1. 05 3月, 2018 3 次提交
  2. 12 2月, 2018 1 次提交
    • L
      vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement · a9a08845
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
      variables as described by Al, done by this script:
      
          for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
              L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
              for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
          done
      
      with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
      
      NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
      values as the POLL* constants do.  But they keyword here is "almost".
      For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
      actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
      
      The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
      should be all done.
      Scripted-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a9a08845
  3. 24 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  4. 20 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 17 1月, 2018 3 次提交
  6. 16 1月, 2018 2 次提交
    • D
      sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() · b2ce04c2
      David Windsor 提交于
      The autoclose field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to
      use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed
      since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation.
      
      This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
      whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
      understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
      mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
      [kees: adjust commit log]
      Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      b2ce04c2
    • D
      sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache · ab9ee8e3
      David Windsor 提交于
      The SCTP socket event notification subscription information need to be
      copied to/from userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch
      defines a region in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy
      operations are allowed. Additionally moves the usercopy fields to be
      adjacent for the region to cover both.
      
      example usage trace:
      
          net/sctp/socket.c:
              sctp_getsockopt_events(...):
                  ...
                  copy_to_user(..., &sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, len)
      
              sctp_setsockopt_events(...):
                  ...
                  copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, ..., optlen)
      
              sctp_getsockopt_initmsg(...):
                  ...
                  copy_to_user(..., &sctp_sk(sk)->initmsg, len)
      
      This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
      can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
      cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
      
      This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
      whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
      understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
      mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
      [kees: split from network patch, move struct members adjacent]
      [kees: add SCTPv6 struct whitelist, provide usage trace]
      Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      ab9ee8e3
  7. 11 1月, 2018 3 次提交
  8. 28 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 21 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  10. 12 12月, 2017 5 次提交
  11. 11 12月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      rhashtable: Change rhashtable_walk_start to return void · 97a6ec4a
      Tom Herbert 提交于
      Most callers of rhashtable_walk_start don't care about a resize event
      which is indicated by a return value of -EAGAIN. So calls to
      rhashtable_walk_start are wrapped wih code to ignore -EAGAIN. Something
      like this is common:
      
             ret = rhashtable_walk_start(rhiter);
             if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN)
                     goto out;
      
      Since zero and -EAGAIN are the only possible return values from the
      function this check is pointless. The condition never evaluates to true.
      
      This patch changes rhashtable_walk_start to return void. This simplifies
      code for the callers that ignore -EAGAIN. For the few cases where the
      caller cares about the resize event, particularly where the table can be
      walked in mulitple parts for netlink or seq file dump, the function
      rhashtable_walk_start_check has been added that returns -EAGAIN on a
      resize event.
      Signed-off-by: NTom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
      Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      97a6ec4a
  12. 06 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 29 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  14. 28 11月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 18 11月, 2017 1 次提交
    • X
      sctp: set frag_point in sctp_setsockopt_maxseg correctly · ecca8f88
      Xin Long 提交于
      Now in sctp_setsockopt_maxseg user_frag or frag_point can be set with
      val >= 8 and val <= SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. But both checks are incorrect.
      
      val >= 8 means frag_point can even be less than SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT.
      Then in sctp_datamsg_from_user(), when it's value is greater than cookie
      echo len and trying to bundle with cookie echo chunk, the first_len will
      overflow.
      
      The worse case is when it's value is equal as cookie echo len, first_len
      becomes 0, it will go into a dead loop for fragment later on. In Hangbin
      syzkaller testing env, oom was even triggered due to consecutive memory
      allocation in that loop.
      
      Besides, SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN is the max size of the whole chunk, it should
      deduct the data header for frag_point or user_frag check.
      
      This patch does a proper check with SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT subtracting
      the sctphdr and datahdr, SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN subtracting datahdr when
      setting frag_point via sockopt. It also improves sctp_setsockopt_maxseg
      codes.
      Suggested-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: NHangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ecca8f88
  16. 16 11月, 2017 2 次提交
  17. 29 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • X
      sctp: reset owner sk for data chunks on out queues when migrating a sock · d04adf1b
      Xin Long 提交于
      Now when migrating sock to another one in sctp_sock_migrate(), it only
      resets owner sk for the data in receive queues, not the chunks on out
      queues.
      
      It would cause that data chunks length on the sock is not consistent
      with sk sk_wmem_alloc. When closing the sock or freeing these chunks,
      the old sk would never be freed, and the new sock may crash due to
      the overflow sk_wmem_alloc.
      
      syzbot found this issue with this series:
      
        r0 = socket$inet_sctp()
        sendto$inet(r0)
        listen(r0)
        accept4(r0)
        close(r0)
      
      Although listen() should have returned error when one TCP-style socket
      is in connecting (I may fix this one in another patch), it could also
      be reproduced by peeling off an assoc.
      
      This issue is there since very beginning.
      
      This patch is to reset owner sk for the chunks on out queues so that
      sk sk_wmem_alloc has correct value after accept one sock or peeloff
      an assoc to one sock.
      
