The generic_fillattr() helper fills in the basic attributes associated
with an inode. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is
accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user
namespace before we store the uid and gid. If the initial user namespace
is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-12-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.

In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.

In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.

If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NTycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.

The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.

In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.

Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Add simple helpers to make it easy to map kuids into and from idmapped
mounts. We provide simple wrappers that filesystems can use to e.g.
initialize inodes similar to i_{uid,gid}_read() and i_{uid,gid}_write().
Accessing an inode through an idmapped mount maps the i_uid and i_gid of
the inode to the mount's user namespace. If the fsids are used to
initialize inodes they are unmapped according to the mount's user
namespace. Passing the initial user namespace to these helpers makes
them a nop and so any non-idmapped paths will not be impacted.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user
namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the
ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default
all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial
user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All
operations behave as before.

Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to
setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
Later patches enforce that once a mount has been idmapped it can't be
remapped. This keeps permission checking and life-cycle management
simple. Users wanting to change the idmapped can always create a new
detached mount with a different idmapping.

Add a new mnt_userns member to vfsmount and two simple helpers to
retrieve the mnt_userns from vfsmounts and files.

The idea to attach user namespaces to vfsmounts has been floated around
in various forms at Linux Plumbers in ~2018 with the original idea
tracing back to a discussion in 2017 at a conference in St. Petersburg
between Christoph, Tycho, and myself.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Pull perf tools fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:

 - Fix 'CPU too large' error in Intel PT

 - Correct event attribute sizes in 'perf inject'

 - Sync build_bug.h and kvm.h kernel copies

 - Fix bpf.h header include directive in 5sec.c 'perf trace' bpf example

 - libbpf tests fixes

 - Fix shadow stat 'perf test' for non-bash shells

 - Take cgroups into account for shadow stats in 'perf stat'

* tag 'perf-tools-fixes-2021-01-17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux:
  perf inject: Correct event attribute sizes
  perf intel-pt: Fix 'CPU too large' error
  perf stat: Take cgroups into account for shadow stats
  perf stat: Introduce struct runtime_stat_data
  libperf tests: Fail when failing to get a tracepoint id
  libperf tests: If a test fails return non-zero
  libperf tests: Avoid uninitialized variable warning
  perf test: Fix shadow stat test for non-bash shells
  tools headers: Syncronize linux/build_bug.h with the kernel sources
  tools headers UAPI: Sync kvm.h headers with the kernel sources
  perf bpf examples: Fix bpf.h header include directive in 5sec.c example

Pull powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
 "One fix for a lack of alignment in our linker script, that can lead to
  crashes depending on configuration etc.

  One fix for the 32-bit VDSO after the C VDSO conversion.

  Thanks to Andreas Schwab, Ariel Marcovitch, and Christophe Leroy"

* tag 'powerpc-5.11-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
  powerpc/vdso: Fix clock_gettime_fallback for vdso32
  powerpc: Fix alignment bug within the init sections

Pull misc vfs fixes from Al Viro:
 "Several assorted fixes.

  I still think that audit ->d_name race is better fixed this way for
  the benefit of backports, with any possibly fancier variants done on
  top of it"

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  dump_common_audit_data(): fix racy accesses to ->d_name
  iov_iter: fix the uaccess area in copy_compat_iovec_from_user
  umount(2): move the flag validity checks first

So technically there is nothing wrong with adding a pinned page to the
swap cache, but the pinning obviously means that the page can't actually
be free'd right now anyway, so it's a bit pointless.

However, the real problem is not with it being a bit pointless: the real
issue is that after we've added it to the swap cache, we'll try to unmap
the page.  That will succeed, because the code in mm/rmap.c doesn't know
or care about pinned pages.

Even the unmapping isn't fatal per se, since the page will stay around
in memory due to the pinning, and we do hold the connection to it using
the swap cache.  But when we then touch it next and take a page fault,
the logic in do_swap_page() will map it back into the process as a
possibly read-only page, and we'll then break the page association on
the next COW fault.

