- 02 9月, 2020 5 次提交
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由 James Morse 提交于
task #28924046 [ Upstream commit 05460849c3b5 ] Cores affected by Neoverse-N1 #1542419 could execute a stale instruction when a branch is updated to point to freshly generated instructions. To workaround this issue we need user-space to issue unnecessary icache maintenance that we can trap. Start by hiding CTR_EL0.DIC. Backport change: Modify the ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419 from 45 to 37 Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NBin Yu <jkchen@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Nzou cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
task #28924046 [ Upstream commit 4afe8e79da92 ] When there is a mismatch in the CTR_EL0 field, we trap access to CTR from EL0 on all CPUs to expose the safe value. However, we could skip trapping on a CPU which matches the safe value. Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NBin Yu <jkchen@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Nzou cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
task #28924046 [ Upstream commit a5325089bd05 ] We already mitigate erratum 1188873 affecting Cortex-A76 and Neoverse-N1 r0p0 to r2p0. It turns out that revisions r0p0 to r3p1 of the same cores are affected by erratum 1418040, which has the same workaround as 1188873. Let's expand the range of affected revisions to match 1418040, and repaint all occurences of 1188873 to 1418040. Whilst we're there, do a bit of reformating in silicon-errata.txt and drop a now unnecessary dependency on ARM_ARCH_TIMER_OOL_WORKAROUND. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NBin Yu <jkchen@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Nzou cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
task #28924046 [ Upstream commit 6989303a3b2d864fd8e17d3fa3365d3e9649a598 ] Neoverse-N1 is also affected by ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873, so let's add it to the list of affected CPUs. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> [will: Update silicon-errata.txt] Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NBin Yu <jkchen@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Nzou cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
task #28924046 [ Upstream commit 95b861a4a6d94f64d5242605569218160ebacdbe ] When running on Cortex-A76, a timer access from an AArch32 EL0 task may end up with a corrupted value or register. The workaround for this is to trap these accesses at EL1/EL2 and execute them there. This only affects versions r0p0, r1p0 and r2p0 of the CPU. Backport change: The patch modifies ARM64_WORKAROUND_1188873 from 35 to 36 and the ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76 is deleted because a previous patch has been modified. Acked-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NBin Yu <jkchen@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: NBaolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Nzou cao <zoucao@linux.alibaba.com>
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- 29 10月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
commit 93916beb70143c46bf1d2bacf814be3a124b253b upstream. It appears that the only case where we need to apply the TX2_219_TVM mitigation is when the core is in SMT mode. So let's condition the enabling on detecting a CPU whose MPIDR_EL1.Aff0 is non-zero. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 12 10月, 2019 11 次提交
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由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于
commit a111b7c0f20e13b54df2fa959b3dc0bdf1925ae6 upstream. Configure arm64 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with the 'mitigations=' cmdline option. This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass. The default behavior is unchanged. Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> [will: reorder checks so KASLR implies KPTI and SSBS is affected by cmdline] Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
commit 517953c2c47f9c00a002f588ac856a5bc70cede3 upstream. The SMCCC ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 service can indicate that although the firmware knows about the Spectre-v2 mitigation, this particular CPU is not vulnerable, and it is thus not necessary to call the firmware on this CPU. Let's use this information to our benefit. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
[ Upstream commit eb337cdfcd5dd3b10522c2f34140a73a4c285c30 ] SSBS provides a relatively cheap mitigation for SSB, but it is still a mitigation and its presence does not indicate that the CPU is unaffected by the vulnerability. Tweak the mitigation logic so that we report the correct string in sysfs. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jeremy Linton 提交于
[ Upstream commit 526e065dbca6df0b5a130b84b836b8b3c9f54e21 ] Return status based on ssbd_state and __ssb_safe. If the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then return the expected machine state based on a whitelist of known good cores. Given a heterogeneous machine, the overall machine vulnerability defaults to safe but is reset to unsafe when we miss the whitelist and the firmware doesn't explicitly tell us the core is safe. In order to make that work we delay transitioning to vulnerable until we know the firmware isn't responding to avoid a case where we miss the whitelist, but the firmware goes ahead and reports the core is not vulnerable. If all the cores in the machine have SSBS, then __ssb_safe will remain true. Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jeremy Linton 提交于
[ Upstream commit d2532e27b5638bb2e2dd52b80b7ea2ec65135377 ] Track whether all the cores in the machine are vulnerable to Spectre-v2, and whether all the vulnerable cores have been mitigated. We then expose this information to userspace via sysfs. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jeremy Linton 提交于
[ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ] Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
[ Upstream commit 73f38166095947f3b86b02fbed6bd592223a7ac8 ] We currently have a list of CPUs affected by Spectre-v2, for which we check that the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. It turns out that not all firmwares do implement the required mitigation, and that we fail to let the user know about it. Instead, let's slightly revamp our checks, and rely on a whitelist of cores that are known to be non-vulnerable, and let the user know the status of the mitigation in the kernel log. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jeremy Linton 提交于
[ Upstream commit e5ce5e7267ddcbe13ab9ead2542524e1b7993e5a ] There are various reasons, such as benchmarking, to disable spectrev2 mitigation on a machine. Provide a command-line option to do so. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Jeremy Linton 提交于
[ Upstream commit d42281b6e49510f078ace15a8ea10f71e6262581 ] Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected by SSB, so that we can later advertise this to userspace. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> [will: Use IS_ENABLED instead of #ifdef] Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Mian Yousaf Kaukab 提交于
[ Upstream commit 3891ebccace188af075ce143d8b072b65e90f695 ] spectre-v1 has been mitigated and the mitigation is always active. Report this to userspace via sysfs Signed-off-by: NMian Yousaf Kaukab <ykaukab@suse.de> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Tested-by: NStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> Acked-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
[ Upstream commit 8f04e8e6e29c93421a95b61cad62e3918425eac7 ] On CPUs with support for PSTATE.SSBS, the kernel can toggle the SSBD state without needing to call into firmware. This patch hooks into the existing SSBD infrastructure so that SSBS is used on CPUs that support it, but it's all made horribly complicated by the very real possibility of big/little systems that don't uniformly provide the new capability. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 31 5月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
commit 969f5ea627570e91c9d54403287ee3ed657f58fe upstream. Revisions of the Cortex-A76 CPU prior to r4p0 are affected by an erratum that can prevent interrupts from being taken when single-stepping. This patch implements a software workaround to prevent userspace from effectively being able to disable interrupts. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 12 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Mark Rutland 提交于
Now that we have sysreg_clear_set(), we can consistently use this instead of config_sctlr_el1(). Signed-off-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 06 7月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
The ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE macro assigns ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM to the '.type' field of the 'struct arm64_cpu_capabilities', so there's no need to assign it explicitly as well. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
When invalidating the instruction cache for a kernel mapping via flush_icache_range(), it is also necessary to flush the pipeline for other CPUs so that instructions fetched into the pipeline before the I-cache invalidation are discarded. For example, if module 'foo' is unloaded and then module 'bar' is loaded into the same area of memory, a CPU could end up executing instructions from 'foo' when branching into 'bar' if these instructions were fetched into the pipeline before 'foo' was unloaded. Whilst this is highly unlikely to occur in practice, particularly as any exception acts as a context-synchronizing operation, following the letter of the architecture requires us to execute an ISB on each CPU in order for the new instruction stream to be visible. Acked-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 05 7月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Track mismatches in the cache type register (CTR_EL0), other than the D/I min line sizes and trap user accesses if there are any. Fixes: be68a8aa ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix CTR_EL0 field definitions") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
If there is a mismatch in the I/D min line size, we must always use the system wide safe value both in applications and in the kernel, while performing cache operations. However, we have been checking more bits than just the min line sizes, which triggers false negatives. We may need to trap the user accesses in such cases, but not necessarily patch the kernel. This patch fixes the check to do the right thing as advertised. A new capability will be added to check mismatches in other fields and ensure we trap the CTR accesses. Fixes: be68a8aa ("arm64: cpufeature: Fix CTR_EL0 field definitions") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 05 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Arnd Bergmann 提交于
Without including psci.h and arm-smccc.h, we now get a build failure in some configurations: arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c: In function 'arm64_update_smccc_conduit': arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:278:10: error: 'psci_ops' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'sysfs_ops'? arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c: In function 'arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation': arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c:311:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'arm_smccc_1_1_hvc' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, NULL); Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 01 6月, 2018 6 次提交
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
