Since we are adding some new fields to this structure it is safest if all
users reliably initialize the struct to zero.
Signed-off-by: NParav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>

Simplify the flow_resources_alloc() function call by reducing
number of goto statements.
Reviewed-by: NMichael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

The flows were hidden from the C compiler; expose them as a zero-length
array to allow struct_size to work.
Signed-off-by: NMatthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:

struct foo {
    int stuff;
    void *entry[];
};

instance = kmalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + sizeof(void *) * count, GFP_KERNEL);

Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:

instance = kmalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);

This patch makes the changes for kmalloc()-family (and kvmalloc()-family)
uses. It was done via automatic conversion with manual review for the
"CHECKME" non-standard cases noted below, using the following Coccinelle
script:

// pkey_cache = kmalloc(sizeof *pkey_cache + tprops->pkey_tbl_len *
//                      sizeof *pkey_cache->table, GFP_KERNEL);
@@
identifier alloc =~ "kmalloc|kzalloc|kvmalloc|kvzalloc";
expression GFP;
identifier VAR, ELEMENT;
expression COUNT;
@@

- alloc(sizeof(*VAR) + COUNT * sizeof(*VAR->ELEMENT), GFP)
+ alloc(struct_size(VAR, ELEMENT, COUNT), GFP)

// mr = kzalloc(sizeof(*mr) + m * sizeof(mr->map[0]), GFP_KERNEL);
@@
identifier alloc =~ "kmalloc|kzalloc|kvmalloc|kvzalloc";
expression GFP;
identifier VAR, ELEMENT;
expression COUNT;
@@

- alloc(sizeof(*VAR) + COUNT * sizeof(VAR->ELEMENT[0]), GFP)
+ alloc(struct_size(VAR, ELEMENT, COUNT), GFP)

// Same pattern, but can't trivially locate the trailing element name,
// or variable name.
@@
identifier alloc =~ "kmalloc|kzalloc|kvmalloc|kvzalloc";
expression GFP;
expression SOMETHING, COUNT, ELEMENT;
@@

- alloc(sizeof(SOMETHING) + COUNT * sizeof(ELEMENT), GFP)
+ alloc(CHECKME_struct_size(&SOMETHING, ELEMENT, COUNT), GFP)
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

The struct ib_uverbs_flow_spec_action_count associates a counters object
with the flow.

Post this association the flow counters can be read via the counters
object.
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NRaed Salem <raeds@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

This is required when user-space drivers need to pass extra information
regarding how to handle this flow steering specification.
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NBoris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Add a new MPLS steering match filter that can match against
a single MPLS tag field.

Since the MPLS header can reside in different locations in the packet's
protocol stack as well as be encapsulated with a tunnel protocol, it
is required to know the exact location of the header in the protocol
stack.

Therefore, when including the MPLS protocol spec in the specs list,
it is mandatory to provide the list in an ordered manner, so
that it represents the actual header order in a matching packet.

Drivers that process the spec list and apply the matching rule
should treat the position of the MPLS spec in the spec list as the
actual location of the MPLS label in the packet's protocol stack.
Reviewed-by: NMark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NAriel Levkovich <lariel@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Adding a new GRE steering match filter that can match against
key and protocol fields.
Reviewed-by: NMark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NAriel Levkovich <lariel@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

This patch fixes a crash that happens due to access to an
uninitialized DM pointer within the MR object.

The change makes sure the DM pointer in the MR object is set to
NULL during a non-DM MR creation to prevent a false indication
that this MR is related to a DM in the dereg flow.

Fixes: be934cca ("IB/uverbs: Add device memory registration ioctl support")
Reported-by: NLijun Ou <oulijun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NAriel Levkovich <lariel@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

This patch adds a check in the ib_uverbs_rereg_mr flow to make
sure there's no attempt to rereg a device memory MR to regular MR.
In such case the command will fail with -EINVAL status.

fixes: be934cca ("IB/uverbs: Add device memory registration ioctl support")
Signed-off-by: NAriel Levkovich <lariel@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

This change allows vendors to report device memory capability
max_dm_size - to user via uverbs command.
Signed-off-by: NAriel Levkovich <lariel@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Adding a new ESP steering match filter that could match against
spi and seq used in IPSec protocol.
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Binding a flow_action to flow steering rule requires using a new
specification. Therefore, adding such an IB_FLOW_SPEC_ACTION_HANDLE flow
specification.