Honestly, this issue could have been fixed in any of those other places:
(a) we could refuse to unmap a pinned page (which makes conceptual
sense), or (b) we could make sure to re-map a pinned page writably in
do_swap_page(), or (c) we could just make do_wp_page() not COW the
pinned page (which was what we historically did before that "mm:
do_wp_page() simplification" commit).

But while all of them are equally valid models for breaking this chain,
not putting pinned pages into the swap cache in the first place is the
simplest one by far.

It's also the safest one: the reason why do_wp_page() was changed in the
first place was that getting the "can I re-use this page" wrong is so
fraught with errors.  If you do it wrong, you end up with an incorrectly
shared page.

As a result, using "page_maybe_dma_pinned()" in either do_wp_page() or
do_swap_page() would be a serious bug since it is only a (very good)
heuristic.  Re-using the page requires a hard black-and-white rule with
no room for ambiguity.

In contrast, saying "this page is very likely dma pinned, so let's not
add it to the swap cache and try to unmap it" is an obviously safe thing
to do, and if the heuristic might very rarely be a false positive, no
harm is done.

Fixes: 09854ba9 ("mm: do_wp_page() simplification")
Reported-and-tested-by: NMartin Raiber <martin@urbackup.org>
Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
 "Nine minor fixes, seven in drivers and two in the core SCSI disk
  driver (sd) which should be harmless involving removing an unused
  variable and quietening a spurious warning"
Signed-off-by: NJames E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>

* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
  scsi: sd: Remove obsolete variable in sd_remove()
  scsi: sd: Suppress spurious errors when WRITE SAME is being disabled
  scsi: scsi_debug: Fix memleak in scsi_debug_init()
  scsi: mpt3sas: Fix spelling mistake in Kconfig "compatiblity" -> "compatibility"
  scsi: qedi: Correct max length of CHAP secret
  scsi: ufs: Correct the LUN used in eh_device_reset_handler() callback
  scsi: ufs: Relocate flush of exceptional event
  scsi: ufs: Relax the condition of UFSHCI_QUIRK_SKIP_MANUAL_WB_FLUSH_CTRL
  scsi: ufs: Fix possible power drain during system suspend

We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
dentry getting renamed right under us.  And it's possible for
old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.

Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
 "Just an nvme pull request via Christoph:

   - don't initialize hwmon for discover controllers (Sagi Grimberg)

   - fix iov_iter handling in nvme-tcp (Sagi Grimberg)

   - fix a preempt warning in nvme-tcp (Sagi Grimberg)

   - fix a possible NULL pointer dereference in nvme (Israel Rukshin)"

* tag 'block-5.11-2021-01-16' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  nvme: don't intialize hwmon for discovery controllers
  nvme-tcp: fix possible data corruption with bio merges
  nvme-tcp: Fix warning with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT
  nvmet-rdma: Fix NULL deref when setting pi_enable and traddr INADDR_ANY

Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
 "We still have a pending fix for a cancelation issue, but it's still
  being investigated. In the meantime:

   - Dead mm handling fix (Pavel)

   - SQPOLL setup error handling (Pavel)

   - Flush timeout sequence fix (Marcelo)

   - Missing finish_wait() for one exit case"

* tag 'io_uring-5.11-2021-01-16' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
  io_uring: ensure finish_wait() is always called in __io_uring_task_cancel()
  io_uring: flush timeouts that should already have expired
  io_uring: do sqo disable on install_fd error
  io_uring: fix null-deref in io_disable_sqo_submit
  io_uring: don't take files/mm for a dead task
  io_uring: drop mm and files after task_work_run

Pull RISC-V fixes from Palmer Dabbelt:
 "There are a few more fixes than a normal rc4, largely due to the
  bubble introduced by the holiday break:

   - return -ENOSYS for syscall number -1, which previously returned an
     uninitialized value.

   - ensure of_clk_init() has been called in time_init(), without which
     clock drivers may not be initialized.

