kernel slab memory.
Reported-by: NAndy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Suggested-by: NDavid Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Suggested-by: NPeter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eaf78265 ("KVM: SVM: Move SEV code to separate file")
Fixes: 2c07ded0 ("KVM: SVM: add support for SEV attestation command")
Fixes: 4cfdd47d ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command")
Fixes: d3d1af85 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command")
Fixes: eba04b20 ("KVM: x86: Account a variety of miscellaneous allocations")
Signed-off-by: NAshish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: NPeter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220516154310.3685678-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NSudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.124
commit d6be031a2f5e27f27f3648bac98d2a35874eaddc
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5L6E7

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=d6be031a2f5e27f27f3648bac98d2a35874eaddc

--------------------------------

commit eba04b20 upstream.

Switch to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for a handful of allocations that are
clearly associated with a single task/VM.

Note, there are a several SEV allocations that aren't accounted, but
those can (hopefully) be fixed by using the local stack for memory.
Signed-off-by: NSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210331023025.2485960-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: NSudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>

stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.122
commit 320acaf84a6469492f3355b75562f7472b91aaf2
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5W6OE

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=320acaf84a6469492f3355b75562f7472b91aaf2

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit a6a5eb26 ]

As x86 uses the <asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-*.h> headers, the
regular forms of all bitops are instrumented with explicit calls to
KASAN and KCSAN checks. As these are explicit calls, these are not
suppressed by the noinstr function attribute.

This can result in calls to those check functions in noinstr code, which
objtool warns about:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x28: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: syscall_enter_from_user_mode_prepare+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: irqentry_enter_from_user_mode+0x24: call to __kcsan_check_access() leaves .noinstr.text section

Prevent this by using the arch_*() bitops, which are the underlying
bitops without explciit instrumentation.

[null: Changelog]
Reported-by: Nkernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220502111216.290518605@infradead.orgSigned-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NZheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: NWei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>