Flow steering rules could use flow_action(s) and as of that we need to
avoid deleting flow_action(s) as long as they're being used.
Moreover, when the attached rules are deleted, action_handle reference
count should be decremented. Introducing a new mechanism of flow
resources to keep track on the attached action_handle(s). Later on, this
mechanism should be extended to other attached flow steering resources
like flow counters.
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

The current implementation of kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter, which takes
a uAPI based flow steering specification and creates the respective kernel
API flow steering structure, gets a ib_uverbs_flow_spec structure.
The new flow_action uAPI gets a match mask and filter from user-space
which aren't encoded in the flow steering's ib_uverbs_flow_spec structure.
Exporting the logic out of kern_spec_to_ib_spec_filter to get user-space
blobs rather than ib_uverbs_flow_spec structure.
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

This is already used in many places, get the rest of them too, only
to make the code a bit clearer & simpler.
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Use macros to make names consistent in ioctl() uAPI:
The ioctl() uAPI works with object-method hierarchy. The method part
also states which handler should be executed when this method is called
from user-space. Therefore, we need to tie method, method's id, method's
handler and the object owning this method together.
Previously, this was done through explicit developer chosen names.
This makes grepping the code harder. Changing the method's name,
method's handler and object's name to be automatically generated based
on the ids.

The headers are split in a way so they be included and used by
user-space. One header strictly contains structures that are used
directly by user-space applications, where another header is used for
internal library (i.e. libibverbs) to form the ioctl() commands.
Other header simply contains the required general command structure.
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

The QP state is internal enum which is checked at the driver
level by calling to ib_modify_qp_is_ok(). Move this check closer
to user and leave kernel users to be checked by compiler.
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NDennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Implement the RDMA nldev netlink interface for dumping detailed
MR information.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Attempt to modify XRC_TGT QP type from the user space (ibv_xsrq_pingpong
invocation) will trigger the following kernel panic. It is caused by the
fact that such QPs missed uobject initialization.

[   17.408845] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000048
[   17.412645] IP: rdma_lookup_put_uobject+0x9/0x50
[   17.416567] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   17.419262] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   17.422915] CPU: 0 PID: 455 Comm: ibv_xsrq_pingpo Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #86
[   17.424765] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
[   17.427399] RIP: 0010:rdma_lookup_put_uobject+0x9/0x50
[   17.428445] RSP: 0018:ffffb8c7401e7c90 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   17.429543] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffb8c7401e7cf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   17.432426] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   17.437448] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000218f0 R09: ffffffff8ebc4cac
[   17.440223] R10: fffff6038052cd80 R11: ffff967694b36400 R12: ffff96769391f800
[   17.442184] R13: ffffb8c7401e7cd8 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff967699f60000
[   17.443971] FS:  00007fc29207d700(0000) GS:ffff96769fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   17.446623] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   17.448059] CR2: 0000000000000048 CR3: 000000001397a000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   17.449677] Call Trace:
[   17.450247]  modify_qp.isra.20+0x219/0x2f0
[   17.451151]  ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0x90/0xe0
[   17.452126]  ib_uverbs_write+0x1d2/0x3c0
[   17.453897]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x93c/0xe40
[   17.454938]  __vfs_write+0x36/0x180
[   17.455875]  vfs_write+0xad/0x1e0
[   17.456766]  SyS_write+0x52/0xc0
[   17.457632]  do_syscall_64+0x75/0x180
[   17.458631]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86
[   17.460004] RIP: 0033:0x7fc29198f5a0
[   17.460982] RSP: 002b:00007ffccc71f018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[   17.463043] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000078 RCX: 00007fc29198f5a0
[   17.464581] RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 00007ffccc71f050 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   17.466148] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000078 R09: 00007ffccc71f050
[   17.467750] R10: 000055b6cf87c248 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffccc71f300
[   17.469541] R13: 000055b6cf8733a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   17.471151] Code: 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 47 48 48 8b 00 48 8b 40 10 e9 0b 8b 68 00 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 53 89 f5 <48> 8b 47 48 48 89 fb 40 0f b6 f6 48 8b 00 48 8b 40 20 e8 e0 8a
[   17.475185] RIP: rdma_lookup_put_uobject+0x9/0x50 RSP: ffffb8c7401e7c90
[   17.476841] CR2: 0000000000000048
[   17.477764] ---[ end trace 1dbcc5354071a712 ]---
[   17.478880] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[   17.480277] Kernel Offset: 0xd000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Fixes: 2f08ee36 ("RDMA/restrack: don't use uaccess_kernel()")
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

uaccess_kernel() isn't sufficient to determine if an rdma resource is
user-mode or not.  For example, resources allocated in the add_one()
function of an ib_client get falsely labeled as user mode, when they
are kernel mode allocations.  EG: mad qps.