   - fix sifive,uart0 driver to properly display the baud rate. A fix to
     initialize MPIE that allows interrupts to be processed during
     system calls.

   - avoid erronously begin tracing IRQs when interrupts are disabled,
     which at least triggers suprious lockdep failures.

   - workaround for a warning related to calling smp_processor_id()
     while preemptible. The warning itself is suprious on currently
     availiable systems.

   - properly include the generic time VDSO calls. A fix to our kasan
     address mapping. A fix to the HiFive Unleashed device tree, which
     allows the Ethernet PHY to be properly initialized by Linux (as
     opposed to relying on the bootloader).

   - defconfig update to include SiFive's GPIO driver, which is present
     on the HiFive Unleashed and necessary to initialize the PHY.

   - avoid allocating memory while initializing reserved memory.

   - avoid allocating the last 4K of memory, as pointers there alias
     with syscall errors.

  There are also two cleanups that should have no functional effect but
  do fix build warnings:

   - drop a duplicated definition of PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC.

   - properly declare the asm register SP shim.

   - cleanup the rv32 memory size Kconfig entry, to reflect the actual
     size of memory availiable"

* tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
  RISC-V: Fix maximum allowed phsyical memory for RV32
  RISC-V: Set current memblock limit
  RISC-V: Do not allocate memblock while iterating reserved memblocks
  riscv: stacktrace: Move register keyword to beginning of declaration
  riscv: defconfig: enable gpio support for HiFive Unleashed
  dts: phy: add GPIO number and active state used for phy reset
  dts: phy: fix missing mdio device and probe failure of vsc8541-01 device
  riscv: Fix KASAN memory mapping.
  riscv: Fixup CONFIG_GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL
  riscv: cacheinfo: Fix using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
  riscv: Trace irq on only interrupt is enabled
  riscv: Drop a duplicated PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC
  riscv: Enable interrupts during syscalls with M-Mode
  riscv: Fix sifive serial driver
  riscv: Fix kernel time_init()
  riscv: return -ENOSYS for syscall -1

Turning a pinned page read-only breaks the pinning after COW.  Don't do it.

The whole "track page soft dirty" state doesn't work with pinned pages
anyway, since the page might be dirtied by the pinning entity without
ever being noticed in the page tables.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Turning page table entries read-only requires the mmap_sem held for
writing.

So stop doing the odd games with turning things from read locks to write
locks and back.  Just get the write lock.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Linux kernel can only map 1GB of address space for RV32 as the page offset
is set to 0xC0000000. The current description in the Kconfig is confusing
as it indicates that RV32 can support 2GB of physical memory. That is
simply not true for current kernel. In future, a 2GB split support can be
added to allow 2GB physical address space.
Reviewed-by: NAnup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: NAtish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>

Currently, linux kernel can not use last 4k bytes of addressable space
because IS_ERR_VALUE macro treats those as an error. This will be an issue
for RV32 as any memblock allocator potentially allocate chunk of memory
from the end of DRAM (2GB) leading bad address error even though the
address was technically valid.

Fix this issue by limiting the memblock if available memory spans the
entire address space.
Reviewed-by: NAnup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: NAtish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>

Currently, resource tree allocates memory blocks while iterating on the
list. It leads to following kernel warning because memblock allocation
also invokes memory block reservation API.

[    0.000000] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/resource.c:795
__insert_resource+0x8e/0xd0
[    0.000000] Modules linked in:
[    0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted
5.10.0-00022-ge20097fb37e2-dirty #549
[    0.000000] epc: c00125c2 ra : c001262c sp : c1c01f50
[    0.000000]  gp : c1d456e0 tp : c1c0a980 t0 : ffffcf20
[    0.000000]  t1 : 00000000 t2 : 00000000 s0 : c1c01f60
[    0.000000]  s1 : ffffcf00 a0 : ffffff00 a1 : c1c0c0c4
[    0.000000]  a2 : 80c12b15 a3 : 80402000 a4 : 80402000
[    0.000000]  a5 : c1c0c0c4 a6 : 80c12b15 a7 : f5faf600
[    0.000000]  s2 : c1c0c0c4 s3 : c1c0e000 s4 : c1009a80
[    0.000000]  s5 : c1c0c000 s6 : c1d48000 s7 : c1613b4c
[    0.000000]  s8 : 00000fff s9 : 80000200 s10: c1613b40
[    0.000000]  s11: 00000000 t3 : c1d4a000 t4 : ffffffff