On a system where firmware can dynamically change the state of the mitigation, the CPU will always come up with the mitigation enabled, including when coming back from suspend. If the user has requested "no mitigation" via a command line option, let's enforce it by calling into the firmware again to disable it. Similarily, for a resume from hibernate, the mitigation could have been disabled by the boot kernel. Let's ensure that it is set back on in that case. Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
In order to avoid checking arm64_ssbd_callback_required on each kernel entry/exit even if no mitigation is required, let's add yet another alternative that by default jumps over the mitigation, and that gets nop'ed out if we're doing dynamic mitigation. Think of it as a poor man's static key... Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, it may be useful to either permanently enable or disable the workaround for cases where the user decides that they'd rather not get a trap overhead, and keep the mitigation permanently on or off instead of switching it on exception entry/exit. In any case, default to the mitigation being enabled. Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation. A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a config option. Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
In a heterogeneous system, we can end up with both affected and unaffected CPUs. Let's check their status before calling into the firmware. Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
In order for the kernel to protect itself, let's call the SSBD mitigation implemented by the higher exception level (either hypervisor or firmware) on each transition between userspace and kernel. We must take the PSCI conduit into account in order to target the right exception level, hence the introduction of a runtime patching callback. Reviewed-by: NMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NJulien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> Acked-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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- 09 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 David Gilhooley 提交于
The NVIDIA Denver CPU also needs a PSCI call to harden the branch predictor. Signed-off-by: NDavid Gilhooley <dgilhooley@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 12 4月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2 mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would become strictly KVM specific. Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
The very existence of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_* is a thinko, as KVM will never use a HVC call to perform the branch prediction invalidation. Even as a nested hypervisor, it would use an SMC instruction. Let's get rid of it. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Since 5e7951ce ("arm64: capabilities: Clean up midr range helpers"), capabilities must be represented with a single entry. If multiple CPU types can use the same capability, then they need to be enumerated in a list. The EL2 hardening stuff (which affects both A57 and A72) managed to escape the conversion in the above patch thanks to the 4.17 merge window. Let's fix it now. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Shanker Donthineni 提交于
The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 was introduced as part of SMC V1.1 Calling Convention to mitigate CVE-2017-5715. This patch uses the standard call SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor chips instead of Silicon provider service ID 0xC2001700. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: NShanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> [maz: reworked errata framework integration] Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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- 28 3月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS is changing, and won't have the same meaning in 4.17, and the right thing to use will be ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS. In order to cope with the merge window, let's add a compatibility macro that will allow a relatively smooth transition, and that can be removed post 4.17-rc1. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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由 Marc Zyngier 提交于
Creates far too many conflicts with arm64/for-next/core, to be resent post -rc1. This reverts commit f9f5dc19. Signed-off-by: NMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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- 27 3月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Will Deacon 提交于
An allnoconfig build complains about unused symbols due to functions that are called via conditional cpufeature and cpu_errata table entries. Annotate these as __maybe_unused if they are likely to be generic, or predicate their compilation on the same option as the table entry if they are specific to a given alternative. Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap. This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks. To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other fields except the matches & cpu_enable. This ensures : 1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects 2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches". This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action. The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules). If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being called multiple times. This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af4 ("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability"). Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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由 Suzuki K Poulose 提交于
Add helpers for detecting an errata on list of midr ranges of affected CPUs, with the same work around. Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: NDave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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