The result is that these qps are skipped over during a nldev query
because of an erroneous namespace mismatch.

So now we determine if the resource is user-mode by looking at the object
struct's uobject or similar pointer to know if it was allocated for user
mode applications.

Fixes: 02d8883f ("RDMA/restrack: Add general infrastructure to track RDMA resources")
Signed-off-by: NSteve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Update all the flows to ensure that function pointer exists prior
to accessing it.

This is much safer than checking the uverbs_ex_mask variable, especially
since we know that test isn't working properly and will be removed
in -next.

This prevents a user triggereable oops.
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88006476a198 by task syzkaller697701/265

CPU: 0 PID: 265 Comm: syzkaller697701 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #90
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xde/0x164
 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
 ? show_regs_print_info+0x17/0x17
 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0
 print_address_description+0x83/0x3e0
 kasan_report+0x18c/0x4b0
 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 ? lookup_get_idr_uobject+0x120/0x200
 ? copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 copy_ah_attr_from_uverbs+0x6f2/0x8c0
 ? modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350
 modify_qp+0xd0e/0x1350
 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xf9/0x170
 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70
 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
 ? attach_entity_load_avg+0x8b0/0x8b0
 ? ib_uverbs_query_qp+0xa70/0xa70
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670
 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? kernel_read+0x170/0x170
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x40
 ? finish_task_switch+0x1bd/0x7a0
 ? finish_task_switch+0x194/0x7a0
 ? prandom_u32_state+0xe/0x180
 ? rcu_read_unlock+0x80/0x80
 ? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260
 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
 ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x433c29
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf2be82a8 EFLAGS: 00000217

Allocated by task 62:
 kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x141/0x480
 dup_fd+0x101/0xcc0
 copy_process.part.62+0x166f/0x4390
 _do_fork+0x1cb/0xe90
 kernel_thread+0x34/0x40
 call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0x112/0x260
 process_one_work+0x929/0x1aa0
 worker_thread+0x5c6/0x12a0
 kthread+0x346/0x510
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Freed by task 259:
 kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0
 kmem_cache_free+0xf3/0x4c0
 put_files_struct+0x225/0x2c0
 exit_files+0x88/0xc0
 do_exit+0x67c/0x1520
 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88006476a000
 which belongs to the cache files_cache of size 832
The buggy address is located 408 bytes inside of
 832-byte region [ffff88006476a000, ffff88006476a340)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000191da80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000100080008
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff88006bcf7a80 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88006476a080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88006476a100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88006476a180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                            ^
 ffff88006476a200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88006476a280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11
Fixes: 44c58487 ("IB/core: Define 'ib' and 'roce' rdma_ah_attr types")
Reported-by: NNoa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Avoid circular locking dependency by calling
to uobj_alloc_commit() outside of xrcd_tree_mutex lock.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
4.15.0+ #87 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syzkaller401056/269 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<000000006c12d2cd>] uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360

but task is already holding lock:
 (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da010f09>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}:
       __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720
       rdma_alloc_commit_uobject+0x22c/0x600
       ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0x61a/0xdd0
       ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
       __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
       vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
       SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b

-> #0 (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex){+.+.}:
       lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440
       __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720
       uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
       remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110
       uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730
       ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120
       ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570
       __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0
       task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0
       do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520
       do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
       SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ucontext->uobjects_lock);
                               lock(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex);
                               lock(&ucontext->uobjects_lock);
  lock(&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by syzkaller401056/269:
 #0:  (&file->cleanup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000c9f0c252>] ib_uverbs_close+0xac/0x570
 #1:  (&ucontext->cleanup_rwsem){++++}, at: [<00000000b6994d49>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730
 #2:  (&ucontext->uobjects_lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000da010f09>] uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syzkaller401056 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xde/0x164
 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730
 ? console_unlock+0x502/0xbd0
 print_circular_bug.isra.24+0x35e/0x396
 ? print_circular_bug_header+0x12e/0x12e
 ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
 validate_chain.isra.28+0x25d1/0x40c0
 ? check_usage+0xb70/0xb70
 ? graph_lock+0x160/0x160
 ? find_usage_backwards+0x30/0x30
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? print_irqtrace_events+0x280/0x280
 ? __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630
 __lock_acquire+0x93d/0x1630
 lock_acquire+0x19d/0x440
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 __mutex_lock+0x111/0x1720
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 ? __mutex_lock+0x828/0x1720
 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550
 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x168/0x730
 ? __lock_acquire+0x9a9/0x1630
 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1550/0x1550
 ? uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0xf6/0x730
 ? lock_contended+0x11a0/0x11a0
 ? uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 uverbs_free_xrcd+0xd2/0x360
 remove_commit_idr_uobject+0x6d/0x110
 uverbs_cleanup_ucontext+0x2f0/0x730
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
 ? uverbs_close_fd+0x1c0/0x1c0
 ib_uverbs_cleanup_ucontext.constprop.3+0x52/0x120
 ib_uverbs_close+0xf2/0x570
 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50
 ? ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xb50/0xb50
 __fput+0x2cd/0x8d0
 task_work_run+0xec/0x1d0
 do_exit+0x6a1/0x1520
 ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x220/0x220
 ? exit_notify+0x9f0/0x9f0
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 ? time_hardirqs_on+0x27/0x670
 ? time_hardirqs_off+0x27/0x490
 ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x6c/0x460
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0x8b
 do_group_exit+0xe8/0x380
 SyS_exit_group+0x1e/0x20
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x431ce9

Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11
Fixes: fd3c7904 ("IB/core: Change idr objects to use the new schema")
Reported-by: NNoa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

There is no matching lock for this mutex. Git history suggests this is
just a missed remnant from an earlier version of the function before
this locking was moved into uverbs_free_xrcd.

Originally this lock was protecting the xrcd_table_delete()

=====================================
WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
4.15.0+ #87 Not tainted
-------------------------------------
syzkaller223405/269 is trying to release lock (&uverbs_dev->xrcd_tree_mutex) at:
[<00000000b8703372>] ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
but there are no more locks to release!

other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by syzkaller223405/269:
 #0:  (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){....}, at: [<000000005af3b960>] ib_uverbs_write+0x265/0xef0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 269 Comm: syzkaller223405 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #87
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xde/0x164
 ? dma_virt_map_sg+0x22c/0x22c
 ? ib_uverbs_write+0x265/0xef0
 ? console_unlock+0x502/0xbd0
 ? ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x131/0x160
 lock_release+0x59d/0x1100
 ? ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
 ? lock_acquire+0x440/0x440
 ? lock_acquire+0x440/0x440
 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x88/0x670
 ? wait_for_completion+0x4c0/0x4c0
 ? rdma_lookup_get_uobject+0x145/0x2f0
 ib_uverbs_close_xrcd+0x195/0x1f0
 ? ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0xdd0/0xdd0
 ib_uverbs_write+0x7f9/0xef0
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? ib_uverbs_open_xrcd+0xdd0/0xdd0
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? cyc2ns_read_end+0x10/0x10
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x200
 __vfs_write+0x10d/0x700
 ? uverbs_devnode+0x110/0x110
 ? kernel_read+0x170/0x170
 ? __fget+0x358/0x5d0
 ? security_file_permission+0x93/0x260
 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x550
 SyS_write+0xc7/0x1a0
 ? SyS_read+0x1a0/0x1a0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x8b
RIP: 0033:0x4335c9

Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.11
Fixes: fd3c7904 ("IB/core: Change idr objects to use the new schema")
Reported-by: NNoa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Once the uobj is committed it is immediately possible another thread
could destroy it, which worst case, can result in a use-after-free
of the restrack objects.

Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 08f294a1 ("RDMA/core: Add resource tracking for create and destroy CQs")
Reported-by: NNoa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Track create and destroy operations of PD objects.
Reviewed-by: NMark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Track create and destroy operations of CQ objects.
Reviewed-by: NMark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Track create and destroy operations of QP objects.
Reviewed-by: NMark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NSteve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

This matches what the userspace copy of this header has been doing
for a while. imm_data is an opaque 4 byte array carried over the network,
and invalidate_rkey is in CPU byte order.
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

If the input command length is larger than the kernel supports an error should
be returned in case the unsupported bytes are not cleared, instead of the
other way aroudn. This matches what all other callers of ib_is_udata_cleared
do and will avoid user ABI problems in the future.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10
Fixes: 189aba99 ("IB/uverbs: Extend modify_qp and support packet pacing")
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NMoni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

Fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings:
drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1156:1-3: WARNING: PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO can be used

Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO rather than if(IS_ERR(...)) + PTR_ERR

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/ptr_ret.cocci
Signed-off-by: NVasyl Gomonovych <gomonovych@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>

The alternate port number is used as an array index in the IB
security implementation, invalid values can result in a kernel panic.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12
Fixes: d291f1a6 ("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NParav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Current ib_modify_cq() is used to set CQ moderation parameters.