This is also unnecessary as we can pre-compute the total memblocks required
for each memory region and allocate it before the loop. It save precious
boot time not going through memblock allocation code every time.

Fixes: 00ab027a ("RISC-V: Add kernel image sections to the resource tree")
Reviewed-by: NAnup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Tested-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NAtish Patra <atish.patra@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: NPalmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>

sizeof needs to be called on the compat pointer, not the native one.

Fixes: 89cd35c5 ("iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec")
Reported-by: NDavid Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Merge tag 'for-5.11/dm-fixes-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm

Pull device mapper fixes from Mike Snitzer:

 - Fix DM-raid's raid1 discard limits so discards work.

 - Select missing Kconfig dependencies for DM integrity and zoned
   targets.

 - Four fixes for DM crypt target's support to optionally bypass kcryptd
   workqueues.

 - Fix DM snapshot merge supports missing data flushes before committing
   metadata.

 - Fix DM integrity data device flushing when external metadata is used.

 - Fix DM integrity's maximum number of supported constructor arguments
   that user can request when creating an integrity device.

 - Eliminate DM core ioctl logging noise when an ioctl is issued without
   required CAP_SYS_RAWIO permission.

* tag 'for-5.11/dm-fixes-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm:
  dm crypt: defer decryption to a tasklet if interrupts disabled
  dm integrity: fix the maximum number of arguments
  dm crypt: do not call bio_endio() from the dm-crypt tasklet
  dm integrity: fix flush with external metadata device
  dm: eliminate potential source of excessive kernel log noise
  dm snapshot: flush merged data before committing metadata
  dm crypt: use GFP_ATOMIC when allocating crypto requests from softirq
  dm crypt: do not wait for backlogged crypto request completion in softirq
  dm zoned: select CONFIG_CRC32
  dm integrity: select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
  dm raid: fix discard limits for raid1

Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
 "10 patches.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: MAINTAINERS and mm (slub,
  pagealloc, memcg, kasan, vmalloc, migration, hugetlb, memory-failure,
  and process_vm_access)"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
  mm/process_vm_access.c: include compat.h
  mm,hwpoison: fix printing of page flags
  MAINTAINERS: add Vlastimil as slab allocators maintainer
  mm/hugetlb: fix potential missing huge page size info
  mm: migrate: initialize err in do_migrate_pages
  mm/vmalloc.c: fix potential memory leak
  arm/kasan: fix the array size of kasan_early_shadow_pte[]
  mm/memcontrol: fix warning in mem_cgroup_page_lruvec()
  mm/page_alloc: add a missing mm_page_alloc_zone_locked() tracepoint
  mm, slub: consider rest of partial list if acquire_slab() fails

Pull rdma fixes from Jason Gunthorpe:
 "A fairly modest set of bug fixes, nothing abnormal from the merge
  window

  The ucma patch is a bit on the larger side, but given the regression
  was recently added I've opted to forward it to the rc stream.