      Note that when resetting owner sk for chunks on outqueue, it has to
      sctp_clear_owner_w/skb_orphan chunks before changing assoc->base.sk
      first and then sctp_set_owner_w them after changing assoc->base.sk,
      due to that sctp_wfree and it's callees are using assoc->base.sk.
      Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d04adf1b
  18. 19 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • X
      sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one · df80cd9b
      Xin Long 提交于
      Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
      transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
      key in hashtable.
      
      As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
      it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
      netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
      later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
      and dereferencing those transports.
      
      This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
      syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
      
        socket$inet6_sctp()
        bind$inet6()
        sendto$inet6()
        unshare(0x40000000)
        getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
        getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
      
      This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
      netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
      go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
      
      Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
      difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
      in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
      to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
      different.
      Reported-by: NChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df80cd9b
  19. 04 10月, 2017 3 次提交
  20. 16 9月, 2017 1 次提交
    • X
      sctp: fix an use-after-free issue in sctp_sock_dump · d25adbeb
      Xin Long 提交于
      Commit 86fdb344 ("sctp: ensure ep is not destroyed before doing the
      dump") tried to fix an use-after-free issue by checking !sctp_sk(sk)->ep
      with holding sock and sock lock.
      
      But Paolo noticed that endpoint could be destroyed in sctp_rcv without
      sock lock protection. It means the use-after-free issue still could be
      triggered when sctp_rcv put and destroy ep after sctp_sock_dump checks
      !ep, although it's pretty hard to reproduce.
      
      I could reproduce it by mdelay in sctp_rcv while msleep in sctp_close
      and sctp_sock_dump long time.
      
      This patch is to add another param cb_done to sctp_for_each_transport
      and dump ep->assocs with holding tsp after jumping out of transport's
      traversal in it to avoid this issue.
      
      It can also improve sctp diag dump to make it run faster, as no need
      to save sk into cb->args[5] and keep calling sctp_for_each_transport
      any more.
      
      This patch is also to use int * instead of int for the pos argument
      in sctp_for_each_transport, which could make postion increment only
      in sctp_for_each_transport and no need to keep changing cb->args[2]
      in sctp_sock_filter and sctp_sock_dump any more.
      
      Fixes: 86fdb344 ("sctp: ensure ep is not destroyed before doing the dump")
      Reported-by: NPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d25adbeb
  21. 24 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • S
      sctp: Avoid out-of-bounds reads from address storage · ee6c88bb
      Stefano Brivio 提交于
      inet_diag_msg_sctp{,l}addr_fill() and sctp_get_sctp_info() copy
      sizeof(sockaddr_storage) bytes to fill in sockaddr structs used
      to export diagnostic information to userspace.
      
      However, the memory allocated to store sockaddr information is
      smaller than that and depends on the address family, so we leak
      up to 100 uninitialized bytes to userspace. Just use the size of
      the source structs instead, in all the three cases this is what
      userspace expects. Zero out the remaining memory.
      
      Unused bytes (i.e. when IPv4 addresses are used) in source
      structs sctp_sockaddr_entry and sctp_transport are already
      cleared by sctp_add_bind_addr() and sctp_transport_new(),
      respectively.
      
      Noticed while testing KASAN-enabled kernel with 'ss':
      