This patch renames ib_modify_cq() to be rdma_set_cq_moderation(),
because the kernel version of RDMA API doesn't need to follow already
exposed to user's API pattern (create_XXX/modify_XXX/query_XXX/destroy_XXX)
and better to have more accurate name which describes the actual usage.
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

The query_device function can now obtain the maximum values for
cq_max_count and cq_period, needed for CQ moderation.
cq_max_count is a 16 bits number that determines the number
of CQEs to accumulate before generating an event.
cq_period is a 16 bits number that determines the timeout in micro
seconds from the last event generated, upon which a new event will
be generated even if cq_max_count was not reached.
Signed-off-by: NYonatan Cohen <yonatanc@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NMajd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Uverbs support in modify_cq for CQ moderation only.
Gives ability to change cq_max_count and cq_period.
CQ moderation enhance performance by moderating the number
of CQEs needed to create an event instead of application
having to suffer from event per-CQE.
To achieve CQ moderation the application needs to set cq_max_count
and cq_period.
cq_max_count - defines the number of CQEs needed to create an event.
cq_period - defines the timeout (micro seconds) between last
            event and a new one that will occur even if
	    cq_max_count was not satisfied
Signed-off-by: NYonatan Cohen <yonatanc@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NMajd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

There are root complexes that are able to optimize their
performance when incoming data is multiple full cache lines.

PCI write end padding is the device's ability to pad the ending of
incoming packets (scatter) to full cache line such that the last
upstream write generated by an incoming packet will be a full cache
line.

Add a relevant entry to ib_device_cap_flags to report such capability
of an RDMA device.

Add the QP and WQ create flags:
 * A QP/WQ created with a scatter end padding flag will cause
   HW to pad the last upstream write generated by a packet to cache line.

User should consider several factors before activating this feature:
- In case of high CPU memory load (which may cause PCI back pressure in
  turn), if a large percent of the writes are partial cache line, this
  feature should be checked as an optional solution.
- This feature might reduce performance if most packets are between one
  and two cache lines and PCIe throughput has reached its maximum
  capacity. E.g. 65B packet from the network port will lead to 128B
  write on PCIe, which may cause traffic on PCIe to reach high
  throughput.
Signed-off-by: NNoa Osherovich <noaos@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NMajd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Introduce rdma_create_user_ah API which allows passing udata to
provider driver and additionally which resolves DMAC for RoCE.

ib_resolve_eth_dmac() resolves destination mac address for unicast,
multicast, link local ipv4 mapped ipv6 and ipv6 destination gid entry.
This allows all RoCE provider drivers to avoid duplicating such code.

Such change brings consistency where IB core always resolves dmac and pass
it to RoCE provider drivers for user and kernel consumers, with this
ah_attr->roce.dmac is always an input field for provider drivers.

This uniformity avoids exporting ib_resolve_eth_dmac symbol to providers
or other modules. Therefore its removed as exported symbol at later in
the patch series.

Now uverbs and umad both makes use of rdma_create_user_ah API which
fixes the issue where umad has invalid DMAC for address.
Signed-off-by: NParav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NDaniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

After changing INIT_UDATA_BUF_OR_NULL() to an inline function,
this does the same change to INIT_UDATA for consistency.
I'm keeping it separate as this part is much larger and
we wouldn't want to backport this to stable kernels if we
ever want to address the gcc warnings by backporting the
first patch.

Again, using an inline function gives us better type
safety here among other issues with macros. I'm using
u64_to_user_ptr() to convert the user pointer to simplify
the logic rather than adding lots of new type casts.
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

The tag matching functionality is implemented by mlx5 driver
by extending XRQ, however this internal kernel information was
exposed to user space applications with *xrq* name instead of *tm*.

This patch renames *xrq* to *tm* to handle that.

Fixes: 8d50505a ("IB/uverbs: Expose XRQ capabilities")
Signed-off-by: NLeon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: NYishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>

Allow interval trees to quickly check for overlaps to avoid unnecesary
tree lookups in interval_tree_iter_first().

As of this patch, all interval tree flavors will require using a
'rb_root_cached' such that we can have the leftmost node easily
available.  While most users will make use of this feature, those with
special functions (in addition to the generic insert, delete, search
calls) will avoid using the cached option as they can do funky things
with insertions -- for example, vma_interval_tree_insert_after().

[jglisse@redhat.com: fix deadlock from typo vm_lock_anon_vma()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170808225719.20723-1-jglisse@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719014603.19029-12-dave@stgolabs.netSigned-off-by: NDavidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NChristian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: NDoug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NMichael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Benvenuti <benve@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>