   - Fix a ucma memory leak introduced in v5.9 while fixing the
     Syzkaller bugs

   - Don't fail when the xarray wraps for user verbs objects

   - User triggerable oops regression from the umem page size rework

   - Error unwind bugs in usnic, ocrdma, mlx5 and cma"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma:
  RDMA/cma: Fix error flow in default_roce_mode_store
  RDMA/mlx5: Fix wrong free of blue flame register on error
  IB/mlx5: Fix error unwinding when set_has_smi_cap fails
  RDMA/umem: Avoid undefined behavior of rounddown_pow_of_two()
  RDMA/ocrdma: Fix use after free in ocrdma_dealloc_ucontext_pd()
  RDMA/usnic: Fix memleak in find_free_vf_and_create_qp_grp
  RDMA/restrack: Don't treat as an error allocation ID wrapping
  RDMA/ucma: Do not miss ctx destruction steps in some cases

If we enter with requests pending and performm cancelations, we'll have
a different inflight count before and after calling prepare_to_wait().
This causes the loop to restart. If we actually ended up canceling
everything, or everything completed in-between, then we'll break out
of the loop without calling finish_wait() on the waitqueue. This can
trigger a warning on exit_signals(), as we leave the task state in
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE.

Put a finish_wait() after the loop to catch that case.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9+
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
 "A number of bug fixes for ext4:

   - Fix for the new fast_commit feature

   - Fix some error handling codepaths in whiteout handling and
     mountpoint sampling

   - Fix how we write ext4_error information so it goes through the
     journal when journalling is active, to avoid races that can lead to
     lost error information, superblock checksum failures, or DIF/DIX
     features"

* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
  ext4: remove expensive flush on fast commit
  ext4: fix bug for rename with RENAME_WHITEOUT
  ext4: fix wrong list_splice in ext4_fc_cleanup
  ext4: use IS_ERR instead of IS_ERR_OR_NULL and set inode null when IS_ERR
  ext4: don't leak old mountpoint samples
  ext4: drop ext4_handle_dirty_super()
  ext4: fix superblock checksum failure when setting password salt
  ext4: use sbi instead of EXT4_SB(sb) in ext4_update_super()
  ext4: save error info to sb through journal if available
  ext4: protect superblock modifications with a buffer lock
  ext4: drop sync argument of ext4_commit_super()
  ext4: combine ext4_handle_error() and save_error_info()

Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
 "Two small cifs fixes for stable (including an important handle leak
  fix) and three small cleanup patches"

* tag '5.11-rc3-smb3' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
  cifs: style: replace one-element array with flexible-array
  cifs: connect: style: Simplify bool comparison
  fs: cifs: remove unneeded variable in smb3_fs_context_dup
  cifs: fix interrupted close commands
  cifs: check pointer before freeing

Pull arm64 fixes from Catalin Marinas:

 - Set the minimum GCC version to 5.1 for arm64 due to earlier compiler
   bugs.

 - Make atomic helpers __always_inline to avoid a section mismatch when
   compiling with clang.

 - Fix the CMA and crashkernel reservations to use ZONE_DMA (remove the
   arm64_dma32_phys_limit variable, no longer needed with a dynamic
   ZONE_DMA sizing in 5.11).

 - Remove redundant IRQ flag tracing that was leaving lockdep
   inconsistent with the hardware state.

 - Revert perf events based hard lockup detector that was causing
   smp_processor_id() to be called in preemptible context.

 - Some trivial cleanups - spelling fix, renaming S_FRAME_SIZE to
   PT_REGS_SIZE, function prototypes added.

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: selftests: Fix spelling of 'Mismatch'
  arm64: syscall: include prototype for EL0 SVC functions
  compiler.h: Raise minimum version of GCC to 5.1 for arm64
  arm64: make atomic helpers __always_inline
  arm64: rename S_FRAME_SIZE to PT_REGS_SIZE
  Revert "arm64: Enable perf events based hard lockup detector"
  arm64: entry: remove redundant IRQ flag tracing
  arm64: Remove arm64_dma32_phys_limit and its uses

Pull MIPS fixes from Thomas Bogendoerfer:

 - fix coredumps on 64bit kernels

 - fix for alignment bugs preventing booting

 - fix checking for failed irq_alloc_desc calls

* tag 'mips_fixes_5.11.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux:
  MIPS: OCTEON: fix unreachable code in octeon_irq_init_ciu
  MIPS: relocatable: fix possible boot hangup with KASLR enabled
  MIPS: Fix malformed NT_FILE and NT_SIGINFO in 32bit coredumps
  MIPS: boot: Fix unaligned access with CONFIG_MIPS_RAW_APPENDED_DTB