      [ 2326.885243] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] at addr ffff881be8779800
      [ 2326.896800] Read of size 128 by task ss/9527
      [ 2326.901564] CPU: 0 PID: 9527 Comm: ss Not tainted 4.11.0-22.el7a.x86_64 #1
      [ 2326.909236] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
      [ 2326.917585] Call Trace:
      [ 2326.920312]  dump_stack+0x63/0x8d
      [ 2326.924014]  kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70
      [ 2326.928295]  kasan_report+0x288/0x540
      [ 2326.932380]  ? inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
      [ 2326.938500]  ? skb_put+0x8b/0xd0
      [ 2326.942098]  ? memset+0x31/0x40
      [ 2326.945599]  check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
      [ 2326.950362]  memcpy+0x23/0x50
      [ 2326.953669]  inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
      [ 2326.959596]  ? inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill+0x460/0x460 [sctp_diag]
      [ 2326.966495]  ? __lock_sock+0x102/0x150
      [ 2326.970671]  ? sock_def_wakeup+0x60/0x60
      [ 2326.975048]  ? remove_wait_queue+0xc0/0xc0
      [ 2326.979619]  sctp_diag_dump+0x44a/0x760 [sctp_diag]
      [ 2326.985063]  ? sctp_ep_dump+0x280/0x280 [sctp_diag]
      [ 2326.990504]  ? memset+0x31/0x40
      [ 2326.994007]  ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40
      [ 2326.997900]  __inet_diag_dump+0x57/0xb0 [inet_diag]
      [ 2327.003340]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
      [ 2327.007715]  inet_diag_dump+0x4d/0x80 [inet_diag]
      [ 2327.012979]  netlink_dump+0x1e6/0x490
      [ 2327.017064]  __netlink_dump_start+0x28e/0x2c0
      [ 2327.021924]  inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x189/0x1a0 [inet_diag]
      [ 2327.028045]  ? inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x1b0/0x1b0 [inet_diag]
      [ 2327.034651]  ? inet_diag_dump_compat+0x190/0x190 [inet_diag]
      [ 2327.040965]  ? __netlink_lookup+0x1b9/0x260
      [ 2327.045631]  sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x1e0
      [ 2327.050199]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x180
      [ 2327.054574]  ? sock_diag_bind+0x60/0x60
      [ 2327.058850]  sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
      [ 2327.062837]  netlink_unicast+0x2e7/0x3b0
      [ 2327.067212]  ? netlink_attachskb+0x330/0x330
      [ 2327.071975]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
      [ 2327.076544]  netlink_sendmsg+0x5be/0x730
      [ 2327.080918]  ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
      [ 2327.085486]  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
      [ 2327.090057]  ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x24/0x30
      [ 2327.095109]  ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
      [ 2327.099678]  sock_sendmsg+0x74/0x80
      [ 2327.103567]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x520/0x530
      [ 2327.107844]  ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x200
      [ 2327.112510]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x270/0x270
      [ 2327.117660]  ? vm_insert_page+0x360/0x360
      [ 2327.122133]  ? vm_insert_pfn_prot+0xb4/0x150
      [ 2327.126895]  ? vm_insert_pfn+0x32/0x40
      [ 2327.131077]  ? vvar_fault+0x71/0xd0
      [ 2327.134968]  ? special_mapping_fault+0x69/0x110
      [ 2327.140022]  ? __do_fault+0x42/0x120
      [ 2327.144008]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x17a0
      [ 2327.148965]  ? __fget_light+0xa7/0xc0
      [ 2327.153049]  __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
      [ 2327.157133]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
      [ 2327.161409]  ? SyS_shutdown+0x140/0x140
      [ 2327.165688]  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd0/0xd0
      [ 2327.170646]  ? __do_page_fault+0x55d/0x620
      [ 2327.175216]  ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
      [ 2327.179591]  SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
      [ 2327.183384]  do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
      [ 2327.187471]  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
      [ 2327.192622] RIP: 0033:0x7f41d18fa3b0
      [ 2327.196608] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3b731218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
      [ 2327.205055] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3b731380 RCX: 00007f41d18fa3b0
      [ 2327.213017] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc3b731340 RDI: 0000000000000003
      [ 2327.220978] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000040
      [ 2327.228939] R10: 00007ffc3b730f30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
      [ 2327.236901] R13: 00007ffc3b731340 R14: 00007ffc3b7313d0 R15: 0000000000000084
      [ 2327.244865] Object at ffff881be87797e0, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
      [ 2327.251953] Allocated:
      [ 2327.254581] PID = 9484
      [ 2327.257215]  save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
      [ 2327.261485]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
      [ 2327.265179]  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
      [ 2327.269165]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe6/0x1d0
      [ 2327.274138]  sctp_add_bind_addr+0x58/0x180 [sctp]
      [ 2327.279400]  sctp_do_bind+0x208/0x310 [sctp]
      [ 2327.284176]  sctp_bind+0x61/0xa0 [sctp]
      [ 2327.288455]  inet_bind+0x5f/0x3a0
      [ 2327.292151]  SYSC_bind+0x1a4/0x1e0
      [ 2327.295944]  SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
      [ 2327.299349]  do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
      [ 2327.303433]  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
      [ 2327.308194] Freed:
      [ 2327.310434] PID = 4131
      [ 2327.313065]  save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
      [ 2327.317344]  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
      [ 2327.321040]  kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
      [ 2327.325220]  kfree+0x96/0x1a0
      [ 2327.328530]  dynamic_kobj_release+0x15/0x40
      [ 2327.333195]  kobject_release+0x99/0x1e0
      [ 2327.337472]  kobject_put+0x38/0x70
      [ 2327.341266]  free_notes_attrs+0x66/0x80
      [ 2327.345545]  mod_sysfs_teardown+0x1a5/0x270
      [ 2327.350211]  free_module+0x20/0x2a0
      [ 2327.354099]  SyS_delete_module+0x2cb/0x2f0
      [ 2327.358667]  do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
      [ 2327.362750]  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
      [ 2327.367510] Memory state around the buggy address:
      [ 2327.372855]  ffff881be8779700: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
      [ 2327.380914]  ffff881be8779780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
      [ 2327.388972] >ffff881be8779800: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
      [ 2327.397031]                                ^
      [ 2327.401792]  ffff881be8779880: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
      [ 2327.409850]  ffff881be8779900: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
      [ 2327.417907] ==================================================================
      
      This fixes CVE-2017-7558.
      
      References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1480266
      Fixes: 8f840e47 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
      Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NStefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: NXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ee6c88bb
  22. 12 8月, 2017 2 次提交
  23. 07 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  24. 02 7月, 2017 2 次提交