When 'perf inject' reads a perf.data file from an older version of perf,
it writes event attributes into the output with the original size field,
but lays them out as if they had the size currently used. Readers see a
corrupt file. Update the size field to match the layout.
Signed-off-by: NAl Grant <al.grant@foss.arm.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124195818.30603-1-al.grant@arm.comSigned-off-by: NDenis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

In some cases, the number of cpus (nr_cpus_online) is confused with the
maximum cpu number (nr_cpus_avail), which results in the error in the
example below:

Example on system with 8 cpus:

 Before:
   # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu2/online
   # ./perf record --kcore -e intel_pt// taskset --cpu-list 7 uname
   Linux
   [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
   [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.147 MB perf.data ]
   # ./perf script --itrace=e
   Requested CPU 7 too large. Consider raising MAX_NR_CPUS
   0x25908 [0x8]: failed to process type: 68 [Invalid argument]

 After:
   # ./perf script --itrace=e
   #

Fixes: 8c727469 ("perf machine: Replace MAX_NR_CPUS with perf_env::nr_cpus_online")
Fixes: 7df4e36a ("perf session: Replace MAX_NR_CPUS with perf_env::nr_cpus_online")
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Tested-by: NKan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210107174159.24897-1-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

As of now it doesn't consider cgroups when collecting shadow stats and
metrics so counter values from different cgroups will be saved in a same
slot.  This resulted in incorrect numbers when those cgroups have
different workloads.

For example, let's look at the scenario below: cgroups A and C runs same
workload which burns a cpu while cgroup B runs a light workload.

  $ perf stat -a -e cycles,instructions --for-each-cgroup A,B,C  sleep 1

   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

     3,958,116,522      cycles                A
     6,722,650,929      instructions          A #    2.53  insn per cycle
         1,132,741      cycles                B
           571,743      instructions          B #    0.00  insn per cycle
     4,007,799,935      cycles                C
     6,793,181,523      instructions          C #    2.56  insn per cycle

       1.001050869 seconds time elapsed

When I run 'perf stat' with single workload, it usually shows IPC around
1.7.  We can verify it (6,722,650,929.0 / 3,958,116,522 = 1.698) for cgroup A.

But in this case, since cgroups are ignored, cycles are averaged so it
used the lower value for IPC calculation and resulted in around 2.5.

  avg cycle: (3958116522 + 1132741 + 4007799935) / 3 = 2655683066
  IPC (A)  :  6722650929 / 2655683066 = 2.531
  IPC (B)  :      571743 / 2655683066 = 0.0002
  IPC (C)  :  6793181523 / 2655683066 = 2.557

We can simply compare cgroup pointers in the evsel and it'll be NULL
when cgroups are not specified.  With this patch, I can see correct
numbers like below:

  $ perf stat -a -e cycles,instructions --for-each-cgroup A,B,C  sleep 1

  Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

     4,171,051,687      cycles                A
     7,219,793,922      instructions          A #    1.73  insn per cycle
         1,051,189      cycles                B
           583,102      instructions          B #    0.55  insn per cycle
     4,171,124,710      cycles                C
     7,192,944,580      instructions          C #    1.72  insn per cycle

       1.007909814 seconds time elapsed
Signed-off-by: NNamhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210115071139.257042-2-namhyung@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pass more info to the saved_value in the runtime_stat, add a new
struct runtime_stat_data.  Currently it only has 'ctx' field but later
patch will add more.

Note that we intentionally pass 0 as ctx to clock-related events for
compatibility.  It was already there in a few places.  So move the code
into the saved_value_lookup() explicitly and add a comment.
Suggested-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NNamhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210115071139.257042-1-namhyung@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Permissions are necessary to get a tracepoint id. Fail the test when the
read fails.
Signed-off-by: NIan Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210114180250.3853825-2-irogers@google.comSigned-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>